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Shame is the semivirtue of the learner. 
Myles Burnyeat 
Shame is not a word in my vocabulary. 
A School Counselor 
The pleasure or pain that accompanies people’s acts 
should be taken as a sign of their dispositions... 
Hence the importance (as Plato says) of having been trained 
in some way from infancy 
to feel joy and grief 
at the right things: 
true education is precisely this. 
Aristotle 
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ABSTRACT 
AN ANALYSIS OF MORAL SHAME: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM REFORM 
SEPTEMBER 1999 
JAY JOSEPH CONWAY, B. A., MARLBORO COLLEGE 
M. ED., KEENE STATE COLLEGE 
Ed. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by. Professor Robert Sinclair 
An appealing notion is that the emotions make a significant contribution 
to a flourishing fife. The self-regarding emotions of self-respect, self-esteem, 
and pride are undeniably things of great value; Aristotle proposed that a 
justified sense of honor was the crown of the virtues. Many public schools 
actively incorporate self-esteem initiatives in their curricula in the belief that 
positive self-evaluations enhance learning and good citizenship. 
One can maintain without contradiction that the self-regarding emotions 
with negative properties detract from a happy life. Various attempts have 
been made to suggest that shame, humiliation, guilt, and remorse are 
intrinsically bad. Many proponents from within the two leading moral 
education approaches - the cognitive developmentalists and the traditionalists 
- subscribe to this view. According to these theorists, the aforementioned 
emotions are viewed as counter-productive and unmotivational. I examine 
their positions and find them flawed. 
This dissertation proposes that moral shame can be conditionally good. 
To justify this claim requires a plausible account of what an emotion is, the 
formulation of a clear and precise definition of moral shame, an explication 
VII 
of how shame differs from other emotions of self-assessment, and an 
argument that shame has moral significance. Following that, the two leading 
educational theories of moral development will be examined to assess how they 
value and accommodate the emotions of self-assessment. 
Interviews are conducted with principals, teachers, students, law 
enforcement and district court personnel, members of the clergy, and social 
workers to support the claim that a sense of shame contributes to moral 
progress. In that this view might be overlooked in many of the current moral 
education programs, I conclude the study with suggestions for the necessary 
curriculum reform. 
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CHAPTER 1 
NATURE OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
Most educators, psychologists, and philosophers agree that the primary 
purpose of moral education is to encourage children to develop good and strong 
characters (Kupperman, 1991). There is little disagreement among these 
professionals that the present world our school children inhabit is riddled with 
negative influences. By now the list of these influences is well known. 
Candidates that contend for a high rank in many surveys include broken 
families, teenage pregnancies, substance abuse, illiteracy, egocentrism, and 
dishonesty (Benninga, 1991; Bennett, 1993; Huffman, 1994). How one orders 
this list will, of course, depend in large part on what one values. 
Schools feel the weight of these disorders. Devised in many instances by 
default, school-based programs attempt to rectify negative behaviors. 
Strategies include intervention services, remediation / rehabilitation, and 
various sorts of punishments. This study is not another attempt along those 
lines. In what follows, the focus will be identifying and defining a contributing 
cause to the escalation of these behaviors; and that is, it is proposed, 
shamelessness. One hypothesis of this study is that a sense of shame might 
prohibit some of these disorders from ever occurring. Were this true, it seems 
to follow that our efforts would be more productively channeled in an attempt 
to instill a sense of shame in young children rather than to focus on the 
oftentimes ineffectual and disappointing efforts at rehabilitation. 
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Statement of the Problem 
I first became interested in the notion of shame in a graduate course on 
Aristotle’s ethics. Suitable paper topics in philosophy often concern attempts 
to sort out conceptual puzzles or apparent contradictions in a philosopher’s 
work. In this regard, Aristotle’s work is rich in opportunity. The complexity of 
Aristotle’s thought and the suggestive nature of his writing account for an 
enormous body of secondary literature of widely divergent interpretations. 
An interpretation of Aristotle’s view of shame seemed a suitable paper topic 
because I simply could not understand how his various comments were 
intended to fit together without conflict. 
While Aristotle’s writing on shame is characteristically suggestive, there 
is a limited amount of critical commentary. As with many other Aristotelian 
topics, what interpretive literature exists does not amount to a consensus. 
One explanation for the differing views is that it is not immediately apparent 
whether Aristotle considers shame to be of moral significance. In the 
Nicomanchean Ethics (NE), he explicitly states: 
Shame is not the emotion of a good man, if it is felt for doing bad 
actions, because such actions ought not to be done...so the 
emotion ought not to be felt (1953,1128b20). 
A few lines later there appears to be a puzzling contradiction. “But 
shame may be said to be conditionally good; if a good man does such actions, 
he will feel disgraced” (1128b29). Regarding children, he writes: 
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The passion is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For 
we think young people should be prone to shame because they 
live by passion and therefore commit many errors, but are 
restrained by shame (1128b 16). 
It seems then that Aristotle believes that shame - for adults - can 
function as a corrective measure, while shame - for the young - serving the 
developmental^ beneficial function of restraint, is “becoming”. According to 
Myles Bumyeat, this power to restrain the young affords shame a “semi¬ 
virtue” classification (1980). This interpretation is not universally accepted. 
In “Shame and Moral Progress”, John Kekes understands there to be a 
fundamental disagreement between Plato and Aristotle over the moral 
significance of shame. According to Kekes, Plato considers shame to be “one 
of the important safeguards of morality (1988, p. 282). Kekes claims 
Aristotle clearly disagrees with Plato. He cites this presumably straight¬ 
forward sentence from the same passage of the NE as textual support. “And 
if shamelessness - not to be ashamed of doing base actions - is bad, that does 
not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions” (1128b33). 
When Aristotle says that shame may be said to be a conditionally good thing, 
Kekes apparently understands him to be referring to a prevailing opinion with 
which Aristotle disagrees. 
Contemporary literature on shame contains similar disagreements. 
Kekes, himself, considers shame to be debilitating. He encourages us to 
entertain other responses to moral failings since shame weakens our resolve 
to reform and threatens our self-respect (1988, p. 291). On the other hand, 
Gabriele Taylor maintains that a sense of shame fortifies one’s commitment 
to those values and standards that justify our self-respect (1985). One 
account for disagreements of this sort is the view that an emotion is “passive” 
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or “active”. Kekes considers shame to be “backward-looking”. As such, 
shame cannot deter future wrongdoing, precisely because the wrong is in the 
future: there is, as yet, nothing to be ashamed about. Colleague Arnold 
Isenberg concurs. “Shame and regret are literally helpless, for they are 
concentrated upon what we can do nothing about, on the past. Hence, they 
are “passive”, incompatible with action” (1980, p. 375). Taylor counters that 
a “forward-looking” component of shame is that it strengthens one’s 
commitment to values. We maintain our self-respect by avoiding disgraceful 
conduct. 
Avoidance of shame is one way of losing self-respect, for it is one 
way of blurring the values the person is committed to. From this 
point of view, genuine shame is always justified (1985, p. 85). 
Many psychologists render a blanket condemnation on most shame 
experiences; some feel it is an emotionally primitive (Erikson, 1950; 
Borysenko, 1990) and “toxic” experience (Bradshaw, 1988). Prior to any 
claims about the alleged significance of shame, what immediately strikes a 
reader who reviews the various positions is the profound lack of clarity on 
what exactly shame is. One writer will claim it is an external, social 
experience (Benedict, 1934), another believes it to be primarily internal. As 
we saw above, writers disagree over the passive/active distinction. Additional 
differences will be presented in what follows. But what these initial 
controversies alert us to is that there is great confusion at more basic levels. 
These are: exactly what is an emotion, and, how do individual emotions differ 
from one another. 
Another problem centers on the implementation of moral curricula. 
Proponents of school prayer claim a direct connection between the Supreme 
Courts ruling (Engel v. Vitale, 1976) that state-sponsored public school prayer 
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violates the Constitution with the escalation of crime, racial conflict, drug 
abuse and sexual promiscuity (Eastland, 1995). Opponents of school prayer 
view any connection as mere coincidence. Few in either group, however, 
dispute the worrisome rise in crime statistics since the ruling in 1976. One 
indisputable fact that resulted from the ban on school prayer is that it left 
school leaders perplexed about how one distinguishes religious observances 
from moral education. In response, many simply did nothing (Lickona, 1991; 
Kilpatrick, 1992; Eastland, 1995). 
Years ago, schools focused on socializing students and preparing them 
for citizenship both through the formal curriculum and through the “hidden” 
curriculum. The hidden curriculum refers to implicit expectations, structural 
arrangements and the behavior patterns of the school staff (Sinclair and 
Ghory, 1987). Unwritten standards of behavior applied to all members of the 
school community. The formal curriculum contained clearly articulated 
mission statements, the school’s philosophy, and lesson material which 
included indoctrinative readings in moral education. Reading lessons, gleaned 
from the McGuffey Reader - the largest circulated book in the early 1900’s - 
contained lessons promoting the moral virtues of honesty, charity, courage 
and respectfulness (Lickona, 1991). 
In light of recent trends, many schools felt compelled to actively 
reincorporate moral education into their formal curriculum. Recent efforts 
have included Values Clarification, Sex Education, Conflict Resolution, Peer 
Mediation, Drug Awareness Resistance Education (DARE), The “Just 
Community” School Model, Character Education programs and “self-esteem” 
initiatives. Many of these efforts have met with justifiable opposition. Among 
the charges leveled by parents and community members have been the use of 
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inappropriate materials, subversive ideologies, time management problems, 
social engineering and usurping parental authority. 
Some of these programs are clearly better than others. Negotiating a 
compromise over a playground dispute with a peer mediator, being forewarned 
about the hazards of narcotics, and learning about sexual biology ought not 
qualify as comprehensive moral education curricula. Of the remaining, all 
follow one of two general approaches: character development or cognitive- 
developmental. These two approaches differ both conceptually and 
practically. Theoretically, character education holds that virtue can be 
taught, that good models are essential for moral development and that the 
young are not appropriate candidates for Socratic dialogues. Practically, 
teachers must “impose” specific values to ensure the development of proper 
habits. Virtually every leading theorist in character education takes his or her 
lead from Aristotle by stressing the importance of developing settled 
dispositions or good habits. This school of thought believes dispositions are to 
begin development prior to, not necessarily concurrent with, intellectual 
rationalizations. This indoctrinative approach is dismissed as misguided by 
the cognitive-developmentalists. Often characterized as the indirect approach, 
the various cognitive-development models share a common distrust for the 
development of habits through “indoctrination” or imposing upon the young a 
“bag of virtues”. 
Cognitive-developmentalists often contend that ‘habituation’ is the 
transmission of values that are not applicable in modern times while others 
object that indoctrination usurps autonomous self-direction. Socratic 
dialogues, therefore, are enthusiastically endorsed. These dialogues often 
center on resolving ethical dilemmas. Characterized by a certain 
“intellectualism”, - by virtue of its democratic, open-ended dialogue structure - 
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teachers are instructed to accept each student’s decision nonjudgmentally. 
Even virtuous traits such as honesty, responsibility, and fairness become 
suspect by virtue of their conservatism; empathy and skepticism are higher 
goals than is conformity for advocates of “constructivism”. 
Children must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to recast 
them in light of their own experiences and question, to figure out 
for themselves...which traditions are worth keeping, and how to 
proceed when two basic values conflict (Kohn, 1997, p. 435). 
“Character educators”, suspicious that children have neither the experience 
nor the intellectual machinery to evaluate value conflicts, oppose questioning 
tradition. 
Programs from both approaches have been the subject of criticism from 
education boards, international academic journals, and local school 
committees (Kirkpatrick, 1992; Kohn, 1997; Lockwood 1976; Sommers, 
1984). Coupled with the litigious nature of modern times, many schools 
responded to the critical press and community objections with a second period 
of inactivity. With little confidence in the effectiveness of available programs 
and perceiving an adversarial relationship with a segment of the parent 
population, school administrators offered only the most innocuous of 
instructional offerings and adopted a zero tolerance stance for school 
infractions. Unfortunately, this reactive posture does little for character 
development while resulting in many frivolous suspensions. 
The majority of thoughtful observers from either approach agree that 
troubling behaviors and the severity of the transgressions are escalating 
among America’s youth. These admissions, however, do not translate into an 
agreement on how schools can best assist parents and communities to 
address these problems. The sheer number and variety of models attests to 
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substantive philosophical disagreements over the means to the same goal - 
namely, helping children to develop good and strong characters. 
A problem is this: many disputes arise over the means toward a goal 
that is itself unclear. Over the last few decades several forces have 
undermined the view that ‘good character’ is a concept that is amenable to 
objective and precise formulation. A short list of these forces might include 
the popularity of ethical relativism and nonjudgmental self-help psychologies; 
the difficulty to understand and to implement a character program; and, 
school personnel who have historically claimed to have neither the time, the 
desire, a consensus, nor an abundance of literature to guide an action plan to 
help children develop good character. 
Those contemporary educational methods that reintroduce the affective 
dimension - feelings and emotions - (e.g., Values Clarification, Peer Mediation, 
Conflict Resolution, etc.) tend to replace the objective aspiration toward good 
character with subjective assessments of self-esteem. 
Evidence in this study will be introduced which suggests that high self¬ 
esteem can co-exist with both ethical illiteracy and offensive behavior. Self¬ 
esteem, the common goal for many school programs, may have no necessary 
connection with good character. Proponents of “self-esteem” initiatives 
routinely dismiss shame - an index of one’s serious commitment to values and 
to the standards of the community, as passe’. Some believe shame 
contributes to low self-esteem and is, therefore, a danger to one’s general well¬ 
being (Isenberg, 1988; Kekes, 1993). As such, it is considered intrinsically evil. 
This view creates another problem. 
Accompanying the worrisome rise in crime statistics is an equally 
troubling parallel development: more and more offenders appear to display 
shamelessness for their crimes (Alter and Wingert, 1995). To lack shame for 
serious transgressions may signal a disposition that is resistant to change. As 
bad behavior and high self-esteem are not mutually exclusive, this suggests 
the question whether one can have genuine pride and self-respect without a 
sense of shame. 
Another problem, suggested in the introduction, is that by under¬ 
estimating the positive aspect of shame, we might miss an important 
opportunity. It seems intuitively correct that many of our reactive efforts 
(rehabilitation, cognitive-therapies, elaborate external methods of deterrence, 
etc.) would never be needed if a sense of shame prohibited certain behaviors 
from ever occurring. 
Simply put, the most significant problem appears to be that of having 
things the wrong way around. Self-esteem is considered to be achievable 
independently from that which ought to justify its existence - that being good 
character. High self-esteem is attractive in the ease with which it is promoted 
and in its supposedly painless acquisition. But, without an understanding of 
the proper development of good character and an appreciation for the early 
work it requires, however difficult and sometimes painful, subsequent reactive 
measures are required due to its absence. 
Statement of Purpose 
One purpose of the study will be to propose a clear and useful analysis of 
the concept of moral shame. It is hoped that from such a study a significant 
contribution will be made to future attempts in public school moral education 
initiatives for promoting the acquisition of virtuous dispositions, genuine self- 
respect, and reflective temperaments in children. All these appear to be 
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threatened by popular psychology’s privatization and trivialization of “self- 
esteem”. 
Every educational method cited above is, in some degree, guilty either of 
an incoherent psychological view of self-esteem as a self-referential emotion 
that can be “caused” by others or of neglecting or underestimating the 
reformative potential of shame. In the introduction to Self-Esteem, author 
Matthew McKay promises the therapist: “You can increase a client’s self¬ 
esteem more rapidly...using the cognitive restructuring techniques presented 
here (McKay and Fanning, 1987, p. 5). Many methods over-estimate the 
value of self-esteem with weak philosophical arguments. The issue of genuine 
self-respect is further complicated by ethical theorists who consider it to be 
synonymous with self-esteem (Rawls, 1971), locate it as a subset of 
self-esteem (Branden, 1993), or believe self-respect and self-esteem precede 
good character (Rogers, 1965). 
If it is true that genuine self-respect results from, and does not precede, 
good character, this, then, seems to merit a reinvestigation into the nature of 
the emotions of shame and self-esteem. A review of the literature and 
interviews with children and adults might suggest that shame plays a 
. conditionally good role in the formation of a virtuous character. This may 
support the view that those strategies intended to elevate self-esteem while 
disparaging a sense of shame may be non-starters. Evidence for this 
contention constitutes the second aim of this study, while suggestions for the 
required refinements to our schools moral education programs is the third aim. 
Three mqjor research questions will guide this study. These are: 
1) What is the emotion of moral shame? 
2) What impact might moral shame have on character development? 
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3) What implications for the reform of school curriculum are suggested by the 
findings of this study? 
Definition of Terms 
Several key terms are central to this study. As one objective of the 
study is to clearly define these concepts, the following proposed definitions or 
descriptions should be considered tentative. 
Character: a person’s normal pattern of thought and action, especially 
with respect to concerns and commitments in matters affecting the happiness 
of others and of himself, and most especially in relation to moral choices 
(Kupperman, 1995). 
Embarrassment: the awareness of the involvement in something 
unfortunate and awkward and the judgment that one is incapable of 
responding appropriately (Solomon, 1992). 
Emotion: a dynamically related complex of cognition, affect and desire 
(Oakley, 1992). 
Regret: a sad feeling toward a state of affairs that had negative 
consequences (e.g. S, a teacher, lost her job). 
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Agent-regret: a sad feeling toward a state of affairs that had negative 
consequences in which one was a participant (e.g. S, a teacher in my 
department, lost her job) (Barron, 1988). 
Remorse: a sad feeling toward a state of affairs that had negative 
consequences that one was a participant in and which one could have and 
should have averted (e.g., S, a teacher in my department, lost her job because 
I bed on her evaluation) (Barron, 1988). 
Repentance: “the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one’s 
wrongful and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one’s character 
that generated the actions, the resolve to do one’s best to expiate those 
aspects of one’s character, and the resolve to atone or make amends for the 
harm that one has done” (Murphy, 1995). 
Self-esteem: The emotional response of a person to the self-evaluation 
of the ratio of personal aspirations to personal successes (William James, 
1890) or “the disposition to experience oneself as competent to cope with the 
basic challenges of life and as worthy of happiness” (Branden, 1994). 
Self-Respect: “a complex and multifaceted phenomenon 
involving...aspects of cognition, valuation, orientation, affect, expectation, 
motivation, action, and reaction that bear on one’s worth as a person - that is, 
on one’s dignity as a person as such, the value and significance of one’s life 
(and) the quality of one’s character and manner of living” (Dillon, 1995). 
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Moral Development: The view, according to cognitive developmentalists, 
that individuals necessarily move through stages of concept displacement of 
increasingly adequate or sophisticated rationalizations (e. g., Kohlberg’s 
Preconventional, Conventional and Autonomous levels). This view 
concentrates almost entirely on the adjudication of conflicting moral claims. 
By contrast, character educators stress the importance of acquiring 
proper habits and emotional states as necessary components of development. 
In this view character development is considered to be the process of forming 
virtuous habits by exposure to role models, the practice of right behavior and 
the acquisition and development of proper emotional reactions and feelings. 
A third view - a synthesis of the above positions - proposes five distinct 
dimensions of development: paradigms, defining characteristics, the range of 
cases, adjudicating conflicting moral claims and moral imagination (see 
Matthews’ The Philosophy of Childhood, pp. 54 -67). 
Moral Shame: a painful, self-directed feeling and cognitive realization 
that one has fallen short of what one considers to be a worthy and valid 
standard to which one does or should aspire; a self-accusatory social emotion 
elicited by wrongful action. 
Guilt: self-reproach; a painful, self-directed feeling and cognitive 
realization that one has transgressed a boundary or limit set by an authority 
figure; an awareness of harm brought upon others by one’s action or inaction. 
Humiliation: a deflation, often with comic overtones, of one’s 
pretentiousness. 
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Significance of Study 
Herbert Morris, editor of Guilt and Shame, charges that analytic 
philosophers have given “offhand attention” to the concept of guilt. With 
shame, these same philosophers displayed “almost a total lack of philosophic 
interest” (Morris, 1971, p. 2). They are not alone. Philosopher Robin Dillon 
claims psychologists talk almost exclusively about self-esteem (Dillion, ed., 
1994), while psychiatrist Daniel Nathanson laments the fact that nothing in 
his training or that of his colleagues, “had anything to do with shame” (Karen, 
1992, p. 46) One contribution of this study will be the attempt at a greater 
definitional precision of these concepts. It is hoped that with this clarity 
comes an understanding of the proper place in moral education of shame and 
other emotions of self-assessment. 
It has been proposed that children with high self-esteem are better able 
to withstand negative pressures (Kirkpatrick, 1992). Psychologist Nathaniel 
Branden considers self-esteem “the single most important psychological 
subject in the world” and defines self-esteem as: “the disposition to experience 
oneself as competent to cope with the basic challenges of life and as worthy of 
happiness” (1995, p. 27). This definition (and similar variants) is found in 
many school manuals on self-esteem. It has difficulties. It offers no 
explanation of what constitutes happiness. A “disposition” of competence and 
the range of challenges one entertains can be highly subjective. As noted 
above, many popular “therapies” are considered successful if, as Carl Rogers 
proclaims, the proportion of positively framed self-references increase (1965). 
In these approaches it is not clear that merit be reassessed or that changes in 
conduct or conscientious effort require modification. If happiness is achievable 
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merely by increasing the ratio of positive self-references, children or therapy 
clients need only adjust their field of challenges. Not only is this condescending 
to children, it also sets the stage for what some school counselors fear the 
most - facing humiliation. 
This style of cultivating self-esteem patronizes children, yielding 
cynicism in the smart ones and deceiving the others, ultimately 
producing an ignorance not as easily corrigible as more innocent 
ignorances. Because this ignorance is eventually maintained by 
self-deception it often produces an effrontery that insists (often 
rather aggressively) on the excellence of its own mediocrity 
(Miller, 1993, p. 135). 
For many children it seems to be only a matter of time for the 
unfortunate but inevitable deflation of this pretentiousness. External forces 
are not the only threat. E. D. Hirsh, Jr. foresees internal emotional dangers. 
Lavish, unmerited praise to bolster self-esteem, in his view, “breeds 
complacency, or skepticism, or both, and, ultimately, a decline in self esteem” 
(“Education Review”, 27 Oct. 96). These authors agree that many 
educational programs have a confused notion of the goal. High self-esteem 
may not promote good character; high self-esteem ought to be in recognition 
of an existing and stable good character. 
If we view virtue as an excellence of character, then it follows - as with 
any developed excellence - it is preceded by hard work, it presupposes skilled 
teachers, it requires practical wisdom and emotional control. It, by necessity, 
must also honestly acknowledge occasional failures. How one views failure 
gives us insight into that person’s motivation, standards and goals. 
To define and to clarify what an emotion is, and to explicate the 
conceptual links between the emotions of shame and guilt and self-respect and 
self-esteem will be of benefit in assessing moral education programs. This aim 
will allow the study to proceed to formulate and defend suggestions of 
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curriculum reform for moral education programs whereby these emotional 
states have a newfound clarity and utility. 
Lastly, it is hoped that what will follow from a clarity of these concepts 
is support for the argument that the reorientation of the goal to be that of good 
character. And as the concept of the goal changes, so must the strategies to 
achieve that goal undergo refinement. 
Delimitations of the Study 
This is a conceptual study with practical applications. It concentrates 
on formulating and defending an analytic definition of moral shame. It will 
attempt to explain the conditionally good influence this emotion may have on 
character development. Shame, however, is an emotion of perplexing 
variability in both degree and form (Taylor, 1985; Kekes, 1988; Karen, 1992; 
Dillon, 1995). Among the many forms it may take are: a “universal shame”, a 
globalized feeling of worthlessness; an “existential” shame, a feeling of 
alienation or meaninglessness; a “class” shame, a crippling self-hatred; a 
“narcisstic” shame, a globally negative self-portrait and a “situational” shame, 
a passing shame experience that may arise from a personal rejection or 
humiliation. In short, one can feel shame about virtually anything (Karen, 
1992). As rich as these topics may be, it is not the aim of this study to 
examine personal reactions to one’s gender, sexual orientation, social or 
economic position, or intellectual and physical endowments. The study will not 
attempt to describe, or prescribe for, shame-prone individuals or dysfunctional 
family systems. These issues are the domain of psychiatry and counseling 
psychology. 
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Since one aim of the paper is to support the view that a particular form 
of shame can be a morally significant emotion, it will be necessary to argue for 
a logical and necessary connection with a specific view of virtue and with the 
notion of living a good life. For moral shame to be rational the transgression, 
the standard, and proper aspirations must be afforded a reasoned argument. 
The position in this paper on the end that constitutes a good life and the 
necessity of moral virtue in the pursuit of that end, in large part, will be 
Aristotelian. The literature on Aristotle’s ethics is enormous, so clearly it will 
not be possible to address every puzzle in or argument with Aristotle’s ethics 
and neither will it be possible to examine all of the work that concerns this and 
related topics of interest. 
One aspect of Aristotle’s ethics that recommends it is that it does not 
look for precise, finely grained prescriptions for specific circumstances. This is 
to say that there is room for individual and cultural elasticity. Therefore, the 
view of moral shame and other related emotions in this paper will attempt to 
have a nature of universal applicability in their relation to living a flourishing 
life. It will, then, enjoy a certain cultural neutrality. Obviously different 
cultures express different views concerning one and the same concrete act. 
This problem has been and can be expressed in numerous arguments and 
scenarios. This paper will offer one explanation how we might sort out this 
puzzle without reverting to ethical or cultural relativism. 
A further limitation concerns the infinitely complex nature of human 
agency. Moral shame ushers in the related topics of responsibility, choice, 
involuntary actions, a good will, theories of punishment and motivation. These 
topics are worthy of dissertations in their own right, as are the ethical theories 
that differ from Aristotle’s. Although the tension these opposing theories 
introduce - and how they accommodate the above topics - will, hopefully, be 
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substantive, it is conceded at the outset that the treatment here can in no 
way will be exhaustive. 
Review of the Literature 
The literature review will consist of four major parts. In order to have a 
credible account of the moral significance of the specific emotion of shame, it is 
necessary to have an account of what an emotion is. This will be the focus of 
the first part. I will support the view that an emotion is comprised of 
cognition, affect, and desire. These three elements offer a variety of 
combinations; different writers propose different combinations. For example, 
William James, Carl Lange and David Hume propose that an emotion is a 
bodily or ‘psychic’ feeling following a mental impression. According to these 
writers, an emotion is merely affect. Cognitive theorists, on the other hand, 
such as Robert Solomon claim the affective dimension is quite superfluous. 
Solomon proposes that emotions are ‘judgments’. 
I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or 
offended me. Accordingly, we might say that anger involves a 
moral judgment...an appeal to moral standards and not merely 
personal evaluations. My anger is that set of judgments (Cited in 
Oakley, 1992, p. 24). 
Arguments in support of the view of an emotion as comprised of the 
three elements conclude the first part of the literature review. Some of the 
supporters of this view include Aristotle, Justin Oakley, Michael Stocker, and, 
possibly, Descartes. 
The second section of the literature review will canvas the most 
plausible accounts on specific emotions. Many authors define shame by 
appeal to guilt, while another’s definition of shame (Heller) is a third writer’s 
18 
definition of guilt (Miller). With the components of an emotion in place, a 
tentative definition of shame can be proposed. This will allow us to contrast 
moral shame with other emotions of self-assessment and, it is hoped, begin a 
defense against those theories that render a blanket condemnation on the 
emotion. One reason for this mistaken move is that a definitional precision for 
moral shame is extremely difficult. 
It shades into embarrassment, humiliation, chagrin, guilt, 
dishonor, remorse,prudishness,disgrace,etc.. Another sign of the 
imprecision and complexity of shame is that it has many 
antonyms referring to feelings incompatible with it: pride, honor, 
self-respect, propriety, modesty, and self-esteem are some 
(Kekes, 1990, p. 270). 
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Once we have established the necessary properties of a specific 
emotion, disagreement may still arise as to the moral significance of that 
emotion. The third part, therefore, centers on examining attitudes toward the 
value in moral psychology and character development of moral shame. 
Clearly, opinions are mixed. Positions might be said to fall into one of three 
categories: the negative, the neutral and the positive. Particular attention will 
be given to Aristotle’s suggestive remarks on shame. One can find 
commentaries on shame that refer to Aristotle’s view in support of each of the 
three interpretations. 
Many developmental-psychologists suggest that shame has no 
redeeming value: it is a negative and incapacitating emotion that undermines 
one’s self-esteem (Dyer, 1977; Borysenko, 1990). 
The position of neutrality finds one expression in philosopher J. O. 
Urmson’s article “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”. There he maintains that 
shame is a “mere passive reaction involving no desire”; it is a physical and 
inconsequential reaction not a cognitive and meaningful act. 
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Finally, there are those that believe shame has positive attributes 
(Rawls, 1971; Bumyeat, 1980; Nussbaum, 1980; Damon, 1988; Anderson, 
1992; Karen, 1992; Bennett, 1992,1993; Taylor, 1995; Tefler,1995). Many of 
these authors cite Aristotle in support of their position and claim that an 
honest self-assessment is an essential step toward moral reform. 
The fourth part of the literature review (Chapter 4) will examine position 
papers of the two most influential approaches to moral education programs 
that are implemented in the schools. These are: the cognitive-developmental 
(or indirect) approach, and the traditional (or direct) approach. Advocates of 
the indirect approach (Piaget, Kohlberg, Simon, Raths) prescribe a democratic 
orientation to moral education. Students are encouraged to engage in open- 
ended discussions and to question the validity of authoritarian prescriptions 
and rigid rules. A common practice in the various indirect models is to discuss 
possible resolutions to ethical dilemmas. In the direct approach, by contrast, 
values and virtues are not debated; teachers ‘transmit’ certain views that 
students are encouraged to emulate thereby making the virtues eventually 
their own. Offering a persuasive verbal resolution to a thorny ethical dilemma, 
they often point out, has little bearing on developing the virtues. 
This fourth section will conclude with a examination of how both 
approaches incorporate or neglect the self-regarding emotions. 
Research Design 
The design of this study is organized around each of the research 
questions. Each research question is stated and subquestions are listed. 
Specific steps that will be taken to answer all questions are explained. 
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To formulate, present and defend a definition of moral shame, two steps 
will be taken. First, there will be a review of philosophical and psychological 
texts, articles, and papers. Second, interviews will be conducted with school 
children, police and detention officers, District Court judges, counselors and 
teachers. Questionnaires and an interview consent form are attached in the 
Appendices. 
* Research Question #1: What is the emotion of moral shame? 
For an analysis to be successful the components of a topic must be 
properly understood and logically assembled. Philosopher Fred Feldman 
illustrates this idea by calling our attention to the mechanical diagrams of 
engines that picture “exploded views” of the parts (1992, pg. 12). Following 
this procedural scheme, the study will precede with a literature review of the 
properties of an emotion. Next will be a review of the self-regarding emotions. 
This section will conclude with how moral shame might be distinguished from 
these other emotions. 
This section of the literature review can be outlined as follows: 
A. What is an emotion? 
1. Emotion as affect 
2. Emotion as cognition 
3. Emotion as desire 
4. Emotion as a complex of affect, cognition, and desire 
B. What is the emotion of moral shame? 
1. How is shame related to and distinguishable from: 
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a. Regret 
b. Agent-regret 
c. Remorse 
d. Repentance 
e. Guilt 
f. Embarrassment 
g. Humiliation 
h. Self-esteem 
i. Pride 
j. Self-Respect 
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* Research Question #2. What impact might moral shame have 
on character development? 
The approach to the second research question will have two parts. 
These are: 1) a summary of the views in the literature on the moral 
significance of shame and its impact on character; and, 2) surveys and 
interviews. 
Interviews will be conducted with a number of participants from 
different vocations and with school children from a variety of grade levels. It 
is hoped that it can be determined to what extent shame contributed to 
resolving a particular difficulty. These interviews will be open-ended to 
accommodate individual circumstance. 
Interviews will also be conducted with various correction officers and 
people incarcerated in local facilities. District court judges, police chiefs and 
jail guards will be questioned. 
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The focus of the interviews with the judges will be to determine if 
sentencing an offender is affected by a display of repentance or shame. A few 
judges adapt sentences to shame offenders or take measures to assess the 
emotional state of the individuals before them in court. The effectiveness of 
these approaches will be studied. 
A priest and a rabbi will be interviewed to discuss the religious 
community’s position on absolution. Moral shame appears to be an essential 
ingredient in character reformation and a necessary emotion that must be 
expressed in order to receive absolution for sins. The Council of Trent (1551) 
seems to refer to shame as an “affliction of spirit”, a reforming pain and 
sadness that is a component of repentance. It is hypothesized that Church 
teachings may offer insights into the dynamic nature of the emotion of moral 
shame. 
Interviews will be requested of inmates presently incarcerated in 
Greenfield’s Elm Street facility. The purpose of these interviews will be: 1) to 
determine if punishment promotes repentance, or has the reverse effect of 
anger and resentment; 2) to determine the emotional reaction of the inmates 
to their transgression; and, 3) to try to correlate emotional disposition with 
reformation of character. 
Counselors in correctional facilities, public schools, and private practice 
will be interviewed. If, as hypothesized, many counselors have a negative view 
of shame, then the cognitive restructuring techniques employed might result 
in an increase in positive self-reports among their clients. But, the change in 
internal restraints may be, in turn, minimal or nonexistent. It would seem 
that unless the “remedy” treats the “cause”, any positive change seen in 
therapy might be short-lived. 
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Lastly, veteran school teachers will be interviewed. This series of 
interviews will center around issues of changes in: approaches to discipline, 
operating philosophies, mission statements, parental modeling and 
involvement, and the attitudes and values of students over the course of their 
tenure. 
Permission to tape-record and transcribe all of the interviews is 
requested. 
* Research Question #3. What implications for the reform of school 
curriculum are suggested by the findings of this study? 
The approach to the third research question will have four parts. The 
first part will review the literature on the two most influential approaches to 
moral education that are utilized in the schools: the cognitive-developmental 
model and the character education model. This section will also review several 
programs that are derivatives of one of these two approaches (e.g., Values 
Clarification, Peer Mediation, Conflict Resolution, “self-esteem” initiatives, 
etc.). 
The second part will outline how the self-regarding emotions are either 
accommodated or neglected by these moral education programs. 
The third part of this research question will be an interview survey of 
several area elementary and secondary school principals, counselors, and 
school committee members. The purpose of the interviews and the 
examination of each school’s operating philosophy and mission statement will 
be to assess each schools approach to moral education. 
The fourth part of this research question will consider data from the 
above to offer suggestions for the necessary curriculum reform. 
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Outline of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter Two: This chapter will discuss the methodology involved in the design 
of the study. It will discuss the data collection and analysis. 
Chapter Three: This chapter will review the literature on emotion, moral 
shame, related emotions of self-assessment, and the moral significance of 
shame. This chapter will formulate, present, and defend a definition of moral 
shame. 
Chapter Four: This chapter will review the literature on the two main 
approaches to moral education in public schools. These are: the cognitive- 
developmental (or the indirect) approach and the traditional (or the direct) 
approach. How these moral education theories and programs value and 
accommodate the emotions of self-assessment will be examined. A proposal 
on how moral shame contributes to character development will be advanced. 
Chapter Five: This chapter will introduce the participants in this study, will 
contain relevant excerpts that relate to each of the interview questions, and 
will advance an answer to the third research question. 
Chapter Six: This chapter will summarize the study and propose 
recommendations for curriculum reform and advance ideas for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the activities of the study and the methodologies 
used to study the problem. Participants in the study are presented, the 
instruments used to collect data are described, and the techniques for data 
collection and analysis are explained. 
Description of the Study 
This is a study of the self-regarding emotion of moral shame. The 
purpose of the study is to propose and defend a precise definition of moral 
shame and to investigate how shame might affect one’s character 
development. Findings from these investigations are examined to determine if 
they suggest recommendations for curriculum reform in American public 
schools. 
Research Methodology 
This is a conceptual inquiry which focuses on philosophical, 
psychological, and educational literature as well as material provided by 
interviews and surveys. 
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Given the purpose and the questions of this study an extensive review of 
the pertinent literature was required. In addition, both qualitative and 
quantitative methods were employed. A qualitative method refers to a 
research procedure “which produces descriptive data: people’s own written or 
spoken words and observable behavior” (Bogdon and Taylor, 1975, p. 4). This 
study employs the in-depth interview as a qualitative instrument. In 
Interviewing as Qualitative Research. I. E. Seidman describes the purpose of 
interviewing as: 
not to get answers to questions, nor to test hypotheses, and not to 
“evaluate” as the term is normally used. At root of in-depth 
interviewing is an interest in understanding the experience of 
other people and the meaning they make of that experience 
(1991, p. 3). 
The method of an open-ended, in-depth interview seemed suited to 
achieve the aim of allowing participants to reflect, from their particular 
vantage points, upon the emotions, generally, and moral shame, specifically, 
as elements of positive or negative influence in a child’s development. An 
interview guide (Appendix B) offered a semi-structure to each interview. 
Personal circumstance, vocations, and experiences accounted for the unique 
direction of each interview. Various clarifying or new questions arose 
accordingly. 
Quantitative measurement relies on instruments that “provide a 
standardized framework in order to limit data collection to certain 
predetermined responses or analysis categories” (Patton, 1980, p. 22). In this 
study, the quantitative measurements involved a survey form to ascertain 
elementary and high school age student’s level of respect for fifteen 
professions (Appendix E). From this survey five professions that might be 
classified as authority figures (priest, mother, school teacher, police officer, 
27 
and judge) are separated in order to examine if these professions appear to 
gain or loss a child’s respect as these children mature. As is proposed in an 
earlier chapter, recognition respect and moral shame are assumed to have a 
necessary connection. 
A second survey inquired about elementary school children’s perception 
of the purpose, the effectiveness, and the emotional impact of in-school 
detentions (Appendix C). Detentions were specifically selected as a focus to 
engage students in reflecting upon their emotional reaction to a presumed or 
real violation of school rules and to initiate dialogue regarding a child’s response 
to an act of behavior which violates institutional policy and/or an individual 
value. 
Participants in the Study 
The subjects sampled for the research study were selected by virtue of 
their involvement with some aspect of child development, welfare, or education 
or who are public school children themselves. All adult participants were 
initially contacted by phone or a personal visit to be informed of the research 
topic. Of those who agreed to an interview, a letter of consent and a 
personalized interview guide were then mailed or delivered [See Appendices (A) 
and (B) for the text of these forms]. Permission to tape-record the interview 
was requested at this time and each participant was informed that the letter 
of consent must be read and signed prior to beginning the interview. 
Those individuals who agreed to interviews were: two District Court 
judges, eight elementary school teachers, two elementary school principals, 
two guidance counselors, one high-school English teacher, one elementary 
health teacher, a state trooper, a retired Catholic priest, a rabbi, a Director of 
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Social Services, a juvenile probation officer, a fifteen year-old female high- 
school potential drop-out, a fifteen year-old high school honor student and 
distinguished athlete, and a sixteen year-old ten-grade high school repeat 
criminal offender. All but three elementary school teachers allowed the 
researcher to tape-record the interviews. 
Repeated attempts to receive permission to interview people 
incarcerated in Franklin County went unanswered. 
Five hundred and seventy six elementary school children (Grades K - 6) 
completed the detention survey. Four hundred and nine elementary students 
(Grades 3-6) completed the level of respect for professions survey. Forty-two 
elementary school teachers and aides completed this same survey. 
Permission to administer this survey at the Mahar Regional High School 
in Orange, Massachusetts was denied the researcher by principal Frank Zak. 
Citing school committee members fear of “social engineering”, as of 
September 1998, apparently all requests for surveys at Mahar are denied. 
The researcher then contacted principal Paul Danielovich of the 
Greenfield High School and was kindly granted permission to conduct the 
survey. Sixty-four ninth graders and seventy-four twelfth graders completed 
the survey. This brought the total number of participants in the level of 
respect survey to six hundred and fifty seven. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Three main research objectives guided the design for data collection and 
analysis. An explanation of the procedure in achieving each research objective 
is outlined below. 
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The data needed to answer Research Objective #1 - “What is the 
emotion of moral shame?” were obtained almost exclusively from the research 
literature. The data collected for this portion of the objectives were important 
for three reasons. First, a review of the philosophical, psychological, and 
educational literature explicitly shows that there is no consensus on what an 
emotion is. Disagreements obviously translate into varying opinions on 
specific self-regarding emotions as well as the possible moral significance of 
these emotions. Second, a review of the literature has determined that there 
is widespread disagreement on how particular emotions can be distinguished 
from one another. Precise definitions are often obscured by a author 
attributing properties to a particular emotion that does not withstand logical 
scrutiny. Third, confusion surrounding what an emotion is or the proper 
attributes of a specific emotion oftentimes leads to a faulty conclusion as to 
whether that emotion has a conditionally good status. One hypotheses of this 
research study is that moral shame is particularly plagued by all these logical 
errors. 
The data needed to answer Research Objective #2 - “What impact 
might moral shame have on character development?” - were obtained from 
research literature, surveys, and in-depth interviews. The data collected for 
this portion of the objective are important for two reasons. First, the two 
theories of character development that are widely utilized in public schools has 
been discussed and subjected to critical analysis in Chapter 3. There support 
for the argument that the emotion of moral shame is profoundly neglected in 
all the various character development initiatives is advanced. This neglect, in 
some cases, is enough to charge that a particular theory is defective. Second, 
an obvious implication for curriculum reform arises with a proposal to remedy 
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this omission. If moral shame is viewed as a self-protective emotion with a 
conditionally good status and character education is a legitimate educational 
priority, then curriculum designs that neglect these notion will require revision. 
The data needed to answer Research Objective #3 - “What implications 
for the reform of school curriculum are suggested by the findings of this 
study?” - are obtained from interviews, surveys, and from conclusions drawn 
from the first two objectives. The importance of this portion of the objective is 
the recommendations that will be proposed might help public 
school operate more effectively and, in some small measure, help children to 
develop into happier, healthier adults. 
Chapter Summary 
Data needed to achieve the three objectives were obtained from surveys 
of school children, from interviews with a variety of people in education, 
various human service professions, and in law enforcement as well as from an 
extensive review of the literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF THE SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS 
Introduction 
One difficulty in an analysis of moral shame is what many authors refer 
to as shame’s confounding variability (Karen, 1992; Dillion, 1995; Goleman, 
1995). It is not always evident what type of shame some writers have in 
mind. Shame can take many forms and a person can feel ashamed about 
virtually anything (Karen, 1990). In Point Counter Point. Aldous Huxley 
observed that in certain situations people can be “agonizingly ashamed of 
wearing brown boots with a black coat, or speaking with the wrong accent 
(Cited in Bonhoffer, 1945, fh. p. 21). But clearly there is an important 
difference between being ashamed of crooked teeth and being ashamed of a 
crooked scheme that has bankrupted elderly citizens. 
John Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, has a helpful and general 
distinction: certain features of an experience occasion a natural shame as 
opposed to a moral shame. Rawls claims an agent ought not to be morally 
blameworthy for a physical disability or a speech impediment (1971). Prior to 
sorting out the widely divergent views on the unique characteristics of moral 
shame, or the attempt to establish its moral significance, we need an account 
of what an emotion is. A review of the literature will show that many writers 
propose several different interpretations of what constitutes an emotion. 
Possible candidates include: 1). an affect; 2). a cognition; 3). a desire; 4). an 
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affect and cognition; 5). cognition and desire; or, 6). affect, cognition and 
desire. 
In the first section I will review the literature on the possible 
candidates. I will argue for the account of emotion as containing cognition, 
affect and desire. I propose that those authors who maintain that an emotion 
is a dynamic relationship of all three elements have things essentially right. 
Arguments will be offered to support the contention that a theory is flawed by 
virtue of neglecting one or more of these elements. 
Next, having proposed one view for the necessary and sufficient 
properties of an emotion, I will review the literature that attempts to 
distinguish moral shame from other emotions of self-assessment. These will 
include regret, agent-regret, remorse, repentance, humiliation, 
embarrassment, guilt, self-esteem, pride, and self-respect. The literature 
contains substantial disagreements as to the nature of these emotions. 
Representative arguments for the most plausible views will be considered. 
Definitions that accord with the complex view of an emotion will be formulated. 
This will set the stage to answer the first research question: What is the 
emotion of moral shame? 
Finally, in the last section, I will review some of the most significant and 
plausible definitions of shame and theories that attribute either positive or 
negative value to the emotion. Having the correct view on the proper 
constituents and their interplay in an emotion does not secure a guarantee 
that one recognizes the moral significance of that emotion. The review of the 
literature has discovered that a group of authors agree upon the view of 
emotions as a complex phenomena, but they disagree as to the moral 
significance of certain emotions. This is particularly true of moral shame. For 
example, although Kekes (1988,1993,1995), Isenberg (1980), and Urmson 
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(1980) recognize elements of cognition and affectivity in moral shame, it 
remains for them a “passive” emotion. As such, they consider moral shame to 
be unproductive and unmotivational. In this section I will argue this approach 
is mistaken. My argument will propose that a theory is rendered incoherent 
with the suggestion that self-regarding emotions are “passive”. 
This claim is independent of an explication of the necessary constituents 
of an emotion. Let us proceed with a review of the proposed definitions of an 
emotion. 
Components of an Emotion 
In Book II of the Rhetoric. Aristotle begins his discussion of the 
emotions with a procedural arrangement. In order that we know how to elicit 
an emotion from someone - so as to be an effective, persuasive speaker - we 
must know three general requirements of an emotional state. Using anger as 
an example, Aristotle labels these categories as: knowing the state of mind of 
an angry person; knowing who or what will anger the agent; and, knowing the 
grounds for the agent’s anger (1378a24-26). By virtue of these categories, 
some writers attribute cognition and affect to Aristotle’s view of emotion.1 
As Aristotle continues with a formal definition of anger, a more complex 
view of an emotion emerges. His definition reads: 
Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a 
conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without 
justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what 
concerns one’s friends (1378a31-33, p. 1380). 
1 See, for example, Solomon (1980). Emotions and Choice. Appendix, pg. 271. 
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Anstotle qualifies the ‘slight’ as unjustified and from a specific, 
identifiable source. Emotions, therefore, have an object. We can say both, 
“ The agent is angry because...” and, “The agent is angry at...”. The ‘because’ 
logically implies that the emotion of anger contains the belief or judgment that 
the agent has been wronged. The ‘at’ logically implies that the emotion has an 
object; a specific individual has wronged the agent. Unlike hatred, 
which may be directed at groups of people, anger, Aristotle tells us, is “always 
concerned with individuals - a Callias or a Socrates” (1382a5). Furthermore, 
this definition entitles us to include desire in the necessary components of 
emotion. The contemplation of revenge is characterized as pleasurable 
(1378b3) and logically requires emotions to entail goal directed behavior. An 
agent who does not contemplate how to avenge the individual who has slighted 
him can not be considered angry, had the slight been justified, the agent might 
be regretful or repentant (Fortenbaugh, 1969). 
In Aristotle’s view, then, the emotion of anger entails: cognition, the 
identification of a specific and unjustified harm; desire, the intention to 
retaliate and the wish for the pleasure that accompanies retaliation; and 
affect, the pain at having been unjustly slighted. 
Conditions are proposed in NE for how emotions or “passions” 
contribute to virtue. Moral virtue, Aristotle tells us at 1106bl6, is “concerned 
with passions and actions”. For an act to be virtuous, activity and emotions 
must contribute to it “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, 
toward the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way” (1106b20- 
21). These conditions on Aristotle’s characterization of an emotion’s role in 
virtue allow us to ascribe intentionality, - one must have the right motive - as 
well as the capacity to apprehend and evaluate the situation correctly. 
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The good tempered man, then, is the man that apprehends and 
evaluates correctly and so becomes angry on the grounds he 
ought, at whom he ought, as he ought, when and for as long as he 
ought (Fortenbaugh, 1969, p. 168). 
In Aristotle’s theory it logically follows that one can go wrong regarding 
emotional states and emotional reactions in a number of ways. 
Misapprehensions, poor timing, improper objects, the wrong motive or 
audience can account for an emotion to be considered ‘wrong’. 
It may be assumed that to claim emotions can be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ is a 
controversial, if not an outlandish, statement. But, the claim is one that has 
attracted a great deal of interest; it is an indirect, but obvious, implication in 
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the recent work in attention deficit - hyperactivity disorder (Phelan, 1996; 
Barkley; 1997) and of direct implication in the recent and popular work in 
emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1996). Here the interest has largely centered 
on the alleged neurological causes of inappropriate emotional reactions and 
their potential detrimental effects. A more relevant and primary 
consideration was proposed by Franz Brentano. With evident Aristotelian 
overtones, Brentano writes: “One loves or hates correctly provided that one’s 
feelings are adequate to their object - adequate in the sense of being 
appropriate, suitable or fitting” (cited in Chisholm, 1986, p. 52). The 
significance of this claim will be developed in the section on shame. 
Few people would dispute the notion that emotions contribute in a 
significant way to the richness of a person’s life; most would agree that an 
individual is considered indeed fortunate to lookback on a life that has included 
frequent episodes of joy, pride and love. But this does not give us insight into 
the nature of these emotions nor does it suggest we are obliged to endorse a 
complex view of emotion. 
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Psychologists have relied on examining subjective reports of feelings, 
overt behavior, and physiological responses in the attempt to measure and 
establish distinctions between these different experiences. Oftentimes we can 
accurately infer from overt behavior which emotion an individual is 
experiencing. We can assume with some confidence that a woman is worried if 
she wrings her hands and furrows her brow, or that she is angry if she clenches 
her fists and teeth. With equal confidence we can infer she is ashamed if she 
blushes and hides her face. Self-reports of her feelings can verify our 
impressions. 
It is customary in these self-reports for an agent to refer to physiological 
impressions. Internal or physiological changes seem to be inextricably and 
undeniably connected with emotion. The agent who grimaces and clenches his 
fist (overt behavior) might report his “blood boils” and his stomach “feels in 
knots” (physiological changes). A polygraph or “lie-detector” measures these 
physiological changes exclusively. It is designed to register guilt or anxiety in 
an alleged criminal by monitoring changes in blood pressure, respiration and 
heart rates, and galvanic skin response (GSR) (Braun and Linder, 1979). In 
other physiological examinations, scientists have measured bodily changes in 
patients that experience fear. Among the physical changes they note are: 
constrictions in the gastrointestinal areas, the stimulation of the liver by the 
endocrine glands to release sugar, and increases in the supply of oxygen to the 
bloodstream (Lang, et.al., 1972). 
These studies do not resolve a basic and long-standing question among 
psychologists as to the nature of an emotion. That question is this: is the 
feeling of fear the cognition of a dangerous or harmful situation which is then 
followed by physiological changes or is fear the recognition that our heart is 
racing and we are breathing rapidly? William James took the latter position. 
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In 1890, James proposed that we identify and label our emotions based 
on our ability to interpret bodily changes. An opposing view contends that the 
cognition of an event in the environment is then followed by physical reactions. 
A third proposal is that emotions are a complex phenomena that entail 
cognition, physiological affect, and desire. Let us review each of these views in 
turn. 
Emotions as Affects 
William James considers “affect” sufficient for an emotion. In “What is 
an Emotion”, James writes: 
My thesis ...is that the bodily changes follow directly the 
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the 
same changes as they occur IS the emotion...Without the bodily 
states following on the perception, the latter would be purely 
cognitive in form (cited in Oakley, 1992, p. 17). 
Presumably, following the recognition of a slight, I attend to the facts 
that my voice trembles and my stomach tightens. For James, this affective 
experience is the emotion of anger. In 1890, Carl Lange independently 
proposed a similar theory based on his research on blood pressure (Honderich, 
ed., 1995) In recognition of Lange’s contribution, this view is commonly 
referred to as the James-Lange Theory. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 
characterizes this notion as: 
An emotion is the experience of an appropriate physical response 
to external stimuli. Sadness and anger don’t make us cry and 
strike, rather they are the feeling of doing so (1995, p. 426). 
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To construe an emotion as merely affect might be to say that someone 
notices or attends to an impression of a feeling. This affective impression may 
be noticing a physical or bodily change or it may be a “psychic” feeling. A 
bodily impression - in the case of shame - would be to attend to that fact, blood 
having rushed to the face, that one is blushing as the result of some mental 
distress. In the case of fear, the agent recognizes her throat has gone dry, 
her heart is racing, adrenaline is flowing, and she is inclined to flee. 
One justification for the physiological, affective view is found in James’ 
The Principles of Psychology. It reads: 
If we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from 
our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we 
find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stufT out of which the 
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of 
intellectual perception is all that remains (1950 p. 52). 
Presumably, without bodily changes all perceptions of events would 
merely be detached observations, not emotions. This view implies that 
emotions may follow from cognition but that they are not constituted by these 
cognitive operations. Contemporary psychologist James Harper holds a 
James-Lange type view of shame. “Shame”, Harper writes, “is an emotion in 
response to a negative evaluation of one’s self.” (1990, p. 3) Harper refers to a 
shame experience as an “innate affect” (p. 7). 
Self-esteem and shame are conceptually different in that shame 
is an affect, and shame-prone identity describes the affective 
experience of a person with such an identity. Self-esteem is not 
an affect but more of a cognitive evaluation of the self (p. 143). 
An affective theorist might also recognize psychic or non-bodily - 
feelings. Psychic feelings can be said to be emotional feelings one has that 
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cannot be related to or localized in the body; one does not notice a specific 
bodily change. The general, unlocalized agitation I might feel before a job 
interview, the buoyancy in my step if all goes well, or the general mood of 
dejection if not, are examples of psychic states. These feelings need not be 
specifically identifiable by bodily changes such as an increased heart rate or 
dryness in one’s throat. 
Psychic feelings may also be illustrated by those emotions a person 
experiences over an extended period of time. The love for one’s spouse, 
children, or parents is an emotion most all people share. Here one does not 
experience this love as constant bodily agitation or continuous feelings, but 
rather as involving an interest in their projects, warming in their company, 
desiring to be with them, and so on (Oakley. 1992). Similarly, the lasting grief 
over losing a loved one is not characterized by constant bodily turmoil and 
mental distress, but it may color the way we perceive the world and our 
projects. Antonio Damasio refers to these particular psychic experiences as 
“background feelings” or bodily states that prevail between instances of 
clearly recognizable feelings (1994). By way of illustration, a woman may be 
in a general mood of despondency having lost her husband of forty years. She 
goes about her business in a quiet but unattached way. Every day may seem 
to her to be generally overcast. Her general disposition is one of sad 
resignation. However, when a neighbor inquires as to her condition, the 
background feelings or emotions of sadness and despair emerge to the 
forefront of her consciousness. She now “experiences” vivid remembrances of 
happier times, her eyes well up with tears. According to this version of the 
affective theory, the despondent “background” disposition is an emotion. 
James contends, however, only when this background feeling is physically 
manifested in the act of crying does the widow experience an emotion. 
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Allowing an affective theory of emotion to entail attending to bodily 
changes, long-term dispositional states, and psychic feelings seems to be a 
plausible view. Versions of this view have been attributed to philosopher 
David Hume. 
Many writers interpret Hume to hold a view of emotions as psychic 
feelings or non-bodily impressions (Kenny, 1963; Foot, 1978, Oakley, 1992). 
Much like Harper’s treatment of shame, Hume classifies emotions as 
“impressions of reflexion”. In Book II of the Treatise of Human Nature. Hume 
gives this account: 
The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and 
uniform impressions, ‘tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude 
of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the 
passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them 
by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them (1967, 
Bk. H, Pt. I, p. 277). 
Oakley interprets Hume to understand emotions as ‘simple’ reactions 
formed in response to circumstance. A valid and influential objection to this 
proposition was advanced by Anthony Kenny (1963). Conceding that Hume 
recognized emotions to have objects and causes, Kenny understands Hume to 
contend that an object is only contingently related to an emotion and therefore 
not constitutive of that emotion. But as both Kenny and Phillia Foot argue in 
order to feel pride there must be thought about a specific object from which 
one derives their pride (Lind, 1990). And in defining pride, Hume appears to 
say just this when he writes “Everything related to us, which produces 
pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility” (1967, p. 291). Here an 
agent feels a secondary pleasure which distinguishes pride from joy. Hume 
illustrates this as the difference between pleasure one feels attending a feast 
contrasted with the pleasure the host feels: a guest is not connected with the 
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event in the same way as the host. Relevant conditions Hume imposes on 
feeling pride are that the object that one derives pleasure from connected with 
the agent in a “close” relation, that it is relatively rare, fairly constant, and 
discernible to others (Taylor, 1985). 
While it might be argued that Hume is misrepresented as an “affective 
theorists”, the James - Lange theory remains an accurate portrayal of this 
view. Following the general lead of James, many psychologists have modified 
the theory to propose more plausible originating sources for the locus of 
emotion. Whereas James proposed emotions originate in the intestinal area, 
more recent research suggests the locus to be facial expressions (Tompkins, 
1962: Zajonc, 1985) and the sympathetic nervous system (Frankenhauser, 
1975). 
Some of the most persuasive arguments against the James-Lange 
theory of emotions were proposed by Walter Cannon in 1927. Physiological 
change is not a sufficient cause for an emotion since intense physical exertion 
or an injection of adrenaline will produce the same physical effect as some 
emotions. The person that has exercised or received an injection may not feel 
any specific emotion. Secondly, Cannon reasoned many emotions assail us 
almost instantaneously. At the sight of a poisonous snake, we feel immediate 
panic; to register a physiological change could not transpire so rapidly. Third, 
Cannon demonstrated that the emotional states of fear and anger as well as 
the non-emotional states of chilliness, hypoglycemia, and fever produce the 
same reactions from the sympathetic nervous system (Solomon, 1977). 
The James-Lange theory has been further discredited by studies that 
have suggested that the same emotional response (e.g., fear, anger) can vary 
within the same individual according to changing circumstances as well as 
varying from individual to individual (Lang, Rice, and Sternbach, 1972). 
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While physiological change is an important component in an emotion, it 
is an untenable position to claim it is the sole constituent of emotion. 
Emotion as Cognition 
A leading proponent of the cognitive theory of emotion is Robert C. 
Solomon. In direct opposition to the affective theory, Solomon explicitly 
states, “ Emotion is neither sensation nor a physiological occurrence, nor an 
occurrence of any kind” (Solomom, 1980, p. 251). Emotions, he claims, may 
involve feelings, but feelings are neither sufficient to differentiate nor sufficient 
to identify a specific emotion. Solomon suggests that emotions can be 
rational, purposeful and intentional. 
An emotion is intentional in the sense that it must be about something. 
To claim that “I am angry” or “I feel angry” is incomplete. Solomon recognizes 
that an intentional object that angers us must exist; the “object of the emotion 
is simply ‘what the emotion is about”’ (1980, p. 257) 
I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or 
offended me, Accordingly, we might say that anger involves a 
moral judgment..., an appeal to moral standards and not merely 
personal evaluations. My anger is that set of judgments (1977, p. 
187). 
Emotions, then, share a conceptual similarity to beliefs. Being angry 
“about...” is structurally similar to “believing that...”. Another component of 
intentionality that Solomon explicitly recognizes is the feature of desire in a 
set of judgments. 
Most importantly, emotions include intentions for the future, to 
act, to change the world and change our Selves, to revenge 
ourselves in anger, to punish ourselves in guilt, to redeem 
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ourselves in shame, to restore our dignity in embarrassment 
(1977, p. 189). 
Gabriele Taylor maintains that beliefs play a prominent, essential role 
in emotion in two ways: identification and explanation (1985). A belief (or 
beliefs) identifies an emotion for what it is as well as distinguishing it from 
other emotions. Anger is not envy by virtue of the belief in anger is expressed 
as, “I believe Smith has slighted me”. Envy, by contrast, is, “I believe Smith 
has personal qualities or material property that I covet”. Taylor suggests 
these identificatory assertions are two-part. In envy, I must judge or believe: 
1) Smith has certain qualities I lack, and 2) those qualities constitute an 
important or an unfair advantage. The structural arrangement of 
identificatory beliefs is that reason 1 is justified by reason 2. Since I believe 
certain qualities constitute an unfair advantage, I am inclined to be envious of 
someone possessing them. 
This two-part identification is the basis for the explanatory element in 
an emotion. I can give specific reasons (1 and 2) for being envious. In and of 
themselves, these reasons make no appeal to rationality. Consider a simple 
example of fear as irrational. As a young child, Sarah was bitten by an 
English bulldog. As a result of the attack, Sarah has some permanent scars. 
Now, as a young adult, Sarah is visibly shaken and flees whenever she 
encounters a bulldog. The form of the identificatory belief is: Sarah is afraid of 
bulldogs because 1). she believes all bulldogs pose a threat; and the threat is 2) 
their bite is painful and disfiguring. The pain and the disfigurement of dog bites 
(2) justify believing all bulldogs are threatening (1). Both (1) and (2) are what 
make Sarah’s state of fear intelligible. Either reason, however, need not be 
rational. Sarah may know that bulldogs - although frightfully ugly - are 
characteristically a gentle, non-aggressive breed. She may also clearly 
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remember the youthful indiscretion of provoking one particular dog 
mercilessly. All other bulldogs she has encountered seem to fit their 
reputation for gentleness. If we substituted poisonous snake for the bulldog, 
few would find the reasoning irrational. 
The account of emotion as constituted by identificatory and explanatory 
beliefs gives us an insight into how Solomon justifies his claim of 
purposefulness. Sarah’s fear of poisonous snakes serves to keep her safe. 
She avoids snakes to avoid serious injury. 
Self-regarding emotions (or emotions of self-assessment) require certain 
beliefs. As “self-regarding” obviously implies these beliefs take the self as the 
object. 
In experiencing any of these emotions the person concerned 
believes of herself that she has deviated from some norm and that 
in doing so she has altered her standing in the world. The self is 
the object of these emotions, and what is believed amounts to an 
assessment of that self (Taylor, 1985, p. 3). 
In Morality and the Emotions. Justin Oakley proposes that beliefs may 
be too strong a characterization. To believe some proposition p seems to 
require that we give our assent to p or that we are convinced that p is true or 
justified by the evidence. This is a much stronger claim than to say S 
entertains p or imagines p. In emotions, imagining p is often the case. The 
structure of the cognitive belief, whether rational or irrational, can follow along 
the identical lines proposed by Solomon and Taylor regardless of the 
justificatory evidence. Oakley suggests that our set of judgments in emotions 
be given wide range encompassing a variety of ways of apprehending the 
world, ranging over beliefs, construals, thoughts, and imagings (1992). 
Even still, to construe emotions as desireless cognition presents a 
problem similar to that by the affective theorists. Is anger comprehensible 
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without the component of desire of retaliation? Let us consider the role of 
desire in emotion. 
Emotions as Desiro 
Alternative accounts could maintain that an emotion is solely desire. A 
review of the literature finds no subscribers to this position. Emotion as an 
affectless desire would have to maintain that an emotion is simply an 
inclination or aim. Anger would be merely the desire to injure. There are 
straightforward objections to this view. Presumably, the attainment of the 
respective goals would not elicit any bodily or “psychic” response. Being 
“affected” clearly seems to be requirement of an emotion. Secondly, as with 
an objection to the “affect-only” view of emotions, one would be unable to 
distinguish one emotion from another on the “desire-only view”. Fear, shame, 
humiliation, or guilt may motivate someone to flee and take cover. Righteous 
indignation, anger or jealously might motivate us to desire that the offending 
person suffer. The omission of the cognitive element makes these decidedly 
different situations indistinguishable. Jealous husbands, impartial judges, and 
robbery victims might wish to inflict punishment; the cognitive component of 
these desires, when articulated, clearly distinguishes the justification and the 
object. The judge hopes to rehabilitate, deter others, and/or to protect society 
while the robbery victim seeks retribution and the recovery of his goods. 
Emotion as affective desire is open to the same objections. Although 
now the view could maintain that an emotion is a desire imbued with feelings, 
one is still unable to make particular distinctions. Again, both fear and shame 
may motivate an individual to flee a scene. The cognitive component 
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differentiates between the avoidance of imminent physical danger in the 
former, and, in the latter, the avoidance of exposure or disrepute. 
The importance of desire in emotion can be seen in an objection to the 
“cognitive-only” view that maintains emotions are merely a set of judgments. 
Consider a variation on a frequently used illustration involving two store 
owners.2 A customer makes purchases in two stores. The proprietors, A and 
B, make the sale and give the correct change. Proprietor A gives the exact 
change because he believes that if he were to cheat his customers it would 
lead to the eventual ruin of his business. Proprietor B gives the correct 
change because he understands that that is what morality requires. 
Regardless of the eventual effect on revenue, agent B believes that stealing is 
wrong; people deserve to be treated honestly. 
One feature of the above example is that the intentional object of the 
desire distinguishes the emotions of the two store owners. One is motivated by 
fear and possibly greed, the other by upholding his integrity and recognizing 
the dignity of others. This introduces the idea of desire as ‘will’. Franz 
Brentano, writing about willing, describes it as an “endeavor to bring about, or 
preserve, a given state of affairs; or it may be the endeavor to prevent a given 
state of affairs or to cause it to cease to obtain” (Cited in Chishom, 1986, pp. 
23-24). This implies that to will something to happen requires that that thing 
be within our power to bring it about. This distinction is also made clear in 
Aristotle’s discussion of‘choice’. 
There is no choice of impossibilities...but one can wish for what is 
impossible, e. g. immortality. Also one can wish for results which 
could not possibly bring about oneself, e.g, the success of a 
particular actor or athlete, but nobody chooses things like that - 
only what he thinks could be achieved by his own efforts...a choice 
is more properly praised for choosing the right object than for 
being correct in itself (llllb22-25 - 1112a8). 
2 This case has been used to discuss Kant’s view of moral motivation and his theory of 
maxims. See, for example, Feldman, (1976) pp. 100-101. 
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Anstotle, in a later passage, discusses the importance of choosing and 
acting from the right desires. The outward manifestation of the two store 
owners actions may appear to the customer as indistinguishable; on both 
occasions he receives the proper change. But, for a choice to be morally right, 
the component of desire must have a proper target. That target must be 
capable of being realized by our own endeavors and recognized as the 
praiseworthy alternative. Here we get a sense of desire as the pursuit of that 
which we believe to be good. 
Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of appetition correspond 
exactly to affirmation and negation in the sphere of intellect; so 
that, since moral virtue is a state involving choice, and choice is 
deliberate appetition, it follows that if the choice is to be a good 
one, both the reasoning must be true and the desire right...(T)he 
function of the practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that 
corresponds to right (desire) (NE, 1139a20-25). 
This feature - the desire to pursue or avoid certain states of affairs - 
allows us to see emotions as motives for action, something that might be 
inexplicable on the “cognitive-only* or “affect-only” views. Proprietor B takes 
pride in his honesty. We may now be in a better position to consider an 
emotion as a complex phenomena. 
Emotions as a Complex of Cognition. Affect, and Desire 
In the previous sections we have seen both the importance of cognition, 
affect, and desire in explaining and in the having of emotions as well as the 
difficulties we encounter in various attempts to exclude any of these 
components from an explanation of an emotional experience. To claim that an 
emotion is a complex of cognition, affect, and desire is to say more than these 
three elements co-exist: the stronger claim is that these elements are 
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conceptually linked (Oakley, 1992). The emotion of anger can again illustrate 
this claim. 
An individual, S, has spoken disparagingly about me to my supervisor. 
In this instance, it is obvious to both my supervisor and to me that the 
allegation is transparently false. It is equally obvious to both of us that S is 
widely considered to be a meddlesome and ill-tempered malcontent. The 
charges by S actually amuse me. But, I, at the same time, may feel agitated 
on the job because of overwork and I may believe that another individual, S’, 
deserves to suffer some harm for making similar comments of my co-workers. 
I may also believe correctly that I am not the appropriate person to 
determine or administer punishment to S’. Therefore, although I 
simultaneously experience a set of judgments, feel agitation, and desire a 
certain result, I cannot characterize my emotion as anger simply because 
these elements are not dynamically related in a specific way to one object or 
one specific state of affairs. 
In order to answer the first research question the analysis of moral 
shame must, then, explicate the elements of cognition, affect, and desire as 
interrelated. 
Secondly, this view of emotions as a complex experience helps to 
distinguish different emotions. A frequent claim in the literature is that the 
emotions “shade into” or “overlap” one another (Taylor, 1985; Kekes, 1988; 
Dillion, 1995). It is not always clear what writers have in mind when they 
make this claim; in what follows it will be argued it sometimes leads to 
mistakes. However, the view of emotions as entailing cognition, affect, and 
desire permits some clear distinctions. For example, in pride and shame we 
have the cognition that our standing has been altered, it is elevated and 
diminished, respectively. The affective reactions are clearly different; pleasure 
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and pain again respectively. The desire in pride, recalling Brentano, is 
preservation, whereas in shame it will be some action toward reinstatement 
so as to have the current state of affairs “cease to obtain”. 
With the view of emotions in mind, let us turn to the specific emotions. 
The Self-Regarding Emotions 
“Shame”, an article by Robert Karen, begins with this paragraph: 
A mathematics professor in his fifties, who likes to think of 
himself as dynamic and rakish but who is at the moment 
“between lovers,” stands on the subway platform eyeing an 
undergraduate. He sees that his gaze is making her 
uncomfortable. He feels a twinge of shame over this intrusion, 
but not enough to stop. He files his behavior under “manly 
aggression” and keeps staring. Then a searing thought enters...his 
mind. Feeling inexplicably crestfallen, he looks away from the 
young woman, buries his head in his paper, and seeks out a 
separate car when the train comes in. He doesn’t want people 
near him.. .The idea that scorched him was the image of himself, 
all too believable, as a hungry, unhappy loner, a man...incapable 
of lasting attachments, staring forlornly at a woman who could 
not possibly be interested in him. The shame that that image 
evoked was too hot to handle (Karen, 1992, p. 40). 
In this example, some features of what is normally thought to constitute 
the emotion of shame are present: a transgression, the disapproving gaze of 
another, the desire to flee and hide, and the painful realization that a man is 
not all that he had thought himself to be. But are these sufficient conditions 
to confidently identify this particular experience as one of shame? 
Embarrassment, humiliation, remorse, and guilt may share these same 
features. 
In this same 1992 article, Karen notes that ‘guilt’ has so dominated the 
attention of contemporary psychologists that many of these same 
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professionals would be “hard pressed” to distinguish it from shame (p. 47). 
Might Karen have made a similar error by confusing shame with humiliation? 
The professor’s only transgression in Karen’s example seems to be one of 
etiquette: it is in bad taste to stare. To evoke a shame “too hot to handle” 
seems an overly severe reaction for a breach of decorum. Shame seems 
reserved for darker times, more serious transgressions. 
What actually transpired on the subway platform might be this - the 
professor has presented himself as something he is not: happy, magnetic, and 
self-confident. In response, the undergraduate wordlessly deflates his 
pretentious presentation. His invitational “gaze” is rejected with incredulous 
“discomfort”. He has been vain and vanity invites humiliation, not shame. 
Shame and humiliation share structural similarities (Taylor, 1985). 
Both involve an adverse self-directed judgment and require the notion of an 
audience. But, as Gabriele Taylor points out, humiliation is primarily 
concerned with an audience’s assessment that an agent merits a fall from a 
higher to a lower status. 
She will think of herself as appearing contemptible or ludicrous 
just because she is not, in the audience’s view, the sort of person 
she gave herself out to be...It is that she aspired to the high 
position when she had no business to do so, or appeared to others 
to do so, and it is this thought, that she is regarded as 
presumptuous, which is essential to humiliation as it is not to 
shame (Taylor, 1985, pp. 67-68). 
To be “crestfallen” signifies feelings of dejection and a lack of 
spiritedness. To stare forlornly suggests the professor is in a condition of 
dreadful loneliness, not the image one wishes to communicate with “manly 
aggression”. As William Miller recognizes, those individuals that put on airs 
quite often are unaware of their own shortcomings and inattentive to their 
self-presentation. “They seek deference from others, and in doing so they 
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presume on others: those others will get even.” It is precisely this 
presumption, Miller writes, “that enables the humiliation and justifies it” 
(Miller, 1993, p. 137). 
Kekes correctly observes that shame “shades into” humiliation as well 
as other self-regarding emotions (1988). These two emotions share similar 
cognitive moves, desires, and, as we saw, affects. But it is not an auspicious 
start for any study on shame to begin the discussion with an example of 
humiliation. Whether the professor experiences shame or humiliation, the 
more important point is that his assessment of himself has changed. This is 
what I take “self-regarding* to imply. In an emotion classified as self- 
regarding, the agent takes himself as the subject and the object. He is the one 
experiencing the emotion and he is experiencing that emotion because 
of some action or inaction of his. My claim is, then, that the affects, the 
nature and complexity of the set of cognitive beliefs, and the desires will have 
unique properties. In the experience of self-assessment, as Taylor points out, 
the self, as the object, has a new standing. 
In experiencing any one of these (self-regarding) emotions the 
person concerned believes of herself that she has deviated from 
some norm and that in doing so she has altered her standing in 
the world. The self is the ‘object’ of these emotions, and what is 
believed amounts to an assessment of that self (1985, p. 1). 
Shame is a remarkably complex self-regarding emotion. It is conceded 
that it does indeed “shade into” other emotions. In one sense, it does so by 
requiring and entailing these other emotions (e.g. regret, remorse, guilt), but, 
however complex, clarity about distinguishing features increases clarity about 
the significance of the individual emotions. To substantiate these claims, let 
us begin the survey of the self-regarding emotions. 
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Regret 
A reasonable starting point in an analysis of the self-regarding emotions 
would be with regret. There are several varieties and, unlike many of the other 
emotions of self-assessment, some of its forms are relatively simple. 
Secondly, an element of regret is a feature of other self-regarding emotions (e. 
g. remorse, guilt, shame). 
In “Remorse and Agent-Regret”, Marcia Baron proposes that the 
objects of regret can be a state of affairs, one’s own actions, or a state of 
affairs and one’s own actions. A constitutive thought in all forms is “how 
much better if it had been otherwise” (Williams, 1985). 
The forms of regret can be thought of in terms of occupying a place on a 
graduated scale. One feature that establishes its particular place on the scale 
is the level of one’s participation in a regrettable state of affairs. Simple regret 
(SR) involves no participation on the part of the agent. I play no role in the 
passage of time, as when seasons change, nor do I participate directly in the 
fortunes or misfortunes of, say, the Boston Red Sox. But I can regret the 
passing of summer, the end of baseball season, and yet again another last 
place finish for Boston. 
An example often used in the literature to illustrate different forms of 
regret is that of a taxi cab driver who hits and seriously injures a small child 
(Nagel, 1979; Rorty, 1980, Williams, 1985; Baron, 1988). Simple regret is 
merely to learn of the incident. Taxi driver, X3, hits and injures child, Y. Z 
regrets to learn of this unfortunate occurrence and the state of affairs that 
a Following conventions in much of the literature, these designations will be used 
throughout this paper: S = an agent; X = some specific, concrete act (an act token), or one 
of multiple agents (as in X, Y,and Z); E = an event or a state of affairs; E’ = an alternative 
to E; and, tl, t2, t3, etc. = specific times at which an event occurs. 
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there is one more seriously injured child in the world. But, Z played no part in 
this tragedy and shares none of the assignable blame. We might propose 
simple regret is: 
SR: S regrets E = S feels a sadness over a state of affairs, E, that was 
brought about without S’s direct or indirect involvement. 
We can propose that the emotional components of SR would be that an 
agent must believe that some other state of affairs, E’, is preferable to E, and 
that the agent is sadden that E exists. The component of desire in SR would 
seem to be confined to a desire or wish that the world were different than it is. 
By virtue of the fact that some event contains a bad, harmful or undesirable 
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feature, an agent feels SR. In that it transpired without the agent’s input, SR 
contains the agenf s correct belief that nothing he or she has done or could or 
should have done could change things. 
Agent-regret (AR), on the other hand, involves participation. Whereas 
the appropriate response to simple regret might be, “if only it had been 
otherwise”, agent regret elicits a response that acknowledges the action 
happened with some level of the agent’s participation. The agent is no longer 
merely a spectator. The cognitive component of agent-regret recognizes the 
agent himself as part of the object. AR also differs from SR in the affective 
dimension; it pains the agent differently. In that the agent participated, he is 
pained by what he has done, not simply at what has transpired. The level of 
involvement accounts for several distinct varieties of agent-regret. The 
cognitive component of AR, as Williams writes, includes the constitutive 
thought, “ if only it had been otherwise, and it happened thru me” (cited in 
Barron, 1988, p. 267). 
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A basic form of AR is suggested by Descartes (1985) and Solomon 
(1977). Descartes defines regret as “a kind of sadness...joined to memory of a 
pleasure that gave us joy. We regret only the good things which...are so 
completely lost that we have no hope of recovering them” (Trans. 
Cottiingham, Stoffhoff, Murduch, Vol 1,1985, p. 402).4 This type of regret 
need not have an ethical dimension. Unlike SR, in Descartes’s view an agent 
simply reflects upon happier times in which he participated. Examples might 
include looking back on high school or college days, one’s first love, the 
outgrown membership in the girl’s club or little league, or family outings to 
museums or Fenway Park when the children were young. 
One worry about Descartes’s definition is that it does not capture an 
essential feature of agent-regret. Although the agent participated in the 
events that he now longs for, the salient feature of this state of affairs is 
simply that time has transpired, not that the agent has done something 
specifically regrettable. 
A proposed definition of Descartes’s view of simple agent-regret is: 
SAR: S regrets E = S, at t2, is sadden that E does not contain particular 
goods and opportunities that were available to S at tl. 
Solomon has a similarly restricted view of agent-regret. He claims 
regret is distinguishable from remorse by virtue of the level of one’s 
responsibility. In regret, the cognition, he claims, is that one does not take 
responsibility, “blaming whatever disappointment is involved on 
‘circumstances beyond one’s control”5 (1977, p. 347). The element of affect, 
then, is a sad resignation that life oftentimes subjects us to inevitable 
disappointments, as in “one regrets not having finished high school because of 
the war” (p. 350). Solomon’s account introduces a feature that illustrates a 
4 Hereafter CSM. 
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second restriction in Descartes’s definition. Descartes confines regret to the 
loss of a good that one once had. Solomon allows for opportunities missed, 
things we might have had. This version allow us to simplify SAR to eliminate 
the condition of prior possession. We might say. 
SAR’: S regrets E = S is saddened that E does not contain, for S, 
particular goods and opportunities. 
Descartes and Solomon have proposed legitimate forms of agent-regret, 
but they are far too simplistic to range over all the possible cases. 
Both Baron (1988) and Amelie O. Rorty (1980) recognize, but do not 
make explicit, several variations of AR that the accounts of Descartes and 
Solomon cannot accommodate. Several distinct cases of AR, on a graduated 
scale, seemed to be implied by their work. Rorty establishes this condition for 
agent-regret: 
If an agent S regrets having done something, having brought 
about a state of affairs E, then he believes that he has 
contributed to the occurrence of E, and characteristically, he 
judges that E is harmful, bad, or undesirable (1980, p. 489). 
There are many things to notice about this view of AR. First, S may 
have brought about E involuntarily, as in some person or element coerced S to 
bring about E. Second, S may regret doing something to bring about E - but 
not regret E . Here some feature of E is regrettable, not E seen as a whole. 
Third, S might regret E in that S could have averted E coming to be. Under 
one description of this third variation, ‘could’ implies ‘should’. The cognitive 
component of this variation would work something like the following. At least 
two acts, X and Y, were available to S. Performing act X, S is responsible for 
E. By virtue ofX, some part of E is undesirable, bad, or harmful. Had S 
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performed Y, E would: 1) not contain this bad part; and, 2) be less bad, 
harmful, or undesirable. Therefore, S should have performed Y. This 
interpretation of regret directly contradicts Solomon’s general claim of 
responsibility. Taking each of these variations in turn will help make explicit 
the variations of agent-regret. We can begin by considering the condition of 
involuntary action in regret. 
In his discussion of regret and assigning praise and blame according to 
features of actions, Aristotle recognizes that force and ignorance can, in 
certain circumstances, absolve an agent. 
Those things...are thought involuntary, which take place by force 
owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving 
principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is 
contributed by the person who acts - or, rather is acted upon 
(1109a2-4). 
To illustrate regret through coercion, Aristotle’s offers an example of a 
ruler forcing someone to perform some repugnant act, X, in order to protect a 
family member (1110a2).5 X is regretted, would not have been considered 
without external force, but is performed to avoid the more objectionable 
alternative. Since, roughly, praise and blame are reserved for voluntary acts, 
S can regret having performed X while remaining supposedly blameless. 
We might define this AR type as: 
AR1: S regrets E = S is saddened to have to perform X, in light of no 
viable alternative, in order to bring about E. 
6 Sophie's Choice is a contemporary example. Briefly, that case involves Sophie, her two 
children and a sadistic German soldier. Sophie and her two children are hoping to board a 
train to flee Germany during World War II when they are approached by the soldier. He 
gives Sophie a choice: she can hand over one of her children for execution or, if she is unable 
or she refuses, he will kill them both. 
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There are also types of regret that are occasioned by things that happen 
to us and do not involve deliberation and choice at the time they happen. 
These cases constitute, as Aristotle characterizes, examples of agents being 
“acted upon”. While coercion is characterized by AR1, involuntary activities 
are exemplified by one case of the taxi driver. These facts are known about 
this case. A child darts into the street from between two parked cars. The 
taxi cab driver slams on his brakes and swerves, but to no avail. The child is 
struck by the cab and seriously injured. 
Simple regret and simple agent-regret would be inappropriate reactions 
from the driver. Clearly, he was a participant and for him to assume a 
spectator role (SR) or to simply feel life was less complicated up to the point of 
the accident (SAR) signals a morally deficient character. The affective 
dimension of the driver’s agent-regret ought to pain him in a significant and 
personal way. Unlike Solomon’s view, the agent clearly bears some 
responsibility although culpability will be established by other factors. 
Providing many conditions obtain, S’s agent-regret need not be remorse. 
Had he been sober, attentive, observing all the relevant laws, his car in 
excellent working order, and so on, he might curse his tragic misfortune for 
being at the wrong place at the wrong time, but he would not feel he ‘could’ or 
‘should’ have averted the tragedy. Nor was he coerced to choose between two 
objectionable alternatives, as in AR1. The taxi driver was an involuntary 
participant. We might formulate this version of AR that inadvertently occurs 
through an agent as: 
AR2: S regrets E = S is saddened that X occurred involuntarily through 
him which brings about E. 
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A variation on AR2 is also recognized by Aristotle. Here the action by S 
is “mixed”: in consideration of a greater harm by doing Y, S reluctantly, but 
voluntarily, performs X. He illustrates this possibility with a scenario of a 
man throwing cargo overboard during a storm in order to save his crew, 
himself, and his ship (1110a 8-10). 
Such actions...are mixed but more like voluntary actions; for they 
are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end 
of an action is relative to the occasion (1110all-12). 
This variation of a regrettable act is one that is performed voluntarily, 
but contains an undesirable feature. The state of affairs that results is, on 
balance - or considered in its entirety - the best possible whole although it 
contains a bad part. Although the bad part is regretted, it is voluntarily 
chosen and it is accepted as inextricably contained in E. 
In “Remorse and Agent-Regret”, Baron recognizes this variation and its 
unique emotional components. 
They chose the deed toward which they now feel agent-regret, but 
they have agent-regret without wishing that they had acted 
differently or believing that they should have acted differently. 
Still, they are pained at what they did and wish that they had not 
had to act as they did (Barron, 1988, p. 264). 
According to Baron, the cognitive element is the recognition of X as the 
best alternative. It is the judgment that: 1) to act in this way is acceptable, 
and, 2) in the future, if presented with identical circumstances, the agent 
would condone similar action by himself and by others. S can, at the same 
time, desire that these circumstances do not arise again. The affective 
element is the pain from performing the necessary bad part. 
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Baron illustrates this AR type as the unfortunate situation of an 
employer firing a trusted, loyal employee during times of cut-backs. For the 
sake of the company, in dire economic times, down-sizing requires certain 
individuals must be sacrificed. The employer regrets the obvious hardships 
this presents the employee, but, all things considered, he judges this to be the 
right act to perform. Rorty (1980) also explicitly recognizes this variety of 
regret. 
Conceptually, but not analytically, agent-regret presupposes 
event regret; but the event that the agent brings about need not 
be regarded by him as wholly undesirable, or even undesirable as 
a whole. Characteristically, there is some aspect or feature of E 
that S considers in a negative light (Rorty, 1980, p. 493). 
This type of agent-regret requires a different formulation of the 
definition. In that E, considered as a whole, might be desirable, we can 
consider: 
AR3: S regrets X of E = S is saddened to choose X, in light of no viable 
alternative, in order to bring about E. 
The coerced / voluntary “mixture” in AR1 and AR3 can be the source of 
some controversy. It might be argued both Sophie - in Sophie’s Choice - and 
the Captain had a choice. One attempt at a partial resolution to this 
controversy would be to suggest that in AR1 an agent is forced into a choice 
between alternatives neither of which she would normally entertain (as in, “to 
have to perform X”). The Captain and the Employer, in AR3, are forewarned, 
because of their station, that regrettable circumstances could arise whereby 
they must make difficult decisions (e.g., all things considered it would be best 
to choose X). 
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There is the additional condition wherein an agent unintentionally 
causes a tragedy for which the agent is blameworthy. S might have been 
driving under the influence of alcohol or knowingly have been negligent in 
keeping his cab in good repair. These cases will occasion reactions of “if only 
I...and I could and should have”. Baron, Rorty, and Taylor imply, or explicitly 
assert, that the inclusion of‘should’ in the cognitive move requires us to move 
on to the emotion of remorse. They claim that one feature of agent-regret is 
the acceptance of the chosen alternative. Rorty says explicitly: “It is not a 
condition of regret that the agent would undo the action if he could” (1980, p. 
495). Baron recognizes two types of agent regret. That of the taxi-driver 
under the blameless and under the culpable descriptions, and those that 
“chose the deed...without wishing they had acted differently (1988, p. 264). 
Taylor writes: 
Not surprising that the person who feels remorse and the person 
who feels regret should view differently the relevant past event. If 
she feels remorse then she wants to undo the action and its 
consequences which cause the remorse, but when feeling regret 
she need not think that she would undo the action if she could...It 
is possible to regret an action but accept it as the thing to do 
(Taylor, 1985, pp. 98-99). 
This might seem clear in AR3. To accept these claims would require us 
to move on to consider remorse. But this seems hasty. Clearly, in AR1, if one 
is coerced into hurting a child to avert a greater tragedy, the agent would 
certainly wish to “undo” that unfortunate circumstance. In a like manner, the 
taxi-driver, in AR2, curses his misfortune. It would be perfectly 
understandable to imagine him concocting any number of scenarios that would 
have put him away from the scene of the accident, as in, “If only I had that 
second cup of coffee...”. These are certainly futile attempts, but nonetheless 
representative of desires to undo the harm. But the futility of the desire does 
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not rule it out under Rort/s description; her claim is simply ‘if she could’. 
Clearly, if Sophie could, she would. This claim is not analogous to the feature 
of moral obligation that posits ‘ought implies can’, or roughly, the idea that we 
can only be obligated to do those things that we are capable of doing. There 
are many instances of remorse and regret that are beyond repair or, shall we 
say, undoable. The point here is only that wishing to undo an act can apply to 
regret as well as remorse. 
Another objection to the “undo” claim is that, under a certain 
description, AR3 might carry with it a moral requirement to bring about E\ 
Act X in E is not, therefore, in and of itself, the thing to do. S may consider X 
unacceptable as it stands. Technically, something more is needed to undo the 
present circumstance, as in the present employer feels obligated to assist the 
trusted employee in finding suitable alternative employment. Likewise, if the 
Captain was commissioned to deliver the cargo, then we would expect him to 
ponder how he could replace the client’s goods. This is not to say these 
individuals would “undo” X; but it is to say that both X and E are unacceptable 
as they stand. Therefore, the individual wishes to undo E by a subsequent act, 
Y. With Y, E’ obtains. 
Both Williams and W.D. Ross recognize this complication, one that 
affects theories of agent-regret - not exclusively remorse - and the emotional 
acceptance of the result of our actions. Speaking of conflicting moral 
obligations, W. D. Ross refers to the compunction we feel when confronted by 
dilemmas. 
When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally 
obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve someone’s distress, 
we do not for a moment cease to recognize a prima facie duty to 
keep our promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or 
repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do 
(Cited in Pojman, p. 256) 
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I take compunction to be an uneasy feeling and remorse to be more than 
that. In “Ethical Consistency”, Williams points out: 
A fundamental criticism of many ethical theories (is) that their 
accounts of moral conflict and its resolution do not do justice to 
the facts of regret and related considerations: basically because 
they eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted on 
(cited in Baron, 1988, p. 265, underlining added). 
In the case of the Captain, the conflict might be: If one contracts to 
deliver goods to S, then one ought to keep one’s contractual promise. This 
agreement may be superseded, but that does not absolve the Captain of his 
commitment. The Captain may regret he was unable to honor the contract in 
a timely manner. He offers the storm and the dangers to his crew as 
justification. The original promise still carries with it certain obligations. 
Therefore, none of the previous versions of regret and agent regret can 
accommodate all regrettable experiences. This new consideration is 
accommodated in AR4. It reads: 
AR4: S regrets X of E = S is saddened to voluntarily choose X that 
brought about E and S feels obligated to do Y in order to bring about E\ 
In conclusion, the feature of not wishing to undo an action is insufficient 
grounds to distinguish agent-regret from remorse. In complex cases, agent- 
regret can entail a moral imperative to “undo” E in the sense that more is 
required of the participating agent. In simpler cases of coercion and 
involuntary participation, the desire to “undo” E seems self-evident. 
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Remorse 
Remorse can be distinguished from the various forms of regret and 
agent-regret in significant ways. A primary distinction is that remorse never 
implies acceptance of what has been done (Taylor, 1985; Baron, 1988). The 
constitutive thought in remorse contains from agent-regret the antecedent “if 
only...” which is necessarily followed by the consequent “and I could and should 
have done otherwise” (Williams, 1985). 
The move from regret to agent-regret to remorse involves no 
discarding of notions, but only the addition of layers. One goes 
from “If only it had been otherwise” (general regret) to “ And it 
happened through me” (agent-regret) to “And I could have 
averted it” - and if at this stage the ‘could’ implicitly involves a 
‘should’, we reach remorse (Baron, 1988, pp. 267-268). 
In remorse, then, S sees himself as the origin of the conduct unlike the 
spectator in SR or as an agent reflecting on transpired events in SAR. 
“Regret”, Taylor remarks “but not remorse can be felt about an event for 
which the agent does not take herself to be even just causally responsible 
(1985, p. 98). The agent’s recognition that he could have acted differently 
distinguishes remorse from AR1 and AR2. In remorse S does not believe he 
had to perform X nor did X happen involuntarily through him. 
How the agent is responsibly tied to a particular deed further 
distinguishes remorse from agent-regret. In AR3, the agent regrettably 
chooses the lesser of two evils in order to bring about, as he sees it, the best 
available alternative. In AR4, by virtue of choosing X which brings about E, 
the agent is obligated to perform Y, in order to bring about E\ By contrast, 
the feature of responsibility in remorse is that the agent chose incorrectly; he 
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recognizes that something should have gone differently and, through him, it 
could have. 
Several authors, at this point, recognize an internal difficulty. Agent- 
regret can also contain the cognition that one could have acted differently. 
Baron suggests that the “seriousness” of the act distinguishes the agent- 
regret from remorse. She illustrates this point with the regret we feel when we 
are abrupt with someone. In a footnote, she proposes if X (as in a 
momentarily unkindness) were “more serious, (it) would occasion remorse in 
us” (Baron, 1988, p. 279). Taylor makes a similar claim. “Remorse is felt 
about a sin or moral wrong whereas regret is felt about what is in some way 
undesirable, but not particularly morally so” (Taylor, 1985, p.98) 
These attempts to distinguish these emotions seem unpersuasive. 
Remorse, as has been claimed, never implies acceptance. A past deed has 
been committed and the agent recognizes, at the time when it was performed, 
that a viable alternative was open to him. This is not the case with regret. 
Even in AR4, X is acceptable by virtue of Y. Although regret entails an 
undesirable, bad, or harmful feature, the agent chooses that act from among 
the field of possible alternatives that minimizes the harmfulness. But, to 
“minimize” harmfulness need not have any relationship to the“seriousness” of 
the state of affairs that an agent may find him or herself in. The mistake here 
may be to assume remorse requires an intense reaction, whereas regret 
occasions milder responses. But, I see no reason to assign a mild reaction to 
Sophie: one of her children died. She and the taxi driver are entitled to feel, and 
indeed we expect them to feel, a profound regret. For even though regret may 
entail the idea that, all things considered, X was the right thing to do, both 
alternatives, X and Y, may be very bad. Recall William’s implication that the 
lesser of two evils is still an evil. Regardless of a viable alternative, I see no 
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reason to take any evil - in and of itself - lightly. Remorse, on the other hand, 
looks back on the possible alternatives and concedes that the agent could and 
should have done otherwise. As Taylor goes on to note “the aspect of the 
action which causes remorse...is regarded (as) outweighing any possible good 
that may come from it...It is impossible to feel remorse and yet believe that 
overall it was the right thing to do” (1985, p. 99). Looking back, the cognitive 
component in regret is different. This fact seems sufficient to distinguish the 
emotions. The appeal to a calculation of “seriousness” ought to be rejected. 
The recognition of a more desirable alternative and the acceptance of 
the responsibility for a wrong choice has led some writers to consider remorse 
as a constructive emotion. Taylor cites Max Scheler’s view of remorse as 
“necessary for the guilty to be reestablished” and “an emotion of salvation” (p. 
101). 
In remorse...the agent takes a positive attitude toward the 
situation and himself. It constitutes a “change of heart”, or a 
totally new attitude, and through it the agent can regain his 
powers and rebuild himself (p.101). 
Taylor reflects a similar sentiment. 
No action need follow from regret, or even be expected to follow. 
This is not surprising if the agent may think that all things 
considered she did the right thing, or did what had to be done. But 
we do expect some sort of action from her who feels remorse...She 
wants to undo what she has done...(and) she would normally be 
expected to try and do something towards repairing the damage 
(p. 99). 
For many of the same reasons, these comments also seem wrong. One 
of the difficulties at arriving a precise definitions of emotions is that many 
authors tend to attribute too many features to an emotion. By doing so, one 
66 
emotion overlaps or “shades into” another and lines of demarcation blur. With 
emotions overlap does occur; it is important, however, that the overlap is 
legitimate. Remorse is one such emotion with a blurry perimeter. 
Scheler and Taylor might be mistaken for these reasons. Even if we 
were to grant that remorse differs from regret in that in the former the agent 
would undo that action if he could, this does not commit us to accept any 
future predictions of behavior or are we committed to propositions that future 
intentions are required by remorsefulness. Consider this example. S has a 
history of multiple arrests for driving under the influence. Last night he 
borrowed the family car, drove to a bar, had too much to drink, and crashed 
the car on the way home. His family is now burdened emotionally and 
financially as well as inconvenienced. S reports that he feels remorseful. Had 
he to do it over, S would do things differently. But, as I see it, remorsefulness 
alone need not entail “a change of heart”. More than remorse is needed to 
attribute considerations of remediated future conduct. We can verify this 
claim in two ways. 
First, if we can supply identificatory and explanatory reasons which 
satisfy the requirements of the definition of remorsefulness without a change 
of heart, it would then appear Scheler’s claim fails. These plausible and 
relatively commonplace reactions seem to suffice: S is remorseful he crashed 
the family car because 1) he may, as a result, be incarcerated (which will 
interfere with his drinking); or, 2) his family will be reluctant to let him borrow 
the car again; or, 3) he had intended to enlist the support of a designated driver 
and had he, he could have had a number of more drinks. 
Second, there seems nothing incompatible with the idea that an agent 
will be, can be, or is remorseful about past conduct while being well aware - 
indeed expecting - that the future will contain the same type of activity. The 
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despair and the hopelessness heard in the self-reports of many individuals 
addicted to various substances is precisely because of this connection between 
genuine and heartfelt remorse and their acknowledgment of anticipated 
substance-abusing future conduct The report of remorse alone is not enough 
to assuage the counselor’s skepticism. A counselor can believe the client is 
truly remorseful while still lacking the required elements of motivation, 
responsibility, and/or atonement necessary for remediation. Therefore, it 
seems to be an invalid deduction to claim that if someone would undo an action 
if they could, then we are entitled to make predictions of that agent’s future 
behavior. It is in a very literal sense that we can understand Descartes when 
he writes: “remorse does not concern the time to come, but rather the present 
or past” (CSM, 1988, p.351, underlining added). 
These points would indicate that a suitable definition of remorse be 
restricted to the past or present tense, free of future intentions, and devoid of 
any comparative calculations regarding ‘seriousness’. We might consider: 
S is remorseful about X = S is saddened to have performed X, desires X 
could be undone, and recognizes that he could and should have acted 
differently. 
As we continue on the graduated scale, repentance supplies the 
legitimate additional components in cognition, affect and desire. 
Repentance 
Descartes draws a distinction between remorse and repentance in terms 
of cognitive certainty. Remorse requires doubt. Its function is a prompting 
toward inquiry to ascertain “whether the object of our doubt is good or not 
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(Sec. 177, p. 392). Repentance, on the other hand, entails the belief that what 
we have done is wrong. 
Repentance is...a kind of sadness, which results from our 
believing that we have done some evil deed; and it is very bitter 
because the cause lies in ourselves alone. But this does not 
prevent it from being very useful...because our repentance 
prompts us to do better on another occasion (Sec. 191, p. 396) 
All the elements of an emotion are here. The agent has the cognition 
that he is responsible for a wrong act. The affect is a notably intense sadness. 
It is clearly an active emotion; one desires to conduct oneself differently on 
future occasions. It could be that Descartes is making a similar linear move 
that is analogous to that of regret to agent-regret to remorse: remorse “shades 
into” repentance as doubt clears away. But it seems intuitively correct that 
repentance entail remorse, not supplant it. To repent a person must first 
believe - with a remorseful certainty - that a wrong was committed. 
In his unpublished manuscript, “Repentance and Criminal Punishment”, 
Jeffrie Murphy offers a definition of repentance that explicitly requires 
remorse as a component. It reads: 
Repentance is the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for 
one’s wrongful and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects 
of one’s character that generated the actions, the resolve to do 
one’s best to extirpate those aspects of one’s character, and the 
resolve to atone or make amends for the harm that one has done 
(Murphy, unpublished manuscript, p. 3). 
This is a complex description. If we were to combine atonement with 
making amends, there will be four necessary conditions an emotion must 
satisfy in order to qualify as repentance. These are: [A] responsibility with 
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remorse; [B] an honest review of an undesirable character trait; [C] the 
resolve to reform; and, [D] the resolve to atone. 
Repentance is a concept that occupies considerable interest in 
theological literature. In the sections on repentance in the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church. (CCC) all the requirements of Murphy’s definition 
(designated as [A], [B], etc.) are accounted for. The remorseful acceptance of 
responsibility is covered in the discussion of confession. 
The confession (or disclosure) of sins...facilitates our reconciliation 
....[A] Though such an admission man looks squarely at the sins he 
is guilty of, takes responsibility for and thereby opens himself 
again to God (Ed. Ratzinger, 1994, Sec. 1455, p. 365). 
t 
Following confession, if an agent is repentant, he will do penance. 
Penance is a testimony that one is willing to reorder one’s life and attempt to 
sin no more. 
Absolution takes away sin, but it does not remedy all the 
disorders sin has caused. Raised up from sin, the sinner must still 
recover his full spiritual health by doing something more to make 
amends for the sin: he must “make satisfaction for” or “expiate” 
his sins. This satisfaction is also called “penance” (Ratzinger, 
1994, Sec. 1459, p. 366). 
Repudiation of a character trait and the resolve to reform are covered in 
the definition of interior repentance and contrition. Interior repentance is: 
[B] A radical reorientation of our whole life, a return,...an end of 
sin, a turning away from evil, [C] with repugnance toward the evil 
actions we have committed...it entails the desire and resolution to 
change one’s life (Sec. 1431, p. 360). 
The CCC considers contrition to be of the utmost importance. It is 
defined as the “sorrow of the soul and [B] detestation for the sin committed, 
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[C] together with the resolution not to sin again” (Sec. 1451, p. 364). 
Atonement [D] is expressed and achieved in various ways. Common ways are 
through fasting, prayer and almsgiving; these acts make amends in relation to 
oneself, to God and to others, respectively. 
Murphy observes that repentance means “not merely a resolution not 
to commit wrong again, but a resolution that includes a desire to make 
amends” (p. 7). And for Murphy, the component of making amends entails 
remorse over what has been done. 
Murphy s analysis of repentance seems correct. His definition seems 
acceptable. 
Guilt 
Much of the literature on the emotion of guilt concentrates on an 
analysis of the objective state of “being guilty” and not on the emotive state of 
“feeling guilty”. This focus can be attributed, in part, to the fact that, unlike 
shame, guilt has direct legal connotations. For some act, X, to be wrong, there 
must be some source of authority that prohibits X. Here right and wrong can 
be defined in terms of permissibility. If some authority with jurisdiction over 
an agent permits certain conduct, it is ‘right’. Conversely, if this same 
authority prohibits certain conduct, it is ‘wrong’; acts of this sort are not 
permissible as they constitute a violation of the prohibition. As Gabriele 
Taylor observes violations are punishable. 
Guilt, unlike shame, is a legal concept. A person is guilty if he 
breaks a law, which may be of human or divine origin. As a 
consequence of this action he has put himself into a position 
where he is liable to punishment...Given only that he is under the 
legislation of the authority in question, violation of the law is 
sufficient for guilt (Taylor, 1985, p. 85). 
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In a legal situation, then, guilt involves the notions of breaking a law 
established by an authority under whom one lives and, thereby, deserving of 
punishment (OTIear, 1976). Nothing in this analysis attempts to explain an 
agent’s feelings of guilt. It is plausible that an agent can acknowledge the 
objective state of his being guilty and his liability for punishment while, at the 
same time, he can feel guiltless. One justification for this emotive stance can 
be that the agent considers the law that he has violated to be a bad one. 
Examples might include resisting a military draft, violating laws requiring 
segregation, or obstructing access to an abortion clinic. In these instances the 
agent recognizes the law as binding but considers the law itself to be incorrect 
or immoral. This insight seems to be overlooked in many influential views on 
guilt and shame. 
Psychoanalysts Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer advanced theories of 
guilt and shame which focus primarily on the objective state of being guilty. 
Almost fifty years ago Piers and Singer formulated a distinction between guilt 
and shame that continues to influence psychologists and philosophers. Using 
Freudian terminology, Piers and Singer claim that an agent experiences guilt 
when one transgresses a boundary set by the “Super-Ego” (or an authority 
figure), whereas shame is felt when a goal set by the “Ego-Ideal” (or one’s self- 
conception) has not been reached (Piers and Singer, 1951). Summing up 
Piers’s view, John Deigh writes “ Shame is felt over shortcomings, guilt over 
wrongdoings” (1995, p. 133). But Piers’s view fails to clearly distinguish the 
objective state of “being guilty” with the emotional experience of “feeling 
guilty”. Clearly, it is possible for an agent to do wrong yet feel guiltless as well 
as for an agent to feel guilty but to be innocent. 
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Frequently the emotive aspect of guilt is overlooked because various 
theorists attempt to define guilt by contrasting it with shame in terms of 
internal or external sanctions or guides. Presumably laws are external guides 
while standards are internal. Piers’ view clearly classifies guilt as external, 
shame internal. A scientist in general agreement with Piers is sociologist, 
Helen Block Lewis. She has written: 
Shame is about the self. We say, I am ashamed of myself. I am 
guilty for something. Guilt is out there in the real world, 
something you did or something you thought that you shouldn’t 
have thought. Shame is only about the self (Cited in Karen, 
p. 47). 
In Helen Merrell Lynd’s On Shame and the Search for Identity, a 
different picture emerges. For Lynd, guilt is internal while shame is primarily 
a social, external experience. 
Guilt, or self reproach, is based on the internalization of values, 
notably parental values - in contrast to shame, which is based 
upon disapproval coming from outside, from other persons...Ruth 
Benedict makes a similar distinction...Guilt (is) a failure to live up 
to one’s own picture of oneself (based upon parental values), with 
shame, a reaction to criticism by other people...(so) shame is a 
more external experience (1958, p. 21). 
Another attempt at this distinction, as noted by Lynd, was made by 
anthropologist Ruth Benedict in her study of Japanese culture. She concludes 
a shame culture is one characterized by a fear of expulsion from the group. 
One fears ostracism; this motivation to conform comes in part from a sense of 
shared values - an external consideration. By contrast, a guilt culture is one 
wherein individuals control their behavior by their own internal compasses 
(Dizard, 1996, p. 22). Again, on this view, shame is external and construed to 
result from recognized violations of social conventions or agreements. With 
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guilt, pressure is exerted by reference to an ideal that maybe entirely of one’s 
own private construction. We see then that Benedict’s view is just the 
opposite of Piers. Benedict’s characterization has been credited with being the 
most widely accepted definitions of these two emotions (Lynd, 1957). But on 
her view guilt is merely a subjective realization that one has failed to meet an 
internal standard. It is not clear why guilt would be the obvious emotional 
reaction to this insight as opposed to shame, frustration, or discouragement. 
Many current educational theorists, however, subscribe to Benedict’s 
formulation. Brown University professor, William Damon proposes a similar 
idea so as to distinguish guilt from shame: 
In general...shame always remains to some extent other- 
orientated...in the eyes of others, one’s behavior is contemptible. 
In this regard it differs from guilt, with relies more exclusively on 
one’s own evaluations rather than on the real or imagined 
evaluations of others (p. 22). 
These formulations seem too sketchy. On Benedict’s and Damon’s view 
an audience is required to shame a person; but this notion can not account for 
the instances when one may feel shame when no one else is present. Feelings 
of guilt, on the other hand, cannot exclusively rely on one’s own evaluation. As 
mentioned in the case of the bad law, an agent can perform prohibited 
behavior and feel guiltless. However, effective social reformers acknowledge 
their legal violations and accept their punishment. Similarly, some criminals 
will readily admit their guilt but remain emotional unaffected. A bank-robber 
may admit his guilt, but that confession may not tell us anything about his 
cognitive operations or his emotional state. 
So four general emotional responses to guilt seem possible. These are: 
1) to be guilty and feel guilty, 2) to be guilty and feel guiltless, 3) to be guiltless 
and feel guilty, and, 4) to be guiltless and feel guiltless. 
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Various justifications for these emotional responses can be offered. To 
feel guilty when one is and to feel innocent when one is guiltless are rational 
reactions. Regarding feeling guiltless when one is in fact guilty is more 
complicated. A variety of justifications might apply. One explanation might 
be that the agent does not hold himself responsible for the act; he might 
appeal to a presumed genetic predisposition, to a poor upbringing, or to an 
ignorance of the law. As mentioned, another justification might be that the 
agent considers the law that he has violated to be a bad law. Here he could 
accept both responsibility and punishment while, at the same time, he 
believes he acted properly. Other examples might be that of an agent who 
simply lacks the cognitive / emotional sophistication to be negatively affected 
by his conduct or of an agent who simply has no respect for legal and moral 
principles. 
Feelings of guilt are included in an alternative views to Taylor’s which 
establish an additional requirement of guilt. In order “to be guilty”, S commits 
some act X that an authority figure prohibits and which causes harm to 
another person. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (OCP) defines guilt, in 
part, as: 
The state imputed to a person who has done moral or legal 
wrong...Full acceptance and realization of guilt involves remorse 
and desire to expiate the wrong done...Yet guilt is not simply self- 
reproach; it is inseparable from awareness of the harm, or 
neglect, brought about to the others affected by one’saction or 
inaction (ed. Honderich, 1995, p. 329). 
A number of necessary conditions emerge in the OCP definition. One 
condition of guilt presupposes a specific relationship of an agent to an 
authority figure. Under this description in order for an agent to feel guilty, an 
authority’s prohibition must be viewed by the agent as both correct and 
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binding. This requires several cognitive steps. For an agent to recognize and 
accept that he is guilty, he must acknowledge that he has violated a 
prohibition that has been established by an authority, he assents to that 
authority as binding, and he accepts that the authority’s prohibition is, in fact, 
correct (Taylor, 1985). This acceptance of the correctness of the prohibition is 
an essential component to being and feeling guilty. The inclusion of this 
condition seems to be an improvement on the earlier, less elaborate theories. 
Furthermore, on the OCP analysis acceptance of guilt entails a 
requirement to atone or make amends. On this view we see structural 
similarities with repentance. Two conditions of repentance were: 1). the 
remorseful acceptance of responsibility for a wrongful act; and, 2). the resolve 
to make amends. Amends, in the case of guilt, is the making of restitution to 
the offended party. To be legally guilty overlaps with a requirement of 
remorse as defined in Rl. Legal guilt is incurred by doing what one knew (or 
could have known) to be wrong when one could and should have done otherwise 
(van der Haag, 1975). Therefore, to feel guilty the agent can not appeal to 
ignorance of the prohibition. 
As with the OCP view, several sources include the requirement of‘harm 
to others’ as necessary to guilt (Deigh, 1995; Rawls, 1971; Taylor, 1985: van 
der Haag, 1975). For example, in A Theory of Justice. John Rawls illustrates 
a case of guilt with an example of a man who cheats an associate. In 
transgressing the rights of others, an agent wrongly advances his own 
interests (p. 482). In an obvious consideration of the harm to others clause, 
Rawls claims guilt is reconciled by reparations and forgiveness. In the 
acknowledgement and acceptance of reproofs and penalties, the desire an 
agent has is for “reinstatement” (p. 483). In reaction to the same 
transgression, moral shame, on the other hand, is the acknowledgement that, 
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by cheating, one has not lived up to “a conception of moral worth he has set 
himself to achieve” (p. 482). 
Rawls makes an important distinction between the reactions one 
expects in guilt and shame. An ashamed person will anticipate to be treated 
with derision and contempt because he has fallen short of a standard and 
shown himself to be “unworthy of association with others who share his ideals. 
He is apprehensive lest he be cut off and dejected” (p. 483). A guilty person, on 
the other hand, expects to engender anger and resentment from the injured 
party. “Guilt is relieved by reparation and the forgiveness that permits 
reconciliation; whereas shame is undone by proofs of defects made good, by a 
renewed confidence in the excellence of ones person” (p. 484). 
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Bernard Williams makes much the same point in Shame and Necessity. 
What arouses shame in an agent is the expectation of eliciting contempt, 
avoidance, or derision from others; in guilt, the agent expects, because of some 
act or omission to act, anger, resentment, and indignation (Williams, 1993). 
Here shame is metaphorically tied to “sight’, the agent wishes to hide or 
disappear, whereas in guilt the agent hears the sound of an internal, 
disapproving judge. In disappearing, one hopes shame dissolves, but if one 
were to disappear with guilt it is as though “it would come with me” (1993, p. 
89). In that guilt requires reparations, it is intimately connected with others; 
shame redounds only on the self. 
We can feel both guilt and shame towards the same action. In a 
moment of cowardice, we let someone down; we feel guilty because we 
have let them down, ashamed because we have contemptibly fallen 
short of what we might have hoped of our selves... What I have done 
points...towards what has happened to others(and) in another 
direction to what I am (p 93). 
77 
And this analysis suggests that the cognitive operations for certain self- 
regarding emotions are multi-step. Michael Lewis, in “Self-Conscious 
Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt”, advances a version of 
this multi-step process with his Cognitive-Attributional Theory. 
His cognitive-attributional model is as follows: 
SELF-CONSCIOUS EVALUATIVE EMOTIONS 
A. STANDARDS AND RULES 
B. EVALUATION 
C. ATTRIBUTION OF SELF 
SUCCESS FAILURE 
HUBRIS SHAME GLOBAL 
PRIDE GUILT/ SPECIFIC 
REGRET6 
Lewis contends that the self-regarding emotions of pride, guilt, and 
shame are elicited when “one makes a comparison or evaluates one’s behavior 
vis-a-vis some standard, rule, or goal (SRGs) (Lewis, 1993, p. 563). Pride 
occurs when one judges one’s behavior to have succeeded in maintaining or 
achieving one’s SRG’s and shame or guilt is elicited when the agent concludes 
he has failed (1993). 
The first cognitive-evaluative step is what SRG’s the agent accepts as 
binding on him. “All of us have beliefs about what is acceptable for others and 
ourselves in regard to actions, thoughts, and feelings” (p. 567). 
The second step is the the agent’s two-part evaluation of his particular 
conduct in regard to the SRG’s. The first part is whether the agent accepts 
responsibility for the act (internal attribution) or whether the agent attributes 
* Lewis (1993) p. 566 
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responsibility to some other party or circumstance (external attribution). If 
the agent assumes responsibility, the second aspect is how the agent assesses 
a particular success or failure (1993). As discussed in the section on self¬ 
esteem, personal evaluations vary greatly. For example, a passing grade of B 
may constitute success for one person and failure for another. 
The last aspect of Lewis’s cognitive-evaluation model is the attribution 
of the self. The emotional state of guilt, Lewis proposes: 
is produced when individuals evaluate their behavior as a failure 
but focus on the specific features or actions of the self that 
led to the failure. Unlike the focus in shame on the global self, the 
focus in guilt is on the seifs actions and behaviors that are likely 
to repair the failure (1993, p. 569). 
Lewis’s implication that the emotion of guilt is conditionally good in that 
it might instigate reformative behavior is a controversial assertion. Equally 
controversial is his claim that shame is necessarily and always a global 
assessment of one’s character. However, Lewis does propose a plausible 
account of the cognitive operations that must obtain in order to be and to feel 
guilty. Combining Lewis’s account with those of OCP and Rawls, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of guilt will read: 
An agent supposes and accepts that he: 
1. is responsible for and has committed some act, X. 
2. X is prohibited by an authority figure, A, and 
3. that A has jurisdiction over him. And, 
4. that A’s prohibition is correct and binding, and 
5. by performing X, he has harmed others, he is, therefore, 
6. deserving of punishment, and, 
7. he believes he has an obligation to make amends. 
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We might formulate a tentative definition of guilt as : 
Gl: S is guilty = S merits punishment and feels an obligation to make 
amends for having violated a correct and binding prohibition, mandated by a 
legitimate authority, that has harmed others. 
With the exception of the “harm to others” clause, there is general 
agreement in the literature on the objective state of guilt (Rawls, 1971; 
Solomon, 1977; Taylor, 1985; Dillion, 1995). “To be guilty”, an agent, under 
the jurisdiction of an authority, violates a prohibition. However, substantial 
disagreements arise in explanations of the “harm to others” clause and in the 
content of “to feel guilty”. 
r 
Taylor suggests that Rawls has a needlessly restricted view of guilt that 
cannot account for such (Kantian) notions as failed suicide attempts, laziness, 
and ‘rusting talents’ (1985). All her examples display the crucial feature of 
doing what maybe forbidden, while, conceivably, influencing only the agent in 
question. Allowing for Taylor’s objections, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for guilt would now read: 
An agent supposes and accepts that he : 
1. is responsible for and has committed some act, X. 
2. X is prohibited by an authority figure, A, and, 
3. that A has jurisdiction over him. And, 
4. since A’s prohibition is correct and binding, he is, therefore, 
5. deserving of punishment, and, 
6. he believes he has an obligation to make amends. 
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G1 would be revised as: 
G2: S is guilty = S merits punishment and feels an obligation to make 
amends for having violated a correct and binding prohibition mandated by a 
legitimate authority. 
By virtue of the violation of a legitimate prohibition, G2 entails the 
consideration that harm has, or might, result to oneself or to others. However, 
it, unlike Gl, does not make harm to others a necessary condition. 
The importance of the requirement for making amends, or atonement, 
for a wrong done is a notion that is often overlooked in discussions which 
center on extemal/intemal distinctions. An external view can easily dismiss 
an important cognitive component to guilt; atonement and “reinstatement” 
involve internal operations. Yet a solely internal view cannot account for 
forgiveness from and restitution to some audience. 
One point Williams seems to make - when he says that if a guilty agent 
were to disappear, guilt would go with her - is that guilt is a burden. It is a pain 
an agent feels about herself. Following Gl, we might say that in guilt a 
number of cognitive operations have taken place. An agent, S, has done harm 
by violating a prohibition as well as harming herself or another. Some type of 
disfigurement has taken place. Repair can take the form of restitution or 
repayment. In repayment, part of the harm is undone. But if this repayment 
is entirely external, it is hard to see how any personal disfigurement is 
repaired. Here imagine a entirely passive defendant standing before a judge. 
She admits her guilt and accepts her sentence, but she feels unrepentant. No 
internal conversion has occurred nor will it occur and this suggests we must 
withhold forgiveness. For if we were, under these conditions, to reaccept the 
unrepentant defendant, it would seem to imply we value the ‘right’ or 
honorable conduct as lightly as she. This seems to be the sense in which we 
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are to understand the religious directive that absolution must be withheld if it 
is evident to the clergy that the confessor is unrepentant. Lacking 
repentance, the prohibited act is implicitly condoned as well as the 
acknowledgment of a possible “hardening of the heart” (Taylor, 1985). 
Repayment, only in the sense of‘doing the time’, is one explanation for 
recidivism. The (external) debt is erased while the disfigurement (internal) 
remains. 
An analysis of guilt therefore requires the inclusion of cognitive and 
affective components. Among them are: the recognition of harm, a violation of 
a correct and binding prohibition, the acceptance of responsibility, a 
disfigurement, and repentance. The affective experience is one of pain. The 
desire is to both rehabilitate oneself (the resolution to change) and to make 
amends to others. 
If it is true that these conditions constitute the emotion of guilt, it seems 
clear the internal / external distinction will fail to be enlightening. More can be 
said about guilt. This will be taken up in the section on shame. Let us now 
turn to embarrassment and humiliation. 
Embarrassment 
Embarrassment, humiliation and shame share similar structures. All 
three emotions are self-regarding and require a relation to the social world in 
which one’s actions and one’s standing are subject to appraisal (Miller, 1993). 
In all three an agent is self-consciously aware of how his position is seen or 
may be seen by an audience; this objectified view reveals to the agent a status 
that is inferior to what he had previously believed or hoped it to be (Taylor, 
1985). One method to distinguish these three emotions can be accomplished 
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with much the same strategy that was used with the linear development of 
the various forms of regret. But here the distinction is not drawn by the level 
of participation of the agent to the same object (e.g., one’s relation - as 
spectator or driver - to an injured child); with the various individual forms of 
embarrassment, humiliation, and shame the objects differ. 
Unlike humiliation and shame, one can respond with embarrassment to 
praise, to the recognition for doing good works, or for the sake of amusement. 
An agent might relate a self-effacing anecdote to his colleagues to alleviate 
tension or, for much the same purpose, his colleagues might intentionally 
embarrass the agent knowing it will be received in the right spirit. Here the 
motivation (or object) is amusement, not degradation (Miller, 1993). 
Descartes considers those that willingly subject themselves to this “gentle 
mockery” to be individuals who exhibit a cheerful temperament, a tranquil 
soul, and a quick mind (1985). And, as will be seen, self-effacement can, at 
times, be a protective tactic that makes one immune to humiliation. 
Praise and public recognition of good-works can cause embarrassment. 
An agent responds with an ineffectual and awkward dismissal of the praise: he 
attempts to divert attention, to change the subject. Carrying an elderly 
person’s groceries, helping one’s parents, or comforting a child that has lost 
sight of her mother are not acts done for public recognition. An additional 
feature of this type of embarrassment can include an empathic concern for 
the person in need of assistance: the helping agent can be equally 
embarrassed in the knowledge that those being helped might experience a 
tinge of embarrassment to be seen as needing such assistance. 
The feature of awkwardness is unique to embarrassment and it is an 
element in all the various forms. Embarrassment entails the feeling that one 
is unable to respond appropriately to a particular incident. Examples might 
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be that I have arrived at the party overdressed, or underdressed, or with a 
tear in my pants. Others at the party might feel embarrassed for me. 
Here the notion of an audience is essential to embarrassment as is not 
the case with shame. I am embarrassed by my dress only because I am seen. 
In shame, an agent’s final judgment concerns himself only. He is degraded not 
relative to an audience, but absolutely: he believes he has been revealed to 
merit - and to be truly represented - by this new lower status (Taylor, 1985). 
In embarrassment, an agent is seen as awkward only in this particular 
instance; the audience imposes a demand that the agent is unable to meet 
(e.g., I can think of nothing to do or nowhere to go to change my inappropriate 
dress). 
Embarrassment, then, is localized to a particular incident. As such, it 
rarely reflects on an agent as a whole as does shame and humiliation. By way 
of illustration, my car may stall in traffic. After all the obvious gauges check 
out and knowing little about mechanical things, I do not know whether to 
check the fuel fine, the spark plug wires, the fuses, the carburetor, and so on. 
My embarrassment stems from the fact that my associates in the car pool (or 
the drivers behind me) are imposing a demand on me to respond to the 
breakdown. This example brings out two other features of embarrassment: 
tension and confusion. Tension arises from the imposition of a demand from 
the audience for an agent to respond coupled with the knowledge that he or she 
is unable to do so. This inability causes confusion: “What shall I do?” In 
embarrassment, as soon as the agent resolves the conflict, the feeling 
subsides. I might notice the distributor cap is loose or I call road assistance. 
Having found my way around the obstacle, the incident passes. I am 
reinstated with my associates and we move on to new matters. I probably 
should know more about cars, but I have made no claims to be knowledgeable 
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in this area. Had I, this incident could have been humiliating. We might 
formulate a definition of embarrassment to be: 
El: S is embarrassed = S is observed by an audience as unable to 
respond in a timely manner to an awkward situation. 
A distinguishing feature of embarrassment, then, is that of an adverse 
judgment of an individual in a given situation, not of the individual as a whole 
(Taylor, 1985). The next time it is my turn to drive my associates in the car 
pool might subject me to embarrassing comments, but these remarks would 
take the specific form: “If there is car trouble, then we will be in some difficulty 
because...”. By contrast, humiliation and shame concern weightier matters 
reflecting upon the individual as a whole. 
Humiliation 
Humiliation follows embarrassment along the linear structure by being 
a darker emotion. Embarrassment oftentimes is a light, humorous emotion. 
It can be self-imposed to alleviate tension. To humiliate oneself or to be 
humiliated by others can involve comic overtones, but this is an emotion with 
elements of brutality and ‘rough justice’ (Miller, 1993). 
As with embarrassment and shame, humiliation requires an audience 
under some description. Quite literally, an agent is embarrassed only when 
seen. If I fumble about, alone on a deserted road, unable to locate the problem 
with my stalled car, I might be frustrated, angry, and regret having allowed 
my car to fall into disrepair but, without outside observers, I need not be 
embarrassed. As in embarrassment, with humiliation, an audience plays an 
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essential role. But, unlike embarrassment, humiliation requires a certain 
posture from the agent. 
Had I presented myself to my associates as a expert car mechanic, and 
proved to be completely inept at restarting the stalled car, I would invite 
humiliation. Here we see why the audience is essential to humiliation. It is 
their view that I have been pretentious in the estimation of my skills. In their 
view, I deserve a fall. The “object” of humiliation is the fall. To be humiliated, 
then, is to be assessed by the audience as deserving of a lower status than the 
agent previously held or assumes he merits. In humiliation the audience 
informs the agent of his misjudgment concerning his place in the social world. 
Unlike shame, it need not involve the breach of a norm or a moral wrong; to be 
humiliated the audience merely rejects the agent’s self-assessment. They 
communicate to the agent that he has over-valued his status or worth and 
that he has attempted to elicit outside agreement for this inflated estimation. 
To be humiliated is stronger stuff than the good-natured teasing of 
embarrassment. Whereas one primary reason for intending embarrassment 
is to provide amusement, in humiliation it is to degrade (Miller, 1993). This is 
not to say ‘to be humiliated’ requires either a malevolent intention or correct 
justificatory beliefs. What is essential in humiliation is that the agent now 
believes that he looks foolish or contemptible in the audience’s view. (Taylor, 
1985). The observer merely asserts that the agent aspires to or assumes he 
inhabits a higher position than the one to which he is entitled. “If shame is the 
consequence of not living up to what we ought to, then humiliation is the 
consequence of trying to live up to what we have no right to” (Miller, 1993, p. 
145). 
Recalling the mathematics professor eyeing the undergraduate in 
Karen’s example, we can assume she had no malicious intent nor did she 
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derive any pleasure from the professor’s pain. Simply put, in response to his 
unrelenting gaze, she needed to respond. In doing so, she made it evident there 
was no attraction. The pain of humiliation was grounded in the professor’s 
belief that he appeared ludicrous: he presented himself as something he was 
not. But, the undergraduate need not know, or even assume, the professor 
held any particular view of his irresistibility. Without knowledge of the 
professor’s self-assessment, the undergraduate did not know if she was party 
to humiliation. 
Humiliation shares a necessary connection with an audience as does 
embarrassment. In embarrassment the audience demands a response and 
recognizes the agent’s awkwardness. In humiliation the audience assesses the 
agent. This assessment need not be accurate and the agent need not agree 
with the assessment. So a primary feature of humiliation is the fall from a 
higher to a lower status, not that the agent accepts the new degraded status 
as merited. It is simply that the agent is viewed by an audience as 
presumptuous; he has assigned himself a position, or presented himself as a 
person, above that that he appears to be entitled. By doing so, he appears 
contemptible. It is possible the audience is wrong. The observers may be 
unqualified to assess the agent’s true qualifications. Now an agent may feel 
anger; he perceives this assessment as an unjustified slight. Whether he 
deems it important to correct this impression relies on the importance he 
attributes to his connection with the audience. And he still may feel 
humiliation whether the fall is justified or not, for it is still a fall. A proposed 
definition for humiliation is: 
HI: X is humiliation = df. X is a feeling of presumptuousness and 
deflation for regarding oneself more highly than an audience believes is 
merited. 
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Self-Esteem 
It seems indisputable that a necessary requirement for a flourishing 
life will be some sense of pride in oneself. Robin Dillion states empathically, 
“Self-respect is undeniably something of great value” (1995, p. 10) and 
philosopher John Rawls suggests without respect for oneself and for one’s life 
plans, ”all desire and activity becomes vain and empty, and we sink into 
apathy and cynicism” (1971, p. 440). Psychologist Nathaniel Branden 
considers self-esteem to be “the single most important psychological subject in 
the world” (1994, p. xii) while the California Task Force on Self-Esteem 
proposes the lack of self-esteem to be the central cause of most personal and 
social ills (cited in Kirkpatrick, 1992). 
Presumably, people are entitled to respect simply by virtue of being 
human. One formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative expresses this view. 
It states respect for the moral law requires us to treat people as ends in 
themselves (Kant, 1964, p. 96). This imperative expresses the intuitively self- 
evident principle that a person should never be treated merely as an animated 
tool for the benefit of another. By appealing to this imperative, slavery and 
segregation have been faulted and subsequently outlawed on the grounds of 
violating the inherent dignity of the individual. Martin Luther King Jr. 
frequently referred to Kantian imperatives. One such expression of the dignity 
of all people comes from King’s “The Ethical Demands for Integration”. 
Deeply rooted in our political and religious heritage is the 
conviction that every man is an heir to a legacy of dignity and 
worth...There is no graded scale of essential worth; there is no 
divine right of one race...Every human being has etched in his 
personality the indelible stamp of the Creator (1986, pp. 118-9). 
88 
However, it seems equally self-evident that self-esteem can be excessive 
or pride misplaced, that self-respect can rise and fall, and that others must 
earn, can fail to earn, or can lose our respect. These notions imply that a 
person ought to conduct him or herself in particular ways in order to merit our 
respect: we might suggest he or she is obligated to adhere to certain objective 
standards of conduct and decency. And what applies to others will also apply 
to oneself, for if I am to respect myself, satisfying certain requirements must 
somehow figure in my calculations as well. Yet it appears paradoxical to have 
to earn something to which one is entitled by virtue of one’s personhood. How 
can we lose - or fail to earn - a birth-right? Will these puzzles be resolved if we 
can establish ‘self-esteem’, ‘self-respecf, and ‘pride’ as distinctly different 
emotions with unique properties or are they, in fact, synonymous? In this 
section these are some of the questions that will guide the attempt to arrive at 
clear and precise definitions of these three terms. 
The literature on these emotions is enormous. Pride and honor has 
occupied the attention of philosophers long before Aristotle, while 
contemporary psychologists devote their careers to defining the nature and 
role of self-esteem. Views are widely divergent. Some writers believe self- 
respect and self-esteem are synonymous (Rawls, 1971). Others clearly 
distinguish them (Tefler, 1968; Darwall, 1977; Taylor, 1985) while a third 
group proposes self-respect to be a component of self-esteem (Branden, 1995). 
Various accounts characterize these emotions as feelings, beliefs, attitudes, 
sources of motivation, or dispositions. A further complication is that there is 
no consensus on whether these emotions are subjective (psychological) or 
objective (moral) experiences. 
Those writers who distinguish these emotions nevertheless agree that 
the common thread that connects respect, esteem, and pride is their concern 
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with worth. Esteem is presumed to be the appraisal of an object’s worth, 
respect the recognition and the appropriate response to the worth of an object, 
and pride and honor the reward due that object for its great worth (Dillion, 
1995). Let us take these emotions in turn. 
The earliest, and what many consider to be the definitive account of self¬ 
esteem was formulated by psychologist William James. In 1890, James 
proposed: 
I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am 
mortified if others know more psychology than I. But I am 
contented to wallow in the greatest ignorance of Greek. My 
deficiencies there give me no sense of personal humiliation at all. 
Had I “pretensions” to be a linguist, it would have been the 
reverse...With no attempt there can be no failure; with no failure 
no humiliation. So our self-esteem in this world depends entirely on 
what we back ourselves to be and do. It is determined by the ratio 
of our actualities to our supposed potentialities; a fraction of 
which our pretensions are the denominator and the numerator 
our successes: thus, 
Successes 
Self-Esteem = _ 
Aspirations7 
(cited in Branden, 1994, p. 305) 
This view is a clear expression of self-esteem as a subjective, relative 
concept. Not only do personal values and aspirations guide the evaluation, but 
each person will calculate different personal qualities according to how central 
they may be to their self conception. The sense of worth a person has thus 
turns on his ability to interact with his environment as he constructs it and 
only in those areas he deems important. 
7 Psychologists normally refer to self-esteem in terms of one’s spirits as high or low. In 
James’s formula 1 would signify the highest self-esteem possible while 0 would designate 
the lowest or the unsuccessful attainment of all a person’s aspirations. This paper will 
follow the current usage of the adjectives ‘high’ and low’ hereafter. 
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Two points seem especially noteworthy in James’s influential formula. 
First, on this account, self-esteem is perfectly neutral about ends. The 
successful attainment of a goal to which I aspire is the sole concern in my 
calculation, not judgments of its moral permissibility or of its social benefit. 
Whether I aspire to be a theologian or a burglar is irrelevant. 
Second, an inherent flaw presumably surfaces in a comparison of two 
individuals with vastly different levels of aspirations. Consider X and Y, two 
highly intelligent and talented individuals. X has only a few mundane and self- 
interested aspirations at which he easily succeeds. Y has grander, altruistic 
plans for which she studies and toils relentlessly. She succeeds at most but 
not all. Although Xs fraction is mathematically greater than Y’s, even on a 
subjective account it is difficult to agree X will, much less should, appraise 
himself more highly than Y. Two concerns with James’ version are 
then: 1) the neglect of the moral dimension or the social utility of one’s aims, 
and 2) the stringency of one’s aspirations. 
In 1971 when John Rawls published A Theory of Justice it contained 
what some considered the ”most detailed examination of shame and self- 
respect in recent moral philosophy” (Nussbaum, 1980, p. 397). For Rawls, 
self-respect and self-esteem are synonymous. Self-esteem (or self-respect) 
has two components. It is defined as “a person’s sense of his own value, his 
secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth 
carrying out” (Rawls, 1971, p. 440). Secondly, self-esteem “implies a 
confidence in one’s abilities...to fulfill one’s intentions” (p. 440). 
The concept of a person’s ‘sense of worth’ is defined as “1) having a 
rational plan of life, and in particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian 
Principle; and, 2) finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by 
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others who are likewise esteemed and their associations enjoyed” (p. 440). 
The Aristotelian Principle is defined as: 
Other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their 
realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities) and this 
enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the 
greater the complexity (p. 426). 
The Aristotelian Principle asserts that a person will enjoy an activity to 
a greater extent if it both taxes his capacities and if it continues to embody 
new complexities even as the agent becomes increasingly familiar with the 
activity. These are the components of desire in the emotion, the “principles of 
motivation” (p. 427). By way of illustration, checkers gives way to chess, as 
“the simpler things he enjoyed before are no longer sufficiently interesting or 
attractive” (p. 428). Whereas one quickly encounters all possible game 
options in checkers, chess contains endless variations and intriguing new 
challenges. Similarly, a person rereads Aristotle’s Ethics or continues to 
practice Bach because revisiting works of immense sophistication and 
subtlety holds the possibility of new insights and heighten pleasures. Rawls 
claims that when we cease to benefit from an activity - or if our associates 
believe our time to be misspent - we will soon lose interest. And Rawls claims 
that the support of associates enhances a person’s chance of succeeding at 
difficult projects; without support and approval an individual cannot maintain 
the belief that the activity is worthwhile (p. 440). In addition to one’s 
associates confirming one’s sense of worth, they are also considered by Rawls 
to be valuable by setting an example of excellence to which to aspire. The 
“companion effect” to the Aristotelian Principle - another principle of 
motivation - is defined as the arousal of desire in us to be like those of our 
associates who exercise well-trained and developed talents (p. 428). Having a 
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rational plan of life which satisfies the Aristotelian principle is, then, the 
criteria for being appreciated by one’s associates. 
On Rawls’ account, a person will have high self-esteem if: 1) she believes 
her plan of life is worthwhile, 2) she is confident she can carry the plan out, 3) 
the plan embodies complexities that continue to tax, but do not overwhelm, 
her abilities, and, 4) she is appreciated for her efforts by associates in a 
position of close proximity or connection. The emotional components - 
cognition, the identification of and belief in a worthy pursuit; affect, the 
pleasure from accomplishment, mastery, and approval; and desire, the 
motivation to improve and develop - are all accounted for in this formulation. 
Although more elaborate, Rawls’s notion of self-esteem shares 
structural similarities with James’s version. Martha Nussbaum observes, on 
Rawls account, the subjective conditions of believing a life plan to be worthy 
and the confidence to carry it out are sufficient conditions for self-esteem. 
Rawls thus implicitly denies that the objective (or 
inter subjective) value of my pursuits and the truth of my beliefs 
about them are at all relevant to the issue of self-(esteem) and 
shame (1980, p. 398). 
But Rawls’ denial seems more than implicit. As with James, there is a 
subjective feature which introduces a neutrality that affects both activities 
and ends. The application of the Aristotelian Principle, Rawls’ states, “is 
always relative to the individual and therefore to his natural assets and 
particular situation” (p. 441). And on Rawls’ account, an association is 
afforded a remarkable insularity. Claiming associations are groups by virtue 
of the match between the collective aspirations and ideals, he writes: 
93 
The activities of many groups may not display a high degree of 
excellence. But no matter. What counts is that the internal life of 
these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants 
belonging to them...The absolute level of achievement...is 
irrelevant (1971, pp. 441-2). 
So just as self-esteem can be calculated by the particular success one 
experiences and is recognized for, likewise shame, as one might expect, is 
“relative to our aspirations, to what we try to do and with whom we wish to 
associate” (p. 444). 
It can be inferred from this Rawlsian analysis that feelings of low self¬ 
esteem can originate from the subjective realization that one’s goals are 
unimportant, morally suspect, viewed as insignificant by our associates, or 
from the belief that one is ill-suited to achieve them. Presumably, all these 
impressions require verification from the group. Although all others may 
admire him, James, as well, implies that it is only the group well-versed in 
psychology who are capable of an informed assessment of what he aspires to 
be and has accomplished. 
In the above quotation, ‘But no matter’ is a witty little sentence, but it 
ought to give us pause. It simply is not true that associations are as insulated 
as Rawls claims them to be, nor is it true that the aspirations of the members 
of groups are appraised as distinct from and incommensurable with other 
associations. Although a person maybe internally disconnected or 
unassociated with a group of surgeons, philosophers, educators, or rocket 
scientists, he is likely to be cognizant of the required intelligence, fortitude, and 
talent necessary to maintain such lives. I see no reason, that in assessing his 
own group, the talents and accomplishments of others should not figure into 
his personal calculations. 
The comments on shame indicate another area of concern. If I consider 
both my aims and ideals worthy and that I am well-suited to pursue them, I 
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am a candidate for high self-esteem. Those with whom I associate must verify 
that my actions and aspirations are in accordance with my stated goals and 
that these goals are worthy. However, my associates might be as misguided 
as I am in what we consider to be worthy aims and honorable behavior. Street 
gangs are a concrete example.8 ‘Admirable’ behavior often entails drug¬ 
running, assault, theft, and murder. Rawls’s treatment of associations offers 
a feature of insulation to the gangs members as if to imply societal and legal 
scrutiny will have a negligible effect on gang associates. It is, however, 
indisputable that most criminals know there is strong outside disapproval for 
their activities. 
In many ways Rawls’s theory of self-esteem seems extensionally 
equivalent to that of James: the same objections apply. So Rawls’s theory of 
self-esteem has some difficulties that need to be avoided in the formulation of 
a definition, and in the assumed significance, of self-esteem. 
Considered by many to be the “father” of research on self-esteem, 
psychologist Nathaniel Branden, has written extensively on this emotion. 
Noting that people with low aspirations “are not conspicuous for their 
psychological well-being”, Branden recognizes an inherent difficulty with 
James’ version (1994, p. 306). Branden proposes self-esteem to be defined as 
“the disposition to experience oneself as competent to cope with the basic 
challenges of life and worthy of happiness” (1994, p. 27). This definition entails 
two components: self-efficacy and self-respect. 
Self-efficacy is described as the ability to master the challenges 
“enacted by our values” (p. 34). Self-respect is the conviction that we are 
worthwhile, valuable beings with an inalienable right “to live and be happy” (p. 
36). Self-esteem, according to Branden, is, then, an attitude of entitlement 
8 See, for example, Isaiah Anderson’s “Code of the Streets”, Atlantic Monthly. 
February, 1992. 
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and possibility, not an evaluation of achievement. Pride, Branden proposes, 
contemplates what has been accomplished while self-esteem “contemplates 
what needs to be done” (p. 40). 
Branden’s version of self-esteem differs from James’ in that the latter 
calculates the level of self-esteem based on accomplishments. Branden 
diverges from a Rawlsian account with even stronger subjective claims. 
Evaluative recognition from one’s associates plays less, if any, role in 
Branden’s version. Self-esteem is “what I think and feel about myself, not 
what someone else thinks or feels about me” (p. 52). Regarding the self- 
evaluation of my abilities and aspirations, “mine is the only judgment that 
counts” (p. 146). When conflict arises between personal values and societal 
prescriptions and prohibitions, Branden suggests an individual “challenge any 
and all authorities” (p. 152). 
Objecting that James’ version both lacks specificity and that is a 
prescription for anxiety - by virtue of comparing oneself to others - Branden 
advises individuals to assess their level of integrity. On his description, 
integrity is the fit between one’s aspirations, beliefs, and ideals with one’s 
behavior. Acting in accordance with our beliefs is ‘congruent’ behavior. People 
of integrity act congruently and, therefore, merit high self-esteem. But 
Branden’s appeal to ‘integrity’ hardly seems to constitute an improvement 
either over James or Rawls. If one has only oneself to answer to, beliefs can 
simply change so as to coincide with one’s present behavior.9 This technique is 
explicitly advocated by therapist Matthew McKay. The very objective of the 
cognitive behavioral therapist is to raise a client’s self-esteem by encouraged 
that person to “change the way you interpret your life” (1987, p. 3). A 
9 This is how a non-judgmental client-centered therapy operates. Its originator, Carl Rogers, 
considered success of therapy was determined by the quantitative increase in a client’s 
positive self-regarding statements (see Client-Centered Therapy. 1965, pp. 137-8). 
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person’s internal critic is “constantly evaluating...by comparing you to an ideal 
of perfection” (p. 100). The way to “beat the critic” is to repeat mantras of self 
acceptance until a new attitude begins to emerge (p.13). 
It seems to be a legitimate objection that Branden’s account lacks 
specificity. Just a few of the concepts that remain undeveloped are: ‘basic 
challenges’, ‘worthy’, ‘happiness’, and ‘integrity’. Still, many psychologists and 
psychotherapists subscribe to the general theory of self-esteem advanced by 
Branden. Variations on Branden’s version include defining self esteem as: 
conscientious effort toward challenges regardless of outcome (Bednar and 
Peterson, 1995), the courage to be ‘authentic’, or true to oneself, irrespective of 
another’s opinion (May, 1983), to the extreme view of advocating a complete 
disregard of external influences in the calculation of self-satisfaction (Dyer, 
1977). 
A fourth and influential account of self-esteem is from Stanley 
Coopersmith. In The Antecedents to Self- Esteem, the result of an extensive 
six-year research study, Coopersmith defines self-esteem as an approving or 
disapproving subjective self evaluation that calculates a person’s beliefs of his 
worthiness and significance. 
In short, self-esteem is the personal judgment of worthiness that 
is expressed in the attitudes the individual holds toward himself... 
in which the individual examines his performance, capacities, and 
attitudes to his personal standards and values”(1967, pp. 4-7). 
Coopersmith claims that an individual’s personal values are objectively 
influenced by the general social norms of one’s group (p. 244). Regardless of 
their level of talent or capacities, his study participants reported a relatively 
uniform acceptance of their particular social group’s values regarding 
intelligence, achievement, and social success (p. 244). However, within social 
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groups, Coopersmith discovered markedly different personal ideals and 
aspirations (p. 245). 
This second finding of Coopersmith’s research proposes individuals will 
prioritize the accepted, “internalized” set of socially defined values differently 
as well as to subjectively assign different weights to each specific feature 
within that set (p. 245). 
One example of the first instance could be this: in society A, academics, 
social position, physical attractiveness, and athleticism are highly valued. 
Success in academics and social interactions may constitute reason for 
person A to esteem herself highly whereas person B may look only to his 
physical attractiveness and athletic ability to measure his worth. An 
illustration according to the second finding might be three people who regard, 
say, academics highly in their calculations may assess similar 
accomplishments differently. Reflecting on an end of the year grade point 
average of 3.5 may please A, leave B indifferent, and distress C. 
A third important finding in Coopersmith’s study was that those people 
who scored highest on self-esteem inventories were those who set high 
personal expectations for themselves (p. 246). Favorable self-assessments 
have, then, no apparent connection with “lowered personal standards that 
permit judgments of success at lower levels of performance but rather with 
higher standards that are objectively attained” (p. 246). If this is in fact true, 
it helps to rectify an apparent flaw with James’s formulation: a 
mathematical equation that calculates low aspirations will not have a decided 
advantage. We naturally resist the Jamesian equation model precisely 
because it tends to favor fewer aspirations and this seems unjust. But, it is 
not at all clear that this finding should be accepted uncritically. The only 
evidence that Coopersmith offers to support this proposition appears to be: 
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“Persons with high self-esteem generally conclude that they are closer to their 
aspirations than are the individuals with low self-esteem who have set lower 
goals” (p. 246). This merely expresses a trivial truth. Regardless of the 
number or the stringency of aspirations, an agent who is ‘closer’ will always be 
one with ‘higher’ self-esteem. 
A second appealing finding is that general social norms tend to permeate 
an individual’s field of aspirations. “The similarity of value preferences in spite 
of manifest differences in capacity and achievement suggests that the value 
preferences that people actually employ...are those that are generally 
espoused by their group” (p. 244). This appears to offer further support to 
question the “insulating value” Rawls attributes to associations. Coopersmith 
proposes that people within social groups generally recognize the same 
features to consider in their calculations, but the individual assessments of the 
ultimate value of particular features, the satisfaction derived, and the 
perceived level of personal accomplishments will vary and tend to override the 
group norm. “Although shared standards make it likely that persons will 
emphasize and value the same goals, they may differ in how they appraise 
their attainment of those goals” (p. 245). This finding, on the other hand, 
would seem to display a sympathy for Rawls’s speculation that as interests 
and talents are fine-tuned by the Aristotelian Principle and the companion 
effect, people will gravitate towards one another to form associations. 
Coopersmith’s findings, then, suggest that even within a social group, 
infinite variations affect the calculation of self-esteem. To illustrate, let us 
suppose, a social group has four preferred values that individuals will, in some 
form, internalize. Lets call these the set {A, B, C, D} where A = intellectual 
achievements, B = economic security, C = moral behavior, and, D = social 
position. Now Coopersmith’s findings say several things. One is that although 
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members of the group generally recognize the same qualities, individuals will 
prioritize them differently. So for three members, X, Y, and Z, we can have: 
X favors {A, B, C, D>, Y favors {D, C, B, A}, while Z favors {A, D, B, C}. 
The suggestion that different agents weigh the same feature differently, 
adds an enormously complex variable. Here the sets for X, Y, and Z could 
maintain the same ordering, as in (A, B, C, D} but the weights (adding up to 
100 for simplicity) might be X = {30, 25, 24, 21}, Y = {50, 30,18, 2}, and Z = 
{70,15,10, 5}. Variations multiply exponentially when we add different 
priority orderings and more elements to the set. 
The difficulty hardly stops there, for Coopersmith acknowledges that 
different people will view their accomplishments differently, as we saw in the 
grade point average example. To illustrate this, consider that X and Y favor 
economic security as their highest priority and little else from the social set 
matters to them. So for X and Y let us assume their sets are {B, D, A, C} with 
the weights of {85,8, 4, 3}. Lets further suppose that X and Y have identical 
holdings, assets, and responsibilities. Even in this implausible situation, it is 
easy to imagine, as Coopersmith points out, that X and Y may very well 
“appraise the attainment of (their) goal” differently. X may feel very secure 
while Y, preoccupied as she is with money, is riddled with anxiety. 
We might conclude that self-esteem is afforded little objective validity by 
virtue of internalizing a general set of a group's values. It seems more 
plausible, as Rawls suggests, that individuals do in fact form associations with 
others who share the same prioritized ordering, similar assigned weights, and 
recognize similar levels of accomplishment. 
Coopersmith concludes that the ‘antecedent’ conditions that best foster 
high self-esteem in the formative years are parental acceptance, clearly 
defined rules, and respect. Published in 1967, at the beginning of a socially and 
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psychologically liberal era in America, Coopersmith summaries his study with 
a conservative warning. 
We should restate...that higher levels of self-esteem are 
associated with greater demands, firmer regulation, and parental 
decisiveness rather than with a tension-free, permissive, and 
otherwise idealized environment (p.261). 
To summarize, these findings suggest that group norms are inclined to 
influence the content of the field of aims for all members of the group although 
individual aspirations, assessments of accomplishments, and weights assigned 
within the field of aims tend to be subjectively determined. Calculations from 
person to person will show great variations. 
t 
Although there exists fundamental disagreements, these four main 
theories might agree on a formal definition of self-esteem to be: 
SE1: x is self-esteem = df. x is the level of self-approval/disapproval in 
reaction to the subjective appraisal of the worthiness of one’s chosen aims, of 
one’s perceived suitability to pursue those aims, and one’s level of anticipated 
and actual accomplishments. 
The components of the emotion of self-esteem would be: cognition - the 
evaluation of aims, accomplishments and anticipated accomplishments; 
affect, the pleasure or displeasure from the perceived fit between aims and the 
suitability of personal talents; and, desire, the motivation to realize, maintain, 
or to reflect upon successes. 
Self-esteem initiatives have fallen into disfavor, in large part, because 
researchers have concluded that truly objectionable behavior can co-exist with 
high self-esteem. William Kilpatrick notes that some of history’s worst 
scoundrels “seem to be quite self-satisfied” (1992, p. 42). A1996 report in 
“Psychology Review” studied the self-reports of individuals convicted of 
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serious crimes, among them such people as neo-Nazis and spousal abusers. 
The study reports that these individuals consistently expressed high levels of 
self-approval (cited in Glencoe McGraw-Hill. 1997, pg. 3). These reviewers 
claim that self-esteem ought to be in reaction to having “mastered something 
significant” (p. 3). “Real self-esteem is a by-product of real learning and 
achievement” (Kilpatrick, 1992, pg. 41). But, these objections restrict self¬ 
esteem to the past, to reflections on accomplishments. However, SE 1 and the 
accounts of Rawls and Branden state that one can have high self-esteem if 
one feels adequate to pursue one’s life plan. Branden’s requirement of being 
competent to cope with life’s challenges is necessarily future-orientated. John 
Deigh, in “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique” proposes that a person may 
identify, 
for purposes of self-assessment, with the person he believes he 
will become, his present self having little bearing. Consequently, 
he may even at the time be leading an all-together easygoing and 
frivolous life while exuding self-esteem (1983, p. 136). 
An adequate definition of self-esteem ought to entail the subjective 
appraisal of potential and actual worth. These four theories do not exclude 
anticipated accomplishments; even James’s version seems to imply he will be 
recognized for his expertise. 
The objections voiced against the individual theories may not, however, 
offer counterexamples that require us to amend our definition of self-esteem. 
The problem maybe in the alleged significance of the emotion. 
One reason to resist the seemingly attractive psychological view of self¬ 
esteem is the fact that as moral agents we necessarily appraise the kind of 
people we are as well as the kind of lives we lead. Moral agency is not within 
our volitional control. A moral dimension is a necessary component of every 
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human life and, therefore, it is essential in our calculations of that life. Critics 
might want to insist upon self-esteem recognizing some objective verification 
of the moral permissibility or social utility of one’s aims in self-calculations. 
Others might argue self-esteem must be associated with activity, speculation 
on what one might accomplish would not be adequate grounds for self- 
assessment. Presumably, on William James’s account he could be accurately 
assessed only by himself or other psychologists since success at his profession 
was what “he backed himself to be”. Recalling our definition of humiliation, we 
can imagine his humiliation if he was discovered by his associates to be 
ignorant of some fundamental principle of psychology. However, it is an 
incoherent feature of his theory to attempt to apply the notion of “with no 
attempt, no failure and no failure, no humiliation” to one’s character. Here 
Kilpatrick’s objection to self-esteem initiatives is well taken. It is puzzling 
that someone can be a scoundrel, know that he is a scoundrel, intend to 
remain a scoundrel, and yet have high self-esteem. 
Kilpatrick’s objections notwithstanding, nothing in the proposed 
definition of self-esteem, nor in the separate theories reviewed, offers 
assurance that the aspirations and qualities appraised are necessarily good 
and praiseworthy. Nor need they be. The subjective nature of the appraisal 
merely requires that someone hold a favorable view towards oneself on the 
basis of certain aims or accomplishments. For just as the aspirations and 
accomplishments can be misguided, so to can the judgment. Here the neo-nazi 
helps illustrate the point. It would indeed be a monumental accomplishment 
to stir up a previously harmonious community into a hotbed of racial 
animosity and violence. Setting that objective is adventurous, achieving it, no 
small feat. So to derive pleasure from that dubious accomplishment might be 
understandable under one description. But we need only recall the Aristotelian 
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insight that sweet things seem bitter to the man with a fever and “as different 
things seem valuable to boys and men, so they should to bad men and to good” 
(1176al5). We need not contest the validity of the neo-nazi’s report that he is 
pleased with himself; he unquestionably is. But, we can question the 
credibility of the reporter himself; we can object that his reasoning and 
judgment are wrong and his aspirations misguided. But we cannot appeal to 
self-esteem to sort out our difficulty. Any attempt to interject an objective 
moral significance into self-esteem is, by definition, unjustified. It neither 
requires nor necessarily entails an appeal to morally correct beliefs. One may, 
of course, consider moral merit in their self-assessments. Most do. When this 
occurs it is not by virtue of the demands of a subjective appraisal of personal 
aims, but from the objective considerations required by self-respect and pride. 
To substantiate this claim let us turn now to these emotions. 
Pride 
Various editions of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE) translate the 
virtue of megalopsuchia as ‘pride’, ‘greatness of soul’, ‘magnanimity’, and ‘self- 
respect’ interchangeably (Trans. Ross, 1925; Thompson, 1953). The term 
‘self-respect’ has become the popular choice in modem times. This may be 
primarily because various historical accounts use ‘pride’ to denote a vice, a 
virtuous disposition, a subjective attitude, or an objective fact. Modem writers 
may tend to prefer ‘self-respect’ considering it to be immune from negative 
connotations or theological overtones. As mentioned, there is overlap with the 
emotions of self-assessment as well as a propensity by psychologists to 
concern themselves with self-esteem, philosophers with self-respect, and the 
historical accounts with pride. However, one feature of the historical accounts 
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that recommends them is the discussion of “proper pride” as a correct 
measure of self-regard for the right reasons. An understanding of this notion is 
important to the general discussion of the self-regarding emotions as well as 
self-respect and shame specifically. 
In this section I will begin the discussion of pride by reviewing Aristotle’s 
account of excessive and deficient beliefs of one’s worth. In the literature, his 
accounts are generally considered to be accurate and uncontested. Aristotle’s 
view, then, will help clarify the target of proper pride. Next, I will introduce 
various comments by Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, and Isenberg on the 
conditions and requirements for feeling proud. These comments pose some 
curious puzzles for an analysis of shame. Last, with an emphasis on 
comments by Hume and Taylor, I will discuss how pride is connected to some 
other self-regarding emotions and review various definitions. 
In his customary form of analysis of the virtues, Aristotle discusses 
magnanimity, or pride, as a state of proper measure (or a mean) between two 
extremes - one of excesses, the other a deficiency. A vice of excess - vanity - is 
characterized by the man who thinks himself “worthy of great things, being 
unworthy of them” (1123b8). The deficiency is to think oneself worthy of less 
than one is properly entitled, to be unduly humble. The mean is for a man to 
“estimate himself at his true worth” (1123bl4). If that worth is great, a man 
is entitled to feel “magnanimous”. 
Aristotle defines another excessive form as conceit - the over-estimation 
of one’s worth and abilities. “Conceited people...being ignorant of their own 
limitations...attempt honorable undertakings for which they are not qualified, 
and...are exposed as incompetent” (1125a26-30). Conceit, therefore, invites 
humiliation. Aristotle also refers to arrogance or “superciliousness” as 
characterized by those people born with advantages but without virtue; for 
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“without virtue it is not easy to bear the gifts of fortune inoffensively,...and 
supposing themselves to be superior to everyone else, they despise other 
people, and behave as fancy takes them” (1124a29-b2). 
A contemporary explanation of excessive pride by Gabriele Taylor 
follows Aristotle’s distinctions of vanity, conceit, and arrogance. Vanity is 
commonly thought to be an excessive preoccupation with oneself and an 
inordinate desire to be admired by others. Conceit connotes an exaggerated 
sense of one’s abilities and the belief that all others pale by comparison. 
Arrogance, on the other hand, seeks no comparison. An arrogant man takes 
his superiority for granted, with no concern for evidence to support his claim of 
elevated position, status, or talent (Taylor, 1985). Taylor points out it is 
conceivable for a man to be vain, conceited and arrogant simultaneously. 
Preoccupied with oneself, a man might believe if he were to be compared with 
others he would come out “infinitely superior” (p.48). Believing that, any 
comparison with others becomes superfluous. For both Aristotle and Taylor, 
one requirement of proper pride is to hold correct beliefs regarding one’s 
capabilities, character, and merit. 
Aristotle’s discussion of pride is complex; it is an explication of the 
nature and value of the proper appreciation of merit, the grounds for merit, 
and the appropriate attitude toward public recognition. A proud person, on 
Aristotle’s terms, is rare. Since “it is impossible without nobility and goodness 
of character” to be genuinely proud, true pride is merited only by those that 
have achieved noble characters (1124a5). The reward for a noble character is 
honor, the greatest of external goods and the appropriate response to the 
dignified status of greatness in “every virtue” (1123b30). The grounds for 
feeling proud are, then, the proper concern for virtue and the correct judgment 
that one has a virtuous character. 
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We might assume Aristotle intends us to understand that a person is 
virtuous so as to merit and receive honor. He claims honor is to be loved for 
itself and that it is the “end of the political life” (1095b20). It, by necessity, 
follows virtue. So this causal relationship seems to imply that one is virtuous 
(the means) in order to be honored (the end). But a few lines later Aristotle 
remarks that political “people seem to seek honour in order to convince 
themselves of their goodness...so evidently in their view goodness is superior to 
honour” (1095b26-30). In Aristotle on the Human Good. Richard Kraut 
proposes how we ought to understand the virtue/honor relationship. 
I take Aristotle to be saying...(people) want to be honored for 
their virtue by those in a position to assess their character. In 
other words,...they love virtue even more than they love honor, 
and they seek honor as an indication they they have succeeded in 
their efforts to become virtuous. If they are honored by the right 
people for the right reasons, then they can be more confident 
that they really do have the virtues, and no adjustments are 
needed in the way they lead their lives (1989, p. 234). 
Honor, on the Aristotelian account, is now seen as the public 
confirmation of a virtuous disposition and as a motivational force to continue 
living nobly. From these comments, we can extract a possible insight about 
shame. It seems implicitly clear that to be dishonored (shamed) by the right 
people for the right reasons signals a failure or a shortcoming that will require 
an adjustment. What is explicitly clear from Aristotle’s account is that honor 
must come from the right sources and greeted with “moderate” pleasure 
(1124a2). Honors conferred by “ordinary people” should be discounted, 
presumably on the grounds that these people are incompetent to judge all¬ 
round excellence in the virtues. And honor should be the source of only 
moderate self-satisfaction for no external good “can be enough for perfect 
excellence” (1124al0). Pride, what Aristotle calls “the crown of the virtues”, 
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is, then, a feeling of moderate self-satisfaction for achieving - and being 
recognized by the right people as having achieved - excellence in all the 
virtues. 
Recognition and confirmation by associates is important in several 
other views of pride, none stronger than in Hobbes, and possibly none more 
perplexing than in Descartes. The view from the audience, for Hobbes, is all 
that matters. 
The value or WORTH of a man is, as of all other things, his price 
- that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his 
power - and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the 
need and judgment of another (cited in Dillion, 1995, p. 9). 
On this account nothing is of intrinsic value. Virtue, as with any other 
quality, has value if and only if it is valued by one's associates or by the 
conventions of one’s society. Justice, conscientious effort, honesty, and 
courage may or may not, at some particular time, be praiseworthy. It 
depends entirely on societal conventions. In Hobbes’s view, there is no 
Aristotelian sense of an individual evaluating himself appropriately. “Dignity 
is ‘the public worth of a man...set on him by the commonwealth”’ (Cited in 
Dillion, 1985, p. 10). 
It is on the Hobbesian view of pride that a shame-culture is 
comprehensible. In a shame-culture, pride and self-respect are synonymous 
with public respect. Public esteem is the greatest good and it is merited by an 
individual by conforming to the code that his society has established. By 
conforming to this code, he establishes his reputation. Public recognition 
establishes the appropriate level of pride or shame a man may take in himself. 
It is tempting to characterize a shame-culture as appearances versus 
reality. Shame-cultures seem to suggest that it is how a man appears to his 
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group, not how he actually is, that dictates how he is received by the group. 
And that reception of one’s appearance dictates or establishes his value. But, 
in a shame-culture, as in Hobbes’s notion of pride, appearances are reality. 
And, this is because, as Taylor points out, when there is no distinction between 
public and private evaluations, “a person can assess himself only in terms of 
what the public thinks of him” (1985, p. 55). 
Numerous arguments can be offered to show that this view is flawed. 
To consider attitudinal conflicts over segregation and slavery might 
sufficiently illustrate the flaw in Hobbes’s proposition. Clearly, all societies 
have a one time or another subscribed to bad codes. Not long ago in America 
the social policies generated by appeal to the intrinsic value of blacks 
accounted for some particularly offensive codes. But, if Hobbes’s view were 
true, segregation laws would have, at one time, been correct and justifiable by 
virtue of majority agreement on the presumed capabilities or social utility of 
blacks. Secondly, when slavery or segregation were operative in society, those 
individuals that objected to these policies could expect resistance and 
devaluation simply in virtue of opposing the operative code. It is evident in 
hindsight that those individuals who opposed slavery deserved respect for their 
convictions, not derision; they had legitimate grounds for pride. Third, unjust 
laws set the “price” too low thereby frustrating the talents, the aspirations, 
and the self-respect of blacks. These laws were, therefore, morally 
objectionable. 
Descartes finds some middle ground between Aristotle and Hobbes. As 
with Aristotle, proper pride, for Descartes, is intimately connected with being 
honored by others. In The Passions of the Soul, he writes: 
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‘Pride’ is a kind of joy based on the love we have for ourselves and 
resulting from the belief or hope we have of being praised by 
certain other persons. Thus it is different from the internal 
satisfaction which comes from our belief that we have performed 
some good action...For seeing that we are esteemed highly by 
others is a reason for esteeming ourselves (CSM Pt. 3, Sec. 204, 
p. 401). 
Unlike ‘self-satisfaction’, which requires no third party acknowledgment, 
Descartes claims that both pride and shame are inseparable from and 
grounded in the recognition of others. “A good or evil which is in us, or which 
has been in us, produces pride and shame respectively, when it is related to 
the opinion which others may have of it (Pt. 2, Sec. 66, p. 352, underlining 
added). And unlike Aristotle, when it comes to pride, Descartes appears far 
less discriminatory with the composition and qualifications of the audience. 
He offers the following directive: 
For although the common people are very bad judges, yet 
because we cannot live without them and it is important for us to 
be an object of their esteem, we should often follow their opinions 
rather than our own regarding the outward appearance of our 
actions (Pt. 3, Sec. 206, p. 401). 
Given his views on how one should verify that which one holds to be true, 
this position seems quite remarkable.10 His comments on pride and shame 
seem irreconcilable with this passage from his Discourse on the Method. 
10 For a comprehensive discussion of Descartes’s view of justifying knowledge claims and 
to fully appreciate the oddity and equivocal nature of Descartes’s directives for verifying 
one’s sense of pride and shame, see Garth Matthews’s Thought’s Ego in Augustine and 
Descartes (1992), in particular “Descartes’s Intemalism” pp. 125-140. Further, it cannot 
be offered in Descartes’s defense that The Passions of the Soul was an early work, 
containing views he would be inclined to revise; it was his last book. Nor is it much comfort 
that he originally intended the work to be primarily for the edification of Princess Elizabeth 
of Bohemia, with the inference Descartes believed appearances are uniquely important for 
those in noble positions. It is unlikely he would be condescending to her (by advocating style 
over substance), for in a letter to a contemporary he explicitly ascribed to Elizabeth 
“extraordinary” mental powers (see CSM, vl, pp. 325-7). 
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And yet a majority vote is worthless as a proof of truths that are 
at all difficult to discover; for a single man is much more likely to 
hit upon them than a group of people (Pt. 2, p. 119). 
From Rules for the Direction of the Mind Descartes even rejects allowing 
us to rely on a majority of ancient scholars. 
We ought to read the writings of the ancients...But at the same 
time there is considerable danger...even if all the writers were 
sincere and open...we would always be uncertain which of them to 
believe, for hardly anything is said by one writer the contrary of 
which is not asserted by some other. It would be no use to count 
heads, so as to follow the view which many authorities hold. For if 
the question at issue is a difficult one, it is more likely that few, 
rather than many, should have been able to discover the truth 
about it (p.13). 
As with Hobbes, in Descartes’s philosophy, the grounds for pride have a 
public and quantitative feature. It is only when others recognize some good in 
us that we are entitled to experience pride. Presumably, the greater number 
of witnesses, the more confident one can become. 
There is a parallel passage from Aristotle that also displays an 
asymmetry regarding the appropriate audiences for pride and shame. With 
shame, appearances seem to play an essential role. Whereas common opinion 
is disdainfully ignored in assessing honorable activities, the court of common 
opinion must be weighed in what may appear to be shameful. 
For the sense of disgrace...is consequent on bad actions for such 
actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in 
very truth and others only according to common opinion, this 
makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so 
that no disgrace should be felt (1128b21-25). 
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There is a further and troubling implication in Aristotle. Shame, we are 
told, is “more like a passion than a state of character’’ (1128bl0). Pride, on 
the other hand, can be properly defined through an investigation of a “state of 
character or the man characterized by it” (1123b30). Whereas pride implies a 
settled disposition, shame seems relegated to a feeling of disrepute. This 
introduces a puzzle that will require attention. These various views might 
suggest pride and shame are not contraries; the former being a virtue, the 
latter a mere feeling or physiological reaction. 
David Hume, for instance, suggests pride’s contrary to be humility, for 
he writes, “it is impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and 
humble” (Cited in Isenberg, 1980, p. 362) and “everything related to us, which 
produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility” (Cited in 
Taylor, 1985, p. 20). These comments suggest two things. First, each emotion 
signifies the acceptance of a position on a scale. The humble man accepts a 
relatively low position correctly assessing his capabilities, accomplishments, 
and his respective merit as rather meager. The proud person, by contrast, 
assesses herself highly. This interpretation accords well with the definition of 
humiliation. Humility offers immunity to humiliation, but it is not 
immediately evident what implications this holds for shame. For example, if 
an agent incorrectly were to rank herself too highly and to present herself as 
such, there is little trouble picturing an audience gathering the necessary 
evidence to deflate her presumptuousness. In their humiliation of her is the 
assumption that she ought to have been more humble, not the implication 
that she has been shameless. And, if the audience’s view is correct, and she 
comes to see it as such, her new status requires not that she necessarily 
reform shameful conduct, but that she make the necessary adjustments to 
both her self-assessment and to her self-presentation. 
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Although it will do little to sort out the puzzle with shame, it is relatively 
easy to discount Hume’s contention that pride and humility are contraries. 
One way is to recognize the possibility, and indeed a rather commonplace 
occurrence, of agents who take pride in their humility. A person can take pride 
in the absence of self-preoccupation or in the lack of an exaggerated sense of 
importance as well as in their correct beliefs concerning their status. Arguing 
against Hume’s notion of humility, Arnold Isenberg suggests this. 
Humility consists in knowing one’s limitations as pride consists in 
knowing one’s merits...the knowledge of both is comprehended in 
the act of knowing one’s place...(Therefore) Humility is not the 
opposite but the compliment of pride (1980, pp. 361-2). 
Here humility tempers pride from the excesses of vanity, conceit or arrogance. 
Secondly, being virtuously humble in a Christian sense need not be a 
form of deferential meekness, but more an acknowledgment, as Isenberg 
states, of one’s limitations and capabilities. Deferential meekness, as Aristotle 
suggests, is to be unduly humble. But in an attempt to comprehend (and in 
contrast with) God’s perfection, even our best efforts can be viewed, in the 
words of Malcolm Muggeridge, as “utterly inadequate” (Buckley, 1980, p. 14). 
His point seems to be that one can be proud of building a beautiful house while 
at the same time humbled by contrasting that house with a European 
cathedral. And we can further fine-tune our perspective on our house by 
imagining the proud architects of the cathedral humbled (and inspired) 
speculating upon the magnificence of God’s work. 
A second point in Hume’s remarks establishes a condition of 
relatedness or “closeness” with the object that elicits pride. Taylor illustrates 
this condition with an example of a beautiful house. I can take joy or pleasure 
in looking at any beautiful house, but I can only take pride in a house that is in 
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some way is connected to me, as in “My beautiful house”, or “My family’s 
beautiful house” A house, or anything that elicits pride, in addition to having 
some direct connection with the agent, must also be seen, in some respect, as 
desirable or valuable. Here it is not the value of the house, but the connection 
of the house with the agent that is of value. 
Hume’s additional requirements on pride are that the agreeable object 
be “comparatively rare, fairly constant, and discernible to others as well as to 
the agent himself” (Taylor, 1985, p. 21) For a quality or possession to be ‘rare’ 
implies that it exceeds some standard. These standards, Taylor calls, the 
“norm of expectations”. Following Hume, Taylor’s norm of expectations are 
established by 1) what a person can expect from external circumstances; 2) 
by his view of his own abilities and limitations, what he can or cannot achieve; 
and, 3) by the agent’s view of the expectations of others, by what in his view 
society expects or can expect from him (1985, p. 40). As Aristotle has said, 
exceeding these norms is rare; it therefore gives one reason to be proud. In 
interpreting this same view from Hume, Taylor explains: 
It is...that what a person is proud of goes beyond that person’s 
norm of expectations, and in whatever way she sees it as 
exceeding what she thinks she can expect, she will see it as an 
achievement of hers (1985, p. 40). 
The condition of “discernible to others” is explicitly rejected by Isenberg 
in his article, “Natural Pride and Natural Shame”. There he defines pride as 
“1) a quality which 2) is approved (or considered desirable) and 3) is judged to 
belong to oneself” (1980, p. 357). Arguing that we are proud of something 
which we value regardless of approval or disapproval from society, Isenberg 
rejects the idea that the object of pride must be recognized with approval by 
others. He illustrates his point by suggesting that the general public may be 
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incapable of evaluating the attributes that justify pride for an artist or a 
scientist, individuals who “demand applause on their own strict terms” (p. 
356). It is by their own lights that these specialists must ultimately assess 
their accomplishments.11 Citing this position by Isenberg, Taylor claims that 
we naturally hope for the approval of others, but it is a mistake to suggest we 
can be proud of something only on the condition others recognize and approve 
of that quality (1985, pp. 25-6). 
The restriction is not that she cannot be proud of this or that 
because others do not see its value...it is that the person must 
think her view of what is valuable in the situation is one that can 
at least in principle be shared by others. And this limitation is 
implied by the condition that a person is to be proud of something 
she must believe it to be of value” (1985, p. 27). 
Isenberg’s definition has a feature of self-sufficiency not found in 
Aristotle, but there are some counter-examples that suggest it is, at the very 
least, unenlightening. To suggest that - pride is a desirable quality that 
belongs to me - fails to distinguish, or pinpoint, my attitude toward how that 
quality reflects on my status. My attitude toward that desirable quality may 
cause me to become arrogant, conceited, or both; and technically, these are 
not instances of pride in the sense of a virtuous self-regarding emotion. 
Clearly, arrogance - a vice - cannot qualify as “the crown” of the virtues. 
Conversely, not every desirable quality of mine is reason to feel proud. 
Isenberg claims, “there is no quality deemed desirable the possession of which 
cannot be the source of pride” (p. 356). But this seems just plain wrong. Let’s 
say I am physically well-proportioned, free of major deformities, and 
11 The case of the artist (or the scientist) can be used to illustrate how the cognitive 
components of humiliation and anger work. If the above analyses are correct, we can 
imagine an audience, incapable of assessing the true merit of the artist, believing her to be 
pretentious. The audience thinks she deserves a fall and they register that sentiment in, 
say, an unflattering review. But the artist will not accept the audience’s evaluation, 
knowing what she knows, thus she will not feel humiliated (although she has been 
humiliated), but rather angry at what she perceives to be an unjustified slight. 
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moderately handsome. In short, blessed with some desirable qualities. This 
strikes me as an occasion to feel fortunate, not proud. There is nothing 
exceptional about these desirable qualities; they are quite ordinary. They do 
not exceed the norm of expectations nor have they come about through any 
effort or achievement of mine so they cannot constitute any special merit. In 
my case these qualities neither exceed a standard nor do they elevate my 
status. In another example we might imagine I have been blessed with 
exceptional intelligence. But if I were to waste away my life in one mundane 
pursuit after another isolated from and contemptuous of others, there seems 
to be no valid justification to take pride in the quality of my intellect. No good 
works result from this desirable quality. 
These examples seem to suggest Isenberg’s definition is too permissive. 
So a satisfactory definition of pride ought to include: 1) restrictions on excess, 
2) stipulations on the employment of one’s desirable qualities, and 3) some 
requirements on the quality that it is some fashion earned ot the result of 
effort. 
Selected from the above views, the necessary conditions for pride seems 
to be as follows. For a person to feel proud he must believe that he is 
connected to some thing or quality that is in some respect desirable or 
valuable. He must believe that he is at least partially responsible for bringing 
that desirable quality about. That quality either maintains high standards or 
will exceed one’s “norm of expectations”. That quality or feature is discernible 
to others in the sense of being demonstrable. When it is demonstrated, 
recognition must come from appropriate referees. The appropriate response 
to recognition is a moderate self-satisfaction with the desire to maintain one’s 
honorable position. 
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We might define pride as: 
X is pride = df. X is moderate self-satisfaction justified by the correct, 
evaluative belief that by virtue of a desirable, personal quality an agent has 
maintained or elevated his status by demonstrably exceeding an expectation. 
The elements of the emotion of pride seem would then be: the cognition 
that one’s status has been elevated by an activity that exceeds an 
expectation, the pleasurable affect that one’s status has been elevated, and 
the desire to maintain standards and to be recognized as honorable because of 
such activity. 
For Aristotle, the quality of one’s character is the proper grounds for 
pride; only the virtuous merit favorable self-regarding attitudes. Immanuel 
Kant introduced a completely different consideration. With the notion of 
autonomy, Kant suggests all persons are entitled to respect. - regardless of 
social position or conventions, and irrespective of character or merit. And the 
component of desire to maintain standards may foreshadow a resolution to the 
puzzle of pride as a virtue / shame as a feeling. It might be that pride entails a 
‘sense of shame’: the cognition that certain conduct should be avoided (e.g., 
conduct that violates standards). This introduces the notion of self-respect. It 
might be that a person maintains his or her self-respect by virtue of having 
and maintaining certain standards. This would then supply a j ustification for 
feeling proud. Let us review self-respect next. 
Self-Respect 
Respect is an emotion that can be interpreted from a variety of vantage 
points. Depending on one’s area of interest one might attempt to understand 
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respect as it is grounded in the intrinsic value of personhood, or 
in the context of rights and duties, or as it is appraised or distributed according 
to social position, virtue, a person’s integrity, or achievements. Of all the 
emotions of self-assessment, self-respect shares a particularly intimate 
relation to shame; Rawls, in fact, defines shame as an injury to one’s self- 
respect (1971, pg. 442). 
In this section an attempt will be made to define self-respect so as to 
distinguish it from self-esteem as well as to help explicate the notion of moral 
shame. 
It has been proposed that self-esteem is predominately a subjective 
appraisal; esteem implies that an evaluator estimates and attributes value to 
an object. With self-esteem people regard themselves favorably or 
unfavorably. On the basis of these beliefs, feelings will range from high to low. 
Respect, on the other hand, implies a multi-faceted phenomenon 
involving evaluation, standards, activities, and responses to others. To 
respect something, in one sense, presupposes evaluation. Having determined 
some thing, X, to be important and/or good, X thereby merits due consideration 
and commands appropriate treatment. We might say the worth of X requires 
a respectful response. To propose a person deserves respect essentially 
suggests one of two possible evaluative considerations. 
First, we may believe all people have intrinsic value. By virtue of their 
intrinsic value, a quality that is good in and of itself, people merit due 
consideration. The position of inherent value in all people was, most notably, 
introduced by Kant although this notion is central to many religious traditions 
and doctrines as well as presupposed in ancient philosophies. 
Second, a person “merits’’ respect, or is entitled to be self-respecting, by 
virtue of the content of his character, the quality of his conduct, the 
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assessment of his abilities, and, possibly, by the loftiness of his aspirations. 
Unlike the inalienable and invariant dignity grounded in the intrinsic value of 
personhood, merit requires individual calculations. Here the respect that is 
merited may vary according to such things as talent, effort, achievement, or 
virtue. This may suggest, unlike self-esteem, that respect is necessarily 
connected to activity. 
The sense of “properly valuing” certain attributes and accomplishments 
significantly complicates this second sense of respect; if self-respect is a 
subjective, relative emotion, to value some attribute objectively may be an 
incoherent notion. Let us consider both these evaluative approaches - 
intrinsic value and merit - and several views that propose the suitable 
candidates to weigh in our calculations. 
One of the most complex theories of respect is formulated by Immanuel 
Kant in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals. An enormous amount 
of critical commentary has been devoted to understanding Kant’s view of 
respect. It has been justifiably criticized for, among other things, being: 
obscure, open to counter examples, and lacking in persuasive arguments to 
support several fundamental claims (Feldman, 1976); neglectful of the 
significance and interplay of all other emotions (Oakley, 1992); an indefensibly 
restricted view of morally worthy actions (Schiller, 1949). Kant’s theory does 
however contain such suggestive and intuitively plausible insights about 
respect that most subsequent theories acknowledge his general contributions. 
Kant claims the attribute that makes one a person - a bearer of 
intrinsic value - is the rational ability to prescribe moral laws for oneself and to 
abide by them (1964, pg. 107). This capacity Kant calls ‘autonomy. 
“Autonomy is...the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every 
rational nature” (pg. 103). The Kantian prohibition to never treat people 
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merely as means expresses the view that - regardless of character, conduct, 
social status or native endowments - people, as such, must be respected. On 
the basis of a rational, autonomous capacity for moral goodness, people are 
worthy of respectful treatment since rational nature, in and of itself, is 
dignified (p. 96). Kant’s theory follows the logic: reason, and beings who 
possess reason, have moral value; to have moral value is to have a dignified 
status; and, the obligatory response to bearers of dignified status is respectful 
treatment. 
Stephen L. Darwall, in “Two Kinds of Respect” characterizes this 
Kantian notion as “recognition respect” or giving appropriate consideration to 
some feature of an object and deliberating about the proper response due that 
object. For Darwall, institutions such as the church, the courts, or marriage, in 
addition to persons, are entitled to recognition respect (1992). 
For a person to have recognition self-respect, in Kantian terms, is for 
him to 1) recognize his person to entail rationality; 2) to evaluate that 
characteristic as important; and, 3) to be disposed to treat himself 
appropriately. Inappropriate treatment or disrespect, on the recognition 
concept, would be instances where we denigrate ourselves - performing acts 
the degrade or disavow our dignity. Kant lists duties to oneself to prohibit: 
committing suicide, making false promises, allowing one’s talents to remain 
undeveloped, and ignoring others in distress (1964, pp. 96-98). As to other 
persons, Darwell concurs with Kant; recognition respect entails the moral 
obligation to behave toward others in appropriate ways. In dealing with 
others, Darwall acknowledges recognition respect restricts our conduct. 
Recognition respect for someone as a person is to give 
appropriate weight to the fact that he or she is a person by being 
willing to constrain one’s behavior in ways required by that fact. 
Thus, it is to recognition respect for persons that Kant refers 
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when he writes, ‘Such a being is thus an object of respect and, so 
far, restricts all (arbitrary) choice”’ (1995, p. 191). 
Presumably, it is in the sense of recognition respect that we are to 
understand such claims of democracy and biblical prescriptions as “All men 
were created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable rights...” and “Love your neighbor as yourself” (John 13:34) The 
inability of some to recognize the inherent dignity of people of color - and our 
duty towards them - is what prompted Martin Luther King, Jr. to portray non¬ 
violent opposition as “a means to awaken a sense of shame within the 
oppressor” (King, 1986, pg. 12). Citing this Kantian imperative, King believed 
subjugation (roughly understood as justifying the restriction of basic human 
rights to some individuals or groups) to appeal to a misconception that is itself 
- and results in - shameful behavior.12 
Before Kant, Descartes similarly proposed: “I see only one thing in us 
which could give us good reason for esteeming ourselves, namely, the exercise 
of our free will and the control we have over our volitions (1985, sec 152, pg. 
384). Descartes’s view of the importance of the capacity of free will - the 
“freedom to dispose his volitions” - parallels features of Kant’s “autonomy”. 
Descartes’s “control of our volitions” (p. 384) mirrors the Kantian 
version of self-respect he terms ‘pride’. As we saw, autonomy, for Kant, is a 
capacity the possession of which entitles the bearer a dignified status. In that 
autonomy is a capacity, it may or may not issue into morally good action. 
How that capacity is utilized introduces two other senses of self-respect found 
in Kant: reverence for oneself and noble pride. Reverence for oneself 
recognizes autonomy’s potential; it is the motivational, subjective feeling a 
person has as a free agent. It is “the assessment of a worth which far 
outweighs all the worth of what is commended by inclination” or self-interest 
u See “The Ethical Demands of Integration”, (King, 1986, pp. 117-125). 
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(1964, p. 71). “The dignity of man consists precisely in his capacity to make 
universal law, although only on the condition of being himself also subject to 
the law he makes” (pg. 107, underlining added). 
The evaluative form of self-respect is pride, or the level of self-respect 
we merit on the basis of our specific actions or how autonomy is utilized. 
Abiding by the commands of one’s universalized prescriptions justifies prideful 
feelings. A Kantian reverence for oneself seems to imply certain behavior, as 
in a slavish reliance on alcohol or an intentional verbal deception is beneath a 
self-respecting person. To have one’s pride’ prohibits such behavior. 
Respect, then, in Kant’s philosophy, is a complex phenomena. It entails 
the recognition of an objective intrinsic value (autonomy), an obligation to 
recognize the appropriate constraints upon our behavior (duty), a subjective, 
motivational feeling to perform morally good acts and to avoid evil (reverence), 
and an evaluative reflection for having performed good acts (pride). It is in this 
last sense of self-respect that issues in the concept of individual appraisals. 
On Darwall’s account, recognition respect involves the idea “this is 
important”. Like Kant’s ‘autonomy, with Darwall the inherent dignity of 
personhood is grounds for this kind of self-respect. In order to accommodate 
the type of self-respect that issues from how one’s autonomy is utilized, 
Darwall distinguishes two forms of appraisal respect: 1) an attitude toward a 
person as a moral agent, and, 2) an attitude toward a person engaged in some 
pursuit (1995). Therefore, the appropriate grounds for appraisal is either the 
person’s character or their displayed excellence in a pursuit or profession. 
The first form of appraisal respect can be illustrated by the simple 
example of promise-keeping. Other things being equal, both X and Y have the 
same (autonomous) capacity for keeping their promises. Different evaluations 
are grounded in their specific conduct. Therefore, I will appraise X as 
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trustworthy and Y to be untrustworthy by virtue of their keeping and 
failing to keep their promises respectively. These particular evaluations then 
factor into the general, overall appraisal. 
The second form of appraisal respect is the evaluation of an individual 
within a particular pursuit or vocation. Here we might propose a profession 
entails objective standards of excellence: a “code of ethics”. For example, we 
will appraise a surgeon highly if she correctly and consistently diagnoses her 
patient’s illnesses and performs the required surgery successfully. We tend to 
prefer, in the process, that she do so in a compassionate and timely manner 
and that she recognize the dignity of her patients. 
The idea in appraisal respect is “This is good” and the appraisal of a 
person as a moral agent introduces, in a broad and preliminary way, the notion 
of character. Character implies those habits and tendencies of a person that 
require development. Habits and tendencies imply predictability. As Joel 
Kupperman points out, “To have no character...is to be morally unreliable, a 
state not as bad as being wicked. The wicked can be relied on in a negative 
way” (1991, p. 7). Obviously, then, a person can have a “strong” character 
that is wicked. To have ‘no character’ suggests a person without direction, 
aims or convictions. Conversely, we can say that when a person’s habits and 
tendencies are morally virtuous, we tend to ascribe to him a ‘good character’. 
To have a good character suggests not only the presence of virtues and the 
absence of major vices, but that others can rely on a person of good character 
to act accordingly (Kupperman 1991). This also suggests how we can 
understand a person acting “out of character”. We react with startled 
amazement and disappointment when lied to by a person of good character. 
Habits and tendencies also imply activity. To have a good and strong 
character is to be committed to moral conduct (Kupperman, 1991). 
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Commitment implies having “a settled constellation of aims and ideals” 
(Deigh, 1995, p. 137). 
But where it was suggested that self-esteem can take the form of a 
favorable self-assessment justified by projecting on what one intends to 
accomplish, self-respect might be distinguishable by requiring activity. This 
distinction would pose problems for a Rawlsian analysis of self-respect since 
he equates it with self-esteem. This difficulty occupies the interest of Martha 
Craven Nussbaum in “Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity. Aristotle’s 
Criticism of Plato”. In a discussion of Rawls’s view of self-respect Nussbaum 
creates several scenarios designed to highlight potential difficulties for Rawls. 
One of her examples is essentially this: S is dissatisfied with her life. She is 
not exercising her excellences. External circumstance conspires to frustrate 
her efforts. Other times she is downright lazy. After a few sessions of “some 
fashionable kind of therapy”, she is now quite content (1980, p. 398). 
Nussbaum wonders: Has the treatment given S self-respect? 
It would appear we could answer in the positive only if we acknowledged 
S has adjusted her aims, ideals, and her life-plan as well as her assessment of 
her capabilities. This seems implausible, but I see no difficulty in assuming S, 
after therapy, may now view herself more favorably. Psychologists Rogers 
and McKay claim these revised self-assessments constitute successful 
therapy, they propose, moreover, it is therapy’s primary objective. 
Nussbaum objects to the implication in Rawls that “if you feel your life 
plan to be a worthy on and feel confident that you can carry it out, that 
appears sufficient to make you a person of self-respect” (p. 398). Nussbaum 
contends that the objective value of pursuits and the true beliefs ought to 
distinguish a genuine self-respect from mere feelings of respect (p. 399). 
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We do not think that my reducing my expectations and/or 
becoming placid about failure to achieve my aims will necessarily 
be a route to real self-respect...(W)e do not think that the solution 
to all problems of shame lies in the effacement of the 
uncomfortable feelings; we think it makes a difference pertinent 
to judgments of self-respect whether I solve my problems...(not) 
simply learning not to care (1980, p. 400). 
According to Nussbaum, appraisal self-respect implies correct evaluations of 
objectively good activities. 
The differences between the forms of respect can now be distinguished 
as follows: recognition respect is the acknowledgment of the inalienable and 
invariant value of people as such and the awareness that our actions are, 
therefore, restricted in certain ways. Appraisal respect acknowledges 
individual merit according to 1) the particular deeds and character of 
individuals, or 2) a person’s expertise within a particular pursuit. This 
explanation seems to resolve the puzzle of how all people are entitled to 
respect, under one description, while at the same time one individual is entitled 
to more respect than another. 
There is also a form of self-respect in the sense of maintaining standards 
that one has set for oneself. Like Darwall, Elizabeth Telfer, in “Self-Respect”, 
divides self-respect into two distinct kinds. For Tefler, an ‘estimative’ self- 
respect is a favorable opinion of oneself. In her view, conduct and character 
constitute the grounds for a favorable estimation, the self-regarding belief that 
a person attains some minimum standard “with an appropriate emotional 
accompaniment (of the)...admiration of others (1992, p. 107). Estimative self- 
respect speaks to the proposition “This is good” and it coincides with Darwall’s 
appraisal respect, the Rawlsian notion of “sense of 
worth”, and the subjective accounts of psychologists expressed as personal 
judgments of worthiness (e.g., Branden, Coopersmith). 
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Tefler suggests that if estimative self-respect were all there was to the 
emotion, it is unclear how we can attribute motivation or a desire to behave in 
a worthy manner (1995). For her, “It is not clear how a belief that one is 
already in some way satisfactory can be invoked as an explanation of 
satisfactory behavior” (p. 108). And this is precisely one point on which the 
subjectivist self-esteem advocates have been open to criticism. Fault found 
with the report from the California Task Force on Self-Esteem includes their 
dismissive references to achievement, competition, and success and their 
reliance on personal attitudes (Leo, 1990). Critics wonder, “If children feel as 
though they are perfect the way they are, what is there to strive for?”13 
Tefler’s second type, a “conative” self-respect addresses this apparent 
omission. It is defined as “a desire not to behave in a manner unworthy of 
oneself, or a disposition which prevents one from behaving in a manner 
unworthy of oneself’ (1995, p. 109). This type entails a motivational 
component to abide by standards of worthiness and “to shun unworthy 
behavior” (p. 110). Conative self-respect parallels recognition self-respect, the 
realization that an important status entails obligations of appropriate 
conduct. It seeks to acknowledge the “This is important” component. 
In a review of Tefler’s view, Dillion interprets Tefler to suggest these 
obligatory standards can be subjective or objective. “The standards include 
both objective ones, some of which are dictated by the moral significance of 
autonomous agency, and subjective ones, which one sets for oneself or are 
provided by one’s goals, projects, and roles” (p. 26). 
Tefler explicitly lists three objective, personal qualities that she claims 
have universal moral significance. 
13 See, for example, Leo. “The trouble with self-esteem”. U. S. News & World Report. April 
2, 1990. 
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When we say that someone has self-respect, we are attributing to 
him qualities of independence, tenacity and self-control. A man 
cannot have conative self-respect if he does not have these; 
whether he himself values them or not is immatprial...thig will 
involve meeting standards, attaining goals, fulfilling roles which he 
has set for himself. On the other hand, the fulfillment of some 
role is to be tested by an objective standard, even if the choice of 
role is a personal one (p. 112, underlining added). 
So Teller’s position seems to claim that by virtue of personhood all 
individuals have some objective standards to recognize and that each 
individual, at the same time, subjectively assumes other standards by virtue 
of their self-chosen projects and pursuits. Further, in light of the subjective 
choice of projects, the individual needs to recognize the objective standards 
inherent in these pursuits. This might be illustrated by recalling the surgeon. 
She subjectively chooses the field of medicine and is objectively obligated by, 
among other things, the Hippocratic Oath as well as hospital regulations and 
policies. 
Two authors, Stephen Massey and Thomas E. Hill, Jr., make similar 
points about self-respect. Massey, in “Is Self-Respect a Moral or 
Psychological Concept?”, suggests the subjective view has the following 
criteria: 1) a person identifies with a project, an activity or a particular status 
as having value, 2) this project provides a standard of behavior; 3) a self- 
respecting person believes that he or she acts in accordance with these 
standards; and, 4) he or she intends to continue to act in an appropriate 
manner (1995). Satisfying these criteria entitles a person to have a favorable 
attitude (estimative) toward him or herself. 
On this account, as Massey proposes, no reference need be made to 
independent or objective standards. The above criteria seem compatible with 
Rawls’s subjective (psychological) account of “a sense of worth” for Massey 
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writes, “we can accept that (a person) respects herself, provided that she 
believes her claims” (1995, p. 202, underlining added). 
An objective (moral) version of self-respect would need to introduce the 
qualification of an insistence upon the attitudes and actions of a person 
satisfying independent standards of worthiness. Massey asserts that the 
most frequent claim in the literature for objective standards “involves the 
requirement that a self-respecting person believe himself to have equal basic 
rights and properly value those rights” (1992, pg. 203). Much of the literature 
on race relations and the women’s movement appeals to the Kantian notion of 
the equal status of all people. A common argument for the objective basis for 
self-respect makes reference to the concept of recognition respect prohibiting 
unwarranted servility (Taylor, 1985; Dillion, 1995; Hill, 1995a, 1995b; Boxill 
1995). For a woman to be deferential solely on account of certain beliefs about 
gender, or for a black to assume a white has special entitlements or 
capabilities can be considered morally objectionable beliefs. If all people have 
intrinsic value, it becomes a duty to oneself and to others to acknowledge one’s 
equal rights and moral equality. 
Massey claims that the subjective account of self-respect “need not 
have any particular content nor must his actions meet any independent 
standards of worthiness or appropriateness” (1992, p. 202). But he seems to 
contradict himself when he lists as one of the four criteria of the subjective 
account an objective feature of‘conative’ self-respect. 
Identification with a project, activity, or status provides both a_ 
standard of worthy or appropriate conduct and a desire to act in 
accordance with it. This desire is central to the attitude involved 
when we speak of self-respect, since to respect oneself is to have 
certain attitudes and desires, especially the desire to act in a 
manner that one believes is worthy of oneself, and not simply to 
have certain beliefs about one’s worth (1992. p. 201, underlining 
added). 
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Here Massey reinforces Nussbaum’s objection to the presumed value of 
mere psychological realignment. In Massey’s psychological version of self- 
respect emphasis is placed on an agent’s desire to behave appropriately. 
However, one must be careful not to overlook his clear implication that the 
subjectively identified project entails objective standards. It follows that for 
an agent’s beliefs of personal worthiness to be correct, his perception of these 
standards must be accurate and his evaluation of his compliance must be 
correct. 
In “Self-Respect Reconsidered”, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. takes up the idea of 
fulfilling those roles that one has set for oneself. With it, Hill claims, there is a 
new sense in which a person can be self-respecting that need not appeal to the 
intrinsic value of persons nor to particular merit in conduct or pursuits. Hill 
introduces “a case of respecting someone independently of rights and merits”, 
the idea that a person can devise standards of appropriate behavior for oneself 
without the Kantian requirement to “universalize” the standard (1995, p. 119). 
Self-respect, in this form, requires one to five by personal standards, and 
evaluate oneself accordingly, but not to extend any demands upon others. 
These will be standards below which the agent himself cannot go. These 
standards constitute both subjective ideals toward which an agent aspires and 
constitute standards for the agent’s self-identification. Hill remarks, “Whether 
one sees them as objective or not, one genuinely takes the attitude that one is, 
in one’s own view, better or worse according to how one measures up to them” 
(pp. 120-121). 
The implication of the comments by Tefler, Massey, and Hill is that self- 
respect can rest on a comparison with standards and need not be a 
comparison with other people. The conceited or vain man compares himself 
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with others, in some cases without reference to any standards. Hill, however, 
introduces the notion that a self-respecting person feels an obligation to 
adhere to standards regardless of comparative appraisals with others. A 
person keeps her self-respect by maintaining her standards. It is in this sense 
that Taylor considers self-respect a “protective” emotion (1985, p. 80). The 
expectations of a person of self-respect must be those that the agent thinks 
are important, that are of value, and that contribute to the life she is leading. 
As Taylor, Tefler, and Hill suggest, some of these values maybe peculiar to 
her life. 
To summarize, many of the position papers on self-respect can be 
classified into those that advocate for a moral or objective account and those 
that propose self-respect is a psychological or subjective phenomena. Kant 
would seem to be a strong advocate for the objective view; self-respect, in his 
view, is construed as a moral duty to uphold the dignity of one’s rational 
nature. With their emphasis on personal aspirations, psychologists Rogers, 
McKay, and Branden, on the other hand, suggest self-respect should be 
calculated by whatever the individual deems worthy. They argue imposing 
objective standards upon oneself is a prescription for anxiety. The objectivists 
counter that individuals can frequently be deluded concerning the worthiness 
of aspirations (as portrayed by the cases of the neo-nazi, the gang members, 
and the spousal abusers). Accordingly, the different accounts will logically 
imply different views of shame. 
Both views have appeal. What seems to have been largely overlooked in 
the literature is that a plausible view of self-respect can blend elements from 
each account into a coherent whole. Rather than concentrate on points of 
disagreement, a compromise might be reached. One can find encouragement 
for this approach by the fact that the two views need not be mutually 
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exclusive. A further benefit of a successful blend of these two notions is that it 
will afford us a greater precision in an analysis of shame. 
The blend of the two views is suggested in a comment by Aristotle. 
Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of desire (appetition) 
correspond exactly to affirmation and negation in the sphere of 
intellect; so that, since moral virtue is a state involving choice, 
and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that if a choice is to be a 
good one, both the reasoning must be true and the desire right; 
and the desire must pursue the same things that the reasoning 
asserts (1139a20-26). 
Earlier in the Ethics. Aristotle proclaims “Our characters are 
determined by our choice of what is good or evil...”(1112a3). And since 
character is, for Aristotle, the grounds for one’s self-respect, his analysis 
incorporates: 1) conduct 2) motivated by the desire of a proper object 3) 
correctly appraised. For S to respect her character, she must have confidence 
that she has her aims right, that she can discern right from wrong, and that 
she has the tenacity and strength of will to pursue the right. But this account 
does not eliminate from consideration that the aims can be subjectively 
chosen. For a person to truly respect oneself there would seem to have to be 
the consideration of an autonomously directed life. One feature of servility 
that characterizes it as an objectionable state is that aims or aspirations are 
restricted or imposed upon an agent. That agent must conform to an alien 
standard, one not self-chosen. 
This suggests that we need not offer two definitions of self-respect, one 
that recognizes intrinsic value (conative) and another that accommodates 
individual appraisals (estimative). A satisfactory definition could incorporate 
the objective features of due regard for human dignity, proper aspirations, and 
conduct together with autonomously chosen goals and the fulfillment of 
personal ideals. From the psychological account, autonomy is recognized and 
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ideals are relative to one’s beliefs and calibrated, as Rawls suggests, to the 
individual s talents and inclinations. From the moral account, the desires, 
beliefs, and aims are verified to be directed at proper objects and connected to 
reality. The objects are neither the result of muddled reasoning or values nor 
are they indecent. Self-respect thus cannot degenerate into mere attitude nor 
can it dismiss objective moral standards or tolerate affronts to human dignity. 
As Aristotle insists, reason and desire pursue the same object. One reason for 
remorse is that an agent desires and pursues that which he knows to be an 
affront to human dignity. The agent is cognizant that he desires an object 
that is incompatible with reason and one that detracts from the goal of living a 
flourishing life. 
If we were to concede these points, we might formulate a definition of 
self respect to be: 
Xis self-respect = df. Xis a self-regarding evaluative appraisal that 
calculates an agent’s autonomy, aspirations, and conduct. 
A blow to one’s self-respect is a serious matter. It is more than the 
embarrassment over a stalled car, or the humiliation of realizing the days of 
being sexually provocative to undergraduates have long since past. Neither is 
it agent-regret, a sadness over how things might have been, nor even remorse, 
a resignation that one could and should have acted differently. The discussion 
of self-respect foreshadows several opportunities for an understanding of 
shameful behavior that mandates a reassessment of self-respect. Some 
candidates might include: treating people inappropriately, acting contrary to 
one’s convictions, giving in to temptations, misconceptions of one’s worthiness, 
or the disorganization of aims and ideals. Let us now turn to shame and see if 
these candidates can be explained and supported. 
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Shame 
What soon becomes apparent in a review of the literature on shame is 
the extent of the disagreements over precisely what it is and what significance 
it might have. At the same time, there is substantial agreement on some of 
shame’s specific features. Virtually all commentators agree that shame is a 
painful feeling that impacts upon one’s self-assessment. A sense of 
diminishment, which is never pleasant, is an integral component of the shame 
experience. As with other self-regarding emotions, the subject and the object 
of shame is the agent. No author that I am aware of disputes the basic 
observation by John Kekes that “it is a bad, unpleasant, painful, disturbing 
feeling, for it involves regarding ourselves in an unfavorable light” (1993, p. 
143). 
Commentators further agree that shame shares a connection with guilt, 
self-respect and self-esteem. On account of a failure or a transgression one 
feels diminished and a sense of diminishment requires a reassessment. The 
attitude held prior to a shame experience is supplanted by a less favorable 
one. And it is undisputed that some notion of an audience is involved; the 
desire to hide, flee, or cover-up is universally recognized. As with humiliation, 
in shame we are seen in a new light and we are sometimes startled by the 
unfavorable evaluation; the admonishment “Aren’t you ashamed of yourself5 
frequently alerts us to internal and external aspects of our thought and 
behavior to which we have paid too little attention. 
Lastly, although many people believe that to be ashamed is, in varying 
degrees, a bad thing, I have been unable to locate a single source that 
proposes to be shameless is, in any sense, good. Here is one clear difference 
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between shame and guilt. To be and to feel guiltless (innocent) is a good state 
of affairs. From the prior discussion of self-respect we can propose that to be 
and to feel shameless, is to be, minimally, a person who is without aims, ideals, 
and standards of appropriate behavior. 
Given all this, there are still far more points of disagreement. One writer 
believes shame can be classified into natural and moral categories (Rawls, 
1971) while another proposes that shame in all its forms has moral 
implications. Since it impacts directly on our attempt to lead good lives, 
every shame experience has a moral dimension (Kekes, 1988,1993,1995). 
Some believe shame to be a passive emotion (Urmson, 1980), others active 
(Deigh, 1995). Plato is widely understood to believe a sense of shame is a 
positive thing; it is a beneficial emotion that acts as a constraint on immoral 
behavior. On several points, one author interprets Aristotle to agree with 
Plato (Nussbaum, 1980). Others do not share this view. J. O. Urmson 
interprets Aristotle’s position to be one of neutrality (1980) and John Kekes 
offers persuasive evidence to suggest Aristotle holds a negative attitude 
toward shame (1988,1993). The apparent conflict between Plato and 
Aristotle and the variety of interpretations of Aristotle’s position are 
representative of disagreements that exist today. Current disagreements are 
fueled by the suggestive remarks of these ancient philosophers. 
In several dialogues Plato suggests shame is an important safeguard; it 
restrains immoral behavior. In the Republic, shame is referred to as a 
guardian that constrains young men from dishonoring their elders (Bk. 5, 
465b, p. 704). 
In the Laws. Plato warns against disregarding wise legislation. When 
one does, it is analogous to: 
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the souls of drinkers...(which) become more juvenile...(thereby losing 
the) fear which has received the name of modesty and the sense of 
shame” (671d, p. 1268). 
Again in the Republic, Plato suggests that to fall asleep with the parts of 
one’s soul at war with each other is to invite dreams that are lawless and 
shameful. 
Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites ...that are awakened 
in sleep when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and 
dominant part, slumbers,...endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its 
own instincts. You are aware that in such there is nothing it will 
not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of 
shame and all reason...It is ready for any foul deed...and, in a 
word, falls short of no extreme of folly and shamelessness 
(Republic, Bk. IX, 57 led, p. 798). 
Aristotle is characteristically less poetic. In the Nicomachean Ethics 
he refers to shame as ua sort of fear of disrepute” (1128bl2). This statement 
is obscure. It is unclear which attitude has prominence, the fear that one 
appears dishonorable or the belief, irrespective of appearances, that one has 
acted, or is capable of acting, dishonorably. Fear, in the Rhetoric, is defined as, 
a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive 
or painful evil in the future...fear is caused by whatever we feel 
has great power of destroying us, or of harming us in ways that 
tend to cause us great pain (1382a20-30). 
Shame, then, as a fear of a destructive evil, might be interpreted as a 
cognitive and an affective response to a breach of integrity. Aristotle might 
mean that an agent has failed to maintain a standard that he views as 
important, a standard that contributes to his self-definition. But his account 
of shame in the Rhetoric does not make clear what role the public recognition 
of an agent’s disgraceful conduct serves. 
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Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad 
things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to 
involve us in discredit; and shamelessness as contempt or 
indifference in regard to these same bad things....We feel shame 
at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to 
those we care for (1383bl5-19). 
What remains unclear from these comments is whether a person ought 
to be motivated to avoid disgraceful conduct by the fear of punishment, as in 
the loss of reputation, or by an aversion to vice. These motivations have been 
roughly categorized as external and internal considerations respectively. 
Three influential notions about shame, that in some circles enjoy the 
status of received wisdom, are that shame is an external (Lynd, 1958), 
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primitive (Erikson, 1950), and unproductive (Isenberg, 1980) emotion. In 
what follows I intend to support the claim that these last three views are all 
false. The conclusions drawn from the arguments that shame can be an 
internal, a complex, and a productive emotion will serve as an answer to the 
first research question: “What is the emotion of moral shame?” 
The procedure used to arrive at an answer to this question will be 
organized as follows: 1. a discussion of the internal / external debate (which is 
generally framed as the distinction between guilt and shame); 2. a review of 
the various claims about the necessity of an audience in order to experience 
shame; 3. a discussion of strengths and weaknesses in John Rawls’s 
important distinction of natural and moral kinds of shame; 4. a review of 
some of the most plausible and influential writings on the alleged significance 
or insignificance of shame; and, 5. a proposal of the proper components of 
shame. Next, from all of the above, I will propose a preliminary definition. 
Finally, following the definition, this section will conclude with a proposal on 
how moral shame relates to the other self-regarding emotions that have been 
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previously discussed. Let us begin with the proposition that shame is an 
external emotion. 
The Shame as External. Guilt as Internal Argiimpnt 
t 
A common assertion among some psychologists and philosophers is that 
shame is a social emotion. By social emotion, they mean shame requires an 
audience or that shame is an exclusively external phenomenon. Whereas 
Aristotle seems to imply shame depends upon some sort of public 
recognition, Descartes is explicit. “Pride”, writes Descartes, results “from the 
belief or hope we have of being praised by certain other persons” (CSM, 1984, 
Sec. 204, p. 402). Similarly, shame is “a kind of sadness...which proceeds from 
the expectation or fear of being blamed” (Sec. 205, p. 402). As noted above, 
Descartes distinguishes pride from self-satisfaction by virtue of the former 
emotion depending on “the opinion others may have of” a good quality of an 
agent (Sec. 66, p. 352). 
To explain shame’s social dimension, many authors contrast it with the 
proposed internal operations they attribute to guilt. As with Descartes, in 
Helen Merrell Lynd’s On Shame and the Search for Identity, the external 
quality to shame is equally explicit. Lynd claims guilt is based “on the 
internalization of values” whereas shame depends on disapproval from others 
(1958, p. 21). Anthropologist Ruth Benedict agrees that shame is a reaction 
to criticism from others, and to be “a more external experience” than guilt 
(1958, p. 21). 
Many current theories of shame seem to have evolved from these views 
as well as from the influential writings and research of Erik Erikson. In 
Childhood and Society. Erikson postulated the psychosocial development of 
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people follows eight stages; shame, the second stage, precedes guilt (1950). 
Erikson’s concept of shame is restricted to preadolescence (15 months to 
three years) and his view has been far-reaching in the internal / external 
debate. 
Quoting from Erikson frequently, the popular work of John Bradshaw 
has introduced the concept of shame to a wide audience. Bradshaw accepts 
the Eriksonian notion that shame emerges prior to guilt. In the popular 
Healing the Shame That Binds You. Bradshaw agrees with Lynd’s assertion 
that guilt presupposes an internal value system. 
Healthy guilt...results from behaving in a manner contrary to our 
beliefs and values. Guilt presupposes internalized rules and 
develops later than shame...Guilt is developmentally more 
mature than shame. Guilt does not reflect directly upon one’s 
identity or diminish one’s sense of personal worth. It flows from 
an integrated set of values (Bradshaw, 1988, p. 17). 
Bradshaw refers to the research of Fossum and Mason and their text, 
Facing Shame, as support for his position. From that book, Bradshaw cites: 
The guilty person might say T feel sorry about the consequences 
of my behaviors’. In doing so the person’s values are reaffirmed. 
The possibility of repair exists and learning and growth are 
promoted...The possibility for repair seems foreclosed to the 
shameful person because shame is a matter of identity...not of 
behavioral infraction. There is nothing learned from it and no 
growth is opened by the experience because it only confirms one’s 
negative feelings about oneself (Cited in Bradshaw, p. 17). 
The ideas that shame impacts upon one’s identity, that growth is not 
promoted, and repair is not possible evolve in Bradshaw’s theory to regard 
shame as “the belief we are flawed and defective persons” (1988, p. 195). 
“Toxic shame is no longer an emotion that signals our limits, it is a state of 
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being, a core identity” (p. 10). By contrast, Bradshaw recognizes a “healthy 
shame” as a recognition of limits and fallibility, a “metaphysical boundary” 
(p. 4). 
So Bradshaw portrays shame as a global self-assessment and for one to 
feel ashamed is to make this assessment that one is a defective and 
irreparable individual. Shame, he claims, cannot connect with “an integrated 
sense of values”. None of these propositions seem correct. 
Bradshaw does not make clear what classifies the recognition of limits 
to be shame as opposed to humility. One would expect him to do so, for there 
need not be a failure, a transgression, or a specific moral wrong in an accurate 
assessment of one’s capabilities. To define healthy shame as “a recognition of 
limits” is simply a mistake. Consider this counter argument. A person, S, is a 
genius. She is well aware that she possesses extraordinary intellectual and 
artistic powers and energy. Her scientific research and publications receive 
superlative reviews and her oil paintings hang in the finest galleries. S 
recognizes, however, that she can rarely write more than one scientific text 
and complete more than two paintings in the course of one year. She 
recognizes this limitation. So, knowing her annual limitations, S contracts for 
only those projects that she can honor at her level of excellence. I see no 
reason to categorize this as an occasion for shame nor is it clear how 
Bradshaw would meet this objection. 
“Toxic shame”, Bradshaw writes, “gives you a sense of worthlessness, a 
sense of failing and falling short as a human being” (p. 10). Bradshaw’s 
distinction of guilt from shame parallels what sociologists term the 
psychological states of primary and secondary deviance. Primary deviance 
applies to cases where an individual recognizes that he has committed a wrong 
act but that act does not affect his overall standing as an individual nor does it 
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contribute to his self-definition. As an example, a man steals a pair of gloves 
from a department store. Doing so might surprise him, for he attributes 
stealing to have been a momentary lapse and “out of character”. Apparently 
the appropriate emotional response to primary deviant behavior is guilt. 
Making amends, in this case to the store owner, relieves the “pained feeling or 
regret”. 
Secondary deviance, on the other hand, applies to those cases where 
acts express one’s character; the man understands the act of stealing the 
gloves as representative of who he is, for he thinks of himself as a burglar 
(Solomon, 1977). This seems to be Bradshaw’s point of toxic shame. A 
secondary deviant identification goes to one’s character. An agent believes 
himself to be a burglar; his global assessment or his “state of being” is 
considered to be irreparably defective and undesirable. 
Common and succinct definitions repeatedly heard in seminars and 
surveys and gleaned from the work from Bradshaw express these 
assumptions. A frequent response to an internet survey has been: “Guilt is T 
made a mistake’. Shame is T am the mistake’.” (Cited by Claudia Black, 
seminar overhead, and internet transmission, “BH”, 2 Dec 1997). This idea is 
expanded upon in this carefully worded internet transmission. 
For me shame has always been the result of being blamed- 
someone telling me that something I had done was “shameful”. 
When shame enters the picture, the message I get is that only 
someone inherently defective would have done such a thing. That 
shame can’t be resolved or expiated because it stems from a 
“state of being”. When I become aware that I have done 
something wrong, I feel guilt and remorse and possibly a desire to 
make amends (internet transmission, “NS”, 30 Dec. 1997) 
Here again guilt presumably applies to isolated, concrete acts, 
whereas shame applies to identity or a person’s “global self-evaluation” 
140 
(Lewis, 1993, p. 569). A second inference from these comments is that guilt is 
self-imposed whereas shame must be imposed from outside; one “become(s) 
aware” of one’s guilt (internal) whereas shame comes from “being blamed” 
(external). Secondly, to feel shame is alleged to imply an irreparable defect. 
Guilt, on the other hand, prompts remorse, atonement, and reinstatement. 
And guilt is assumed to be a response to a momentary glitch as in an act that 
is thought to be out of character. An agent is assumed to have acted contrary 
to his or her mature, reasoned, and internalized value system. Shame implies 
agents come to realize their values and aspirations are woefully mismatched 
with their capabilities. 
Like Bradshaw, Fossum, and Mason, Hebert Morris observes in Guilt 
and Shame, “with guilt we are disposed to confess, with shame to hide” (1971, 
p. 2). Morris goes on to note that guilt is resolved by confession and making 
amends. “Restoration” is possible (p. 2). In shame, we are required to change. 
But in many popular views, change is foreclosed by the belief of a secondary 
deviance, an unmalleable identity. The agent is the mistake. 
There are several dangers in accepting these positions uncritically. If 
we look at these distinctions and psychological assumptions carefully, it 
seems evident that they are ultimately unhelpful and seriously confused. 
Restoration implies reestablishing an equilibrium or the return to an 
original state. The learning and growth to which Fossum and Mason refer 
implies improvement, so that the change to one’s character that can 
accompany shame seems more accurately to suggest learning and growth. 
Reinstatement does not suggest growth; it implies repair. 
Secondly, no persuasive evidence is given to support the assertion that 
secondary deviance entails any inherent claims about shame. A man 
identifies himself as a burglar simply because he sees himself as habitually 
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disposed to steal. That, it seems, is merely an acknowledgment that he is 
guilty of repeated acts of stealing. It is easy to imagine a cat burglar or a 
bank robber that approves of and enjoys his life of crime. Although he may 
not harbor any misconceptions about his criminal identity, this does not imply 
he is ashamed of that identity. His lack of desire (or inability) to reform might 
be attributed to shamelessness. 
Another consideration is that if the burglar is apprehended, he will face a 
trial and probable conviction. In a trial evidence is submitted and weighed in 
an attempt to prove his guilt, not his emotional disposition about his life of 
crime. This scenario poses further difficulties for the internal / external 
proposition. A public trial and a jail sentence certainly seem to qualify as 
external sanctions for transgressions of laws or social conventions. And if the 
burglar is unrepentant, that implies he has neither an internalized value code 
nor is it likely that a rehabilitative conversion will take place. As happens 
with many criminals, he may technically “make amends” by serving his 
sentence, but, as criminal justice officials know all too well, this does not 
guarantee rehabilitation. 
Fourth, just as ignorance of the law does not absolve an adult from 
punishment for a crime, children are occasionally admonished for certain acts 
that they have performed even when an adult knows the child has not 
considered the normative status of the act. Parents react with “You shouldn’t 
ever do such and such” knowing full well that the child is learning something 
for the first time. However, the child will still feel guilty. The point is simply 
this: in these instances people come to feel guilty prior to the internalization of 
any applicable value or rule. 
The most important misconception in the formulations of how we are 
instructed to differentiate shame from guilt involves the perspective of the 
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audience. In the popular psychological literature shame is commonly 
portrayed as an external judgment imposed on an agent. A third party 
witnesses our failure or shortcoming and this observation serves to crystallize 
our global assessment of defectiveness. But this view completely overlooks 
many shame experiences that are quite commonplace. One example is the 
shame I might feel when no one is there to observe me. In a department store 
I might notice a beautiful pair of gloves and “consider” stealing them. To even 
entertain the idea of taking someone else’s property makes me feel ashamed. 
It is difficult to conceive of this as in any way “external” nor is it clear what, if 
anything, I am guilty of. 
Sartre has several examples of shameful activities that are frequently 
referred to in the literature. A variation on one is as follows. A man is peeping 
through a hotel keyhole, let’s say, at a woman undressing. He hears footsteps 
of someone descending the stairs near the woman’s room. Immediately the 
peeping tom stands up and begins to walk away. The third person, however, 
continues down the stairs, never entering the hallway. 
The first man avoids detection. There is no public disgrace. But, he 
clearly feels ashamed for he now sees himself as the person on the stairs 
might have - a man sneaking about in order to invade a woman’s privacy. The 
psychological external model does not seem to be able to accommodate this 
shame experience. 
Additional objections concern instances where an agent, S, is ashamed 
for failing to adhere to the supererogatory obligations she has set for herself. 
Merely abiding by social conventions will be insufficient to satisfy her 
internalized values. Illustrations of this might be S’s stringent work ethic, her 
acts of charity and volunteer work for the less fortunate, or the kindnesses she 
feels morally compelled to extend to animals. Although all these acts exceed 
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the demands of social convention, failing to perform them may cause shame 
for the agent who values them as constituting the requirements of leading a 
good life. This shame is entirely internal. No one expects her to exceed 
convention nor are they aware of (and therefore do not hold her accountable 
to) her exceptional “internal” standards. 
There is another example of standards only a person can impose upon 
himself. Let’s assume S is a highly talented furniture maker. He makes a 
comer hutch from beautiful pieces of cherry and mahogany, but he is 
dissatisfied with the finished product. If people with his talent were to closely 
scrutinize the workmanship, they would notice minor defects. Although this is 
unlikely, this piece of furniture is not representative of S’s best work. As such, 
he is ashamed it represents him. Gabriele Taylor refers to a craftsman to 
illustrate this “higher order” self-consciousness that shame can entail. 
(The craftsman) need not imagine an actual observer, and that 
there is such an observer need not be part of the content of his 
thought. All that seems necessary is that he shift his viewpoint 
from that of the creator of the work to that of the critical 
assessor, and he himself can fulfill both these functions (1985, 
p. 58) 
All these objections and examples suggest that a comprehensive 
analysis of shame (as well as of guilt) will need to recognize internal and 
external components. The claim that shame is an emotion solely in response 
to external phenomena is false. But, this does not commit us to argue that 
shame does not require some type of observation. When S reflects upon his 
performance, some sort of detached or objective observation must calculate 
how and to what degree his standards have or have not been maintained. To 
consider this, let’s turn to the idea of an audience 
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The Audience 
Certain comments in Aristotle’s Rhetoric seem to imply that one must 
be seen or have his deeds discovered by people close to him in order to feel 
shame. At 1384a25 he writes: “Since...we only care what opinion is held of us 
because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before 
whom we feel shame are those whose opinions of us matters.” Among 
Aristotle’s list of shameful activities are cowardice, wronging people 
financially, illicit sexual relations, profiting from helpless people, using flattery 
for personal advantage, refusing to endure hardships, and boastfulness 
(1383b20 - 1384a20). The list of people before whom we feel shame includes 
family members, our elders, the well-educated, the acquaintances of our 
friends, and those who take us as their models, such as, students, advisees, 
and rivals, as well as all “those who admire us, those whom we admire, those 
by whom we wish to be admired (1384a27 - 1385al0). In A Theory of Justice. 
John Rawls makes a similar point. 
Shame implies an especially intimate connection with our person 
and with those upon whom we depend...(a man) feels ashamed 
because his conduct shows that he has failed to achieve the good 
of self-command, and he has been found unworthy of his 
associates upon whom he depends to confirm his sense of worth. 
He is apprehensive lest they reject him and find him contemptible 
(1971, pp. 443-445). 
An inference that one is inclined to draw from these comments is that 
shame and humiliation share the common feature of a fall from a higher to a 
lower position by virtue of an external assessment. In humiliation, an agent is 
assessed by an audience to have allotted herself a position higher than that 
to which she is thought to be entitled. Regardless of whether the agent 
disputes the audience’s judgment, she nevertheless feels presumptuous for 
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having assigned herself a rank that is not confirmed by others. As Taylor 
observes: “When feeling humiliated a person realizes either that her good 
opinion of herself is unfounded, or that her belief that she commands the good 
opinion of others is mistaken” (1985, p. 139). The agent thus acknowledges 
that she “appears” contemptible; the audience’s perception is that her self- 
assessment is overblown. She is perceived as vain. 
Shame can operate in this way. In honor groups or in a shame culture 
failing to meet societal demands or adhere to its code results in public 
disesteem. And this view would seem to accord with the psychological 
characterization of shame as an external experience. The audience witnesses 
a failure or shortcoming and the agent, therefore, comes to realize that she is 
not what she assumed herself to be (Taylor, 1985). So one cognitive operation 
in both humiliation and shame is an unfavorable self-reassessment to 
accommodate the audience’s perception. 
But shame need not be the extreme and global overview that one is, 
therefore, ‘defective’, nor must all shame experiences be predicated on public 
exposure. The former claim extends the psychological umbrella of “shame- 
based identities” to range over too many cases. The latter claim Bernard 
Williams calls “a silly mistake”. 
The silly mistake is to suppose that the reactions of shame 
depend simply on being found out, that the feeling behind every 
decision or thought that is governed by shame is literally and 
immediately the fear of being seen...If everything depended on the 
fear of discovery, the motivations of shame would not be 
internalized at all (1993, p. 81). 
Gabriele Taylor expands upon the concept of the audience by 
distinguishing two elements in each case of shame. The first is one of 
identification, the self-regarding adverse judgment of the agent. A shamed 
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person feels degraded, “not the sort of person she believed, assumed, or hoped 
she was or...should be” (1985, p. 64). These notions of what an agent hopes to 
be and what an agent believes one should be foreshadow the argument for 
shame’s conditionally good status. 
The second element - which consists of two parts - involves the agent’s 
relation with the audience. This is the explanatory component and it shares 
structural similarities with humiliation. The “first point of view” audience 
observes the agent and renders an assessment. 
The second point of view audience...concerns the relation between 
the agent and the first audience. It views the different forms of 
seeing, and always views them critically...To speak of the 
audience is...to speak metaphorically...The metaphors of an 
audience...reflect the structural features of the agent’s becoming 
aware of the discrepancy between her own assumption about her 
state...and a possible detached observer-description of this 
state...and of her further being aware that she ought not to be in a 
position where she could so be seen, where such a description at 
least appears to fit (pp. 64-66). 
This metaphorical “detached-observer” audience refers to what Williams 
considers the “more interesting” of the two mistakes (1993, p. 82). “The 
internalization of shame does not simply internalize an other who is a 
representative of (one’s) neighbours” (p. 83). In an important passage from 
Shame and Necessity. Williams describes the possibility of the detached 
observer as other than one’s associates and more than the voice of one’s own 
conscience. This “second-self” can be an agent’s conception of an idealized 
version of him or herself, someone that more closely approximates a truly 
virtuous person. Williams’s passage reads: 
It is a mistake to take that reductive step and...that there are 
only two options: that the other in ethical thought must be an 
identifiable individual or a representative of the neighbours, on the 
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one hand, or else be nothing at all except an echo chamber for my 
solitary moral voice. Those alternatives leave out much of the 
substance of actual ethical life (1993, p. 85). 
Williams goes on to propose a feature of decision-making shared with 
utilitarianism: the obligatory requirement that moral agents weigh the 
consequences of various alternative courses of action in order to bring about 
the best of all possible worlds available. 
The internalized other is indeed abstracted and generalized and 
idealized, but he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and 
somebody other than me. He can provide the focus of the real 
social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in one way rather 
than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my 
relations to the world about me (p. 85). 
The forward-looking component of shame - a sense of shame - would 
thus, upon consideration, restrict the field of alternatives. A sense of shame 
excludes some courses of action. Clearly, Aristotle recognizes this potential 
when he remarks, “For there are many things that shame...makes us do or 
leave undone” (Rhetoric. 1385a6, italics added) and, “Men are ashamed of 
saying, doing or intending to do shameful things (1367a8, italics added). It is in 
this sense that Taylor considers shame a protective emotion. One retains 
one’s self-respect by avoiding shameful activities. This maybe the sense in 
which we are to understand Williams’s claim that a sense of shame is more 
than an “echo-chamber”, more than the pangs of my conscience. In an ethical 
dilemma, the consideration an agent entertains can be “What course of action 
would a truly virtuous person choose?” This, it seems to me, is more than 
“What should I do?” which carries the implication that my inclinations, 
dispositions, and ethical history will sway my decision. In other words, when 
asking what should I do, we ask what would be “in character” for me to do. 
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But, this question, in one sense, lacks both abstraction and idealization. By 
way of illustration, the difference is forcefully captured in the question 
Christians ask, when they ask: “What would Jesus do?” Presupposed in this 
question is the idea that I might be inclined, persuaded perhaps, to perform act 
a; Christ, as an ideal, would not. What seems to be often overlooked in an 
analysis of shame is that this “better self” - in the forward-looking 
deliberations that are influenced by a sense of shame - is not the “present 
self”. 
John Kekes, in The Pluralism of Morality, concurs with the claim that 
shame can entail an abstracted and detached observation. It is noteworthy, 
that he does so however in the past tense. 
The feeling (of shame)...requires us to compare some aspect of our 
present self to a better self that would have approximated the 
value more closely than we have done...One requirement of this 
self-conscious comparison is detachment. We see a 
characteristic or action of ours as others would see it... and we 
accept this detached assessment (p. 143). 
Presumably, “as others would see it” is an objective and harsh 
assessment. The judgment is clear and unprejudicial, unaffected by a possible 
leniency that permeates many self-assessments. Contrary to Kekes’s 
implication, this sense of shame need not be confined by directionality; its 
effectiveness can be in reflection (backward-looking) or in projection (forward- 
looking). For the backward-looking version of shame - the emotional reaction 
to a failure or a transgression (or feeling ashamed for some specific act) - can 
inhibit this type of behavior in the future. Concerning the reflective power of 
shame, Marcia Baron hits upon a simple truth. 
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(F)or while it is not inconceivable that someone might make first- 
person “moral ought” judgments in the present tense but never in 
the past, it would be odd. It would be strange since our thoughts 
about how we should have acted are one of the main sources of 
ideas as to kow we should act (Baron, 1988, p. 260). 
Not all commentators agree. Arnold Isenberg considers shame, as well 
as regret, to be “literally helpless, for they are concentrated upon what we can 
do nothing about, on the past. Hence, they are passive, incompatible with 
action” (1980, p. 375). 
Whether shame is a significant emotion brings us to the section where 
we will take up several prominent and contrasting views in the literature. 
These views are represented by those who consider shame to be conditionally 
good (in a sense, positive), those who believe shame is neutral, and those who 
believe shame is intrinsically bad (negative). Prior to the attempt to 
articulate and comment on these positions, it is important to be clear about 
what kind of shame is the target. This introduces the notion of natural and 
moral shame to which we will turn next. 
What seems to have been established thus far, however, is that any 
emotion that accommodates a detached-observer status can hardly be 
classified as primitive. It is not clear to me that I have come to terms with 
what Erikson and Bradshaw mean to imply by ‘primitive’. If it connotes an 
affective reaction restricted to Erikson’s preadolescent stage of development 
and/or the idea captured by Harper and Hoppes in their definition of shame as 
merely “an affect”, their claims fail. Even if we concede shame is confined to a 
backward-looking ethical review, that requires us to acknowledge there is 
cognitive reflection and affective reaction. Any property with two interacting 
elements is more than primitive. To include the forward-looking desire to 
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reform and improve offers additional support to the objection against a 
primitive categorization. 
So, at this juncture, there seems ample evidence to resist the claims 
that shame is either exclusively an external phenomena or that it is merely a 
primitive reaction. 
Natural and Moral Kinds of Shame 
In A Theory of Justice. John Rawls proposes that one way to distinguish 
shame experiences is by a classification into ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ types. Rawls 
defines natural shame as a reaction to a lack of, or the inability to exercise, 
certain excellences (1971, p. 444). Excellences are goods that are beneficial 
for the person who possesses them as well as for those with whom one 
associates. Rawls considers these to be goods since they enable us to realize a 
more satisfying plan of life. One way these attributes contribute to a more 
satisfying fife is that the appreciation our associates have for our excellences 
“supports our self-esteem” (1971, p. 443). 
Rawls tells us that wit, beauty, imagination and grace are among the 
natural excellences (1971). For a person to lack beauty or wit is an 
involuntary lack of excellence and, therefore, not blameworthy. According to 
Rawls, physical unattractiveness will occasion natural shame if, and only if, 
an individual aspires to a position that requires attractiveness. 
Natural shame is aroused by blemishes in our person....It is our 
plan of life that determines what we feel ashamed of, and so 
feelings of shame are relative to our aspirations, to what we try 
to do and with whom we wish to associate (p. 444). 
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Natural shame is in response to defects in our person “essential to our 
carrying out our more important associative aims” (p. 444). My unpleasant 
physical attributes, let’s say, my ugly face, would cause me repeated episodes 
of natural shame were I to aspire to be a television newscaster. I can avoid 
such episodes by adjusting my goals toward more reclusive professions. Rawls 
illustrates his theory of natural shame with an example of musicality. 
Recognizing one lacks musical ability, one wisely does not attempt to be, say, 
a concert pianist. Such a person will devote her energies to other pursuits for 
which she is better suited; without aspirations to perform, these occasions for 
natural shame are eliminated. Rawls suggests one need not feel shame for a 
lack of musicality, “indeed it is no lack at all” (p. 444). An agent need only 
adjust her aspirations to accommodate her particular natural excellences and 
thereby minimizing the occurrences of natural shame. 
Moral shame, by contrast, concerns voluntary behaviors that involve, 
say, acts of courage or self-control. The principles of right and justice are 
“used to describe the actions disposing us to feel moral shame” (p. 446). 
Moral shame is occasioned when someone lacks the virtues that 
his plan of life requires and is framed to encourage. He regards 
the virtues, or some of them anyway, as properties that his 
associates want in him and that he wants in himself” (p. 444). 
With “some of them anyway” Rawls presumably regards moral virtue to be 
subject to an individual exercising a preferred selection of those virtues at 
which he or she can excel similar to the selection of natural excellences. 
Gabriele Taylor and John Kekes reject the Rawlsian distinction between 
natural and moral kinds of shame. Natural shame, Kekes notes, is 
occasioned “because we are ugly, stupid, deformed, or have the wrong accent” 
(1993, p. 147). Defects such as these, he agrees, are unfortunate and may 
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detract from our self-esteem, but they are not blameworthy since they do not 
violate moral values. Moral shame, by contrast, “is supposedly caused by the 
realization that we are in some respect morally deficient” (Kekes, 1993, p. 
.145). Kekes cites cowardice, lying, and hurtful behavior as examples of 
morally blameworthy acts (p. 145). 
In the Rawlsian scheme natural shame is “placed outside of morality” 
because it involves no choice (p. 146); but, Kekes takes a broader perspective. 
For him, morality is “concerned with living good lives, and there are many 
constituents about good lives about which we have no choice” (p. 146). These, 
he suggests, include the absence of social and personal handicaps. It is to a 
person’s advantage to live in a society hospitable to his aspirations and 
endeavors, and to be blessed with the possession of the native endowments 
included in Rawls’s natural excellences (e.g., wit, beauty, gracefulness). For 
Kekes, since natural disabilities frustrate aspirations to lead a good life, these 
disadvantages have moral implications. “The fact is...we find some aspect of 
our fives deficient. Shame is thus a moral feeling because morality has to do 
with living good fives” (p. 147) 
Gabriele Taylor objects to the natural / moral distinction if the charge is 
these can be distinguished structurally. In all shame experiences, she claims, 
“the agent is seen as deviating from some norm, and in feeling shame he will 
identify with the audience’s view” (1985, p. 57). The verdict that the agent 
accepts, in every case of shame, is that the agent has lost status. Taylor does 
not dispute shame can take different forms, just that they can not be 
distinguished structurally. Kekes makes a stronger claim. All episodes of 
shame have a moral dimension since each occurrence detracts from the 
project of leading a good life (1988,1993). 
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It is not easy to be clear about precisely where the disagreement lies. 
Rawls explicitly recognizes that “we tend to be ashamed of...defects in our 
person and failures in our actions” which negatively affect our aims (p. 444). 
Kekes seems to say exactly this when he comments “defects and failures may 
exist independently of our choices...(so) shame is...an experience of failure, but 
it may or may not be culpable failure” (p. 146). By assigning culpability to 
some episodes of failure and not to others, Kekes appears committed to 
endorsing the natural / moral distinction. 
Rawls is careful to distinguish those defects that we bring about from 
those that are visited upon us. But of the episodes of shame for which we 
assume responsibility, Rawls implies that only those that frustrate our 
chosen aspirations are morally significant. An individual can insulate himself 
to many shame experiences by adjusting his aspirations and by the selection 
of his associations. “What counts”, Rawls proposes, “is that the the internal 
life of these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants of those 
belonging to them” (1971, p. 441). 
Moral or natural shame therefore takes on a remarkable subjectivity in 
a Rawlsian scheme. As Martha Craven Nussbaum remarks, this view is 
counter-intuitive. 
According to this account, apparently, a position that is not felt 
as shameful is not so. And if you feel your life plan to be a worthy 
one and feel confident that you can carry it out, that appears 
sufficient to make you a person of self-respect. Rawls thus 
implicitly denies that the objective...value of my pursuits and the 
truth of my beliefs about them are at all relevant to the issue of 
self-respect and shame (1980, p. 398). 
Kekes’s view goes to the other extreme with his claim that all shame is 
morally significant. In Facing Evil. Kekes develops an elaborate theory of good 
and evil in which he classifies unchosen actions (which allegedly involve no 
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choice) as among those acts that may legitimately considered morally wrong. 
These, he suggests, include acts that emanate from settled dispositions to act 
in particular ways in certain situations. An important point in Kekes’s 
argument is that the contributing factors in the constitution of a settled 
disposition need not be the result of personal choice. 
Customs, laws, rules, ceremonies, and rituals may be evil in a derivative 
way if conformity to or participation in them causes much undeserved 
harm (1990, p. 48). 
An illustration of such acts might be the various harms a klansman 
inflicts upon minorities. Many of these harms may not be thoughtfully chosen 
but rather manifest characteristically from a settled disposition of intolerance 
acquired in the klansman’s racist upbringing. In Kekes’s theory, then, appeal 
to a misguided education or an “unchosen” status does not absolve someone of 
moral responsibility for committing evil deeds. In Kekes’s theory the 
klansman ought to be ashamed of his beliefs and of the actions that emanate 
from these beliefs. This is a complex concept, but much of it seems right. In 
assessing the level of responsibility for one’s actions and also for having 
certain emotions, Justin Oakley offers an important insight. 
In determining whether a person is responsible for something 
which they cannot simply at will prevent themselves from doing 
or having, what we should consider is how they came to be in a 
position where their doing or having it is now unavoidable (1992, 
p. 129). 
In “Shame and Moral Progress” Kekes appeals to this point in order to 
justify investing all shame experiences with a moral dimension. 
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The distinction (of moral and natural shame) becomes 
untenable...since the distinction rests on the assumption that 
morality and choice coincide. Since the objects of natural shame 
are not chosen...natural shame (in Rawls’s theory) is placed 
outside of morality (p. 285) 
Kekes’s point seems to be to impress upon his readers that the impact 
upon our lives of natural shame can be just as debilitating as moral shame as 
both detract from the project of leading a good life. And that which contributes 
to or detracts from leading a good life is a moral consideration. But this does 
not make the distinction untenable. Kekes’s objection to separate natural and 
moral categories relies on the effects of the shame, not on the specific grounds 
that identifies an agent’s moral responsibility for a particular failure or 
transgression. He makes his objection stronger. 
Whether we feel ashamed depends on the fact that we have 
violated some value of ours and not on whether the violation was 
due to innate or acquired, voluntary or involuntary, accidental or 
cultivated causes...(Shame) understands only success and failure; 
the language of motive, intention, and effort, the consideration of 
causes, obstacles, and odds are foreign to it. (1988, p. 146). 
Many notions in this quotation seem wrong. Kekes’s primary error 
might be traced back to an equivocation. At one point Kekes invests shame 
with cognition, affect, and desire. Yet, at another time, he asserts shame only 
understands success or failure and claims shame is “a primitive, inexorable 
feeling* (1988, p. 286). Clearly an emotion with cognitive and appetitive 
properties understands more than that one has failed. If moral shame is a 
response to failing to approximate the better self, an agent will be well aware 
of the sincerity of his motives and effort. And ‘intention’ is the very “index of 
seriousness” that Kekes himself ascribes to shame. 
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Secondly, it does not seem plausible that all episodes of natural shame 
will affect an agent’s conception and acquisition of the good life. People 
deprived of some of the blessings of good natural fortune are not necessarily 
dissuaded from their important life goals. A person need not be handsome, a 
witty conversationalist, or have other admirable social skills to be a successful 
surgeon or an astronaut. For example, a surgeon may occasionally feel 
ashamed of his blundering, awkward bedside manner and also of the 
discomfort his physical unattractiveness creates in some situations. At the 
same time, aware of his intentions, his extraordinary efforts, and his motives 
to heal the sick, he accepts and views these unpleasant moments as quite 
inconsequential. The surgeon may indeed be ashamed of his lack of natural 
excellences, but these in no significant way detract from his important 
commitments and accomplishments. 
In conclusion, a distinction of natural and moral shame seems 
legitimate. Not every episode of natural shame need be infused with moral 
considerations. By the same token, it seems equally wrong to accept Rawls’s 
proposal that the process of electing personal aspirations will thereby 
designate the parameters for moral shame experiences. It is clearly an 
indefensible position to suggest that murder, theft, or adultery are not 
shameful if an agent does not feel ashamed after committing one of these 
acts. A report such as this entails an incorrect belief, a morally objectionable 
object, and a deficient sense of affectivity. 
Kekes is correct to assign moral significance to shame. It has been 
objected that the range of cases he allows is too broad. The literature on 
shame is equally split on the issue of significance. In an attempt to propose 
shame’s proper moral significance, let us turn to some representative and 
conflicting views. 
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The Significance of Shame 
The claim that shame can be conditionally good means roughly that the 
emotion can contribute in some positive way to the future conduct and/or to 
the character of an agent. Inasmuch as shame is widely, if not universally, 
recognized as a painful, self-directed feeling of diminishment, for an author to 
propose that shame might be instrumentally good seems sufficient 
justification to categorize that writer as holding a qualified positive attitude 
toward the emotion. According to this scheme, alternative positions can be 
classified as neutral or negative. In this section we will review representative 
views from each category, consider the various strengths and weaknesses in 
the respective positions, and conclude with a proposal suggesting shame has 
moral significance. 
The Negative View: Isenberg’s Argument 
In Natural Pride and Natural Shame. Arnold Isenberg characterizes 
shame as “misery heaped upon miseries” (1980, p. 365) and “an enduring 
curse” (p. 366). Isenberg’s argument hinges upon the notion of 
“reasonableness”. Pride, he suggests, is reasonable since it is “the pleasure of 
reflecting upon what one has already accomplished, (and it) reinforces the 
incentive to acts of the same kind” (p. 360). Citing Spinoza, Isenberg asserts 
pride is synonymous with “self-satisfaction, the pleasure arising from the 
contemplation of oneself...the greatest good for which we can hope’” (p. 361). 
The analysis of shame, Isenberg writes, “runs parallel to the analysis of 
pride” (p. 365). However, since he offers no specific definition, we may assume 
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Isenberg accepts pride’s definition to be suitably adjusted for shame. That 
would read: Shame is: 1) a quality; 2) which is disapproved (or considered 
undesirable); and, 3) is judged to belong to oneself (p. 357). This definition is 
supported by the text. Regarding shame, Isenberg offers the following 
comments. 
Shame is the feeling that comes with the consciousness of faults, 
weaknesses, disadvantages - that is qualities deemed undesirable. 
Most of these qualities, like deformity, ugliness, and vice, already 
entail suffering by their very nature, so that shame is a misery 
heaped upon miseries (p. 365, underlining added). 
Isenberg acknowledges the position that suggests shame is potentially 
beneficial in that it is necessarily connected with “standards of rectitude” (p. 
374). Without a conception of the right and the good, the notion of shame 
would be unintelligible. And Isenberg accepts Spinoza’s observation that it is 
preferable to be an ashamed man than to be a wicked and shameless man 
(1980). But shame and regret, Isenberg argues “cannot be sanctioned just 
because it testifies to something good: the question is whether it accomplishes 
anything good” (p. 374). On this point, Isenberg is unequivocal. 
(Shame and) regret by (themselves) effect nothing...(They) are 
literally helpless, for they are concentrated upon what we can do 
nothing about, on the past. Hence, they are “passive”, 
incompatible with action...Shame...is seen as a price we may pay 
for our weaknesses and the attempt to cope with them; and 
morbidity...is the evidence...of the inability to act (p. 375). 
Since shame is powerless to effect positive change, but rather leads to 
“despondency”, to “morbidity”, and to directionless “brooding”, it is 
unreasonable to be ashamed of our weaknesses and of our vices (p. 374-5). 
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It is as unreasonable to tolerate the sear of shame upon the spirit 
as it is to permit a wound to fester in the body. There is no such 
thing as a right amount of shame, as there is a right kind and 
amount of pride. Every shame, however circumscribed, must go 
(p. 369). 
When feeling proud, on the other hand, we are encouraged to perform similar 
acts as those that have elicited pride. Unlike shame, it is, therefore, a 
reasonable emotion (p. 367). 
Isenberg makes two separate claims in his analysis of shame. First, he 
claims that shame invariably makes a state of affairs worse, never better. 
Shame is a misery in reaction to a quality or vice that causes us misery. 
Second, Isenberg claims that every shame is passive, incapable with 
motivating action, and literally helpless to bring about reformative or positive 
change. In us, shame festers ineffectually. Both these views, it seems to me, 
are false. 
In order to refute Isenberg’s first claim, it will require a discussion of two 
different principles regarding how elements interact in a state of affairs. So, 
let us turn now to Isenberg’s first claim, that shame is misery upon misery. 
Two Wavs to Calculate the Instumental Value of Pain 
The claim to be defended here is that Isenberg is wrong to assert that 
shame always makes a state of affairs worse. To substantiate this objection 
requires an understanding of the concept of shame as a part of a whole. 
Isenberg’s point is that with the inclusion of shame into a wider state of 
affairs, the whole is therefore invariably worse. 
There are two relevant and conflicting theories of how parts contribute 
to the value of a whole. One is explained by the principle of summation. This, 
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it seems clear, is how Isenberg understands shame to contribute to a state of 
affairs. The other theory is the principle of organic unities. This, it seems 
equally clear, is the proper way to understand shame’s contribution as a part 
of the whole. 
Franz Brentano, in a footnote in his article “The Origin of Our Knowledge 
of Right and Wrong”, explains: “The principle (of summation) tells us that if a 
feeling is good, then if the feeling is increased, the goodness of the act is 
increased” (p. 23). Degrees of bad feelings work similarly. As bad feelings 
increase, the badness of the act increases and the intrinsic value of that act 
decreases. Likewise as either good and bad feelings decrease, so does the act’s 
goodness or badness respectively with the appropriate change in intrinsic 
value. 
The principle of summation can be defined as follows: 
PS: The value of a whole is the same as the sum of the values of the parts. 
It is important to note that this principle does not require that the parts 
of a whole are static or that their value must remained fixed as in elementary 
mathematical addition or subtraction equations. An example of a “fixed 
principle of summation” might be this: Let’s assume, S, empties his pocket 
and counts his change. He has a quarter, a dime, and a nickel. In all, S has 
forty cents. The value of the whole (all the change) is the same as the sum of 
the values of the parts (25 + 10 + 5). Regardless of whether S combines the 
nickel with more change or spends the quarter and the dime, the nickel’s value 
remains the same. The value of each coin is constant; the nickel will always 
be worth five cents. Its value, then, is not subject to fluctuation by virtue of 
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the composition of the whole of which the nickel is a part. But this is not the 
way Brentano intends us to understand the principle of summation. 
As the principle applies to emotions and human conduct the elements of 
cognition, affect (pleasure and pain), and desire interact. As they do, the 
application of the principle becomes far more complex than the ‘fixed’ version. 
To calculate the value of a state of affairs, Brentano establishes some 
important distinctions regarding affect. In an analysis of Brentano’s position, 
Chisholm summaries these relevant considerations. 
We may ask, first, whether the pleasure or displeasure is correct 
or incorrect. We may ask, secondly, about the quality of the 
intentional object. Is it a pleasure (or displeasure) in the good, in 
the bad, or in the indifferent? And we may ask, finally, whether it 
is true or false (Chisholm, 1986, p. 67) 
Two seemingly uncontroversial principles, and ones that Brentano 
believes to be true, are: Pleasure, in and of itself, is good; pain, in and of itself, is 
bad (1986). However, regarding pleasure in the bad, Brentano writes: 
“Pleasure in the bad,...to the extent that it is...an incorrect emotion...is 
something that is bad...Better that there be no pleasure at all than pleasure in 
the bad” (p. 65). 
In an explication of Brentano’s position, Chisholm illustrates this idea 
with an example pertinent to this study. 
Aristotle says that “shamelessness - not to be ashamed of doing 
bad actions - is bad”. Suppose I believe I have performed an evil 
deed and I contemplate what I take to be this deed. The 
contemplation of this deed... will not in itself be bad; we may say 
that it is neutral...Consider now that the neutral state of affairs 
that is my not being ashamed of that which I contemplate. If we 
combine these two neutrals we arrive at that bad state that is 
failure to be ashamed at the contemplation of one’s misdeed 
(Chisholm, 1986, pp. 84-5, underlining added). 
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So it appears that Brentano has run into difficulty. If he intends to 
claim that as a bad feeling increases, the badness of the larger state of affairs 
(of which the bad feeling is a part) increases proportionally, then he appears to 
have committed himself to endorsing conflicting principles. In combining these 
two ideas, we arrive at the unfortunate conclusion that if we increase the 
pleasure in the bad, since it is pleasure, then the goodness of the act will 
increase and, since the intentional object is wrong (some bad from which the 
agent derives pleasure) the badness of the act also increases. 
Let us take a simple example to illustrate the difficulty. Let’s consider 
S, a young boy, intentionally inflicts some pain upon a dog. Here are some, but 
not all, of the features of this state of affairs. S commits an act of cruelty, S 
has an emotional reaction to this act, and the dog experiences some pain. For 
simplicity in this discussion, let us assign some arbitrary numerical values. 
These could be: 
Ex. 1: The act of cruelty (-10); An emotional response of shamelessness (0); 
The pain to the dog (- 5) 
The value of this state of affairs, according to the principle of 
summation, is (-15). Now consider the emotional response of taking pleasure 
in the infliction of pain upon the dog. Here, the emotional response might equal 
(+10), for, as Brentano says, pleasure, in and of itself, is good. Now the parts 
look like this: 
Ex. 2: Cruelty (-10); emotion of pleasure (+10); pain to the dog (- 5). 
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This implies the state of affairs in Ex. 2 is preferable to the state of 
affairs in Ex. 1, since {- 5 > -15). But, Brentano wants to say that pleasure in 
the bad is bad. From the essay “Origins of our Knowledge” he writes: 
We prefer joy to sadness - unless it is joy in what is bad. Were 
there beings who preferred things the other way around, we would 
take their attitudes to be perverse, and rightly so (p. 22). 
The difficulty for Brentano is that if he wants to claim that an emotion 
has to be correct, then this conflicts with a simple reading of the sum of the 
values of the parts. For example 1, although mathematically less, is 
intrinsically preferable to example 2. However, example 1 would appear to 
have three bad parts, or two bad parts and one neutral part, whereas example 
2 has two bad parts and one good part (pleasure). The principle of summation 
states that, in example 2, as the cruel boy’s pleasure increases, so does the 
goodness of the state of affairs. If, for example, the boy takes immense 
pleasure (say, + 50) in the infliction of some pain (- 5), we are left with a state 
of affairs of positive intrinsic value ( + 35). This is, of course, a predominately 
good state of affairs (pleasure far outweighs pain), but it is clearly a repugnant 
conclusion. It seems sensible to conclude that the application of the principle 
of summation has run into serious difficulty. 
Isenberg’s comments suggest we arrive at a similar conclusion. 
Following his argument, this appears to be the result. 
Ex. 1: An act of cruelty (-10); shamelessness ( 0 ); pain to the dog (- 5). 
Ex. 3: An act of cruelty (-10); shame (- 5); pain to the dog (- 5). 
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Isenberg’s arguments suggests Ex. 1 is intrinsically preferable to Ex. 3. 
Mathematically we cannot dispute that shame has made this situation worse. 
But this conclusion is problematic. G. E. Moore, in Principia Ethica. offers an 
intriguing solution. 
Whether the addition of a bad thing to a good whole may increase 
the positive value of the whole,...is, at least, possible, and this 
possibility must be taken into account in our ethical 
investigations. However we may decide particular questions, the 
principle is clear (Moore, 1988, p. 28). 
The quotation continues with Moore establishing the principle of organic 
unities. It is: 
POU: “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum 
of the values of its parts” (p. 28, italics in original). 
In later writings, Brentano appears to have come to accept the theory 
of organic unities (Chisholm, 1986, p. 69). In conflict with the principle of 
summation, he proposes in particular circumstances that as a bad feeling is 
introduced, the value of the whole becomes more positive. 
In...”On the good that there is in order or arrangement”, Brentano 
says that the evil that is involved in retribution may yet make a 
bad situation less bad than it would have been without the 
retribution. Wickedness accompanied by sorrow is better than 
the same wickedness accompanied by pleasure; this fact, 
Brentano suggested, may justify the sorrow that is involved in 
repentance...If A is a wicked deed and if B is the suffering involved 
in the sinner’s remorse...than the two evils, A and B, may be 
preferable to A without B (p. 72, italics added). 
The conclusion to consider is that a whole with a bad part can be 
preferable to the same whole without that bad part. For what Brentano’s final 
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view on organic unities suggests is that shamelessness in reaction to the 
infliction of pain is an incorrect emotion. Likewise, if the boy were to justify his 
shamelessness with the belief the dog felt no pain, then the shamelessness 
component entails a false belief. This, then, expresses how to view the notion 
that displeasure in the bad is a better state of affairs than pleasure in the 
bad. This requires that we recalculate the values in our examples. To agree 
with the principle of organic unities, we might propose this revision. 
Ex. 1: an act of cruelty (-10); pain to the dog (-5); shamelessness {no pleasure 
or pain (0), incorrect emotion (-10)} 
Ex. 2: an act of cruelty (-10); pain to the dog (-5); shame {pain/displeasure 
(-5), correct emotion ( +5), true belief (+5)}. 
Here, we have an argument that appears to retain the general idea of 
the principle of organic unities and one that contains adjusted values which 
accommodates shame into a state of affairs that is mathematically 
preferable to an alternative without shame. Obviously, we can conclude that 
the introduction of shame into a state of affairs does not invariably make that 
state of affairs worse. Feeling ashamed for intentionally inflicting pain upon 
some innocent is intrinsically and instrumentally preferable to no reaction or a 
reaction of pleasure. And this does not, of course, in itself prove nor commit us 
to say that shame is good. The intrinsic value of Ex. 2 is (-10). It is only to 
say, as does Brentano, that cruelty with shame is preferable to cruelty 
without shame. 
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Isenberg’s Argument Reconsidered 
Providing the above points about the preferability of displeasure in the 
bad are true, Isenberg’s argument for the unreasonableness of every shame 
fails. For displeasure in the bad is preferable to both a neutral attitude or 
deriving pleasure in the bad. For S to admit that he did intentionally inflict the 
pain is true. And for S to be displeased is the correct emotion. To think 
otherwise is a false belief; to feel otherwise, as argued in our examples of the 
profound regret of the taxi driver, is a moral deficiency. 
Citing Spinoza, Isenberg himself recognizes it is better to be ashamed of 
some wickedness than to be “wicked and shameless” (p. 374,1980). So, 
Isenberg recognizes instances when the inclusion of shame in a state of affairs 
will be preferable to the emotional response of shamelessness. Isenberg can 
still maintain that every episode of shame makes a state of affairs worse. He 
need only propose that the same state of affairs with shamelessness is even 
worse still. The ‘organic unity argument’ attempts to refute this logic. Either 
conclusion, however, can stand independently of whether shame accomplishes 
anything good, a qualification Isenberg wants to impose upon calculating 
shame’s instrumental value. We will return to second point - that of 
accomplishments - in a latter section. The refutation of Isenberg’s second 
claim requires substantially more preliminary work. 
The Neutral View: Urmson’s Argument 
In his provocative and important essay, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the 
Mean”, J. O. Urmson examines the Aristotelian contention that all emotions 
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are legitimate if felt and expressed in the proper degree. Apparent exceptions 
to the application of Aristotle’s mean (the triad of excessive / 
mean/ deficient expressions of the emotions) are justice, envy, spite, and 
shame. Although Aristotle explicitly recognizes shame to accommodate the 
triadic scheme, Urmson makes some startling claims to disallow shame’s 
inclusion in the Aristotelian table of virtues and vices.14 In that table, Aristotle 
proposes the excess of shame to be shyness, the mean to be shame, and the 
deficient state to be shamelessness.15 
Urmson understands Aristotle to propose all emotions have a appetitive 
component (e.g., fear entails the desire for safety, anger entails the desire for 
retaliation, etc.). But in the case of shame, Urmson takes Aristotle to suggest 
it is “a mere reaction”, an emotion without an element of choice and without 
desire (1980, p. 169). Urmson concludes that: 
In the case of shame...we seem to be faced with a mere passive 
reaction involving no desire. Shame is largely a physiological 
reaction...Neither (shame nor rejoicing in the misfortunes of 
others) is a motive for action (p. 169). 
Urmson concedes that his speculations on Aristotle’s account of shame 
may not be “clearly true or clearly what Aristotle had in mind” (p. 169). 
Several reasons suggest this account of shame is clearly not what Aristotle 
had in mind. 
Urmson maintains that shame is: 1) passive; 2) a mere physiological 
reaction; 3) motivationless; and, 4) nonappetitive (1980). None of these points 
are supported in Aristotle’s texts. 
14 See J. A. K. Thomson’s translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1953) page 104. 
15 In The Passions of the Soul. Descartes appears to propose impudence is a excess of 
shamelessness. There he defines impudence as a contempt for shame. It is, he says, 
“rather a vice opposed to shame and also to pride, inasmuch as these are both good”. 
Impudence, he remarks, is especially bad in that it inclines people to disregard the “many 
constraints to which honor bound them” with the additional feature of an apparent 
deliberate choice to embrace shamelessness (see CSM, pp.401-2). 
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Aristotle explicitly refers to shame as an emotion (NE, 1128b20). If the 
earlier accounts of an emotion are correct, an appetitive component is a 
necessary constituent. To define shame as “a fear of disrepute” 
unquestionably implies, negatively, an agent desires to avoid disgrace, if not, 
positively, to conduct oneself honorably. So the nonappetitive claim fails as 
does the reductive view that shame is a mere physiological reaction. One 
cannot engage in self-assessment of honorable and dishonorable conduct 
without cognitive operations. If Urmson wants to claim these cognitive 
operations precede the physiological reaction of shame and are not a 
constituent of it, he encounters the serious problem of how he intends to 
distinguish shame from, say, embarrassment or humiliation. 
To suggest that shame is motivationless seems clearly to be a 
misreading of Aristotle. As a result, Urmson seems to contradict himself as 
he attempts to substantiate his interpretation. In the Rhetoric. Aristotle 
explicitly says there are many things before those who admire us that the 
motivational component of shame “makes us do or leave undone” (1387a7). 
Urmson appears aware of this passage for he remarks: “Shame may, indeed, 
hold me back from action; but perhaps we have to distinguish a desire not to 
do something from an inability to bring oneself to do it” (1980, p. 169). 
A defense of Aristotle’s claim of a motivational component could simply 
rest on Urmson’s concession that shame “holds me back”. Not wanting to 
perform a is reason to perform b (or not a). And, of course, this comment does 
not address how Urmson intends to deal with those acts that shame “makes 
us do”. But even the notion that we leave things undone from some alleged 
“inability” to do them will fail to support Urmson’s claims. The above 
quotation is an obscure, if not a muddy, sentence. Somewhat tentatively, I 
take it to mean this: shame is not a motive for action if it renders us unable to 
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act. But how are we to understand the notion of being unable to act? 
Consider inflicting pain upon children for pleasure and amusement. 
Most everyone would be unable to bring themselves to do such a thing. They 
have an inability to perform this act. But why? I suggest one reason this is so 
is that it is disgraceful behavior. What is shameful is the needless infliction of 
pain on a child coupled with perverse enjoyment. But this is not from an 
inability to hurt a child in the sense of a physical impossibility. One refrains 
from it because there are compelling reasons to minimize suffering in the 
world. 
A somewhat better illustration of the inability to act is captured in the 
tale of George Washington and the cherry tree. It is reported he responded, “I 
cannot tell a lie”. A common interpretation is that Washington meant lying is 
prohibited, and that which is prohibited cannot be done. But a better 
interpretation might be this: Washington meant lying is shameful behavior 
and shameful behavior is repugnant to a virtuous man. Since under normal 
circumstances virtuous men will not voluntarily elect to do that which they 
know to be bad, Washington could not lie. Truthfulness is what morality 
requires. If the desire to do what morality requires is strong enough, we might 
say a man will be unable to act otherwise. As with inflicting needless pain, 
there is no compelling reason for a virtuous man to lie. Lying is repugnant and 
no one desires that which he estimates as offensive. In stark contrast to 
Urmson’s proposal, here, perhaps, we are justified in being unable “to 
distinguish a desire not to do something from an inability to bring oneself to do 
it”. 
Urmson’s claim might be that it is not desire because it emanates from 
a settled disposition not to inflict pain; there is no choice because inflicting pain 
is not an alternative we would entertain. To argue this, I think, Urmson would 
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have to show that a sense of shame played no part in the formation, and in the 
maintenance, of such a disposition. I do not see how this can be done. Or 
Urmson’s claim may simply mean that on occasion we find ourselves simply 
immobilized. If this is the point, then Urmson should make clear how shame is 
the immobilizing factor and not that it can be attributed to confusion, 
indecision, a weakness of will, or cowardliness. 
As with Isenberg, Urmson’s argument hinges in an important way on an 
account of shame that does not recognize a component of desire. This is a 
fundamental mistake. To consider this, let’s review Urmson’s final charge 
that shame is a neutral emotion because it is “passive”. 
The Classification of Emotions as Passive or Active 
One common method of distinguishing the emotions is to categorize 
them as active or passive. Isenberg considers shame passive because it is 
“incompatible with action” (p. 375). Presumably, active emotions are 
motivational. John Kekes holds a similar view; shame is passive because it 
often “assails” us and it also indicates no direction for us to turn in order to 
respond to or rectify the assault (1988). Urmson interprets shame to be a 
passive, nonappetitive emotion, a “largely physiological reaction...involving no 
desire” (1980, p. 169). 
In Morality and the Emotions. Justin Oakley distinguishes an active and 
passive categorization by virtue of the nature of the desire in the particular 
emotion. Oakley appears to imply that an emotion is active if the component 
of desire motivates a public or external performance (as in the making amends 
in the case of guilt), whereas passive might imply a solitary reaction of 
withdrawal (as in the desire in shame to hide or disappear). 
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Anger might be regarded as an active emotion because it involves 
the desire to seek out the offender for retaliation, while grief might 
be thought a passive emotion because it involves perhaps the 
desire to be left alone and for the past to be different (1992, 
p. 35). 
But neither Isenberg nor Urmson can appeal to the nature of the desire 
because, for them, shame entails no desire. Isenberg restricts shame to 
reflections on “what we can do nothing about, on the past” (1980, p. 375). 
Since no one deliberates about what is unchangeable, shame prompts 
“irrelevant acts of atonement” and “despondency” (pp. 374-5). 
To relegate shame to the status of a physiological reaction eliminates 
the component of desire in Urmson’s account. Here shame is merely an affect 
as in the recognition that we are blushing. But, as has been argued, without 
desire shame could not be an emotion. 
Oakley’s analysis of active and passive emotions necessarily connects 
with activity. According to the nature of the act an emotion inspires, Oakley 
distinguishes active from passive; one expects exertion from active emotions 
and one expects withdrawal or a resigned acceptance from the passive 
emotions. 
What these accounts overlook is: 1) the Aristotelian insight that a 
passive emotion entails a potentiality to be affected in a certain way, and 2) 
that feelings not only precede actions but they also follow in the wake of 
activity. Both these considerations are explored by L. A. Kosman in “Being 
Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle’s Ethics”. 
Kosman tells us that for Aristotle, as for Plato, the questions of moral 
philosophy are ones that address how we are to conduct ourselves as well as 
how we are to become the type of person for whom proper conduct is second 
nature (1980). “The good person is not simply one who behaves a certain way, 
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but one who behaves that way out of a certain character” (1980, p. 103). 
Clearly, good character requires activity, but Aristotle also recognizes that 
how one is affected - how one is acted upon - is an important component in 
one’s moral life. So, Aristotle is concerned with “activities for which the 
virtues are dispositions of two sorts, actions and feelings” (p. 104). 
(Aristotle) views what we would call feelings and emotions as 
modes of a subject being acted upon. This fact is further revealed 
in the list Aristotle offers us of emotions with which the moral 
virtues are concerned and in which there can be excess, 
deficiency, and right measure. The majority of items... are 
described by passive verbs; in thinking of fear, anger, pleasure or 
pain, Aristotle is thinking of being frightened, being angered, being 
pleased, being pained (p. 104). 
Since his list includes shame, Aristotle must be thinking also of being 
ashamed. And the virtues, in Aristotelian terms, are activities broadly 
construed as an individual acting as well as being acted upon. Kosman thus 
understands Aristotle’s moral theory to be concerned with how to act well and 
how to feel well. The moral virtues, Kosman takes Aristotle to be saying, are 
states of character that enable a person to exhibit the right kind of emotion 
and the right kind of action (1980). The development of a virtuous disposition, 
then, necessarily requires a potentiality to feel and to act in the right measure. 
The doctrine of passive potentiality enables Aristotle to envision 
a state of character by virtue of which an individual has the 
power to be affected in certain ways, the capacity to undergo 
certain passions and avoid others. A moral virtue with respect to 
feelings or emotions is just such a capacity; it is the power to 
have and to avoid certain emotions, the ability to discriminate in 
what one feels (p. 107). 
A sense of shame, then, is a dispositional potentiality to be affected by 
past, present, or future honorable and disgraceful behaviors; shamelessness is 
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an inability to be acted upon by disgraceful behaviors. A passive emotion, in 
the sense of being receptive to certain affections, is, for Aristotle, a power. To 
say, as Aristotle tells us in the Metaphysics, that oil is burnable is to ascribe 
to oil a potential to be affected in a specific way (Kosman, 1980). 
Similarly, regarding actions and feelings, Aristotle is suggesting that a 
virtuous person has developed his or her capacities to be affected in specific 
ways. A moral virtue with respect to feelings “is the power to have and to 
avoid certain emotions, the ability to discriminate in what one feels” (1980, p. 
107). Kosman thus enables us to understand in a new way a famous passage 
from Aristotle. 
It is easy to get angry - anyone can do that...but to feel or act 
towards the right person to the right extent at the right time for 
the right reason in the right way - that is not easy...Hence to do 
these things is a rare, laudable and fine achievement (1109a26- 
28). 
With the properly tuned potentiality, a person acts out of anger with 
respect to the correct measure of feeling. Kosman points out with respect to 
courage and fear, it is not that courage as a virtue disposes us to merely feel 
fear in certain ways, or circumstances, or to some specific degree, “but rather 
that it disposes us to certain actions with respect to and in light of our fear” 
(1980, p. 108). A virtuous agent has developed his powers to feel in the right 
measure which then enables one to act or respond appropriately to the 
occasion. 
The rich and complex notion of feelings that follow in the wake of actions 
has also been largely overlooked. Here passive potentiality plays an equally 
important role. Shame is often characterized as exclusively backward-looking 
(Borysenko, 1990). Many discussions halt further examination after 
proposing shame is a primitive and bad feeling that one has when reflecting on 
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a failure (Bradshaw, 1988). Others classify it as a blow to one’s self-esteem 
(Rawls, 1971). Warnings are then issued about dwelling on these feelings 
(Isenberg, 1980). Alternative reactions are occasionally suggested (Kekes, 
1988,1993). But here again the notion of passive potentiality benefits our 
understanding as it sheds new light on another frequently paraphrased section 
from Aristotle. 
The virtues we do acquire by first exercising them.. Anything 
that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it...we 
become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing 
temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones (1103a30-b2). 
Aristotle is not suggesting that a child acquires a brave disposition by 
performing one act of bravery nor is he suggesting, in a strict sense, that we 
choose our feelings. As Kosman notes: “we do not decide to be virtuous and 
straightaway become so” (1980, p. 111). It would be more accurate to 
understand Aristotle to say that after an act of bravery, the child “feels” 
brave and recognizes that feeling as pleasurable and correct. Kosman 
addresses this point elegantly. 
On this view the structure of becoming virtuous with respect to 
feelings reveals itself to be of the following sort: one recognizes 
through moral education what would constitute appropriate and 
correct ways to feel in certain circumstances. One acts in ways 
that are naturally associated with and will “bring about” those 
very feelings, and eventually the feelings become, as Aristotle 
might have said, second nature; that is one develops states of 
character that dispose one to have the right feelings at the right 
time...although we may in some narrow sense not be responsible 
for our feelings, we are responsible for our character as the 
dispositional source of those feelings (p. 112). 
Viewed in this way the notion of a passive emotion becomes more 
complex. It is a power, a potential to be affected in certain ways. So in 
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deliberating how one should act an agent includes in his calculations how he 
should feel toward the alternatives and how he will feel after each 
alternative. A sense of shame influences the formation of an agent's 
disposition and the agent’s perception of how he or she will feel with respect to 
future conduct. One reason shamelessness is bad is that it is a lack of this 
potential to correctly respond to disgraceful behavior. When we regrettably 
marvel at the remorselessness displayed by serious criminals, part of our 
reaction is puzzlement at how they can lack this potential to be ashamed. 
And without the anticipation of an adverse reaction, shame’s power to restrain 
immoral behavior is seriously hampered. On this reading we can guard 
against the hasty reduction of passive emotions to be merely affect. The 
agent sensitive to being “acted upon” in the right way, at the right time, and to 
the right degree engages cognition, affect and desire. And although shame 
may be characterized as passive, the influence this feeling has upon the agent 
cannot be divorced from how he intends to conduct himself in the future. 
Viewed in this way, the categorization of passive and active emotions can be 
misleading; the ‘passive’ emotion of shame has an active component which 
can be just as motivational as that found in anger. 
Isenberg’s and Urmson’s theories of shame suffer from a neglect of 
passive potentiality. This notion undermines Isenberg’s second claim of the 
inability of shame to motivate action. In deliberating about alternative 
courses of action, an agent naturally considers how he “will be” and how he 
“will feel” in the wake of these various alternatives. These considerations, 
contrary to Isenberg’s protests, seem perfectly “reasonable”. This limitation 
also infects the elaborate theory of shame proposed by John Kekes. Let us 
turn to that now. 
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A Qualified Positive View: Kekes’s Argument 
With the publication of “Shame and Moral Progress” in 1988, John 
Kekes introduced a scholarly and persuasive theory of moral shame. His 
through analysis accommodates what has been argued to be the essential 
components of an emotion: affect, cognition and desire. 
In its affective aspect, shame is a painful self-directed feeling; in 
its cognitive aspect, it is a self-conscious detached comparison 
yielding the conclusion that we are in some way deficient because 
we have fallen short of some value we regard as important; and in 
its moral aspect, we feel the importance of the value we have 
violated because our conception of a good life requires that we 
should have lived up to it (1988, p. 286). 
Kekes’s acknowledges “the occurrence of shame is always significant” 
(p. 286). Defining shame as “a response to the realization that we have fallen 
short of some value we regard as important”, Kekes considers shame to be “an 
index of the seriousness we feel about our values” (1993, p. 142). An individual 
incapable of feeling shame is so because he or she fails to attach any 
importance to standards, and Kekes proposes, as does Plato, that such 
individuals are, therefore, “apt to lack moral restraint” (1988, p. 282). Shame, 
for Kekes, is a sign of serious commitments, as well as an impetus for 
honoring those commitments since violations “painfully lowers our opinion of 
ourselves” (p. 282). With Rawls, Kekes believes by failing to live up to a 
certain conception of a good life, “our self-respect may suffer and we...come to 
feel shame” (p. 285). 
Kekes’s analysis also accounts for the sophisticated viewpoint of a 
detached-observer. An agent views an action of his as others might “and we 
accept their actual or hypothetical assessment” (p. 283). As with Taylor 
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(1985) and Williams (1993), Kekes considers the notion that shame 
necessarily requires an audience to be a “general mistake” (p. 284). “What is 
essential for shame is to detach ourselves from what we are, have, or do to the 
extent that we can view it as falling short of some standard” (p. 284). Kekes 
explicitly acknowledges the possibility of public manifestations of shame, but 
he also recognizes occasions for shame when there is no one there to observe 
us. For Kekes, shame, unlike humiliation, can emanate from either the 
operations of external exposure or from internal, solitary insights. 
Another impressive feature of Kekes’s analysis is his distinction of 
shame categories. From his recognition of an agent’s commitment to 
standards combined with a detached-observer status, he distinguishes three 
shame-types: propriety-shame, honor-shame, and worth-shame (1988,1993). 
Each shame-type involves a different cognitive operation and a different 
perspective from the audience. 
In propriety-shame, standards set by appearances count against us. 
Here I feel shame when I am seen naked, in tattered clothes, or unwashed. 
Honor-shame “is consequent on having made standards of appearances 
definitive of our honor” (p. 290). We might say, as in a shame culture, “image 
is character”. Here the appearance of bravery, of self-control, or of honesty 
will outweigh the intrinsic value of these qualities. I am ashamed to give the 
appearance of acting cowardly, not to have been cowardly. Detection by some 
external source elicits honor-shame. The last category, worth-shame, is 
independent of appearances. “Worth-shame is caused by a culpable failure to 
live up to private standards” (p. 290). Worth-shame is occasioned when public 
or private standards that an agent believes to be valid are violated although 
no one need be aware of the violation. 
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In propriety-shame, we care about appearances; in honor- 
shame, we care about appearing as we are; in worth-shame, we 
care about being in a certain way and do not care about 
appearances. The progress is from caring about how we seem to 
caring about how we are (p. 290). 
As the title of his article suggests, Kekes is concerned with moral 
progress, and the movement of one shame-type to the next is evidence of this 
kind of progress. Worth-shame attaches to a conception of “a better self”, the 
abstracted ideal to which one aspires independent of appearances or public 
influence (1993, p. 143). But, unlike Isenberg, although Kekes attaches moral 
significance to shame, his account, like that of Isenberg, ultimately argues 
against it. From the chapter “The Prospects for Moral Progress”, a revision of 
his 1988 article, Kekes succinctly remarks that: “the reasons against shame 
outweigh the reasons for it” (The Morality of Pluralism. 1993, p. 142). 
Kekes suggests various reasons to justify his negative view of shame. 
Shame, for Kekes, is “likely to be self-destructive” (1988, p. 282). Not only 
does shame alert us to our shortcomings, it makes “feel deficient on account of 
them (1993, p. 142). 
(Shame) tends to undermine our confidence, verve, and 
courage...Thus it...jeopardizes the possibility of improvement by 
weakening the only agency capable of effecting it (1988, p. 282). 
Kekes further disallows the potentially beneficial forward-looking and 
the backward-looking aspects of shame. 
If the alleged protection of shame is backward looking, concerning 
a wrong we have already done, then I fail to see how it can protect 
the self from “corruption and ultimately from extinction” For 
such corruption as there is has already set in due to the wrong we 
have done (p. 292). 
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And the claim that a sense of shame might encourage us “to leave 
(disgraceful) things undone" is dismissed. 
If (shame) is forward-looking, it is supposed to protect us from 
doing wrong in the future. But it cannot be shame...since...the 
wrong is in the future, so we have nothing yet to be ashamed 
about. The best that can be said is that the protection is 
provided by fear of shame, not by shame itself... And if we have 
fear as deterrent, then fear of punishment or fear of loss of love, 
respect, or status may serve just as well as fear of shame (1993, 
p. 155). 
After disallowing shame to entail a future-orientated protective feature, 
Kekes lists what he considers to be several viable alternatives to the fear of 
shame. These alternatives presumably do not carry with them the 
debilitating qualities of shame. These, Kekes suggests, are: “anger at 
ourselves, resolution to improve, the desire to make amends, and a quest for 
understanding why we did what we regarded as wrong” (p. 292). 
Having proposed viable alternatives to feeling shame, Kekes encourages 
us to focus on “our conception of a good life”, rather than to “respond to our 
moral failure by dwelling on the deficiency that produced it” (p. 294). This is 
reminiscent of Isenberg’s portrayal of shame as “brooding over our infirmities” 
in the throes of “self-flagellation” (Isenberg, 1980, pp. 374-5). Kekes even 
metaphorically likens shame to the medieval medical practice of administering 
poison to counteract illness (1988, p. 291). This reminds one of Isenberg’s 
“misery upon misery” characterization. For both Kekes and Isenberg, 
ultimately “there is nowhere for shame to go. Like a vermin it eats deeper and 
deeper into the soul” (p. 289). 
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Comments on Kekes’s Argument 
John Kekes’s analysis of shame is comprehensive and has appeal. He 
avoids several analytical errors that infect some of the earlier accounts 
reviewed. Kekes acknowledges each of the necessary components of the 
emotion of shame and assigns many of the proper attributes to them. Most 
important, he recognizes shame’s elements of cognition and desire. With his 
explanation of worth-shame, Kekes avoids the mistakes of relegating shame 
to mere affect or of confining shame to merely an external operation. Worth- 
shame entails the idealized and abstracted detached-observer audience. 
A central feature of Kekes’s account is to propose an alternative 
response to shame that will be more conducive to moral progress. Rather 
than dwelling on our failures - which “undermines our control, reduces the 
chances of moral reform, and weakens the seir - Kekes suggests an agent 
redirect his concentration to that of the goal of living a good life (1993, p. 157). 
But the fundamental problem with Kekes’s account seems to be that his 
objections to shame’s possible effects do not align coherently with what his 
analysis proposes to be worth-shame’s attributes. 
Moral progress is alleged to occur as an agent evolves from a propriety- 
shame to worth-shame. Prevailing conventions and external appearances 
give way to a personal sense of values to which an agent is committed. These 
values then become definitive of that agent’s conception of the good life (1993). 
“This is why his estimate of his own worth was connected to his values, and 
this is why shame, worth-shame, could follow from his violation of them” (p. 
152). Given this, it is difficult to understand Kekes’s easy dismissal of the 
protective feature of a forward-looking sense of shame. If an agent is 
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knowledgeable about and concerned with how he “ought to be” rather than how 
he appears, then he believes that to act in one way and not another will 
approximate the “better self5. To act contrary to this conception of the 
abstracted ideal would bring about shame and disgrace. And this the agent 
wants to avoid. So, a sense of shame is significant in that it is a recognition of 
how honorable conduct constitutes and enables an agent to lead a good life. 
Kekes’s suggested alternatives to the fear of disgrace simply do not 
accommodate the sophisticated cognition and desires of worth-shame. To fear 
the loss of status or respect speaks to a concern with appearances and public 
recognition, not worth. The fear of punishment is no moral concern at all. In 
order to avoid public censure, an agent can act in accordance with prevailing 
conventions that he knows to be morally repugnant. Here an agent might 
voluntarily do moral wrong in order to avoid public reprisals. This motivation 
is irreconcilable with a “worth-shame” conception of a better self. What is 
perplexing is that Kekes appears to recognize this. 
If we fail, we are ashamed because we are dishonored. We are 
dishonored by giving the wrong impression, but it is honor, not the 
impression, that we care about...worth-shame is independent of 
appearance. It is caused by our culpable failure to live up to 
private commitments (p. 153). 
To concede this, it is puzzling why Kekes would propose a fear of loss of 
love, respect, or status to be a preferable substitute reaction to feeling 
ashamed. Fear of these former eventualities apply to individuals motivated 
by propriety and honor. By his own lights Kekes acknowledges that an agent 
at a worth-shame stage will be discriminatingly unreceptive to appearances 
for motivating virtuous conduct. 
Kekes dismissal of the potentially beneficial aspect of the backward¬ 
looking feature of shame is equally troubling. Kekes neglects to address how 
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an agent develops from propriety-shame to worth-shame but he does 
recognize, “Nobody wants to feel shame; we are assailed by it. Shame 
happens to us” (p. 157). When it does, why would it not indicate an alternative 
direction to pursue? Since I did act a, and now feel ashamed, would I not 
contemplate alternatives b or c for some similar future occasion. Second, if 
shame assails us, it seems possible, on some occasions, that it is alerting us to 
some course of action to which we gave too little thought. This seems to be 
the spirit of Aristotle’s remarks that adolescents “living as they do under the 
sway of feelings, they often make mistakes, but are restrained by modesty” 
(1128bl8). Kekes readily admits that “shamelessness is bad and self-respect 
is good” (p. 155). But, two reasons shamelessness is bad are the agent 
neglects to acknowledge the moral dimension of his conduct - as Kekes says he 
is apt to lack restraint - and that, passively, the agent is improperly affected. 
In this regard, shame sensitizes the agent. To be assailed by something 
suggests the agent had no particular idea of how the consequences of his 
behavior would reflect upon him. This seems to me to be a common sense 
view of how children come to learn some things. Motivated by anger or 
frustration they strike out and only later do they recognize the extent of the 
injury they cause. If and how they respond and adjust their future conduct is 
evidence of moral progress. 
The objection that a backward-looking shame is powerless since 
corruption has already set in is simply too extreme. An isolated failure is not a 
sign of an unreformably corrupt disposition. On the contrary, to be unaffected 
by an isolated failure indicates the potential for corruptibility. 
Kekes proposed alternatives to shame are equally unconvincing and 
they also signal a misalignment with worth-shame. The alternatives Kekes 
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proposes are anger at ourselves, a desire to make amends, resolution to 
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improve, and an effort to understand our undesirable behavior. If Kekes 
recognizes an elevated sense of shame to transcend appearances, where no 
one need observe us, to whom do we make amends? What motivates the 
desire to make amends if this is not preceded by a pained recognition of a 
failure or a transgression? And how is anger at ourselves preferable to shame? 
How does one retaliate against oneself? How does retaliation suggest moral 
progress? Retaliation implies someone deserves some level of suffering for a 
past transgression. Nothing in the concept of retaliation entails the notion 
that the suffering required is to be rehabilitative. Furthermore, if Kekes 
attributes desire to shame, how does that exclude a “resolution to improve”? 
Would not an agent able to feel worth-shame be so precisely because he 
desires to improve? Pained by the discrepancy between his present self and 
his conception of a better self, he desires to reform or eliminate his 
shortcomings so as to more closely approximate the better self. Finally, anger 
and amends have traditionally attached to guilt and the resolution to improve 
attaches to repentance. So, there is nothing new in these alternatives. 
Kekes’s project should make clear how they are also to attach to shame 
without further blurring the distinctions between these emotions. Nowhere 
does he undertake such a project. A comprehensive analysis of worth-shame 
should address these questions specifically. 
Kekes begins and ends his article with a reference to the alleged 
disagreement between Plato (who attaches moral significance to shame) and 
Aristotle (who presumably does not). On two occasions Kekes reminds us to 
think carefully about Aristotle’s remark, “If shamelessness is bad...that does 
not make it good to be ashamed” (p. 142; p. 155). For Kekes this statement 
constitutes the gulf between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle’s complete 
sentence, from J. A. K Thompson’s translation, reads as follows: 
184 
Although shamelessness, that is, not being ashamed to do what 
is disgraceful, is a bad thing, it does not follow any the more from 
this that to be ashamed if one behaves disgracefully is a good 
thing (1128b31-33). 
Aristotle immediately goes on to remark: “In the same way continence is not 
to be regarded as altogether a virtue either; it is sort of combination of virtue 
with something else” (1128b34). Aristotle establishes a hierarchy of states of 
character: temperapt, continent, incontinent, and intemperant (Ethics. Book 
VII). Temperance is preferable to continence because a temperate man 
desires to do the right thing and does it. The continent man struggles with 
conflicting desires and succeeds in choosing the morally correct alternative. 
The incontinent man struggles and fails. Aristotle’s analogy seems 
appropriate since the intemperate man desires to do the disgraceful, does so, 
and, in all likelihood, is shameless. With the connection of shame to 
continence, Aristotle’s point may be that to struggle with conflicting desires is 
not ideal. An agent has yet to develop a character from which good acts 
emanate characteristically. Aristotle is clear that he regards intemperance 
as bad, but that does not commit him to suggest that the struggle with the 
desire to do disgraceful acts - whatever the outcome - is good. And it is in this 
manner that he considers continence and a sense of shame to be qualified 
goods: they contain bad parts but are preferable to the alternatives of 
intemperance and shamelessness respectively. Here the point is is that the 
best and worst states of character contain no struggle with vice. Better to 
struggle than to desire to do disgraceful acts and to lack the passive potential 
to be affected by disgracefulness. 
It seems plausible that Kekes has not only misunderstood the intent of 
Aristotle’s comment but that he also errs in a comparison between two 
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comments that have a temporal distinction. Regarding the time element, 
Plato’s comments refer to shame’s beneficial property in assessing possible 
courses of future action; Aristotle’s comment refers to a reaction to a deed 
performed. 
To dispel the notion that a legitimate disagreement on this point exists 
with Plato, Kekes might refer instead to the following passage from Aristotle’s 
Ethics. In this passage, the element of time for Aristotle coincides with the 
time element in the quotation Kekes selects from Plato. 
The passage from Aristotle reads: 
(Lectures on ethics) are incapable of impelling the masses 
towards human perfection. For it is the nature of many to be 
ruled by fear rather than by shame, and to refrain from evil not 
because of the disgrace, but because of the punishments 
(1179b7-14). 
For Aristotle, then, a love of virtue and the worth-shame stage are rare 
and desirable. Recall Aristotle explicitly refers to shame as a fear of disgrace 
applicable to the past, the present, or the future (see the Rhetoric. 1383b). 
Referring back to a previous example, the meaning of Aristotle’s 
comment that it is not good to be ashamed of a disgraceful deed might more 
accurately be portrayed in the following fist. In assessing the intrinsic value of 
states of affairs, the order of Aristotelian preferability is: 
Ex. 1: an act of kindness (+10); pride (+5). 
Ex. 2: an act of cruelty (-10); shame (-5). 
Ex. 3 an act of cruelty (-10); shamelessness (-10). 
The temperant man and the continent man both perform the act of 
kindness. A temperant agent is unconflicted; he wants to perform the 
kindness and he does. The continent man, by contrast, is tom. Some feature 
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of the cruel act is perceived as being pleasurable and the continent man does 
not want to forego an alternative act that contains some episode of pleasure. 
But reason succeeds over an appetitive leaning. The continent man comes to 
believe what the temperant man knows: higher pleasures accompany virtue. 
The incontinent man struggles with these same desires and loses. The desire 
for the wrong pleasure overwhelms. The intemperate man, cognizant of the 
pleasurable aspect of the cruel act and ignorant of the higher goods in an act of 
kindness, is unconflicted. Shamelessly and remorselessly, he performs the 
cruel act. 
Aristotle is not suggesting it is a good state of affairs to have performed 
a disgraceful act; it seems clear he is suggesting only that is better to be 
ashamed if one does rather than to be unaffected. The struggle with 
conflicting desires are the “something else” that is mixed with continence and 
the restraining power of shame. Ideally, for Aristotle, the right act effortlessly 
emanates from a settled disposition. Let us revise the chart to accommodate 
this interpretation 
1. (Temperance) An unconflicted act of kindness (+10) Pride (+5) 
2. (Continence) A conflicted act of kindness (+5) Pride (+3) 
3. (Incontinence) A conflicted act of cruelty (- 5) Shame ( +1) 
4. (Intemperance) An unconflicted act of cruelty (-10) Shamelessness (-10) 
Now the intrinsic value of an unconflicted act of virtue (Ex. 1) takes 
precedence over the struggle with vice (Ex. 2) although, in both instances, a 
good act is eventually performed. As we see in the value of pride in continence, 
the agent is aware that he has been susceptible to temptation clouding his 
reason. This detracts from the pleasure. More than conflicted thoughts 
plague the incontinent man; he loses to the pull of a wrong-headed desire. But 
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in feeling some disgrace, Aristotle seems to clearly imply, the continent and 
the incontinent have a chance at reformation. The intemperant man is 
beyond repair. Aristotle can hold without contradiction that it is preferable to 
exhibit a potential for reform than not (e.g. - 4 > -20), together with the notion 
that to have performed a disgraceful deed is not good. For better still to be 
virtuous. But nowhere does Aristotle suggest a sense of shame is intrinsically 
bad. Again, without contradiction, he can maintain that shame is 
conditionally good although the whole state of affairs (understood as a complex 
organic unity) that entails a disgraceful act and a shameful reaction is not 
predominately good (e.g. - 4). 
If this interpretation is correct, then Kekes is mistaken to suggest that 
on this point there is a disagreement between Plato and Aristotle. 
To summarize, Kekes attributes moral significance to shame. However, 
his eventual discounting of shame is unpersuasive. He suggests untenable 
alternatives, he relies for support on a misinterpretation of a passage from 
Aristotle, his general classification of all shame as psychologically debilitating 
is too extreme, and his objections to the potentially beneficial aspects of 
shame do not accord with his development of a sense of shame through his 
shame-types. 
In conclusion, Kekes recognizes the significance of shame - it is an index 
of an agent’s serious commitment to standards and values. But he proposes 
alternative responses because he questions the conditionally good status of 
shame. Let us turn to two views of shame that do not share Kekes’s 
reservations, those of Gabriele Taylor and Bernard Williams. 
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Positive Views: Tavlor and Williams 
Of all of the accounts of shame that John Kekes is aware, he considers 
Isenberg’s and Gabriele Taylor’s to be among “the most illuminating” (1988, p. 
282). Kekes finds much of value in Taylor and the details of their accounts 
have many points in common, but he comes to prefer the negative view 
expressed by Isenberg. 
Features of Taylor’s account that Kekes adopts are the notions of: 1) 
the structural similarity of all shame experiences, 2) the detached observer 
audience, 3) a hierarchy of shame-types, and, 4) the view that all shame 
experiences have a moral dimension. 
Taylor recognizes “very different cases” of shame, but she suggests that 
they all share the same structure (1985, p. 54). In every occasion of shame, 
Taylor proposes, the agent identifies with an audience’s verdict that he has 
deviated from some norm and has thereby lost status (1985). The agent and 
the audience see the situation alike, and since there is a consensus, “in the 
eyes of both the agent is degraded” (p. 58). But Taylor has a complex view of 
the detached observer that gives the appearance of a contradiction; she 
acknowledges a case of shame wherein the agent feels shame because the 
verdict of the audience is one of approval. What distinguishes the different 
cases of shame is “how he is seen, whether he thinks of the audience as 
critical, approving, indifferent, cynical, or naive” (p. 60). The obvious difficulty 
is to reconcile an audience’s verdict of approval with the notion that in the 
“eyes of both” the agent is degraded. 
Taylor resolves this apparent contradiction by identifying three 
elements in each case of shame. The first element is the agent’s adverse self- 
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regarding judgment. “She feels degraded, not the sort of person she believed, 
assumed, or hoped she was or...should be” (p. 64). The second element is an 
audience s “first point of view”. Here the audience sees the agent under some 
description and with a particular attitude. These attitudes can range from 
approval, to indifference, or to a hostile disapproval. The third element - which 
resolves the apparent contradiction - is the “second” point of view audience. 
The second point of view is the relation of the agent to the first audience. 
This (second) point of view is always needed as a step towards the 
self-realization which is expressed in the person’s self-directed 
judgment...He has to accept it in this case because he thinks he is 
as he is seen, i. e., his judgment coincides with the judgment 
embodied in the observer-description...(or) although the 
judgments do not coincide, there is nevertheless something wrong 
in his being so seen (p. 65). 
To be seen with approval “as wrong in his being so seen” is illustrated 
in Taylor’s text with an example of an artist’s model. A woman posing 
undressed for a painting or a sculpture suddenly becomes aware of the artist 
gazing approvingly upon her not as an artistic subject but as the object of 
sexual interest. Now the critical second point of view comes not from the 
artist but from “a sophisticated type of self-awareness” of the model herself 
(p. 67). The first point of view audience - the artist - approves, but the model, 
identifying with another view, “is seen as being seen...(and this) is to be in a 
position in which no decent woman would find herself” (p. 61). The model 
comes to realize that she has put herself in a position that elicits lust and a 
second audience viewpoint finds this type of approval to be contemptible. The 
model now identifies with a detached observation that sees the artist seeing 
her. This new perspective, the model comes to realize, illuminates a shameful 
component in the state of affairs. 
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It is plainly a state of self-consciousness which centrally relies on 
the concept of another, for the thought for being seen as one 
might be seen by another is the catalyst for the emotion (p. 67). 
All shame experiences, according to Taylor, share these three elements. 
For Taylor, as well as for Bernard Williams, this detached observer in the form 
of the second point of view audience need not be an actual person. Shame, 
Williams claims, “works for us” in essentially the same ways that it did for the 
ancient Greeks (p. 102). 
By giving through the emotions a sense of who one is and of what 
one hopes to be, it mediates between act, character, and 
consequence, and also between the ethical demands and the rest 
of life. Whatever it is working on, it requires an internalized other, 
who is not designated merely as a representative of an 
independently identified social group...(the internalized other 
moreover) embodies intimations of a genuine social reality...how 
it will be for one’s fife with others if one acts in one way rather 
than another (1993, p. 102). 
With the notion of the detached observer, both Taylor and Williams 
recognize a shame type more sophisticated than the conventional idea of 
shame embodied in the conception of a shame culture. Williams invests 
shame with cognitive operations that transcend mere adjustments to the 
prejudices of one’s community. Shame is more than “the individual’s sense of 
what should be done merely on (the) expectations of what others will think of 
him or her” (p. 81). Feeling ashamed is more than being found out. With a 
connection to self-respect, Taylor considers shame conditionally good in that is 
an emotion of self-protection. 
We can characterize self-respect by reference to shame: if 
someone has self-respect then under certain ...conditions he will 
be feeling shame. A person has no self-respect if he regards no 
circumstances as shame-producing (1985, p. 80). 
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The sense of value necessary for self-respect and for shame is what 
Taylor considers “makes it clear why shame is...thought to be so valuable” (p. 
80). In shame a person 1) retains her values, which 2) protects her from 
“corruption and ultimately extinction” (p. 81). If an agent’s reasoning is 
correct and her values are right, a sense of shame will dissuade her from 
unethical alternatives or it will serve to direct her to future ethical conduct. In 
shame, Williams expresses the connection as a lowering of self-respect as an 
agent is diminished in her own eyes (1993). However, with regard to 
redirection Williams suggests “more positively, shame may be expressed in 
attempts to reconstruct or improve oneseir ( p. 90). It is here that the 
analyses of Taylor and Williams will part company with the authors of the 
neutral and negative views. 
Guilt has been alleged to imply restoration and repair (e.g., Fossum and 
Mason) as well as to be a developmentally more evolved emotion than shame 
(e.g., Erikson and Bradshaw). In contrasting guilt and shame, Williams 
persuasively implies both these views are mistaken. The dispute is complex; 
overlooking some of the fine points will detract from a possible defense of 
shame’s conditionally good status. In order to argue for shame’s restorative 
potential and as a powerful aid towards improvement, let us 
propose some final distinctions among the self-regarding emotions of guilt and 
shame gleaned from the positive view of Taylor and Williams. 
Shame and Guilt Revisited 
In A Theory of Justice. John Rawls proposes that a distinction between 
guilt and shame is expressed in what reactions an agent anticipates for his 
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behavior. Every commentator reviewed accepts this aspect of Rawls’s 
position. 
(In guilt) he expects others to be resentful and indignant at his 
conduct, and he fears their righteous anger and the possibility of 
reprisal...(In shame) he is apprehensive lest they reject him and 
find him contemptible...In his behavior he has betrayed a lack of 
moral excellences he prizes and to which he aspires (1971, p. 
445). 
Rawls elaborates on this distinction. Guilt focuses on the infringement 
on others, on the specific injury that we cause, and on the expected reaction of 
resentment or indignation from the victim. In shame, we focus on our anxiety 
about the possible loss of respect we will merit if others were to reassess us 
and on “our disappointment with ourselves for failing to live up to our ideals” 
(p. 446). But what all the commentators from the neutral and negative views 
seem to miss in Rawls’s position is that the restoration in guilt does not occur 
within the offender. It is primarily, if not entirely, an external restorative 
operation that intends to redistribute benefit to the victims. For in guilt our 
focus is on the victims and the element of their anger is explanatory and 
justified precisely because they have been wronged. In shame, by contrast, 
we focus on the internalization of an idealized figure “who shares the standards 
or expectations in terms of which (some act) is a failing” (Williams, 1993, p. 
222). Rawls makes this point explicit. 
Guilt is relieved by reparations and the forgiveness that permits 
reconciliation; whereas shame is undone by proofs of defects 
made good, by a renewed confidence in the excellence of one’s 
person (p. 484). 
Clearly reparations and forgiveness must involve the persons (or 
person) that the agent has harmed. Reparations are due to them; the agent 
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hopes forgiveness is forthcoming from them. Reinstatement of the original 
relationship requires action, therefore, from both parties. Nothing in Rawls’s 
remarks suggests this is necessarily required in shame. An agent fails to live 
up to moral excellences to which he aspires. Others may find him 
contemptible for, as Rawls suggests, lacking self-command “and its attendant 
excellences of strength, courage, and self-control” (p. 446). But, as even the 
negative view acknowledges, in shame no one need know of the failure. And 
secondly, when and if an agent is forgiven, Williams notes that “perhaps the 
case is withdrawn from the internal judge, but their forgiveness has less power 
to repair my sense of myself” (1993, p. 91). The injured party, through 
forgiveness, has the power to reinstate the offender. But, the injured party 
does not, in forgiving, reestablish the agent’s sense of himself. Nor does the 
offending agent’s act of reparation suggest improvement or even imply a 
renewed confidence on his part. Reparations, to be morally acceptable, ought 
to have the well-being of the injured party as the primary motivation. 
On the point of the distinctive features of these two emotions, Williams 
has an instructive example of a moment of cowardice when we can feel both 
guilt and shame. We feel guilty for letting someone down and we feel shame for 
failing to live up to our conception of what we hope ourself to be or assumed to 
have been. 
(An) action stands between the inner world of disposition, feeling, 
and decision and an outer world of harm and wrong. What 1 have 
done points in one direction towards what has happened to 
others, in another direction to what I am (p. 93). 
Shame looks to who the agent is, guilt looks to what the agent has done 
to others (Williams, 1993). Given this, Kekes’s position that shame 
understands only success or failure looks to be all the more untenable. For 
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that which looks to who I am will understand intentions, aspirations, and 
desires as well as outcomes. Williams suggests that it is only when we come 
to understand our shame that we can properly understand our guilt. 
The structures of shame contain the possibility of controlling and 
learning from guilt, because they give a conception of one’s ethical 
identity, in relation to which guilt can make sense. Shame can 
understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself (p. 93). 
The Components of Moral Shame 
Moral shame is a complex emotion. In its affective aspect it is a painful, 
self-regarding feeling wherein both the subject and the object of the emotion is 
the agent. In its cognitive aspect it is a detached comparison with an 
abstracted and idealized figure that renders a judgment that the agent has 
failed to approximate this better self. The cognitive component acknowledges 
that moral values are important and essential for living a good life together 
with the conviction that the agent could have and should have lived up to 
these values. In its moral aspect it is the cognitive recognition that the agent 
has failed to perform an ethically correct alternative that an abstracted, 
better self would have performed. And in the component of desire, moral 
shame is the willing to better approximate the conception of the better self on 
future occasions. 
An Answer to Research Question #1 
In the form of a definition, the answer to the first research 
question, “What is the emotion of moral shame?” reads: 
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SI: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of 
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to some value. 
That value the agent: 1) regards as important; 2) considers it to constitute an 
essential component of living a good life; 3) acknowledges it to be a value to 
which he ought to aspire; and, 4) one that a better self would have more closely 
approximated. 
Chapter Summary 
Many authors allude to an overlap of features in the various self- 
regarding emotions (Dillon, 1995; Goleman, 1995; Karen, 1992; Kekes, 1988, 
1993; Isenberg, 1980; Rawls, 1971; etc.) Kekes, for example, has written 
shame “shades into” the emotions of embarrassment, humiliation, guilt, 
regret, and remorse (1988, p 283). But this literature review and the 
arguments it has produced have pinpointed specific differences. These 
differences are important in the consideration of the second research question: 
“ What impact might moral shame have upon one’s character development?” 
This section, then, will conclude with a brief review of a few of the conclusions 
reached in this second chapter concerning specific differences between moral 
shame and the other relevant self-regarding emotions. 
Of all the self-regarding emotions, shame is, on occasion, most 
easily confused with guilt and humiliation. It is hoped the comments regarding 
guilt drew some clear differences. A frequent mistake, especially in 
educational circles, is the use of humiliation synonymously with shame. And 
humiliation is an emotion that elicits among educators - to borrow from 
Kierkegaard - fear and trembling. This seems justified. It seems true that in a 
great majority of cases it is both indefensible and morally offensive to 
humiliate a child. But, it also can and will be argued: if shame is conditionally 
good, then to instill in a child a sense of shame is a moral responsibility both 
for parents and for educational caretakers. But this does not imply that with 
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for parents and for educational caretakers. But this does not imply that with 
shame one ought to be oblivious to precautions. 
Humiliation, it was proposed, involves a fall. As with shame, some type 
of audience is involved. But the function of the audience in humiliation is more 
direct than it need be in shame; it necessarily consists of identifiable others. 
In humiliation, some outside party alerts the agent to the fact that his self- 
assessment is considered by these others to be unjustifiably inflated. A 
teacher would humiliate a student if, for example, she were to inform him that 
he does not have the comprehensive grasp of a subject he pretends to have. If 
this is done in front of the class and also with an air of sarcastic 
condescension, it can be all the more devastating. The student feels deflated, 
for the audience, whatever its composition, transmits the message that they 
do not share the assessment of the elevated position the student has assigned 
to himself. Taylor distinguishes the essential difference of humiliation with 
shame to be the fall, rather than “the new degraded status” in shame (p. 67). 
The student might redeem himself by exhibiting the required knowledge, but 
until he does he will feel contemptible or ludicrous for having given the 
appearance of presumptuousness. 
Embarrassment has been defined as an emotional reaction to a 
situation of less serious magnitude. It is primarily in response to the inability 
to respond to the demands of an audience. An agent will feel tension and 
confusion; the proper response to the immediate demand alludes him. In 
the above example, the student’s humiliation can be compounded by 
embarrassment. He may in fact know his subject, but flustered by the 
teacher’s confrontation and his classmate’s attention, he freezes. But 
embarrassment is usually in response to lighter situations as when I hit my 
thumb with a hammer or I arrive at a party with a tear in my pants. 
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Taylor further distinguishes shame, humiliation, and embarrassment 
by the extent of their influence upon one’s self-esteem or upon one’s self- 
respect. Since embarrassment is an adverse judgment only on an agent in a 
given situation, it need not effect either self-esteem or self-respect. After 
hitting my thumb with the hammer or building an unsquare frame, I can think 
of no quick, appropriate, and redeeming response to the jeers of my week-end 
carpenter friends. But, it would be illogical for me to consider a global 
reassessment of myself for this momentary and inconsequential carelessness. 
Self-effacing humor will quiet the jeers. They will be reminded, afterall, I am 
only a week-end carpenter. 
Shame and humiliation impact upon one’s status. In explaining how 
these emotions affect one’s status, Taylor attaches humiliation to self-esteem 
and shame to self-respect. Humiliation, for Taylor, is a blow to one’s self¬ 
esteem. In order to be humiliated Taylor claims: 1) a person must have a 
favorable attitude prior to the attack, or, 2) a person will believe he does not 
get the recognition he should (1985). He, therefore, believes he deserves more 
than that which he receives. A blow to self-esteem “is an occasion primarily 
for humiliation rather than for shame, for he may not therefore also think that 
he is worth less than he thought” (1985, p. 78). 
Shame, according to Tayor, connects with self-respect for a person may 
feel shame regardless of whether he or she holds a favorable or unfavorable 
self-regarding attitude. 
The self-respecting person has certain views of what is due him 
and from him...He will lack self-respect if he has no such views, 
and he will lose his self-respect if the relevant expectations are 
not fulfilled. But the frustration of his expectations...is precisely 
the occasion for feeling shame: he will feel shame if he becomes 
aware of his expectations are being frustrated (p. 80). 
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Taylor is correct to take issue with the Rawlsian notion that self-esteem 
and self-respect are synonymous. But attaching humiliation to self-esteem 
seems unhelpful. The features of humiliation which serve to distinguish it 
from shame are the fall and the verdict of presumptuousness. Unlike worth- 
shame, both these attach to appearances. Accordingly, one cannot be 
humiliated without a specific, identifiable audience. 
A second problem with Taylor’s analysis of humiliation is suggested by 
the fact that if an agent does not agree with the verdict, he will not feel 
humiliated. Anger seems a more reasonable reaction. It seems unlikely a 
person will feel humiliated on the basis of a view from an audience that the 
agent deems incapable of assessing his true talents. This fact seems to be 
largely overlooked in the literature. Shame, on the other hand, can be 
protective of one’s values and aspirations above and beyond appearances or a 
third-party confirmation. 
To respect the self, then, is not to think either favorably or 
unfavorably of the self, but is rather to do that which protects the 
self from injury or destruction, just as to respect others is not to 
think well or badly of them, but is at least to abstain from injuring 
or destroying them...And shame is the emotion of self-protection: 
it may prevent the person concerned from putting himself into a 
certain position, or make him aware that he ought not to be in the 
position in which he finds himself (p. 81). 
This notion seems correct. It is a one description of a sense of shame. 
Whether the leading theories of moral education accommodate this insight is 
the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REVIEW OF MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS 
Introduction 
One contribution of philosopher John Dewey was to pose some 
fundamental questions that all teachers, as teachers, should contemplate. 
Dewey considered these questions to be of primary importance: “What should 
be taught?”, “How do children learn?”, and, “What type of society do we wish to 
live in?” (Scharf, 1978). 
To arrive at satisfactory answers would seem to require input, at a 
minimum, from professional educators, curriculum specialists, developmental 
psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, and politicians. As is to be expected, 
the various responses to Dewey’s complex questions have been conflicting. 
One particularly contentious area, implied in Dewey’s questions, has been the 
effort to teach values in public schools. This is not surprising when one 
considers the multicultural composition and the ideological diversity that is 
America. 
An answer to this papers’ second research question, “What impact 
might moral shame have on character development?” touches upon all of 
Dewey’s questions for educators. To assess what impact shame might have 
upon a person requires each respondent to have a preconceived notion of how 
moral character develops (or, “How do children learn?”) as well as to hold 
certain beliefs regarding what constitutes a mature and ideal moral character 
(and an “ideal society”). So, the objectives and content of moral education 
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programs (or, “What should be taught?”), as in all educational endeavors, 
ought to be guided by a clear conception of the desired goal. 
Regarding moral education programs, logic requires that a theorist has 
some concept of virtue and of vice prior to advancing a proposal on how to 
facilitate sound moral development. Here the notion of an ideal character, 
and/or “What type of society do we wish to live in?” should contextually guide 
the answer to “What should be taught?”. 
In this chapter five theories of moral development - and the role of moral 
shame within these theories - will be reviewed. The review of the literature on 
moral education theories and programs reveals an initial difficulty: objectives 
and goals vary. And this is because there is theoretical disagreement as to 
what constitutes a mature, moral character. Since each theory has a 
different conception of character development, it follows practical methods will 
vary accordingly as will the theoretical views on shame’s role in the 
development of character. A review of these theories will illuminate what 
significance shame has for each theorist. 
Disagreements over the proper methodology and the proper goal can, 
roughly, be classified within one of two general schools of thought 
When an American public school considers incorporating the teaching of 
values into the curriculum, there are essentially two general approaches from 
which to choose. The school community may elect a “character education” 
model or a “cognitive-developmental” model. These approaches differ 
conceptually and practically. 
Theoretically, character education holds that virtue can be taught, that 
good models are essential for moral development and that the young are not 
appropriate candidates for Socratic dialogues. Practically, teachers must 
“impose” specific values to ensure the development of proper habits. This is to 
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be done prior to, not necessarily concurrent with, intellectual rationalizations. 
Virtually every leading theorist in character education refers to or directly 
quotes Aristotle on the importance of good habits. One passage - often quoted - 
from the Nicomachean Ethics reads: 
(L)ike activities produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our 
activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that 
determine the resulting dispositions. So it is a matter of no little 
importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age - it 
makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world 
(Trans. Thompson, 1953, p. 92). 
This passage - and similar arguments that support an indoctrinative 
approach - are dismissed as misguided by the cognitive-developmentalists. 
/ 
The two most popular branches within this school are Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
stage development theory and Sidney Simon’s Value Clarification theory. 
Although distinctly different in many of their basic assumptions, both 
methods share a distrust for the development of habits through 
“indoctrination” or imposing upon the young a “bag of virtues”. Advocates of 
these theories often contend that “habituation” is the transmission of values 
that are not applicable in modern times while others object that indoctrination 
usurps autonomous self-direction. In further contrast with character 
education, these theories also enthusiastically endorse Socratic dialogues with 
children when these exchanges are modified to be age appropriate. The Values 
Clarification theory further suggests that these dialogues are to be conducted 
in an atmosphere of nonjudgmental acceptance for each and every view 
expressed. 
Although moral education programs in public schools have been 
primarily influenced by one of these two schools of thought, educators do not 
have the luxury of an simple either / or choice among the practical 
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applications of these methods. The values clarification theory demonstrates 
that an influential theory can evolve from one of these schools of thought, yet 
it will, in the suggested form of implementation, display little resemblance to 
fellow approaches. It follows that the assigned significance and role of shame 
can be decidedly different in theories sharing the same initial theoretical 
orientation. 
The format of this section begins with a review of the most influential 
theories from these two schools of thought. The order of the theories to be 
reviewed will be: 1) the indoctrinative model, 2) the cognitive-developmental 
model as formulated by Jean Piaget, 3) the values clarification method, 4) the 
moral stage development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg, and, finally 5) the 
character education model. Following each section with be a short exposition 
on: 1) the perceived shortcomings of each approach, 2) how shame appears to 
be accommodated within each of these theories, and, 3) how each theory would 
answer the question “What impact might shame have on character 
development?”. The section concludes with an alternative conception of moral 
development which will serve as an answer to the second research question. 
The Indoctrinative Model 
Early in the nineteenth century the majority of the public schools 
adopted an indoctrinative approach to moral education (Scharf, 1978; 
Bennett, 1993; Brooks & Goble, 1997). An indoctrinative model attempted to 
teach specific values to children through literature, lecture, practice, and 
example. Readings from the McGuffev Reader, “which by 1919 had the 
largest circulation of any book except the Bible”, carried lessons of moral 
virtues such as honesty and courage (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 99). One reviewer of 
203 
the McGuffey text observes the qualities of character referenced and 
supported most frequently were charity, industriousness, kindness, 
patriotism, and piety (Beach, 1992). In the McGuffev Reader, young children 
were introduced, unapologetically, to values held to be universally true. 
Always do to other children as you wish them to do to you. This is 
the Golden Rule. So remember it when you play. Act upon it 
now, and when you are grown up, do not forget it (cited in Lickona, 
1992, p. 235). 
Moral education held a central role in the curriculum of nineteenth 
century American public schools (Beach, 1992). The influential educational 
reformer, Horace Mann, advocated a public school curriculum that “sought to 
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form a sincere piety directed toward the Creator, (and) a morality based upon 
the example and ideas of Jesus Christ and conducive to civic peace and social 
righteousness” (Beach, 1992, p. 12). 
Support was also garnered for this approach from social institutions and 
clubs for children. The Boy Scouts of America, founded in 1910, established 
this now familiar oath: A scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, 
courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. A good 
scout, it is explicitly clear, is defined by a conformity to these specific values. 
A basic tenet of indoctrinative instruction was that stories of virtuous 
conduct helped to mold good children. Stories, such as “Jim and the Thief” 
from the McGuffey Reader, provided children with examples of acceptable and 
unacceptable conduct which were intended to stimulate their moral 
imagination. These stories, it was believed, began the work of emotionally 
attaching children to goodness (Kilpatrick, 1994). These insights have their 
roots in Plato and Aristotle. Plato wrote that children ought not hear stories 
“fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds 
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opinions...contrary to those that we shall think desirable for them to hold when 
they are grown up" (Republic, II, 378b, p. 624). Aristotle, we will recall, 
believed that the habits learned early make “all the difference in the world". 
Penmanship exercises in public school also carried clear moral lessons. 
In The Case for Character Education, author B. D. Brooks lists these 
sentences that children were instructed to copy twenty times. 
Quarrelsome persons are always dangerous companions. 
Great men were good boys. 
Justice is a common right. 
Wit should never wound. 
Build your hopes of fame on virtue. 
Zeal for justice is worthy of praise (1997, p. 13). 
Many students of the indoctrinative approach were also familiar with 
the list of virtues that Ben Franklin composed in order to self-monitor his own 
behavior. His list included the following; temperance, silence, order, frugality, 
industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and 
humility (Scharf, 1978). 
Three essential features distinguish the indoctrinative model. 
Indoctrinative educators share the basic assumptions that the values that 
they promote will serve their students well and these values will be as valid in 
the future as they are in the present and as they have been in the past. For 
example, indoctrinative educators believed that the truth value of “Honesty is 
the best policy" would hold constant for future generations. 
Second, in the nature / nurture debate, indoctrinative educators hold the 
nurture dimension at a premium. Inculcation, modeling, rewards and 
punishment, and repetition are highly regarded. Virtues are learned through 
practice and while in the formative stages, children ought not be granted the 
license to debate established wisdom. Following Plato, indoctrinative 
educators believe those children who engage in Socratic dialogues lack the 
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formative background, the skills, and the developed habits to benefit by such 
exchanges. These young debaters will “delight like puppies in pulling about and 
tearing with words” (Republic,VII, 539b, p. 771). They will not, however, 
necessarily acquire the virtues by debating either the value of the virtues in 
general or the specific application of them in particular and/or thorny cases. 
Third, morality is defined by the specific values and rules that are 
current within a specific society. Early American educators, for example, 
attempted to indoctrinate their students with values that may have been far 
different than those that had currency, for instance, in Germany or in China. 
Educators from all these regions, however, could legitimately be classified as 
indoctrinative. So one condition of a value need not be that it satisfy the 
requirement of universal application. Indoctrinative educators “define 
morality in terms of moral rules, values, and virtues of a particular society at 
a particular point in history” (Scharf, 1978, p. 23). 
In the practical application of the indoctrinative model, clear answers to 
Dewey’s questions emerge. What should be taught included moral values. 
Among the specific values that had societal approval in America were: piety, 
kindness, courage, patriotism, obedience, justice, honesty, humility, and 
moderation. An ideal society would be composed of citizens that exemplified 
these virtues. 
Presumably an indoctrinative educator would answer queries about how 
children learn by claiming the primary importance of good example and the 
development of good habits. Examples would come from one’s family, the 
townspeople, the clergy, and one’s teachers as well as from carefully selected 
literature. It was a common assumption that these lessons could be absorbed 
without the active participation or extended group dialogues involving the 
children. The saying “Children should be seen and not heard” held in schools. 
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As in libraries, it would not be unusual for early American classrooms to 
display a sign which read “Silence”. 
Shame and the Indoctrinative Model 
A common image of an early American educator is one of a strict 
disciplinarian, hickory switch in hand, looming over his cowering and compliant 
students. Other images are of dunce caps, red knuckles, and standing in the 
comer of the classroom facing the wall. Essential elements in these various 
forms of punishment were that the public disgrace and personal shame felt by 
the student could be justified by being effective incentives to learn and to 
become good children and citizens. 
Punishment itself is a practice usually justified in one of two ways: 
deterrence or retribution. Roughly, deterrence is forward-looking. One might 
claim that in punishment one intends to provide an individual with an 
incentive not to recommit a crime. Pain of punishment and shame, as with all 
pain, is thought to be something all rational people attempt to avoid. 
On a community level, deterrence hopes to dissuade others, often by 
example, from committing a crime in the first place. Some writers consider 
the latter purpose to be sufficient justification. In Punishing Criminals. 
Ernest van der Haag suggests one view of punishment is that it can be 
inflicted on someone solely for the benefit of others. 
Deterrence protects the social order by restraining not the actual 
offender, whoeo ipso, has not been deterred, but other members 
of society, potential offenders, who still can be deterred. As an 
English judge succinctly remarked: “Men are not hanged for 
stealing horses, but that horses may not be stolen” (van der 
Haag, 1975, pp. 60-61). 
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In contrast to deterrence, retribution is backward-looking. Retribution 
seeks to impose the amount of suffering an offender deserves simply for 
having committed an infraction. By virtue of some past offense, a person 
merits punishing. Providing an example to others, rehabilitation, and 
incentives to conform need not be motivating reasons for retributive 
punishment. In retribution the principle is simple: justice is served when an 
individual receives what he deserves. 
Shaming students, on the early American indoctrinative model, could 
range over all three justificatory punishing practices. The offending student 
deserved censure for an infraction and it was hoped the punishment would 
dissuade both the individual and his classmates from similar future conduct. 
For the common good, rules and values, having been clearly established, were 
to be observed. Since these values constituted the ideal or “the better self”, 
any instance of falling short could occasion punishment. If a child had 
internalized this ideal, he would feel shame for having fallen short in addition to 
the inevitable humiliation that accompanied his public reprimand. 
In the twentieth century, the indoctrinative moral education model 
began to fall into disfavor for a variety of reasons. Chief among the objections 
were that it was unduly harsh, that it was disrespectful of the intrinsic dignity 
of persons, that it was an unsound educational practice, that it relegated 
students to that of passive receptacles (Dewey,1953), and that it did not work 
(Simon, 1972). Indoctrination’s reliance on conventionalism was also faulted 
as philosophically unsound. Opponents correctly observed that an act is not 
morally right simply by virtue of it being permitted by society. Clearly, 
societies have, at various times throughout history, legally endorsed morally 
objectionable practices as permissible (e.g., segregation). 
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Precisely when in the twentieth century this change began is not 
certain. It is widely assumed that the change came abruptly in the 1960s. 
This assumption appears to neglect the facts. Sociologist James Q. Wilson 
notes that the emphasis on character development began to shift much 
earlier. 
In the 1920s, dramatic cultural changes began. The temperance 
movement became discredited and conservative religion lost 
ground. Professor Wilson...notes that from 1890 to 1910, about 
one-third of the (popular magazine) articles about child- 
rearing...dealt with character development. In 1920, only 3% had 
this focus. By 1930, personality development was the dominant 
theme of the women’s magazines (Christenson, 1996). 
Another dramatic change began in the 1920s with the publication of 
/ 
Yale University psychologists Hugh Hartshome and Mark May extensive 
study of children’s moral behavior. Their findings suggested that the behavior 
of children ultimately depends upon their immediate and particular 
circumstance. Children who professed to have honest characters were found 
t 
to be guilty of stealing, cheating, and lying in circumstances of apparent low 
risk (Lickona, 1992). These findings prompted Hartshome and May to 
propose the “doctrine of specificity”: human behavior is variable and 
dependent upon the situation and not predictable by virtue of someone’s 
apparent settled disposition or professed values. 
Other dramatic scientific proposals in the early part of the century that 
affected the confidence of people in the validity of conventional values were 
Darwinism and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Behavioral adaptation by 
evolutionary means and Einstein’s thesis about physical matter were both 
extrapolated to influence morality. As a result of these scientific theories, a 
far greater sympathy for ethical relativism began to pervade America. 
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Established religions, that supported public school moral education 
efforts, also experienced internal reforms prior to 1960. 
The theologian Richard John Neuhaus thinks that shame faded 
away not in the moral relativism of the 1960s, as is usually 
argued, but in the Pollyannaish 1950s, when spiritual leaders like 
Norman Vincent Peale argued you could have the positive side 
without the negative, which is philosophically and practically 
impossible (Alter and Wingert, 1995, p. 22). 
The indoctrinative approach was also subjected to assault from 
psychologists and educational scholars. By 1960, the innovative work of Jean 
Piaget had garnered a large and devoted audience. Expanding upon his work in 
the 1970s, Sidney Simon and Lawrence Kohlberg would advance their 
theories of moral development. These later theories were a direct and a harsh 
assault on the indoctrinative theory. Let us turn now to these three 
educational theories. 
Jean Piaget 
Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget revolutionalized the study of child 
psychology. Piaget’s primary focus was on the process of the acquisition of 
knowledge or the development of cognitive intelligence. Originally trained as a 
biologist, Piaget developed an interest in psychology when, early in his 
career, he was employed in the Binet Laboratory in Paris. Piaget’s primary 
task was to develop and administer French versions of several standardized 
tests, among them the famous Binet intelligence test (now titled the Stanford - 
Binet) (Wadsworth, 1989). 
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Piaget soon tired of his assigned work on standardized tests. Recording a 
child’s correct answers might indicate how much a child knows, but, for Piaget, 
the patterns emerging from wrong answers suggested to him a field of study 
far more intriguing. From the patterns and the content of wrong answers he 
was receiving, Piaget observed that as children mature they employ more 
sophisticated forms of reasoning. Piaget came to believe that cognitive 
development is a “process of successive qualitative changes of cognitive 
structures, each structure...deriving logically and inevitably from the 
preceding one” (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 24). One insight that lead to this 
conclusion was that early on in his research Piaget observed that problems 
that seemed insurmountable for children at one age were solved with relative 
ease by children at a later age (Hersh, et. al., 1982). 
To understand the process of reasoning children employ, Piaget 
developed the “clinical method” of inquiry. Unlike the one word or short phrase 
responses elicited by standardized tests, Piaget posed problems to children. 
He then, through an interview-type format, could observe and record the 
child’s approach to specific problems. Observations, dialogues, and clarifying 
questions were the hallmarks of the clinical method and this approach 
substantially influenced the methodology later employed by Simon and 
Kohlberg. 
Piaget concluded that the “fundamental differences in the way children 
reason are age-related” (Hersh, p. 19). Broadly summarized, the Piagetian 
stages of cognitive development are as follows: 
1. The stage ofsensori-motor intelligence (0-2 years). During this 
stage, behavior is primarily motor. The child does not yet 
internally represent events and “think” conceptually, though 
“cognitive” development is seen as schemata constructed. 
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2. The stage of preoperational thought (2 - 7 years). This stage is 
characterized by the development of language and other forms of 
representation and rapid conceptual development. Reasoning 
during this stage is prelogical or semilogical. 
3. Th e stage of concrete operations (7 -11 years) During these 
years, the child develops the ability to apply logical thought to 
concrete problems. 
4. The stage of formal operations (11 -15 years or older). During 
this stage, the child’s cognitive structures reach their greatest 
level of development, and the child becomes able to apply logical 
reasoning to all classes of problems (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 25). 
From his training in biology, Piaget brought to psychology an awareness 
of an individual’s cognitive and affective development as one that is strongly 
influenced by one’s environment. Piaget’s theory is predicated on assumptions 
of knowledge as the assimilation of environmental stimuli, the cognitive 
organization or “accommodation” of environmental stimuli and demands, and 
the “equilibrium” or disequilibrium of these two elements (Hersh, 1982; 
Wadsworth, 1989). 
The mind does not simply absorb discrete data...rather the mind 
“seeks” to organize itself. It seeks from the environment 
specifically relevant information that it can “use” to “construct” 
a system of order that makes sense of, and thereby enhances, 
interaction with the world (Hersh, 1989, p. 24). 
Cognitive development, for Piaget, requires four variables: direct 
experience, the level of exposure to environmental factors, the social 
transmission of new ideas through, for example, reading and instruction, and 
equilibration, or the ability to usefully structure information and experience 
(assimilation and accommodation). Although not everyone may achieve the 
level of formal operations, all children, Piaget claims, invariably progress 
through the stages in the standard order. 
212 
In many respects, Piaget’s theory of moral development parallels his 
theory of cognitive development. Admittedly, the majority of Piaget’s years of 
research were devoted to cognitive development, but he did, with his 
characteristic ingenuity, research and formulate a theory of moral 
development. 
Affective development, for Piaget, is inseparable from cognitive 
development. In agreement with the notion that emotions are comprised of 
cognitive components, Piaget has written, “It is impossible to find behavior 
arising from affectivity alone without any cognitive element” (1981, p. 2). 
Equally impossible is it to find behavior solely comprised of cognitive elements. 
Affectivity ranges over feelings, interests, desires, tendencies, values, 
and emotions (Wadsworth, 1989) and its connection with cognition, for Piaget, 
is straightforward. The student who likes science is more apt to do well in 
science. The one who does not will be at a disadvantage. 
Since intelligence was for Piaget comprised of cognitive and affective 
dimensions, it is not surprising to find that Piaget had these two aspects 
developing along similar time lines. A comparison of the stages of cognitive 
and affective growth is seen below. 
Cognitive stage 
Preoperational (2 to 7 years) 
Concrete (7 to 11 years) 
Formal (11 -15 and on) 
Moral stage 
Egocentric (4 to 7 years) 
Incipient Cooperation (7 to 11 years) 
Genuine Cooperation (11-12 and on) 
According to Piaget, preoperational children are characterized in the 
cognitive and affective realms by egocentrism. Supposedly, an egocentric 
child cannot take the role, or empathize, with others and the child believes 
that his perception of an event is the perception all others share. (Wadsworth, 
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1989). Conflicting views to his are disregarded as incorrect. Children at this 
stage speak in self-contained monologues and they play group games 
relatively unaffected and uncomprehending of standardized rules (Ginsburg 
and Opper, 1988). 
At the egocentric moral stage, children believe rules are absolute in 
nature and are handed down from some higher authority figure - one’s father 
or mother, God, or the government. 
The child's morality...is one of obedience, what Piaget called 
unilateral respect. Preoperational children do not reason about 
what is right or wrong. For them, what is right or wrong is 
predetermined (by authority) and not subject to their own 
evaluation. There is little cooperation in the social sense - there is 
only obedience (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 108). 
/ 
From his study of children at play, Piaget concluded that rules, to 
children at the egocentric stage, are believed to be unalterable. The child may 
be aware that he is unable to explain why certain rules are in effect; he will 
simply explain an authority figure has established and will enforce them 
(Ginsburg and Opper, 1988). Good and bad are determined by behavior that 
accords or conflicts with these rules. “Any act that shows obedience to a rule 
or even to an adult...is good”, Piaget writes, “and the good, therefore, is rigidly 
defined by obedience” (1965, p. 111). ‘Good’ as obedience is justified by the 
child’s belief that his parents or the authority figures are “omniscient, 
omnipresent...the source both of the uniformity of nature and of the laws of 
morality” (p. 375). Piaget succinctly summarizes the egocentric stage as a 
“blind faith in adult authority” (p. 402). 
Violations of the rules are measured or assessed in “real” terms - the 
extent of the damage done. Piaget’s “moral realism” theory postulates that 
egocentric children do not consider guilt to be moderated by subjective 
intentions or motives. The child who breaks 15 teacups while trying to help 
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his mother is guilty of a more serious transgression than is the child that 
deliberately breaks one. Minor accidents, according to Piaget, overwhelm 
children with a sense of guilt that is “proportional to the extent of the material 
disaster instead of remaining subordinate to the intentions in question” (1965, 
p. 136). Guilt and shame, at the preoperational or egocentric level, will be 
“more burning...the more irreparable the damage” (1965, p. 136). 
As a child matures, moral realism gives way to the incipient cooperation 
stage. Now a child begins to be able to factor in motivation, intentions, and 
the spirit of the law rather than a simple adherence to the letter of the law. 
Rules are perceived as a mutually agreed-upon framework for activities and 
the child is becoming more capable of interacting with others linguistically and 
behaviorally (Wadsworth, 1989). 
Genuine cooperation, beginning at about 11 years of age, parallels the 
cognitive “formal operations” stage. At this level of development the child 
begins to perform abstract operations with rules. 
He enjoys settling differences of opinion concerning the rules, 
inventing new rules, and elaborating on them...He finds that not 
everyone accepts the views promulgated by his parents 
(Ginsberg, p. 101). 
Piaget continues and, at this juncture, makes an rather startling inference. 
(As a result) the child reasons about rules and comes to the 
conclusion that they must, to some extent, be arbitrary and, 
therefore, changeable...The child (begins) to see rules as having a 
human, and hence fallible, origin, and (he) agrees to participate in 
their formation and alteration (p. 101). 
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In that the incipient cooperation stage seems to be one of transition, 
some commentators understand the Piagetian model of moral development to 
involve only two distinct stages. Ginsburg and Opper summarize Piaget’s 
theory on moral development to suggest that children begin at an 
“absolutists” stage characterized by a “morality of constraint” (1988, p.99). 
The central principle of a morality of constraint is: x is right if x accords with 
adult commands. As a child matures this stage gives way to an autonomous 
stage or “a morality of cooperation”. The revised guiding principle for this 
stage will now read: x is right if x accords with society’s commands or 
agreements. And, according to Piaget, society is to be understood as 
containing the child as an emerging participant in the formation of these 
commands. 
During the (egocentric) stage, rules are regarded as 
sacred...emanating from adults and lasting forever...During the 
(genuine cooperation) stage, a rule is looked upon as a law due to 
mutual consent, which you must respect if you want to be loyal 
but which it is permissible to alter on the condition of enlisting 
general opinion on your side (p. 28). 
A two-stage theory agrees with the view of Exile Durkheim, a 
philosopher Piaget held in high regard. Referencing Durkheim, Piaget notes: 
Durkheim’s ethical teaching, “which strikes so sincere a 
note...imbued with such a deeply scientific spirit...regards all 
morality as imposed by the group upon the individual and by the 
adult upon the child” (p. 341). 
As we will see, Piaget’s views on cooperation and self-regulation 
(autonomy) strongly influenced the theories of moral development introduced 
by Sidney Simon and Lawrence Kohlberg. 
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Shame in Piaget’s Theory 
The majority of Piaget’s research efforts and writings concerned 
cognitive development, and although there were parallels, his theory of moral 
development was far less intricate. Guilt and shame, in Piaget’s work, were 
rarely mentioned outside the brief references to moral realism. As mentioned, 
moral realism suggests a child, under a morality of constraint, feels guilt and 
shame in direct proportion to the actual, physical damage that results from 
some action by the child. 
Presumably, as a child matures, possible circumstances for feeling 
shame will increase under the morality of cooperation. Since Piaget evidently 
believes “society...is the only source of morality” (1965, p. 327), occasions for 
shame will arise when one fails to conform to agreed upon social commands or 
when one violates social prohibitions. The field of authority figures to whom 
the egocentric child holds himself accountable now expands at the genuine 
cooperation stage to entail obligations to the general community. A 
communal obligation is not synonymous with a blind obedience to convention. 
Individuals at stages of concrete and formal operations are active and 
autonomous participants in the formation of the binding obligations. 
A rule is...nothing but the condition for the existence of a social 
group; and if to the individual conscience rules seem to be charged 
with obligation, this is because communal life alters the very 
structure of consciousness by inculcating into it the feeling of 
respect (p. 101). 
As egocentrism is displaced by cooperation, Piaget’s mature individual 
actively participates in the construction of his own social world. 
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Autonomy means being governed by oneself, not by others. 
Autonomy of reasoning is reasoning according to one’s own 
constructed set of norms. It evaluates rather than automatically 
accepts the preformed values of others. In addition, autonomous 
reasoning considers others as well as the self. Autonomy is self¬ 
regulation (Wadsworth, 1989, p. 108). 
But Piaget’s view of a mature individual has some definite and 
restrictive parameters. Since his work has been so influential to the 
originators of the Value Clarification method and to Lawrence Kohlberg - 
methods to which we turn next - these restrictions deserve attention. 
In Dialogues with Children. Garth Matthews offers several probing and 
original criticisms of Piaget’s work. One concern Matthews has centers on the 
field of evidence Piaget allows in his effort to assess a child’s development. It is 
natural, Matthews notes, “to conceive developmental psychology on a 
biological model, where a mature specimen is taken as the standard toward 
which the immature individual develops” (1992, p. 117). Having a conception 
of the mature specimen allows a scientist to gauge the progress and assess 
the developmental stage of specific individuals. 
Matthews offers persuasive evidence to suggest that Piaget’s 
investigations discount the natural philosophical inquisitiveness of children.16 
With numerous examples, Matthews verifies instances wherein Piaget shows 
a remarkable lack of interest in some of the philosophically provocative 
answers children offer in the clinical interviews. For a researcher who began 
his investigations inspired by “wrong” answers on standardized tests, this is 
particularly puzzling. Equally perplexing is the fact that the clinical interview 
was specifically formulated to allow a flexibility in responses and in the follow¬ 
up questioning. 
10 See, for example, Philosophy and the Young Child. Chapter 4, pp. 37 - 53. 
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Piaget seemed uncharacteristically rigid when confronted by 
philosophical puzzlement and religious convictions. For example, those 
children who believe God intervenes in their lives are considered to labor under 
a misconception of “artificialism”, an inability to attribute all occurrences to 
natural processes (Ginsburg and Opper, 1988). In instances where a child 
expects punishment to be imposed by divine intervention, the clinical 
interview halts abruptly. 
The subjects who answer “God did it” should immediately be put 
aside...It seems quite natural to the child that a fault should 
automatically bring about its own punishment. For nature, in a 
child’s eyes, is not a system of blind forces regulated by 
mechanical laws operating on the principle of chance. Nature is a 
harmonious whole, obeying laws that are as much moral as 
physical (1965, p. 256). 
By discounting philosophical inquiry coupled with the assumption that 
religious convictions impede development toward autonomous, formal 
operations, Piaget’s clinical interviewing method overlooked many of the 
possible investigative avenues into the moral life and thought of children. Any 
egocentric-stage child who views nature as a harmonious whole seems a likely 
candidate for engaging conversation. In Piaget’s method, these dialogues 
never materialize. More importantly, it is not clear that every child will or 
ought to have absolutistic views supplanted by the view that society is the 
source of all morality. The objection can be raised that Piaget had things the 
wrong way around: some “mature specimens” come to believe that only those 
social rules are valid if they reflect universal and absolute truths. 
With the uncritical adoption of many of Piaget’s ideas, Values 
Clarification brought a secular and highly flawed theory of moral development 
into the public schools. 
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Sidney Simon 
In the preface of Values and Teaching: Second Edition written by Louis 
Raths, Sidney Simon and Merrill Harming, (hereafter referred to as Simon) the 
authors exclaim that “hundreds and hundreds of schools and school districts” 
have used their first edition published in 1966 (1978, p. viii). This claim seems 
modest. In “Ethics Without Virtue”, Christina Hoff Summers cites a Hoover 
Institute study which reports that as of 1975 perhaps thousands of school 
programs employ the values clarification method (VC) and “ten states have 
officially adopted values clarification as a model for their moral education 
programs” (1984, p. 290). 
There are several reasons for VC’s past popularity. Its main tenets can 
be explained within the time constraints of short term workshop settings. 
After these workshops, teachers can easily implement the practice of the 
theory - with a minimum of study - when they return to their classrooms. And 
the several books published by Simon contain hundreds of classroom activities 
that are easy to implement with a minimum of preparation. As of 1978 with 
the publication of the second edition, Simon claims “we are only able to say 
that the need is even greater than it was a decade ago” (Simon, 1978, p. viii). 
The urgency seems to be this: 
The children and youth of today are confronted by many more 
choices than in previous generations. They are surrounded by a 
bewildering array of alternatives. Modern society has made them 
less provincial and more sophisticated, but the complexity of 
these times has made the act of choosing infinitely more difficult 
(p. 15). 
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The external pressures that confront children according to Simon 
include, single parent families, increased mobility and the geographical 
separation of extended families, international unrest, the exposure to a 
seemingly infinite number of opinions, and endless technological changes 
(1978). These and other external factors make value decisions such a 
complicated process. 
As a consequence, some people flounder in confusion, apathy, or 
inconsistency. They cannot get clear on their values. They cannot 
find patterns for themselves that are purposeful (p. 4). 
Due to both the complexity of modem times and the exposure to so 
many divergent viewpoints, more and more children experience problems “of 
deciding what is good and what is right and what is desirable” (p. 10). Simon 
lists as a sample of the divergent opinions to which children are exposed to 
include those of parents, the church, peers, Hollywood, radical spokespersons, 
and cumulative effect of all of one’s teachers (1972, p. 16). 
The rationale for a new public school method of moral education is that 
“Until recently clear procedures based on adequate theory have not been 
available” (p. 12.) Simon explicitly states that the practical application of all 
other previous value theories have failed to establish the necessary clarity in 
less complicated times; these theories are, therefore, ill-suited to address these 
complex modem times. 
Simon lists specific approaches that will be ineffective. These are: 
1. Setting an example either directly, by the way adults behave, or 
indirectly, by pointing to good models. 
2. Persuading and convincing by presenting arguments and reasons for 
this or that set of values and by pointing to the fallacies and pitfalls of 
other sets of values. 
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3. Limiting choices by giving children choices only among values “we” 
accept. 
4. Inspiring by dramatic or emotional pleas for certain values often 
accompanied by models of behavior associated with the value. 
5. Rules and regulations intended to contain and mold behavior until it is 
unthinkingly accepted as right as through the use of rewards and 
punishments to reinforce certain behavior. 
6. Using the arts and literature...to model and promote what “always 
has been” and what “should be”. 
7. Cultural and religious dogma presented as unquestioned wisdom. 
8. Appeals to conscience...that we assume is within the heart of 
everyone; often used with the arousing of feelings of guilt...such as...he 
shamed his parents (p. 41). 
This is clearly an attack on the indoctrinative method. Not only does 
Simon explicitly assert that these approaches are poorly suited for the 
development of values in present times, but the claim continues that there is 
clear evidence that they have always been ineffective. 
(These) methods do not seem to have resulted in deep 
commitments of any sort...They just do not seem to work very 
well. This alone suggests that we should try a new approach 
(pgs. 41 - 42). 
There should be no dispute with Simon over his descriptive analysis of 
certain features of modem times. He correctly recognizes that modem life is 
“complex”; children are indeed exposed to a wide variety of “value conflicts” 
in politics, religion, work, family configurations, matters of sexuality, and in 
sources of authority. 
According to Simon, such a descriptive portrayal of modem life ought to 
suffice to discredit all the approaches that advocate “inculcation”. His 
reasoning seems to be as follows: The “direct inculcation of values works best 
when there is complete consistency” in what constitutes “desirable” values (p. 
42). Since a descriptive portrayal of modem life clearly shows a lack of any 
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consensus, value methods that incorporate inculcation will be ineffective. 
Inculcation (or indoctrination) is further discredited by stifling “ free inquiry, 
thoughtfulness, (and) reason” (p. 42). Blind adherence to existing societal 
norms, Simon correctly observes, has its dangers. But this starting point 
leads Simon to an extreme conclusion. Following the Piagetian notion that 
cognitive and moral development is characterized by the emergence of 
autonomous self-regulation, Simon’s value clarification method entrusts 
children with decision-making authority almost entirely unencumbered by 
adult intervention. This point is verified by the goal of the theory which is 
clearly articulated on the back cover of Values Clarification. 
The goal is to involve students in practical experiences, making 
them aware of their own feelings, their own ideas, their own 
beliefs, so that the choices and decisions they make are conscious 
and deliberate, based on their own value systems (1978, dust 
cover). 
People grow and learn, Simon writes, through experience. 
Since we see values as growing from a person’s experiences, we 
would expect that different experiences would give rise to different 
values and that any one person’s values would be modified as 
those experiences accumulate and change (p. 26). 
If values evolve from experience and these experiences offer new or 
different insights, it is to be expected that one’s values will accommodate these 
new insights. It appears to follow by necessity that since everyone’s 
experiences - and their insights into those experiences - will be different, then 
conceivably everyone’s values could be different. In the preface to Values and 
Teaching this relativistic claim is explicitly affirmed. 
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Different groups of people might have different values and...all 
views should be open for discussion, examination, possible 
affirmation, rejection, or doubt. In other words, people should be 
free to differ in their value indicators and their positions should be 
respected (pgs. viii - ix). 
For Simon, values are, by definition, personal things. Being a product of 
personal experience values are not subject to proof or consensus. Simon 
reasons that since there is no consensus on what constitutes ‘desirable’ 
values, the imposition of a specific value on a young child will inhibit his 
development. Blind conformity to external codes - be they religious 
commandments, moral imperatives or social conventions - are all rejected as 
stifling: external codes limit choices. Simon states xmequivocally, “There is no 
room in this theory for values that are imposed by outside pressure (1978, p. 
47). The final break with the indoctrinative model could hardly be more 
pronounced. 
Predictably, Simon maintains that values are not “hard and fast 
verities”; they are “the results of hammering out a style of life in a certain set 
of surroundings.” After enough ‘hammering’, patterns develop. These patterns 
of evaluation and behavior become our values. These values “are treated as 
right, desirable, or worthy” (p. 26). 
In Helping Your Child Learn Right From Wrong: A Guide to Values 
Clarification. Simon states, “Values cannot be taught” (1976b, p. 23). One 
reason he offers is that no one has the ‘right’ values for anyone else. What can 
be taught to children is the process by which to arrive at values and the 
necessary criteria to examine “whether they really are living according to 
what they say they value” (p. 23). 
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Simon proposes values must satisfy seven criteria. These are: 
Choosing: (1) freely 
(2) from alternatives 
(3) after thoughtful consideration of the 
consequences of each alternative 
Prizing: (4) cherishing, being happy with the choice 
(5) enough to be willing to affirm the choice 
to others 
Acting: (6) or doing something with the choice 
(7) repeatedly, in some pattern of life (p. 28). 
Consistent with the view that indoctrination is a misguided approach, 
advocates of the VCT are not much interested in identifying the values which 
children ultimately hold. The “process” by which children can find their own 
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values - so as to deal with their unique experiences - is the operative feature of 
the theory. From Helping Your Child Learn Right From Wrong. Simon 
comments: 
Values cannot be taught. But the process for arriving at them 
can be. We can teach our children to examine life rationally...Then 
we can help them to learn how to scrutinize their lives to see 
whether they are really living according to what they say they 
value. We can impress upon them the importance of arriving at 
their own personal values (1976b, p. 23). 
The methodology recommended by Simon for classroom VC exercises 
borrows heavily from the therapeutic approach of client-centered therapy 
devised by Carl Rogers. One similarity is in the proposal that a teacher should 
employ nonjudgmental active-listening techniques. Active-listening, 
another technique with roots in the Piagetian clinical method, is characterized 
by the use of clarifying responses. 
Some of the essential characteristics of an appropriate clarifying 
response from a teacher are that it signals to the students an accepting and 
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noncommittal attitude, that it is phrased nonjudgmentally, and that elicits 
opportunities for the student to ponder alternative courses of actions as they 
survey all possible consequences of different actions. 
Directives that are especially pertinent here are: 
1. The clarifying response avoids moralizing, criticizing, giving 
values, or evaluating. The adult excludes all hints of “good” or 
“right” or “acceptability”, or their opposites in such response. 
2. It puts the responsibility on the students to look at their 
behavior or ideas and to think and decide for themselves what it is 
they want. 
3. A clarifying response also entertains the possibility that the 
student will not look or decide or think. It is permissive and 
stimulating but not insistent. 
4. Clarifying responses operate in situations where there are no 
“right” answers - as in situations involving feelings, attitudes, 
beliefs, or purposes. They are not appropriate for drawing a 
student toward a predetermined answer. They are not questions 
for which the teacher has an answer...in mind (1976b, p. 56) 
“In all cases,” Simon insists, “responses are open-ended - that is, they 
lead the student to no specific value. No one must deliver a “right” answer to a 
clarifying response. Each student must be permitted to react in a personal 
and individual way” (p. 58) 
Again, the justification for this directive is that no one has the ‘right’ 
answer to deliver. This may explain Simon’s disinterest in identifying specific 
values: in that it is conceivable each individual will hold different values, the 
identification process would be a daunting, if not impossible, task. 
Simon qualifies this directive as not necessarily communicating 
“approval”; rather, value clarifying requires “acceptance of a person’s total 
being as it is”. Here the parallels with Rogerian client-centered therapy are 
striking. With the recognition that some people may prefer not to be more 
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thoughtful about values, coupled with VC’s aversion to “imposition” and in 
recognition that “the particular content of (the teacher’s) values holds no 
more weight than would anyone else’s” (1972, p. 27) the following directive 
emerges: 
It should be increasingly clear that the adult does not force 
personal values upon children. What the adult does do is create 
conditions that aid children in finding values if they choose to do 
so. When operating within this value theory, it is entirely possible 
that children will choose not to develop values. It is the teacher’s 
responsibility to support this choice also (1976a, p. 48). 
In summary, the originators of the Value Clarification theory have 
proposed that all previous methods of moral development are inadequate in 
present times. The main reasons they offer in support of this claim are that 
modern times are complex and that children become perplexed about what is 
morally right due to the array of conflicting opinions they hear. 
Furthermore, Simon charges previous methods of moral development 
have always been ineffective. Although ‘values’ themselves are not subject to 
‘proof or ‘consensus’, objective observation of the current state of value- 
confusion seems to clearly indicate that these other methods have not 
assisted people to arrive at “deep commitments of any sort”. 
The indoctrination to specific principles and values and the process of 
habituation will inevitably lead to an undesirable state of affairs. No one has 
the ‘right’ values for someone else’s child. Here again Simon cites the 
prevalence of children that display Value-confusion’ as evidence. Unlike the 
assumption in the indoctrinative method that there are specific values that 
have served others well in the past as they will serve children well in the 
future, in VC “there is the implicit assumption that the moral norms of society 
have largely broken down” (Scharf, 1978, p. 27). 
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To remedy value confusion, Simon offers a process of valuing that is 
relatively easy to implement in schools. This process prescribes seven criteria 
that establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a 
‘value’. It is assumed that a cognitive clarity on value issues will lead to a more 
purposeful and satisfying life. 
Another essential feature of VC, which distinguishes it from the 
indoctrinative approach, is that learning is gauged predominately by an 
increased awareness of oneself and not by the level of conformity to accepted 
societal values. Autonomy, not conformity, is one goal. 
Shame in Simon’s Theory 
Although one may hear an occasional reference to VC in public schools, 
as a credible theory and as an operative method it currently has few 
supporters. Throughout the years many objections have been leveled against 
VC. Commentators charge that the theory is merely a simple formulation of 
ethical relativism (Kilpatrick, 1992; Stewart, 1976). Unlike conventionalism, 
that can rely on a consensus as a system of checks and balances, the 
relativistic orientation of VC ultimately leaves individual children to their own 
devices in the decision-making process and in the justification of their 
decisions. Teachers report that if they are to adhere to the directives of the 
method, they can not respond to clear cases of objectionable choices (Lickona, 
1992). When teachers are instructed to avoid all pronouncements of “good”, 
“right” and “acceptable”, shameful behavior is allowed to go unchallenged. 
Simon’s seven criteria of a “value” can be faulted for being too 
permissive. Merely to choose one value from among those available and to 
then happily and repeatedly conform to it are insufficient requirements. S 
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might choose self-centeredness and dishonesty and, although deluded, he might 
consider himself content with his choices. A co-author of the theory, Merrill 
Harmin, appears to have considered this objection. 
Our emphasis on value neutrality probably did undermine 
traditional morality...As I look back, it would have been better 
had we presented a more balanced picture...It makes a good deal 
of sense to say that truthfulness is better than deception, caring 
is better than hurting, loyalty is better than betrayal, and 
sharing is better than exploitation (cited in Lickona, 1991, p. 
237). 
Shame, in Values and Teaching, is only referred to once. In this 
quotation it is unclear whether Simon means to imply that shame and clear 
values can coexist. 
There is something about emotional needs which are the source of 
shame...If we are extremely fearful or feel deeply guilty, we are 
somewhat ashamed of the situation and do things to hide the 
facts. On the other hand, when we have values, we are genuinely 
proud of them; we cherish and esteem them and hold them dear 
(1966, p. 198). 
It is not at all clear that any general assessment of shame’s influence on 
character development can be made in the value clarification theory. If each 
individual establishes their own value system, then feelings of shame will vary 
accordingly. For example, if an individual, S, adopts an operative egoistic 
principle of “me first” to guide his actions, then instances of disregarding the 
rights and needs of others need not elicit feelings of shame. And if optimal 
character development operates as the theory suggests, no external 
imposition of rules or codes of conduct will cause S to reassess his position. S 
will not be influenced by “honesty is the best policy” or similar virtuous 
prescriptions if these are all to be dismissed as value impositions from some 
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alien and external source. 
Simon’s rather confusing quotation above seems to imply that value 
clarity eliminates occasions for shame. Shame might be an incentive for 
someone to “get clear” on their values. But it is difficult to know, from Simon’s 
text, whether the self-centered S is on his way toward greater clarity or has 
already arrived. 
Lawrence Kohlberg 
In the 1970s Lawrence Kohlberg introduced an extensively researched 
theory of moral development that was more substantial than the alternative 
theory advanced by Simon. Kohlberg proposed that moral development 
occurs in an invariant and universal sequence of six qualitatively distinct 
stages. His research also advanced a method for identifying and scoring these 
stages as well as a proposal on how moral development can best be fostered. 
In Kohlberg’s view, moral development occurs in six steps of three 
consecutive levels. The major levels he labels as the preconventional, the 
conventional, and the postconventional. Each major level is subdivided and 
the subdivisions are labeled numerically (e.g., stage two is the second step of 
the preconventional level, stage three is the first step of the conventional level, 
etc.). The preconventional level is occupied by most children under 9, some 
adolescents, and most criminal offenders (Kohlberg, 1976). The conventional 
level is “the level of most adolescents and adults in our society and in other 
societies” (p. 33, italics added). The postconventional level is reached by only a 
small minority (1976). 
“Conventional” Kohlberg defines as “conforming to and upholding the 
rules and expectations and conventions of society or authority just because 
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they are society’s rules, expectations, or conventions” (p. 33). And the three 
different levels are best understood, according to Kohlberg, as the relationship 
of the individual with these conventions, rules, and expectations 
of society (1976). The levels are distinguishable by changes in the social 
perspective of an individual, specifically by the justifications he will give for 
what is right and by his reasons for upholding what is right. 
Kohlberg believed all people are philosophically inquisitive. Irrespective 
of age, many of the philosophical puzzles that all people ponder are moral in 
nature. These questions, believed to have universal appeal and which guided 
Kohlberg’s investigations were: “How should I live?”, “What is right?”, and, 
“How do I know it is right?” (Howard, 1991). Like Piaget’s clinical interviewing 
method, and with obvious and acknowledged credit to Dewey, Kohlberg’s 
research aim was clearly established. His elaborate research method intended 
to assess the maturity of an individual’s moral reasoning by the justifications 
that were given to resolve standardized dilemmas and stories. 
Movement to a higher stage is characterized by an individuals ability to 
offer more sophisticated justifications for the resolution. Kohlberg’s most 
famous testing dilemma was that of Heinz. With his wife dying from a rare 
form of cancer, Heinz becomes aware of a druggist who has formulated an 
expensive new drug that might save his wife. Heinz is distressed to learn that 
he does not have enough money to purchase the drug and that the druggist 
with neither lower his asking price nor will he issue credit. 
Kohlberg asks his subjects, “Should Heinz steal the drug?” The 
classification of the responses according to Kohlberg’s stage model will 
determine an individual’s level. For example, Stage 1 responses resemble 
“Stealing is wrong. It is against the law. Heinz will be punished for stealing”. 
A stage 3 conventional level response might be: “Heinz should not steal. If 
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everyone in difficult times, stole, society would break down. Only bad people 
steal.” Kohlberg gives this example of a stage 6 response to the Heinz 
dilemma. 
It is wrong legally but right morally. Systems of law are valid only 
insofar as they reflect the sort of moral law all rational people can 
accept. One must consider the personal justice involved, which is 
the root of the social contract...Personal justice means, “Treat 
each person as an end, not as a means (p. 39). 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral stages is summarized below. 
LEVEL 1- PRECONVENTIONAL 
Stage 1: “Punishment and Obedience” Orientation 
What is right - literal obedience to authority, avoid breaking rules 
Reasons for doing right - to conform with authority, to avoid punishment 
Social perspective - egocentric outlook, unable to empathize with others 
Stage 2: Instrumental purpose and exchange 
What is right - obey rules only when it is in one’s best interest 
Reasons for doing right - to best serve oneself 
Social perspective - right is relative to concrete individuals 
LEVEL 2 - CONVENTIONAL 
Stage 3: “Good bov. Nice girl” orientation 
What is right - to abide by expectations of ones associates 
Reasons for doing right - the need to be regarded as “good”, desire to 
maintain rules of authority figures 
Social perspective - expectations of others takes precedence over self- 
interest, awareness of Golden Rule and shared feelings and 
agreements 
Stage 4: Social System and Conscience. “Law and Order” Orientation 
What is right - Fulfilling obligations, doing one’s duty, behavior that 
contributes to and supports society or one’s group 
Reasons for doing right - to avoid breakdown of groups and systems 
Social perspective - takes viewpoint of system that defines roles and rules 
LEVEL 3 - POSTCONVENTIONAL 
Stage 5: Social Contract. Utility and Individual rights 
What is right - to impartially uphold values that are relative to one’s group, 
and to uphold values recognized as universal. 
Reasons for doing right - obligation to the law for welfare of others, feelings of 
contractual commitments, concern for law based on utility 
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Stage 6 - Universal Ethical Principles 
What is right - determined by universal and self-chosen ethical principles 
Reasons for doing right- personal commitment to moral principles 
Social perspective - a rational person recognizes that the nature of morality 
requires people be treated as ends in themselves 
Kohlberg’s moral stage theory is far more elaborate than Piaget’s, 
although the latter’s influence on Kohlberg is clearly evident. Both theorists 
consider progress to be successive qualitative cognitive changes with each 
new stage deriving from and supplanting the preceding one. Piaget’s 
preoperational child - as with Stage 1 and 2 children - will presumably view 
laws as external impositions of an authority’s commands. Each theorist 
proposes these children are egocentric and that they will obey rules primarily 
to avoid punishment. 
Piaget’s concrete operational child begins to understand the purpose of 
laws and to assess the motivations of others. In a like manner, Kohlberg’s 
conventional individual (Stages 3 and 4) recognizes lawful behavior as 
supportive of society, is concerned with the welfare of others, assumes 
obligations and duties for the common good, and is capable of empathic 
interplay with his associates. Both concrete operational and conventional 
stage individuals are capable of subordinating personal needs for the welfare of 
the group. The formal operations person in Piaget’s model will view laws as 
alterable and he will assume a participatory role when it is merited. Similarly, 
a person at Kohlberg’s Stage 6 will override laws if they conflict with universal 
or self-chosen moral principles. 
With a clear reference to Piaget, Kohlberg explicitly states that the 
attainment of higher moral stages is contingent upon cognitive development. 
233 
Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral 
reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning. There is a 
parallelism between an individual’s logical stage and his moral 
stage. A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational is 
limited to the preconventional moral stages, Stages 1 and 2 
(Kohlberg, 1976, p. 32) 
Only cognitive growth allows one to pass sequentially through the 
qualitatively different moral stages. For Kohlberg, this growth takes place 
most effectively in a “just community” or in a school that encourages Socratic 
dialogues and policy decisions arrived at democratically. The use of dilemmas 
to foster moral development and a school curriculum organized to 
accommodate democratic participation illustrates two fundamental 
differences between Kohlberg’s theory and the indoctrinative model. 
The direct transmission of values advocated by the indoctrinative 
approach is rejected by Kohlberg as a “romantic” misconception. With an 
emphasis on moral reasoning and personal experience, Kohlberg shifted the 
focus from modeling and lecture to one of Socratic dialogues geared to be 
personally relevant. “Teaching virtue”, Kohlberg writes,”is the asking of 
questions and pointing the way, not the giving of answers” (cited in Howard, 
1991, p. 51). Socratic dialogues was one operating philosophy for the “just 
community” schools. Another distinctive notion was that effective schools 
ought to be run by democratic participation. Students, staff, and faculty in 
community “town meetings” would set and enforce the schools rules and 
debate appropriate punishments for infractions. Each person gets one vote 
on all policy issues. 
In classes, current events and difficult social issues (e.g., pollution, racial 
and gender discrimination, nuclear proliferation) as well as specific behaviors 
(e.g., lying, stealing, drug use, attendance) are the topics of debate (Howard, 
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1991). Although Kohlbergian techniques are still endorsed by many teachers 
and consultants, the just community school experiment had dismal results. 
From his office at Harvard’s School of Education, Kohlberg’s most direct 
involvement benefited the Cluster School in Brookline, Massachusetts. In 
addition to Kohlberg’s supervision, the school had an envious student - teacher 
ratio: thirty students interacting with six teachers and dozens of consultants 
(Kilpatrick, 1991). However, one observer remarked that the school seemed 
in constant turmoil. “Student-citizens (were) forever stealing from one 
another and using drugs during school hours” and the community meetings 
seemed to be continually preoccupied with “problems with drugs, theft, sex, 
and racial divisions” (cited in Kilpatrick, p. 92). In only its fifth year of 
operation the Cluster School closed. 
The enthusiasm with which Merrill Harmin (co-author of VC) and 
Kohlberg introduced their theories was not matched by positive personal 
evaluations of the practical results of their respective theories. Kohlberg 
himself became disenchanted with his theory in practice. Reminiscent of 
Harmin’s reconsideration of his value clarification theory, Kohlberg retracted 
his disdainful assessment of the indoctrinative methodology. 
Some years of active involvement with the practice of moral 
education at Cluster School has led me to realize that my 
notion...was mistaken...The educator must be a socializer 
teaching value content and behavior, and not only a Socratic or 
Rogerian process-facilitator of development...I no longer hold 
these negative views of indoctrinative moral education...This is 
true, by necessity, in a world in which children engage in stealing, 
cheating and aggression (cited in Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 92). 
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Shame in Kohlberg’s Theory 
As with any complex and innovative idea, Kohlberg’s theory has been 
subjected to intense scrutiny. A common criticism is that Kohlberg’s method 
relies almost exclusively on cognitive operations (Lockwood, 1978; Beach, 
1992; Kilpatrick, 1992). It is one thing, Kilpatrick suggests, to know the right 
thing to do and quite another to do it (1992). A careful review of Kohlberg’s 
theory supports the charges that it overlooks much of the impact of the 
affective dimension on moral development, that it fails to account for cognitive 
rationizations undermined by a weak will or a lack of moral courage, that the 
early moral stages are portrayed as one-dimensional, and that the theory 
entails an inadequate notion of the central role of moral training in moral 
development. By far the most common criticism concerns Kohlberg’s neglect 
of the moral emotions. 
Kohlberg, like Piaget, is particularly weak on the development of 
the affective side of morality, of the moral emotions such as 
“guilt”, “concern for others”, “remorse” and so on...(and) Kohlberg, 
in his references to ego strength, sees the importance of will in 
morality, but offers no account of the type of habit training which 
encourages or discourages its growth (Peters, “Phi Delta 
Kappan”, June,1975, p. 678). 
By way of illustration, in a clinical interview setting, an agent, S, may 
cognitively sort out and verbally justify some course of action, a, in situation, 
x. But Kohlberg seems to underappreciate a legitimate concern: that, in 
action, S might actually do b or c regardless of what S might say. And having 
done b or c, presumably knowing a to be the right thing to do, how might this 
affect S? Kohlberg seems to anticipate one aspect of this objection. 
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A variety of factors determines whether a particular person will 
live up to his stage of moral reasoning in a particular situation, 
though moral stage is a good predictor of action in various 
experimental and naturalistic settings (1976, p. 33). 
In a subsequent article, Kohlberg even softens his claim that a moral 
stage is a good predictor. He explains away those occasions of a discrepancy 
between words and deeds by suggesting a person, at a given cognitive stage, 
“maybe one or more stages lower in morality” (1981, p. 138). To avoid 
unpleasant consequences, or “not wishing to be a martyr”, a person may 
“prefer to reason at a lower level” (p. 139). But to reason and to act at a lower 
level clearly sounds like stage-regression - something Kohlberg denies ever 
occurs. 
Kohlbergian moral stages, then, are only predictors of the range of 
alternatives an agent is aware of and of why one ought to act in some specific 
way, not a predictor of what the individual will actually do. And if Kohlberg’s 
theory confines itself with the range of alternatives and justifications as the 
sole constituents of a particular moral stage, neither an agent’s emotional 
response to his actual conduct nor that agent’s resistance to pressures and 
temptations will be introduced or calculated. Only cognitive justifications are 
Kohlberg’s target; conscience, desire, emotional reactions, and concrete acts 
will not be influential designators of one’s moral stage. If one factor in 
calculation of the strength of one’s character is the ability to withstand 
temptation, any theory which neglects this variable is, by design, flawed. 
So Kohlberg’s theory, with its cognitive “what-if” orientation, does not 
calculate feelings of shame. As has been argued, reflecting upon the self- 
regarding emotions will influence how one thinks about how one ought to 
conduct oneself on future occasions. Since one objective of Kohlberg’s work is 
to assess how children progress to the next higher stage, ignoring the affective 
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factor that will - arguably - foster this movement seems to be a serious 
oversight. And it is not surprising that religious educators are among those 
that are most dissatisfied with a Kohlbergian approach to moral development. 
In the classical Judeo-Christian tradition of moral theology, much 
attention is given to the nature of conscience, as the inner 
principle that determines choice...(and) much attention is...given 
to the troubled or guilty or “accusing” conscience, where the self 
comes to acknowledge that it has acted in violation of the moral 
norms the self knows or at least professed in principle. Guilt, 
remorse, contrition, repentance, forgiveness - these traditional 
categories of moral theology - are lacking in Kohlberg’s descriptive 
and normative analysis of cognitive moral development (Beach, 
1992, p. 39, italics added). 
An even more startling limitation is suggested in an analysis of 
Kohlberg’s moral stage theory by Gareth Matthews. Matthews observes that 
according to the conditions of Stage 1 and 2, children will resist performing 
prohibited acts only to avoid punishment. This assertion, Matthews notes, 
necessarily categorizes these children as “pre-moral”. 
The reason they are only pre-moral is that their concept of 
obligation as the realization that they will likely be punished if 
they do such-and-such is not a concept of moral obligation at all. 
It is just the recognition that there are some things we get 
punished, or rewarded, for doing (Matthews, 1995, pp. 55-56). 
Even if a particular child is only occasionally capable of doing the right 
thing for the right reason, Matthews reasons, then they are entitled to be 
classified as more than pre-moral. To say otherwise is simply mistaken and 
condescending, if not morally objectionable. 
Matthews’s insight can apply to the conventional stages with equal 
force. To act in such a way so as to please others (Stage 3) or merely to 
maintain the social order (Stage 4) may cause us shame if and when we let 
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others down. But to merely abide by conventions need not take on a moral 
dimension. Kohlberg himself defines “conventional” as abiding by society’s 
commands just because they are society’s commands. So a person can 
conform to these conventions amorally; he need not trouble himself with 
whether the particular laws of his society or his associates are just. An agent 
will conform simply because it is the conventional practice or because it is 
an external imposition (“It’s the policy” or “We’ve always done it this way”) or 
in order to maintain the respect of his associates (“I was only following orders” 
or “This is what is expected of me”). Performing the objectionable 
requirements of membership in a street gang, a blind obedience to corporate 
policies that are clearly harmful to others, committing murder so as to be a 
“made-man” in the Mafia, or subjugating blacks as a policy of a white 
supremacist group are all concrete examples. 
If these conventionalists rationalize their questionable behavior as the 
means to maintain acceptance within a group or to maintain order within a 
particular society, then their activities will not necessarily elicit a moral 
shame. It would be incompatible for an individual at Stage 3 or 4 to feel 
shame in acknowledging of a moral failure and, at the same time, to feel pride 
for successfully upholding a group standard. An agent’s shame would require 
that some aspect of the group’s standard is seen as reprehensible and 
conformity to it, therefore, would be no justifiable basis for pride. One might, of 
course, feel conflicted; one might acknowledge the “dirty hands” problem.17 
But conflict implies an uncertainty as to how to order one’s priorities. For the 
Stage 3 or 4 conventionalist, in Kohlbergian terms, the sole priority is to abide 
by the expectations of one’s associates. This troubles Matthews. 
17 The concept of “dirty hands”, as I understand the term, refers to the acceptance of 
performing some act that entails a morally repugnant feature or, because of its alleged 
benefit, the act itself transcends moral considerations. Issuing orders for a military attack 
knowing innocent civilians will undoubtably be killed might qualify as an example. 
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One who conforms to expectations simply to avoid disapproval 
(Stage 3) or even one who acts to maintain the “given social order 
for its own sake” (Stage 4) has not, it seems, or at least not for 
those reasons, attained a specifically moral understanding of 
obligation. It begins to look as though all stages before Stage 5, 
or even Stage 6, are really pre-moral stages (1994, p. 60). 
As Kohlberg himself defines the “good-boy” and “law and order” levels, an 
individual’s primary concern is with appearances, pleasing others, or 
supporting the current operating system. Whether these conventions are 
“just” or universally applicable are only considerations that supposedly 
motivate action for Kohlberg’s highest stages - the postconventional. 
Matthews’s “pre-moral” criticism has profound implications. For 
according to Kohlberg’s theory, it is quite possible to be cognitively and morally 
at Stage 4 while being a thoroughly evil person. To see that this is so we need 
only reflect on the idea of a violent Klansman doing what he deems necessary 
to keep his social world “pure”. And what this example illustrates is that 
Kohlberg’s moral stage theory - up to and including Stage 4 - fails to 
discriminate among the objects of a person’s values and interests. A mere 
conformity to group conventions are not principles by which one can 
distinguish the good from the bad; nor are they prescriptions by which we can 
evaluate right from wrong. Clearly it is the case that the values and interests 
of maintaining a Klan group is not morally equivalent to the value and interest 
of supporting a town’s elementary school or its church. 
Kohlberg never addressed this criticism, but he, as well as others, have 
attempted to answer the critics who charge that his theory inadequately 
accommodates the affective aspects of moral development. A standard 
response is articulated in “Lawrence Kohlberg: The Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach to Moral Education”. 
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Kohlberg claims that he has not neglected will and feeling in 
moral development; rather they are part of the process of moral 
reasoning. Thus, he would argue that the exemplars of stage 6 
morality - Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Jesus - are proof the 
‘the cognitively developed’ person is also a person of great moral 
passion and feeling...The Stage 6 person who has reached the 
heights of cognitive moral development is also a person of great 
moral passion (p. 79). 
But this response hardly addresses whether moral feelings affect moral 
development. It merely acknowledges that Jesus, Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
Gandhi - unquestionably Stage 6 (or higher) individuals - are “also people of 
great moral passion”. To say that moral feelings are part of the process of 
moral reasoning at Stage 6 is not to say that they are essential components of 
the earlier stages or that they are necessary for the attainment of subsequent 
stages. Kohlberg merely acknowledges Gandhi to have been a man of moral 
passion. This is beyond dispute. Consider the suggestion that what Kohlberg 
overlooks is that Gandhi was an individual of great moral feeling from a very 
early age. Precisely because of this attribute, one could argue further, Stage 
6 became attainable for Gandhi. Kohlberg has no explanation for how this 
could be. 
It is, then, a valid inference on Kohlberg’s model that only persons at 
Stage 5 or 6 can feel moral shame in instances of personal failings that involve 
and appeal to notions of universal values. This insight suggests that Kohlberg 
does more than ignore the moral emotions; at the early stages, his theory does 
not allow for them. Since one can experience moral shame only after one has 
reached the highest levels - something very few actually do - than, in 
Kohlberg’s theory, moral shame can have no impact on the development of 
character. Kohlberg appears to be committed to the view that one will be 
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sensitive to moral shame only after one’s moral development has evolved into 
that of a “mature specimen”. 
So another startling implication of Matthews’s dissatisfaction with 
Kohlberg’s theory is the apparent suggestion that, aside from instances of 
violating conventions (which in themselves maybe misguided), all children and 
most adults are morally shameless. What is there to be ashamed of if one 
satisfies his own interest or supposes he has abided by the prevailing 
conventions? 
A final difficulty with Kohlberg’s theory of moral development concerns 
what his method of assessment purports to measure. A Kohlbergian stage is 
assigned to individuals by virtue of how he or she resolves an ethical dilemma. 
But if we are to understand character as defined by the patterns and 
continuity of thoughts, actions, and habits of an individual which are guided by 
the values to which this person is committed, then a proper assessment of 
character requires a long perspective - a reflective view of an entire life or, at 
least, a sizable portion of a life. Survey answers hardly seem adequate to 
render a clear portrayal of this intricate nature. Even if we were to concede 
what a person says he would do to be an authentic and accurate testimony of 
what he will do, resolving the conflicting claims in a hypothetical dilemma 
gives but one perspective into a person’s character. Joel Kupperman objects 
to this “snapshot” orientation which he claims infects many ethical theories. 
Kupperman observes that the decision-procedures proposed in many ethical 
theories are formulated in terms of discrete choices so that “the character, 
habits, and past decisions...of the moral agent drop out of the picture” 
(Kupperman, 1991, p. 151). Along these same lines, Matthews faults the 
narrow focus of the Kohlbergian approach. 
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In Matthews’s view moral development takes place across five 
dimensions: paradigms, defining characteristics, the range of cases, 
adjudicating conflicting moral claims, and moral imagination (1994). 
Paradigms are the ability of a person to identify acts that exemplify virtues 
and vices (e.g., is this particular act an act of‘lying’, ‘bravery’, ‘responsibility’, 
etc). “Defining characteristics” is an ability to define terms of moral 
assessment in enlightening ways. For example, the definition of lying as 
uttering a falsehood with the intention to deceive signifies growth from the 
response of “naughty words”. “Range of cases” concerns the ability of a 
person to identify the various acts that can be morally assessed within each 
paradigm. Is keeping incorrect change at the supermarket an act of stealing? 
And is it lying if, at the time, one notices the teller’s mistake and says nothing? 
Matthews’s fourth dimension - adjudicating conflicting moral claims - is the 
ability to sort out the right thing to do when two moral claims appear to make 
demands on us at the same time. The Heinz dilemma is a case in point. Does 
our obligation to help others or alleviate suffering override our duty to respect 
another person’s property? Matthews faults Kohlberg’s focus on this 
dimension to the exclusion of all the others (1994). 
The last dimension in Matthews’s view, moral imagination, is the ability 
to see the moral import in our lives and actions. It is, among other things, the 
ability to empathize with others, a projective sensitivity to anticipate whether 
our actions will alleviate or cause suffering, and an openness to concrete 
instances of moral obligation. Quite literally, before one decides whether to 
contribute some money to a hungry beggar, that person must notice him there 
on the sidewalk. If one is insensitive to suffering, then he will be unaware of 
some of his moral obligations. 
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Envisioning the “better self is an act of moral imagination. So some 
instances of shamelessness might be explained - in the past tense - as moral 
unreflectiveness, and - in the future tense - as an inability to see, or an 
insensitivity to, our moral alternatives. The conventionalism of early 
indoctrinators, the rigidity and limited view of the personal constructivism of 
Piaget, and the presumptuous relativism and value-neutrality of value 
clarification all, in their own way, inhibit moral imagination. And Kohlberg 
cannot calculate how moral shame will affect character development when it 
occurs in these other dimensions if he does not recognize - or if he fails to 
acknowledge - these dimensions exist. Character education takes a broader 
perspective on moral development. Let’s turn to that now. 
A Modem Character Education Model 
Current models of character education (CE) subscribe to many of the 
same principles espoused by their indoctrinative predecessors. Some 
character education advocates, most notably, Thomas Lickona, have 
developed moral education theories that are also selectively informed by the 
work of Piaget and Kohlberg. 
One principle of CE is that certain core ethical values form the basis of 
good character. Honesty, fairness, responsibility, respect for oneself and for 
others, and thoughtfulness are among the values that many CE organizations 
consider obligatory (such as the Character Education Partnership, The Center 
for the 4th and 5th R’s18, the Heartwood Institute, the Jefferson Center for 
CE, and the Josephson Institute of Ethics). Schools committed to CE 
unapologetically name specific qualities they expect their students to strive 
18 The fourth and fifth R’s are respect and responsibility. 
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for, their staff to model, and to which all school members are held accountable 
(Huffman, 1994; Lickona, Schaps, and Lewis, 1995). 
The direct evolution of current CE models from the early indoctrinative 
model is justified in the literature as sharing the educational goals of assisting 
people to become both smart and good and by the vision consistent with the 
American Founders of democracy (Lickona, 1992). Since democracy is 
government by and of the people, the reasoning goes, people themselves must 
be good for the government to be good. 
A second guiding principle of CE, unlike a cognitive-developmental 
approach, is that effective programs must address the cognitive, the 
emotional, and the behavioral aspects of moral life. It is not simply enough to 
proceed through more sophisticated reasoning stages; desire and action play 
equally important roles in moral development. 
Good character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good, 
and doing the good - habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and 
habits of action. All three are necessary for leading a moral life; 
all three make up moral maturity (1992, p. 51). 
The emphasis on action in CE programs shifts the focus of an ethical fife 
of reasoning through dilemmas to one that emphasizes the affective 
dimension. It is just as essential to desire virtue and to do the right thing as it 
is to reason correctly. There will be no dilemma, CE proponents point out, if 
stealing is thought to be permissible or considered to be attractive. The story 
of Kohlberg’s puzzlement over the ineffectiveness of his approach in prisons 
testifies to this point.19 The Heinz dilemma will only be a dilemma to those 
who believe that stealing is, with few exceptions, an immoral activity, and, as 
such, repugnant. 
19 See, for example, Kilpatrick, 1992, “How Not to Teach Morality”, pp. 78 - 95. 
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Another notion which distinguishes character educators from cognitive- 
developmentalists (CD) is their respective views of human nature. 
Developmentalists charge CE as having a dim and pessimistic view of 
children. Some see CE as focusing on how to teach children to restrain 
impulses, to overcome self-centeredness, to socialize them away from their 
natural tendencies to be, in Hobbesian terms, “mean, nasty, and brutish”. 
But an optimism about children’s natural goodness does not motivate 
alternative approaches. Alfie Kohn, in support of the developmental 
approach, cites scientific studies that replicate Hartshome and May’s findings 
that propose people are at the mercy of circumstance. 
(CE) ignores the accumulated evidence from the field of social 
psychology demonstrating that much of how we act and who we 
are reflects the situations in which we find ourselves. Virtually all 
the landmark studies in this discipline have been variations on 
this theme (Phi Delta Kappan, Feb. 1997, p. 431). 
Kohn alleges CE teachers overlook the notion of character formation as 
a function of one’s social environment. This misconception is so common, 
Kohn claims “social psychologists have dubbed this the ‘fundamental 
attribution error’” (p. 431). Cognitive developmentalists hardly seem to gain 
any moral high ground with this view if they are committed to the notion that 
all children are susceptible to a kind of social determinism. Arrange the 
environment in a certain way, they seem to be saying, and a certain product 
inevitably emerges. The character educators, on the other hand, propose 
children need guidance, models, and socialization to develop virtue. If there is 
cause for optimism in either view, it might weight in favor of the CE view: 
regardless of the environment, or more to the point, in spite of a bad 
environment, CE suggests good children can emerge with good training. 
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Training is a point of contention between CD and CE. Character 
educators favor practice so that “habits” form. Their hope is that good acts 
become second-nature. CD views habit as unreflective, a “mindless 
conformity to externally imposed standards of conduct” (Kohn, 1997, p. 434). 
Developmentalists favor a participatory arrangement of the classroom to 
foster empathy, skepticism and “the cultivation of autonomy” rather than a 
blind obedience to uniform standards (Kohn, 1997). CE methods, Kohn 
charges, encourage children to follow rules “regardless of whether they are 
reasonable and to respect authority regardless of whether that respect has 
been earned” (p. 432). 
Other shared principles of CE with the early indoctrinative model is the 
central roles of stories, a belief in the power of example, and of the importance 
of discipline to help children to develop the virtues. CE believes, as did the 
early indoctrinative educators, that stories provide children with good 
examples thereby creating an attachment to goodness and proper codes of 
conduct (Kilpatrick, 1994). The power of example is emphasized in many CE 
programs. Huffman cites the Mount Lebanon School District’s Code 
of Ethics that requires “the staff and the members of the Board of 
Directors...to model the District’s Core Values in their work” (1994, p. 51). 
Discipline is thought of as an edifying deterrent. 
Responses to rule-breaking should give students opportunities for 
restitution and foster the students’ understanding of the rules and 
willingness to abide by them (Lickona, et al 1996). 
Rationales for implementing a character education program in a public 
school will frequently open with a list of dangers facing children and a report on 
the undesirable behaviors of contemporary children. On the first page of 
Thomas Lickona’s preface to Henry Huffman’s Developing A Character 
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Education Program, he cites statistical reports of increasing levels of 
dishonesty, violence, disrespect, peer cruelty, bigotry, self-centeredness, self¬ 
destructive behaviors, and ethical illiteracy as incentives to institute 
character education efforts (Huffman,1994). Enlisting the support of parents, 
community politicians and organizations, the public school staff, area 
businesses, and the clergy are integral parts of CE efforts. Unlike early 
indoctrinative initiatives no longer can one assume the goals for moral 
development initiatives will be universally supported. For example, parents 
and social institutions can no longer be taken for granted as support systems 
for public school character education initiatives. A May, 1994 newspaper 
article reports a “modest amendment” before Congress to award public school 
grants to support the teaching of values such as honesty, responsibility, and 
caring. The amendment was “soundly defeated” for the seventh time (Sharpe, 
Wall Street Journal, 10 May 1994). During consideration of the measure, 
Representative Richard Armey (R - Texas) argued to the Education and Labor 
Committee: 
I, for one, would not tolerate anyone having the presumption to 
dare to think they should define who my children are, what their 
values are, what their ethics are...The fact is these people don't 
know my children...love my children...they don’t care about my 
children...(nor do they) accept responsibility for the outcome...and 
they ought to, by God, leave my kids alone (10 May 1994). 
Opposition to character education in the public schools also takes the 
form of objections to indoctrination, as the imposition of religious doctrines, 
and as a potential inhibitor of critical thinking skills. Developmentalists allege 
that a primary objective of CE initiatives is, in fact, not to foster a child’s 
social or moral development, but to merely demand good behavior or, in early 
indoctrinative terminology, conformity to the prevailing norms. As Kohn 
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understands it, the goal of CE is to “get compliance, to make children act the 
way we what them to” (1997, p. 434). Traditional responses from CE 
advocates are that the values they promote are objectively worthwhile and 
that schools have an obligation to “not only expose students to these values 
but also to help them to understand, internalize, and act upon such values” 
(Lickona, 1991, p. 38). This, they contend, can be accomplished without 
religious influence. 
A response to the developmentalists that might be more persuasive is 
that as a child develops it is hoped he will accept the moral virtues not 
because they have been imposed upon or required of him but because the child 
recognizes virtue to characterize human excellence. A virtuous life, to this 
child, is seen as something of great value. 
Shame in the Modem Character Education Model 
Although Lickona, in Educating for Character, recognizes the 
importance of the affective dimension in moral development, little or no 
attention is given to the emotion of moral shame as an intrinsic motivation to 
guide present behavior or to modify future behavior. This is also true of the 
rest of the literature from the character education movement with which I am 
familiar. In this way CE resembles VC and CD in essentially overlooking 
specific emotions of self-assessment. 
When one fails to do what one supposes to be right, Lickona (as do many 
psychologists) presumes this will evoke a “constructive guilt”. 
A mature conscience includes, besides a sense of moral obligation, 
the capacity for constructive guilt. If you feel obligated in 
conscience to behave in a certain way, you will feel guilty... 
Constructive guilt says, “I didn’t live up to my own standards. I 
feel bad about that, but I’m going to do better” (p. 58). 
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In this brief description, Lickona attributes to constructive guilt: 1) the 
failure to live up to an important value, 2) a painful self-regarding feehng, and, 
3) the resolve to improve. From the earlier analyses of the emotions, it seems 
none of these characteristics are necessarily unique to guilt. Painful feelings 
are common to many self-regarding emotions (e.g., regret, remorse, 
repentance, humiliation, shame, etc.) and, therefore, Lickona’s analysis fails to 
help us locate distinguishing attributes of guilt. Failing to live up to a personal 
standard elicits feelings of shame. The resolve to reform belongs to 
repentance. Guilt, it had been suggested, concerns the violation of a 
prohibition that carries with it the obligation to make amends. One can make 
amends without a personal reformation. 
Lickona also ascribes this resolve to improve to humility which he 
defines as a: “genuine openness to the truth and a willingness to act to correct 
our failings” (p. 61). But humility need not recognize moral failings; more 
accurately, humility is an appraisal of one’s limitations. Here honest 
recognition is called for, not motivation for correction or improvement. 
With the affective dimension in full play, Lickona leans to the cognitive- 
developmental approach to resolve specific difficulties. He suggests that just 
as teachers actively involve children in the democratic adoption of classroom 
rules, they can “continue (this) same critical thinking process with regard to 
consequences” (1991, p. 118). 
By discussing...consequences, the teacher can help students 
understand that the purpose of a consequence is not to make 
them suffer but to help them improve their behavior (p. 118). 
Although this approach emphasizes the positive, democratic 
participation needs to be utilized carefully whenever the topics are rules and 
consequences. Many methods that advocate this approach (Discipline with 
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Dignity, Conflict Resolution) all contain disclaimers that instruct the teacher 
to override student’s poor choices and suggestions. Most students quickly 
come to see the limits of this type of classroom “democracy”. 
Character education advocates, in particular Thomas Lickona, are doing 
important work in public education. Their overall approach has much to 
recommend it. More precision in the affective dimension, however, will only 
improve an already admirable undertaking. 
Summary of Moral Education Theories 
The answers to Dewey’s three fundamental questions for educators 
summarizes the respective differences between the theoretical approaches to 
moral education. 
For the early indoctrinative educators, “What is right?” is answered by 
the prevailing societal and cultural norms. The Value Clarification Theory 
(VC) proposes that right is relative; each child, through reflection, experience, 
and circumstance will arrive at their own personal response. Cognitive- 
developmentalists (CD) believe valid and universal moral principles exist. 
Justice and respect for human dignity are preferable to both an egocentric 
self-interest and to an unquestioning conformity to convention. Character 
Education (CE) advocates also believe a set of core universal ethical values 
define good character. But CE considers right conduct to embody affect and 
desire as well as cognition. Precisely how desire and affect contribute as right¬ 
making characteristics of an act remains undeveloped and vague in many CE 
theories. 
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Unique theoretical assumptions of the individual approaches emerge 
most clearly in answer to the question “How do children learn?” Indoctrination 
emphasizes repetition, modeling, rewards and punishments, and learning by 
example. A student learns, in large part, by a passive internalization of the 
prevailing societal norms. Anecdotal evidence suggests coercive measures to 
force compliance was frequently employed. VC dismisses this approach as 
ineffective; children, they suggest, learn by self-analysis, experience, and 
weighing the consequences of personal choices. Learning occurs as one 
becomes more aware of his or her own inner values. Cognitive- 
developmentalists propose learning occurs through direct and democratic 
participation, by engaging in Socratic dialogues, role-taking exercises, and by 
individuals resolving cognitive conflict. Moral learning is a process of 
increasingly sophisticated ideas as to why certain conduct is considered to be 
right. CE borrows aspects from each of these theories. Modeling, example, 
stories and internalizing acceptable social codes are imported from the 
indoctrinative theory. Socratic dialogues and role-taking exercises are 
endorsed by some character educators but, again, an emphasis on developing 
proper desires and appropriate emotional reactions and behavioral responses 
are also stressed. 
The direct transmission of values, practice, and the inculcation of habits 
are signature aspects of the CE model. CD considers this method 
condescending and “unlikely to leave children with a commitment to that 
behavior” (Kohn, p. 435). Direct transmission is inherently condescending in 
that the adult / child relationship relegates children to “passive receptacles to 
be filled, lumps of clay to be molded, pets to be trained, or computers to be 
programmed” (p. 434). Following Piaget, CD views true learning to occur when 
a child actively constructs meaning for himself (Kohn, 1997). 
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Children must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to recast 
them in light of their own experiences and question, to figure out 
for themselves... what kind of person one ought to be, which 
traditions are worth keeping, and how to proceed when two basic 
values seem to be in conflict (Kohn, 1997, p. 435). 
For CE, “the kind of person one ought to be” can be transmitted. It need 
not be discovered anew by each child. One ought to be, among other things, 
just, responsible, and kind. CE advocates argue that children need not, nor 
should we expect them, to reinvent the wheel. A child learns by example, with 
study, and with practice. Against the romanticism of the cognitive- 
developmentalists, CE distrusts the notion that ethical behavior will 
spontaneously unfold. And just as children will not “invent” algebra or the 
proper rules of English grammar, neither should one assume that they will 
“construct” proper ethical principles on their own. 
As it is with the previous questions, each theory has its own view of 
present society and the type of society it envisions as ideal. The early 
indoctrinative method has commonly been characterized as viewing society as 
under a constant threat of moral dissolution from vice and undisciplined 
natural impulses. Under strict controls, a uniform conformity to conventional 
norms is possible. VC views society as a product of failed previous methods. 
As a result, apathy, indifference, and value confusion plague the majority of 
citizens. An ideal society would be comprised of autonomous individuals 
pursuing their personal conception of values and goals. Cognitive- 
developmentalists envision an ideal society to be composed of high level 
critical thinkers adhering to universal moral principles. Societal norms may 
vary but Stage 6 citizens will contribute to a society that prizes justice for all. 
Present society contains a scant minority of Stage 6 citizens. With the proper 
developmental method this percentage can increase. 
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Character educators frequently justify the need for their approach with 
dire current statistics of youth misbehavior. For CE, the threat of the moral 
dissolution that the early indoctrinative educators feared, has, to a large 
extent, taken hold and pervades society. CE hopes for a society of high level 
critical thinkers who also adhere to a set of core ethical principles. CE 
dismisses the relativism of the VC theory. Although they acknowledge and 
welcome society’s pluralistic composition, specific values are believed to apply 
to all American citizens (e.g., respect, responsibility, fairness, honesty, 
integrity, etc.). A society becomes better as more citizens attach and adhere 
to these values. 
Each theory accommodates the emotion of moral shame differently. 
Nonconformity to conventions creates a shameful condition according to 
indoctrinative adherents. A person who does not abide by these conventions 
will feel shame if he considers these conventions binding. The relativism of VC 
requires a case by case analysis as to when and how someone feels shame. To 
be theoretically consistent VC is committed to the view that nothing is 
inherently shameful. So Simon can not maintain that values can not be 
imposed from external sources and then claim a special dispensation to render 
judgments on tax-evasion or apathy. In order to avoid contradiction, 
dishonesty, theoretically can not universally be deemed a shameful condition. 
The decision not to aspire to be honest must be respected as does the 
individual who rationalizes honesty can be overridden whenever it proves to 
threaten his comfort or security. And Simon suggests when a person is clear 
about his values then shameful conditions will disappear. But this proposition 
is remarkably simple-minded. Klansmen are perfectly clear about their 
commitment to objectively shameful and morally repugnant values. 
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It has been argued that Kohlberg’s composition of the moral stages and 
his emphasis on cognitive operations has the unfortunate result of minimizing 
the affective dimension in general, and, specifically, of committing Kohlberg to 
the position that individuals at the early stages of moral development are 
incapable of being informed and guided by a sense of shame. For the question 
on how moral shame might affect character development, Kohlberg’s narrow 
focus on adjudicating conflicting moral claims neglects important dimensions 
of one’s moral growth and one’s character. 
The theory is also troubled by the concern that the transition from 
Stage 4 to Stage 5 is not logical. How does a conventionalist evolve into a 
person who adheres to universal principles? How does the transition work? 
And how and where does moral training fit in with the theory? When does it 
begin? As a final concern, why should we accept the claim that, at certain 
stages, all children are at all times shamelessly committed to their own best 
interest? Egocentrism need not be a vicious egoism. His view of children, by 
itself, ought to render the theory defective. All these concerns seem to remain 
unanswered in Kohlberg’s work. 
Character education, even with an emphasis on the affective dimension, 
fares no better. Although it appeals to notions of habituation, practice, and 
lectures from the early indoctrinators and to constructivism and Socratic 
interchanges from the cognitive developmentalists, the picture 
of how character develops remains sketchy. This vagueness is compounded 
by imprecise formulations of guilt, humility, and pride and a complete neglect 
of shame. 
In conclusion, it seems evident from the review of the literature that an 
explicit and comprehensive answer to how moral shame might affect 
character development does not emerge from these theories. 
255 
An Alternative 
Various theories from scholars on how children learn and on what should 
be taught have been reviewed. Arguments and counter examples have 
demonstrated that each theory has unique problems. What follows is an 
alternative proposal of character development and an attempt at locating the 
proper place of moral shame. In its essential respects this alternative is 
Aristotelian. 
The format of this section begins with notes on Aristotle’s theory of 
moral virtue and good character. This will be followed with an explication of 
Aristotle’s view on how a good character develops. From these sections, an 
answer to the second research question, “What impact might moral shame 
have upon one’s character development?” can be formulated. 
Any suggested moral development program ought to be preceded by a 
clear conception of virtue and vice. Common sense dictates that if an author 
is suggesting a method by which people can become virtuous, we should know 
something of his or her view of virtue. Errors or omissions at this primary 
stage will infect all subsequent efforts. A fundamental weakness with the 
value clarification theory is the proposition that the necessary conditions for a 
value to be right, good, and desirable are a person’s autonomous choice, 
thoughtful commitment, and repeated affirmation of that value. From this 
position, a method of practical exercises to clarify values evolves. But VC is 
doomed from the start. To appeal again to the wrongheadedness of racist 
ideologies, the klansman’s choice of and thoughtful commitment to the value of 
white supremacy does not render that value right, good, and desirable. The 
klansman has organized his life around a reprehensible goal. Acts that 
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exemplify this value and which are conducive to attaining this goal are wrong, 
if not evil. So more than free choice, commitment, and repeated affirmation 
are needed to distinguish right from wrong and the good from the bad. Some 
theories avoid this fundamental error; Aristotle’s is among them. 
Aristotle 
An influential, complex, and controversial conception of virtue and of 
good character can be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE). Aristotle 
distinguishes two kinds of virtue, intellectual and moral. The development of 
each kind is distinct: intellectual virtues are developed through learning and 
experience, moral virtue “is the result of habit” (NE, 1953,1103al8). The 
intellectual virtues are excellences in Science, Art, Practical Wisdom, 
Understanding, and Philosophic Wisdom (Book VI). Aristotle’s list of the moral 
virtues includes courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, proper 
ambition, patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, and 
righteous indignation (p. 104). 
A moral virtue is defined as “a purposive disposition, lying in a mean 
that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle and by which a 
prudent man would determine it” (1107al-2). Until we understand the 
meaning of many of these terms, this definition remains far from clear. 
First, to begin at the beginning, we need to know what Aristotle means 
by a purposive disposition. One famous passage from the NE explains how 
moral virtue is acquired through habit: “we become just by performing just 
acts, temperate (self-controlled) by performing temperate acts, brave by 
performing brave ones” (1103bl-2). It is in this way that “like activities 
produce like dispositions” (1103b20). A disposition, Aristotle suggests, is the 
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“condition...(by which) we are well or ill disposed in respect (to) feelings” 
(1105b26). Being properly disposed towards feelings takes practice. “The 
causes and means that bring about any form of excellence are the same that 
destroy it, and similarly with art; for it is the result of playing the harp that 
people become good and bad harpists” (1103b8-10). So, for example, bravery 
will be exemplified in acts whereby the agent is well disposed, through practice, 
to respond appropriately to fearful circumstances. 
To develop the proper disposition requires the agent to reason and to act 
so as to hit the mean. 
Moral virtue...is concerned with feelings and actions, and these 
involve excess, deficiency and a mean. It is possible to feel 
fear...too much or too little; and both of these are wrong. But to 
have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds 
towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way 
is to feel them to an intermediate, that is to the best, degree; and 
this is the mark of virtue (1106bl5-24). 
The mean incorporates an array of considerations: motive, timing, 
correct objects, and measure. In general, feelings and actions in the mean are 
characterized as neither too little nor too much. For a number of reasons, this 
is a complex proposition and the “Aristotelian mean” has generated thousands 
of pages of critical commentary. One area of contention is that having defined 
and established the importance of the mean, Aristotle immediately asserts it 
does not apply to all feelings or all actions. It is impossible to have the right 
amount of shamelessness or envy or too much justice and temperance. 
Not every action or feeling admits of a mean...some have names 
that directly connote depravity, such as malice, shamelessness 
and envy, and among actions adultery, theft and murder. All of 
these, and more like them, are so called as being evil in 
themselves...In their case, then, it is impossible to act rightly, one 
is always wrong (1107a9-15). 
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From these many examples and “more like them” it is not immediately evident 
precisely when and where the mean should apply. 
Another misconception regarding the mean is to propose that Aristotle 
intends the mean to be understood as a moderate feeling or act. Clearly this is 
mistaken since Aristotle would apparently condone as appropriate a heated 
and intense indignation toward acts of murder or 
theft. The concept seems to be further complicated when Aristotle says that 
the mean ought to be “relative to us”. Presumably we are to gain an 
understanding of this phrase by examples such as charitable contributions 
from a school teacher and from a corporate executive both can be considered 
generous while being substantially different amounts. Since the particulars of 
everyone will be different, there can be no universal principle or hard and fast 
rule by which we can determine the mean. It is established, when it applies, 
by perception. 
So it is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may 
go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon the 
particular circumstances, and the decision lies with our 
perception (1126b3-7). 
According to the definition of virtue, our perception will be correct if it 
accords with that of the prudent man. Prudence is the practical wisdom to 
deliberate correctly about “what is conducive to the good life” (1140a28) and 
the “rational principle” in moral conduct is prudence (1144b25). Virtues, 
as moral or intellectual excellences, actualized prudently are intrinsically 
valuable constituents of this good life. 
We can propose two preliminary considerations: 1) the proper education 
of a child ought to be guided by this target of virtue, and 2) a failure to exercise 
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these excellences can constitute a shameful condition. An agent will feel 
shame if she has a certain awareness of a discrepancy between her pursuits, 
feelings, or actions and those of this good life. But what is the good life as 
Aristotle conceives it? 
In the opening paragraphs of the NE, Aristotle writes that every action 
and every pursuit is thought to aim at some good. If an action aims at some 
end, that end, by nature, is considered superior to the activity. Therefore 
some things are extrinsically or instrumentally good - good for procuring 
something else (e.g., money, medicine) - and some things are intrinsically good - 
good in themselves (the leisure that money affords, the health that medicine 
restores). Book 1 of the NE asks and gives the outline of an answer to the 
question “What is the supreme good for man?”. Aristotle tells us: “Human 
excellence will be the disposition that makes one a good man and causes him 
to perform his function well” (1106a21). The supreme good will be an intrinsic 
good and it will be man’s true function. 
Just as a conception of virtue is essential to a reliable evaluation of a 
moral development program, some understanding of Aristotle’s answer to the 
ultimate aim is required to locate the appropriate grounds for moral shame as 
well as an understanding of how children develop so as to participate in this 
intrinsic good. And since more than one thing is intrinsically good (candidates 
are the moral and the intellectual virtues), Aristotle’s project is to find the 
supreme intrinsic good or that which is “in accordance with the best and most 
perfect (virtue or excellence)” (1098a20). This good Aristotle claims will be 
eudaimonia or happiness. Happiness is, of course, defined differently by 
different people: a hedonist will propose pleasure, a politician will suggest honor 
or public esteem, while others might propose happiness consists in lavish 
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material comforts. Aristotle refutes these claims and proposes happiness 
consists in one of two activities; the best being the exercise of theoretical 
wisdom or contemplation or, if this is unattainable, second best would be 
virtuous practical activity (or a life exercising the moral virtues). 
Early in Aristotle and the Human Good, Richard Kraut devises a chart 
to demonstrate Aristotle’s hierarchical arrangement of goods. Kraut’s chart is 
arranged with the lowest level representing goods desired instrumentally such 
as wealth. The next row is comprised of goods desirable in themselves, “such 
as honor...though they are not to be identified with happiness” (Kraut, 1989, p. 
6) Next are intrinsically desirable ends - virtuous activities. The hierarchy is 
arranged with each good on the lower level considered “choiceworthy for the 
sake of some good on a higher row” (p. 6). Virtuous activity as an end, what 
Aristotle refers to as the political life, is thus represented on top. Kraut’s 
chart is this: 
B 
M N 
X Y Z 
B: ethical activity 
M, N: other goods desirable in themselves 
X, Y, Z: goods that are conditionally desirable (p. 6) 
Kraut continues that the philosophical life, or a life of 
contemplation, according to Aristotle, is represented by the addition of still 
another level where [A] = contemplation. The completed hierarchy now reads: 
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A 
B 
M N 
X Y Z 
[A] is, then, man’s true function and, by this plan, it is important to note 
contemplation is exercised by an agent who has the ethical virtues [B]. With 
this plan of the ultimate aim some insights can emerge regarding instances of 
moral shame by virtue of miscalculations of the proper hierarchical order or, 
said another way from SI, failures to live up to values that constitute 
essential components of living the good life. We can propose further that this 
hierarchy will afford us a better grasp of the components essential to the 
moral development of children. To these issues we will turn shortly following 
some brief comments on possible objections to this arrangement. 
Controversy swirls around many Aristotelian assertions. As has been 
noted, the complexity of Aristotle’s thought invites this. At the outset it is 
conceded this researcher has neither the space nor the talents to resolve 
interpretive differences which have occupied scholars for years. The modest 
objective here is to defend the conditionally good status of moral shame and to 
locate its place in child development while suggesting that to do this Aristotle 
is a valuable resource largely overlooked by moral developmentalists. Before 
proceeding, however, two premises of his theory deserve a defense. One is the 
assertion that humans have a function, the other is that his concept of the 
mean is ultimately intelligible. 
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Aristotle s attempt to show that human beings have a proper function 
can be considered the single most important argument in his discussion of 
happiness (Kraut, 1989). Happiness, or the human good, is defined as “an 
activity of (the) soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of 
virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind” (1098al6- 
18). An activity “in accordance with virtue” I take to mean an activity which 
actualizes or makes use of that virtue. Human excellence has been defined as 
the disposition that causes a person to perform his function 
well (1106a21). According to the hierarchy Aristotle says that that good 
which is desirable for itself and for which every other good is desired for its 
sake is contemplation. Next best is the practical life of virtuous activity. 
Some commentators object to the basic concept that human beings 
have a function. If they could prove their objection it might not be overstating 
the case to say they would thereby reduce Aristotle’s main argument to a 
house of cards. When Aristotle says “the virtue of a thing is related to its 
proper function” (1139al6) he claims things have a function. A hammer 
functions to pound nails, a saw to cut, a horse to run, “carry his rider, and 
(face) the enemy” (1106a22). The virtue of a hammer would be the proper 
distribution of weight and hardness, a saw its sharpness, a horse his strength, 
stamina, and courage. For humans it is the exercise of his highest faculty and 
excellence in conduct. One expression of a common objection to the function 
argument is from Eric Moore in his doctoral dissertation, “Desert, Virtue, and 
Justice” (University of Massachusetts, February 1998). Moore argues there 
that the function thesis: 
seems to imply that humans are like tools - - they have a 
particular function, and the virtues are what allows them to 
perform their function well...However, it does not appear that 
there is a characteristic function of persons. We are not like tools 
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in at least one important respect: we were not designed to do 
anything, either well or poorly, because we were not designed. So, 
the virtues are not those dispositions which allow us to achieve 
our function (p. 125-126). 
Moore offers no explanation to support his claim “we were not designed”. 
In Aristotelian fashion, Moore does accept the claim that a virtue is “a 
disposition to do certain acts, and those acts exemplify that virtue” (p. 133). 
For example, truthfulness is a virtue, someone with this virtue is disposed to 
tell the truth, and a specific episode of truth-telling is an action that 
exemplifies this virtue. Moore then argues that having the virtues is a desert 
base. People of virtue deserve good things; people with vices are not entitled to 
these same good things. Moore’s projects are to present and defend a view 
that the moral virtues are legitimate desert bases and to argue for a theory of 
justice that calculates virtuous merit. All these general points accord with 
Aristotle’s ethical system; Moore seems only to resist Aristotle’s move of 
elevating theoretical wisdom to the top of the hierarchy. One justification for a 
split with Aristotle is that Moore believes there is more than one way to lead a 
good life and this is represented in his expansion of moral virtues to include 
artistic, social, and athletic excellences. Presumably these lives can be 
commensurate. In Moore’s list talents for music, painting, and gardening are 
artistic moral virtues and strength and hand - eye coordination are athletic 
virtues. Actualizing these virtues entitles someone to good things. And it is a 
plausible and appealing notion that there are numerous ways to lead a good 
life. 
Moore concedes, with his example of Mike Tyson, that a tension exists 
between virtues that make a good person with those that make for a good 
athlete. Being clear about this tension seems important not only in defending 
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Aristotle’s function argument but also for educating the young. 
Using Tyson as an example Moore proposes that on the basis of his 
athletic abilities and talents Tyson is deserving of good things. This seems 
right. Because of his diligence (one of Moore’s moral virtues) Tyson has 
developed his natural gifts of strength, quick reflexes, and stamina to become 
one of the world’s best current boxers. However, his inability to control his 
emotions has resulted in numerous assaults on people and allegations that he 
has raped women. For these crimes he has been repeatedly jailed. So, Moore 
suggests, an accurate appraisal of Tyson would be that he is a very good 
boxer, and thereby deserving of social goods, and that he is probably less than 
a good person, thereby “not deserving of many good things as (a) moral 
person” (p. 127). But it is not at all clear, if athletic talent is morally virtuous, 
how this alleviates the tension. Under Moore’s scheme developing athletic 
talent is one way to lead a morally good life. 
Many great athletes, musicians, actors, and painters, in order to 
diligently pursue their art, have left their families and friends devastated and 
have spent their mature years in a drugged, self-absorbed, and unproductive 
haze. On the basis of their remarkable works these individuals justly deserve 
some social goods but it is unlikely we should characterize their lives as happy 
or attribute much merit to them based on moral virtue. So an obvious way to 
resolve the apparent tension is to object to Moore’s inclusion of athletic, 
musical, and artistic talents under the umbrella of unqualified moral virtues. I 
see no reason to assume winning a title fight is a moral victory. For diligence 
to be morally praiseworthy the activity and motivations have to be assessed. 
Diligently training for a title fight motivated by, say, a desire to have access to 
more and more women to treat badly and to earn money to spend on drugs 
does not qualify as virtuous intentions or activity. Diligence, then, may be a 
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desert base but it is not an unqualified moral virtue. If, however, athleticism is 
a moral virtue, then Moore’s scheme implies Tyson is not deserving of many 
social goods even though he might win several world titles. For regardless of 
how diligently Tyson trains, if his training is motivated by base intentions, 
then his diligence is on the wrong grounds for the wrong motives. Therefore, 
Tyson has not been “morally diligent” according to the definition of virtue 
Moore explicitly accepts from Aristotle. Furthermore, Moore offers no 
explanation of why diligence should be “chosen for its own sake” or how it is 
intrinsically good. It is hard to imagine how this could be done since it is easy 
to think of examples of persons working diligently for ignoble ends. Since few 
people would dispute Tyson is a “good” boxer, Moore’s inclusion of athletic 
talents and diligence as moral virtues does not seem to be persuasive. We 
might conclude that a person can be deserving of good things based on 
something other than virtuous merit. 
The mere claim that people are not designed does not address Aristotle’s 
assertion that happiness consists in the exercise of a human’s highest 
function - that feature distinct to man. Moore seems to assume his phrase 
concludes the argument and, without further elaboration, he dismisses the 
case. But if this refutes the function argument it would imply happiness 
consists in innumerable activities - pleasure for some, wealth for others or, 
from Moore’s list, the exercise of the moral virtue of hand - eye coordination. 
Presumably Moore finds Aristotle’s attempts to refute these ends as extrinsic, 
secondary goods to be inconclusive. 
One objection to this thesis is found in Martha Nussbaum’s article 
“Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato”. 
Nussbaum offers an example of an assembly line worker, X, at a General 
Motors plant who performs the same repetitive task all day, day after day. X 
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may consider himself happy (by exercising his hand - eye coordination). But 
Nussbaum remarks that “there certain sorts of activities that are unworthy 
of the diverse capabilities with which most humans are endowed. Even if X 
likes his work, we can still call it degrading and subhuman, his position a 
shameful one” (1980, p. 400). When and if a machine is designed to do the 
work of 10 people, or 100, how will this affect X’s self respect? As with a 
person who dedicates his entire career to campaigning for a politician who is 
eventually revealed as a thoroughly disreputable character, false beliefs, 
objectively verifiable to X himself, will demonstrate X’s shameful condition. 
Moore’s design argument does not refute Aristotle’s rich metaphysical and 
psychological description of man’s higher faculties. Moore may simply believe 
in a different ontological scheme. Beliefs aside, Moore offers no persuasive 
argument to discredit Aristotle’s function thesis, although the claim that there 
are innumerable ways to lead a good life is compelling. 
Aristotle’s rich psychological description introduces an alternative way 
to understand the doctrine of the mean. His doctrine suggests that a prudent 
man will organize extrinsic and lower level intrinsic goods so as to contribute 
optimally to a morally virtuous life or to the maximization of contemplation. 
The good life, then, is not a composite of all intrinsic goods. For each individual 
it will be only those amounts of lower level goods that contribute to the good 
life. As Kraut states: “A perfectly happy life...will have all the goods he needs - 
not all the goods there are” (1989, p. 308). So a good life is not enhanced by 
directing one’s attention to acquiring more than is needed of extrinsic goods 
(e.g., money). Such activity will infringe upon time better spent in 
contemplation. Since the proper amount of goods varies from person to 
person - just as the proper diet varies for a professional boxer in training from 
that of a poet or a musician - no precise and universal rule can establish the 
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mean ^ everyone as it applies to these lower level goods. Practical wisdom 
and the autonomous direction of one s own life will determine each person,s 
correct measure. 
Any account of conduct must be stated in outline and not in 
precise detail...Now questions of conduct and expedience have as 
little fixity about them as questions of what is healthful...the 
agents are compelled at every step to think out for themselves 
what the circumstances demand (1104al -10). 
This seems to be why the person with [A] needs [B]. One will be 
deflected from contemplation by unbridled appetites or malformed 
dispositions. For each of us, then, the correct decision, he tells us, “lies in our 
perception” (1126a5). We must work out for ourselves how much is just 
enough of the lower level goods so as to maximize the upper level intrinsic 
goods. But what is universally true is that neither too little nor too much of 
extrinsic goods will contribute optimally to maximizing intrinsic goods. 
Aristotle has a plausible and appealing theory on how children develop this 
correct perception which leads to good character. 
Notes on the Development of Character in Aristotle's Ethics 
Since children cannot have a fixed disposition, their characters cannot 
yet be truly virtuous. Intuitively this might seem to commit Aristotle to hold 
a disreputable attitude toward children. Children, it seems, cannot be 
virtuous. What redeems him, I think, is this. By definition, virtue is more 
than an isolated act that is good. If it were not, then the coward, who is clearly 
capable of acting bravely on one occasion, or the habitual liar who tells one 
truthful statement, could be appraised favorably - in a “snapshot” 
assessment - at the time of these fleeting moments of uncharacteristic 
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bchfivior. Furthermore, a. liar or a coward may be motivated, on some specific 
occasion, to do a good deed only by some perceived immediate extrinsic benefit 
or immoral aim. Consider the Tyson example. Thus the requirement for an 
agent to choose the act “for its own sake”. So a virtuous act has to be more 
than an isolated and random performance of, for example, a brave or truthful 
deed; these deeds must emanate from an agent who is in a particular state of 
mind. Aristotle makes this explicit. 
Virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely 
because they have a certain quality, but only if the agent also 
acts in a certain state, viz. (1) if he knows what he is doing, (2) if 
he chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake, and (3) if he does it 
from a fixed and permanent disposition (1105a28-33). 
It follows that an assessment of one’s character cannot be made 
without insight into the disposition of the agent. Therefore, good character will 
be comprised of a fixed disposition to perform virtuous acts, the cognitive 
awareness of why these acts are good, and a desire to perform them for their 
intrinsic value. 
Motivated by personal advantage, the one episode of truth-telling by the 
habitual liar fails to meet several of the required conditions. So just as we will 
not consider the liar to merit the excellence of a truthful disposition on the 
basis of one true statement, neither should we ascribe virtue to children until 
they come to understand truthfulness as intrinsically desirable and conducive 
to a good life. This is not to say children are not fully capable of performing 
good acts from which good habits develop. This is, then, a far more respectful 
attitude toward children and a more optimistic picture of moral development 
than that implied in Kohlberg’s theory. But since children as yet do not have a 
clear understanding of what constitutes a good fife, how can good character 
develop? 
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Myles Bumyeat, in “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good”, offers a 
compelling interpretation of Aristotle’s answer. Burnyeat credits Aristotle 
with a more comprehensive theory than a Socratic or Kohlbergian 
intellectualism - theories that suggest moral development is predominantly a 
process of cognitive sophistications. Burnyeat also credits Aristotle with a 
plausible psychological theory. 
A wide range of desires and feelings are shaping patterns of 
motivation and response in a person well before he comes to a 
reasoned outlook on his life as a whole, and certainly before he 
integrates this reflective consciousness with his actual behavior 
(1980, p. 70). 
Living as they do under the sway of desires and emotions young people, 
Aristotle writes, “often make mistakes” (1128bl6). Aristotle does not dispute 
Matthews’s belief that children, even very young children, are genuinely moral 
agents because “they are capable of sometimes doing the right thing for the 
right reason” (Matthews, 1994, p. 56). Aristotle conceives of a settled 
disposition to develop in a sequence of stages with both cognitive and 
emotional components and by virtue of the blessings of nature, the 
advantages of a good upbringing, and living in a society hospitable to 
institutions supportive of virtuous conduct (Aristotle, 1176b; Burnyeat, 1980). 
Bumyeat outlines the course of moral development with the use of the 
rather cryptic Aristotelian terms “the that” (or, to be used here from the 
Thompson translation, “the fact”) and “the because”. For a person to get 
ahold of “the fact” is for that person to know or believe that something, x, is 
true, as in x is true = x is truthfulness is a virtue. Good parents, teachers, and 
political leaders impart these “facts”. A person can know x is true or believe 
on authority that x is true and not yet truly understand why x is true. Having 
“the because” is understanding why x is true. 
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The man who knows for himself is someone with “the because” - in 
Aristotle’s terms he is a man of practical wisdom equipped with 
the understanding to work out for himself what to do in the varied 
circumstances of life (1980, p. 71). 
This is a feature of the final stage of moral development. At the first 
stage, with the advantages of a good upbringing, children will hear about 
virtuous conduct and the specific moral virtues (e.g., truthfulness, courage, 
temperance, etc.). They will become familiar with those actions “in 
accordance” with virtue. What they learn specifically is that these actions 
are noble and just. This gives a cognitive dimension to developing virtue 
through habit. For if a requirement of a virtuous act is to choose x for its own 
sake, habituation must entail more than the mere recognition of x - type acts. 
The morally developing child has to be on the way to understanding why x is 
true. Contrary to the critics of indoctrination who charge that habituation is a 
mindless conformity to authority or a repression of emotion, 
Aristotle’s conception of being habituated in good conduct is to be 
forming correct ideas regarding the nobility of virtuous acts, discerning 
appropriate exemplifications, and desiring opportunities to directly experience 
virtuous conduct. The direct experience is accompanied by the pleasures 
these acts bring; this is another essential step in the process of forming a 
mature sense of values (Bumyeat, 1980). Since our natures are such that 
what is thought to be pleasant is what we will pursue, Aristotle considers it of 
primary importance in early training that pleasure and pain be appreciated in 
conjunction with the right objects. “True education” Aristotle states, is to 
learn to be pleased by the right things (1104b). 
The instruction appropriate to this age, Joel Kupperman believes, 
“should center on dogmatic instruction of the central moral norms” 
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(Kupperman, 1991, p. 175). Kupperman supports this view in three ways. 
First, children should not be expected to reflectively justify why lying, murder, 
or theft is wrong. This would simply be age-inappropriate - analogous to 
sending a novice skier down an expert slope. Second, any society in order to be 
secure must be able to agree upon some basic set of moral norms without 
question and to be able to distinguish these from ones that invite respectful 
disagreement and debate. In the basic set ought to be a promotion of the 
moral virtues, and clear prohibitions of specific things such as murder, torture, 
rape, child abuse, mistreating animals, and discrimination. Third, dogmatic 
instruction in the clear cases is important because moral reflectiveness at the 
mature stages needs a foundation of habits and attitudes to which one can 
appeal. Analogously, we should not expect children to read a novel before they 
learn the alphabet and the basic rules of sentence construction. But we do 
want all children to read. 
So the first stage of moral development is the introduction to and the 
grasping of moral “facts”. The advantages that benefit acquiring “the facts” 
are the blessings of a receptive temperament, good parents and teachers, and 
a hospitable society. 
The second stage is when the good acts learned through practice become 
“second nature”. At this stage truthfulness begins to characteristically 
emanate from the child. When an action becomes second nature the person 
has a cognitive grasp that x is true and begins to emotively respond to x as 
pleasurable. 
Aristotle holds that to learn to do what is virtuous, to make it a 
habit or second nature to one, is among other things to learn to 
enjoy doing it, to come to take pleasure - the appropriate pleasure 
- in doing it (1980, p.77). 
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Having been trained, as Aristotle says, “from infancy to feel joy and grief 
at the right things , the proper attitude toward pleasure and pain is key to 
developing a good disposition (1104bl4). Inappropriate enjoyment of a virtue 
would be to do acts that exemplify a virtue merely to get one’s allowance or to 
incur favor. Here again we see the important connection between acts and 
feelings. A person with the wrong motivation or feeling can perform an act 
which gives the outward appearance of a good act. 
The appropriate pleasure of virtuous activity is to enjoy it for its 
intrinsic value and to appreciate it as a component of the good life irrespective 
of contingent rewards. Vice, in the same regard, will begin to appear 
unpleasant. Acts of theft and lying, for instance, to a child in the second stage, 
begins to lose attractiveness and these acts will feel as though they go against 
the child’s nature. This child need not yet understand why x is true, she only 
need believe x is true and take pleasure in x type acts. But she is beginning to 
learn for herself, in part because of the pleasure, that what she has been told 
is true. How she learns this therefore has both cognitive and emotional 
components. The step of learning to love an x type act for itself motivates 
similar action since that which is pleasurable is attractive. She is, therefore, 
on her way to choosing virtuous activity ”for its own sake”. 
It is here that we can see a failure to do x will cause shame. With the 
belief that acts in accordance with virtue constitutes the good life, vice seems 
ignoble and unpleasant. When she fails, she will feel ashamed and pained 
“internally, not consequentially” (Burnyeat, p. 79). The less well-brought up 
child, being swayed by feelings of the moment and not cognitively aware that 
virtue is pleasant will, as Burnyeat says “abstain from wrongdoing not 
because it is disgraceful...but simply and solely as a means to avoid 
punishment” (p. 79). External consequences, not a sense of shame, will be the 
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only deterrent. If the perceived threat of external consequences has little or no 
force, as is the case in many areas of modem life, the danger to healthy 
development should now be self-evident. And here it is also important to recall 
Matthews’s devastating objection to Kohlberg’s “good boy - nice girl” and the 
law and order stages. Motivated by a concern to avoid punishment is not a 
moral consideration. Embedded in Kohlberg’s theory is a improbable 
assumption regarding transitions to higher stages. 
Aristotle acknowledges that in the developmental picture, as activities 
become second nature, change from one’s initial course becomes difficult. The 
importance of early education comes through forcefully in this important 
passage from Aristotle. 
Now if discourses were enough...to make people moral...Many 
and fat would be the fees they earned’, quite rightly...(but 
lectures) are incapable of impelling the masses toward human 
perfection. For it is the nature of the many to be ruled by fear 
rather than by shame, and to refrain from evil not because of 
disgrace but because of the punishments...of that which is fine 
and truly pleasurable they have not even a conception, since they 
have never had a taste of it...To dislodge by argument habits long 
embedded in the character is a difficult if not impossible task 
(1179b3-20). 
The second stage of moral development, therefore, seems an 
appropriate time to judiciously interject, with Socratic interplay, examples 
that cover Matthews’s five dimensions. The variety of models, an increasing 
clarity in defining characteristics, the added experience of the maturing 
student to perceive various cases, and adjudicating conflicting moral claims all 
can begin to teach students the complexity of applying their knowledge from 
dogmatic instruction to particular cases. Their moral imagination, fueled by 
noble and just motivations and sensitive to the feelings of others, will only 
enrich the other dimensions. It is at this stage that Kupperman suggests 
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teachers dispense with authoritative dogmatic instruction to allow 
independent perspectives to develop. Moral instruction, to be effective, must 
accommodate individual circumstance; imposing a rigid blueprint for all will 
prove futile and is, in light of individual differences, undesirable (Kupperman, 
1989). But the facts must first be there. If students are debating whether 
truthfulness is, in fact, a virtue as opposed to, for example, a specific instance 
when complete honesty will cause unquestionable suffering, then 
developmentally they have things the wrong way around. The metaphorical 
Platonic “puppies” will tear at arguments precisely because they do not have 
hold of the “facts” to which they can use as guides in particular applications. 
The final stage in Aristotle’s theory of moral development is reached 
when the agent grasps “the because”. Here a person understands virtue to 
constitute the good life, and he desires virtue for itself. With good fortune, a 
person’s disposition is fixed and she chooses virtue for its own sake. 
Virtue, she knows is pleasurable because it is noble and the noble is 
pleasurable because it is good. The mature agent also has the practical 
wisdom to work out for herself, in her particular circumstance, the right thing 
to do. She has her lower level goods in perspective and she aspires to 
maximize the higher level intrinsic goods. 
In summary, a good character develops by performing good acts. These 
acts are introduced to a child by authority figures as being right and good. The 
child accepts these acts to exemplify virtue on external authority. Through 
repetition and guided practice the child begins to realize that what she has 
been told is true and with this belief these acts become pleasurable. Acts that 
exemplify the virtues begin to become second nature. 
As the child matures she begins to see the world in all its complexity as 
well as to clearly assess her talents and limitations. As an individual in this 
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world, to be self-respecting, she realizes that to engage in worthy activities is 
what virtue requires. And to be self-respecting she leads her life rationally, 
undeterred by unreasoned appetites, undeflected by empty glamour, and not 
subservient to others in matters of designing and implementing her important 
life plans. 
Her own practical reasoning works out the specific details of the best 
course for her life plan. She ranks and chooses activities and her reason 
ensures the plan is objectively worthy and that she can carry it out. 
Final Comments on Moral Shame 
At 1107a27 in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers to a 
“table” or “diagram” of the virtues and vices. This table is not listed in W. D. 
Ross’s translation (Random House,1968) or in the revised edition (Oxford, 
1980), It is fisted in J. A K. Thompson’s translation (Penguin, 1953). 
Whether this is Aristotle’s actual diagram is a matter of speculation. 
Included in the diagram of moral virtues in the Penguin edition is a 
virtuous disposition called modesty. But at 1128bl0 Aristotle states: “It is 
not correct to speak of modesty as a kind of virtue because it is more like a 
feeling than a state”. Again at 1128b30 he writes, “Modesty can only be good 
in a conditional sense...but this is not true of the virtues”. And the feeling of 
shamelessness, along with malice and envy, he fists as feelings that are 
intrinsically bad. Intrinsically bad things do not admit of a correct or proper 
degree; however felt or done “it is impossible to act rightly, one is always 
wrong” (1107al4). So the inclusion of modesty on the fist of virtues is suspect 
for, at least, three reasons. Since shame’s deficiency is intrinsically wrong, it 
seems improper to locate this emotion in a diagram where the proper measure 
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is a virtue. Second, the text repeatedly and clearly implies it ought not be 
there; it is not a virtue. Third, it seems unlikely, preposterous perhaps, to 
suppose Aristotle would advise us to choose a conditionally good thing “for its 
own sake”. 
Aristotle does say shame admits of degrees. Modesty is the mean 
between shamelessness (the deficiency or “too little”) and shyness (the 
extreme or “too much”). Since shamelessness is the extreme, a “sense of 
shame” might be considered synonymous with “modesty”. A shameless 
person, then, is one without a sense of shame, or, as Nussbaum defines it, a 
person who “evinces good or confident feelings where we would think a good 
man right to feel shame” (1980, p. 399). It seems plausible that 
shamelessness can also apply to a person who displays no particular feeling 
toward committing a morally wrong act. Either failing to perceive some act as 
morally wrong or through a complete indifference to moral considerations, a 
person could be shameless without the good or confident reaction. This idea 
has textual support in the Rhetoric where Aristotle describes shamelessness 
to include “contempt or indifference” toward things “likely to involve us in 
discredit” (1383bl7-19). This, then, to me, seems plausible and, 
dispositionally and developmentally, just as bad. So let’s expand the 
description of a shameless person as “one who is either unperturbed or evinces 
good or confident feelings where a good man would be right to feel shame”. This 
description seems to fit Aristotle’s portrayals of the shameless 
man as one “who feels too little shame or none at all” (NE, 1108al7) and one 
who “is not afraid of (disgrace)” (1115al5). 
To illustrate a case of shamelessness lets take an uncontroversially 
wrong act, torture, from the basic norms list for dogmatic instruction. The 
case is “S tortures a child for pleasure”. By uncontroversial I mean the case, 
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to all rational people, is objectively wrong. From this example we can see for S 
to be shameless is for S to be both cognitively and emotionally in error. 
S is cognitively in error because he lacks the disposition to have feelings 
of shame in a situation and toward a certain activity agreed to be morally 
wrong. So S is in error in at least three respects: 1) he fails to exercise human 
excellences, 2) he is pursuing an activity that degrades himself and/or others, 
and, 3) he fails to acknowledge the situation of his causing a child needless 
suffering to be morally wrong. However motivated and by any rational 
standard the torturing of children is a base activity. S is emotionally in error 
because his disposition is such that he takes pleasure in an unworthy activity, 
in a wrong object, and in disgraceful behavior. 
A sense of shame is conditionally good because it is an element in the 
right disposition toward disgraceful behavior and conditions. A person will 
have a sense of shame, as Nussbaum says, “if the agent has a certain degree 
of awareness both of the conception of value relative to which (some acts) are 
shameful and of the nature of his own pursuits” (1980, p. 403). A man of self- 
respect, she continues, “must be one who reliably pursues activities that...are 
worthy for a human to pursue (p. 403). A sense of shame, then, acts to 
designate honorable parameters. To be able to discern these parameters and 
to be emotionally attached to stay within them is to have cognitive and 
emotional assets. And to have these assets is conditionally good. 
Nussbaum’s requirements for a man to be truly self-respecting are that 
“reason must rule both as legislator, choosing and ranking activities, and as 
administrator, ensuring that the rational plan is effective” (p. 405). From this 
we can extract three ways a person may come to feel shame. A person may 
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realize her plan or activity is 1) directed by her appetites, not reason, 2) that 
her beliefs about the activity or plan are mistaken and now seen as unworthy, 
or, 3) that she is not the autonomous director of her life plan, but subservient 
to the practical wisdom of others. Regarding this last consideration, a 
rationally chosen life plan appeals to objective standards - that which 
determines what is worthy of humans. Autonomous direction is the practical 
wisdom to work out the particular details for oneself within the confines of 
objective standards. These standards establish the hierarchy and each man’s 
practical reason works out the specific details “relative to us”. 
This consideration suggests a problem with the preliminary definition of 
moral shame, SI, presented in Chapter 3. Nussbaum appeals to these 
objective standards and to autonomous self direction in her objection to 
Rawls’s subjective formulation of self-respect. Nussbaum proposes: “Perhaps 
an ideal of rationality or of the rational judge may need to be built into the 
initial specifications...of self-respect” (p. 402). Just as has been argued that 
Rawls mistakenly proposes a condition is not shameful if a person does not feel 
it shameful, and self-respect is a feeling of capacity or conviction, so to is SI, 
open to objection on the grounds that it is too subjective. SI reads: 
SI: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of 
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to some value. 
That value the agent: 1) regards as important; 2) considers it to constitute an 
essential component of living a good life; 3) acknowledges it to be a value to 
which he ought to aspire; and, 4) one that a better self would have more closely 
approximated. 
In this definition moral shame has no objective standard by which to 
measure the “value” as important. Each person’s conception of living a good 
life will dictate where and how sub-standard deviations occur. So a 
279 
legitimate objection could be this is no improvement over Rawls’s definition of 
self-respect or over the inherent relativism of values clarification. The 
elasticity of personal circumstance ought to be built into how virtues are 
exemplified, not in disputing what the virtues are. For some individuals 
cognitive errors of omission, personal inclination, or poor upbringing will 
effectively eliminate objectively virtuous activities (e.g., truthfulness, courage, 
patience, etc.) from the field of values “to which (all) ought to aspire”. 
According to SI, if one does not think of some virtue as important, one will not 
be diminished by its absence. It is simply not there to calculate. But it is the 
case that good teachers and friends of good character will at times enlighten us 
as to the limitations of our self perceptions. 
Appealing to Aristotelian principles of objectively worthy human 
activity, SI might be repaired in the following way. 
S2: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of 
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to what virtue 
requires. That virtue the agent now: 1) regards as a worthy disposition; 2) 
considers it to constitute an essential component of living a good life; and, 3) 
acknowledges it to be a virtue a prudent person would have more closely 
approximated. 
With S2 it still is the case that if a person is unaware of a virtue then he 
will be unashamed of his failure to exemplify that virtue in action. It does 
seem with S2 that that person may now be objectively blameworthy for his 
ignorance whereas under SI the person himself established the range of the 
virtues. I do not know how to repair it otherwise. 
With this revised definition and with insights from the Aristotelian model 
of development we can proceed to answer Research Question #2. 
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An Answer to Research Question #2 
If one accepts the Aristotelian model of moral development, then it 
follows that a sense of shame will have a beneficial influence on the formation 
of a person’s character. In the above I have tried to argue why there are 
persuasive reasons to accept this model as preferable to many alternatives. 
An answer to the Research Question #2: “What impact might moral shame 
have on character development?” requires us to view shame at each of three 
broadly construed developmental stages. These stages correspond with the 
sequence of Aristotle’s theory of acquiring the virtues. 
With an example from a psychological research study of a fifteen month 
old infant comforting another crying infant, Gareth Matthews supports his 
contention that very young children “are capable of recognizing and accepting 
a moral obligation” (1994, p. 56). This observation effectively discredits 
Kohlberg’s theory of the stages of moral development, calls into question many 
remarks by Piaget, and implies the narrow “toileting” focus of Erikson’s 
preadolescent “shame” stage to be significantly inadequate. Nothing in 
Aristotle’s work suggests disagreement with Matthews’s subtle but 
devastating objection to Kohlberg’s theory. 
In Book X of the NE, Aristotle writes: “Some thinkers hold that it is by 
nature that people become good, others that it is by habit, and others that it is 
by instruction” (1179bl8). In what follows in his text it appears Aristotle held 
that all three contribute, in this order, to moral development. 
Just as it seems to him that some people are born with a temperament 
that is resistant to “discussion and instruction”, others, “by some divine 
dispensation”, are receptive (1179b20). But anyone who spends time on a 
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playground with young children, as I do, will observe when a child is hurt, there 
will frequently be a universal display of concern. It will not be unusual for a 
half a dozen of these “egocentric” toddlers to suspend their play, take matters 
into their own hands, and assist the injured boy or girl to the nearest teacher 
or to the nurse’s office. So Matthews is right. Very young children recognize 
moral obligation, are sensitive to the suffering of others, and are capable of 
doing the right thing for the right reason. More than a promise of reward and 
the threat of punishment is present in a young child’s cognitive and emotional 
machinery. So at an early age, children are capable of doing good deeds and 
are innately sensitive to right and wrong. How else are we to understand 
modem psychology’s claim that the saturation of television and movies with 
violent images “desensitizes” young children to the suffering of others? To be 
“desensitized” implies a prior state of sensitiveness. Whether all psychologists 
recognize this implication, they are, perhaps inadvertently, attributing an 
admirable quality to very young children. Given this, they would do well to 
take Aristotle in all seriousness when he advises true education is learning to 
take pleasure in, and to be pained by, the right objects. 
At the first stage of moral development (approximately preschool and 
elementary grade levels) and with the benefit of good parents and teachers, 
children are introduced to the basic moral “facts”. How they are introduced to 
these facts is extremely important. It is obvious that children of this age will 
have little knowledge of the concept of character as a disposition which is 
unified over time and they will be cognitively and emotionally limited in their 
experience and social interactions. So instruction, as Kupperman insists, 
ought to be dogmatic. But if we attribute the ability to do genuinely good acts 
to children, we must, at the same time, recognize that when they make 
mistakes their response can be, or is, more than a fear of punishment. So, 
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again, there must be some capacity for a sense of shame that is innately 
present and capable of development. Shame will impact on these children in 
clear instances of violating these central moral norms, in reaction to causing 
others to suffer, and in cases of perpetuating injustice, as in, perhaps, hoarding 
all the cookies for oneself. Getting ahold of the moral “facts” is also getting 
ahold of instances of clear violations. Allowing an insensitivity to violations to 
fester is negligent instruction as is engaging in inappropriate debates that 
confound cognitive and emotional reactions. 
This innate sense of shame will emerge as a beneficial force as specific 
acts become second nature in the second stage (roughly the late elementary 
to, perhaps, the high school years). Guided by instruction in good conduct, 
children begin to learn first hand that what they have been told is true. With 
luck, the pain a child feels following a mistake or a transgression has an 
internal component. This, it seems, is what Myles Bumyeat means when he 
says “Shame is the semivirtue of the learner” (1980, p. 78). Having learned 
that “x is true” is more than a mere conformity to the content of adult 
instruction as a child begins to take pleasure in x - type acts. Following a 
mistake, feeling ashamed expresses a desire to do better. 
At this second stage the child has yet to take appropriate pleasure in 
acts that exemplify the virtues because of the intrinsic value of virtuous 
conduct. And the things that appear pleasant will be many. So mistakes will 
happen. But now virtue is beginning to be desired as noble and just conduct 
and a scheme of values - as the noble and the just - will become integrated 
with what the young person desires. 
Moral instruction at this second stage can emphasis the idea that 
character is a disposition unified over time which encompasses commitments, 
projects, goals, and responsible conduct. These young students will be 
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receptive to the analogy that developing a virtuous character can be likened to 
the effort and time it takes to be an accomplished musician, a good athlete, or 
a formidable chess player. Children can clearly see they are, as yet, none of 
these through no fault of their own. 
Rules and principles dogmatically instilled can be examined, the 
adjudication of conflicting moral claims can be discussed, and the range of 
cases of the exemplifications of the virtues and the vices can be expanded. A 
respect for multiple perspectives can be introduced and the appropriate and 
inappropriate applications - or limits - of tolerance explored. This stage seems 
critical for whether one develops a proper sense of shame as a semi-virtuous 
disposition or merely one learns to only fear punishment. A sense of shame 
will offer new motivations for virtuous conduct as one’s practical reason 
becomes integrated with one’s desires. With only a fear of punishment the 
taste for wrong objects can become habits. Shame will impact upon character 
development with the cognitive assemblage of honorable parameters and in 
the emotive attachment to objects as well as in thoughtful reactions to 
weaknesses. 
Early on, certain acts will be avoided because they are simply wrong. It 
is not as yet clear why they are wrong. This would seem to suggest the child 
will be somewhat perplexed by why she feels ashamed. But the second stage 
brings a cognitive awareness that wrong is synonymous with disgraceful and 
that disgrace connects with one’s character. This signifies that a child is 
inspired by her sense of shame to avoid wrong acts by a fear of disgrace. Part 
of the reason shame or disgrace is unattractive is because it is an internal 
pain. 
At the third stage (high school and on) when a disposition is becoming 
settled or fixed, shame can contribute to one’s character to guard against a 
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weakness of will. Good character has to be characterized as a strong 
character. Strength of character can be characterized as the resistance to 
emotional temptations and cognitive confusions. A mature character desires 
the noble and the just. As Aristotle puts it: 
The appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize 
with reason; for the noble is the mark at which both aim, and the 
temperate man desires the things he ought, as he ought, and 
when he ought, and this is what reason directs (1119bl5-18). 
Aristotle’s temperate person has ahold of the “facts” and the “because”. 
She desires virtuous conduct and the exercise of intellectual virtue for itself. 
Irrespective of reward or public acknowledgment, she desires virtue for its 
nobility. And her desire is, according to Aristotle, an uncorrupted and 
incorruptible conformity with what her reason asserts to be good. 
This view of the final developmental stage sheds new light on the 
remarks introduced early in this paper that appeared so perplexing in their 
apparent contradictory nature. Shame is becoming to youth because all that 
seems pleasant is not so. All desire is yet to become reasonable. Part of the 
struggle the continent man experiences is that there seems to be compelling 
reasons to do something wrong. Some feature or features of an immoral 
alternative appears tempting. 
When cognition and desire are in time, affect - or pleasure in the good - 
becomes a prime motivation. A sense of shame, as an awareness of honorable 
parameters, informs cognition of the particulars in one’s unique situation. The 
continent man will feel ashamed merely to be tempted and to have struggled. 
The incontinent man will be ashamed to have succumbed to desires that 
betray his hierarchical scheme of values. And to have succumbed, as 
Aristotle says, and to feel as one should following a failure, is to feel an emotion 
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that “ought not be felt” (1128b20). Introducing shame into the state of affairs 
seen as an organic unity “does not make it good” (1128b33). Seen as a whole a 
state of affairs that one is ashamed of is predominantly bad. But, as has been 
argued, it is not the feeling of shame that makes it so. 
Modem life, as everyone knows and as the interviews to follow 
show, is indeed hard. Cowardly administrators, discouraged teachers, ill- 
prepared and overwhelmed parents, entertainment executive’s stupidity and 
base motivations, and an association with influential, developmentally young 
peers conspire to corrupt a young person’s alignment of desire and affect with 
reason. Modem science even calls into question a person’s natural 
receptiveness and ability to develop temperance with speculations on genetic 
predispositions to infidelity, substance abuse, and uncontrollable emotional 
reactions that require medication. Even the fear of punishment as an 
incentive one should outgrow, resurfaces, as the interviews show, to tempt us 
in new, profound, and many displays of ineffectiveness to be justly 
administered. Recent high profile cases testify to the fact that with an 
expensive defense team and shameless acts of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, one can “get away” with virtually anything. 
True Aristotelian temperance may be an attribute of saints. In many 
areas of our lives - throughout our fives - continence is probably the best most 
can hope for. All the more reason to keep a sense of shame operative. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviewed five theories of moral development which 
influenced different programs for public school moral education programs. 
These theories were: the indoctrinative model, the theories of cognitive- 
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developmentalists Piaget, Simon, and Kohlberg, and a modern character 
education theory. Following an explication of each theory, how the emotion of 
moral shame is accommodated within the theory is reviewed. Next an 
Aristotelian theory of moral development is examined. It is argued that this 
theory of moral development is superior to the others previously reviewed by 
virtue of its comprehensive analysis of character development, its 
sophisticated view of virtue, and its recognition of shame’s beneficial 
properties. 
The Aristotlelian theory proposes a person develops moral character in 
three stages. With good teachers and good fortune, in the first stage a child is 
introduced to the basic moral facts. In the second stage the child becomes 
emotionally attached to acts that exemplify the virtues. At this stage 
virtuous activity becomes second nature, or, said another way, habitual. The 
pleasure that one experiences from virtuous activity pleases one internally 
and motivates continued virtuous activity. At the final stage, a person’s 
cognitions, affections, and desires harmonize to pursue the noble and just. 
This model of moral development permits the answer to Research 
Question #2 to conform to these three broad stages of growth. Moral shame 
alerts and sensitizes the young child to violations of the basic moral principles. 
In the second stage, shame pains the child internally. Mistakes are recognized 
as disgraceful and are seen as contributing to one’s disposition. Shame in the 
final stage is the recognition that a person acted unreasonably. Right reason 
recognizes virtue to contribute to a happy, noble fife. Reasonable behavior 
requires one to desire and to perform good acts. Shame is the realization that 
one has, in some way, erred. 
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Interviews with children and teenagers as well as a priest, a rabbi, a 
state trooper, teachers, and others testify to the fact that moral shame ought 
to play a more prominent role in human experience than many of the theories 
of moral education recognize. Pertinent excerpts from these interviews are 
assembled in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Introduction 
This study presents an analytical definition of moral shame, reviews a 
series of alternative definitions, and describes several operative school-based 
approaches to moral education. Interviews were conducted with a variety of 
individuals who are professionally and/or personally involved with children to 
ascertain their views - and their perceptions of the views of children - on 
education, society, the development of character, and moral shame. 
This study is guided by three research questions. These are: 
1. What is the emotion of moral shame? 
2. What impact might moral shame have on character development? 
3. What implications for the reform of school curriculum are suggested 
by the findings of this study? 
As a result of the review both of the related literature in Chapter 3 and 
of moral development programs in Chapter 4, an answer to the first research 
question was proposed. It reads: 
S2: X is moral shame = df. X is a painful, self-regarding feeling of 
diminishment that acknowledges an agent has failed to live up to what virtue 
requires. That virtue the agent: 1) regards as a worthy disposition; 2) 
considers it to constitute an essential component of living a good life; and, 3) 
acknowledges it to be a virtue a prudent person would have more closely 
approximated. 
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Chapter 4 reviewed school-based moral education theories and 
programs and discussed how these theories accommodated moral shame 
practically and conceptually. In light of the analytical definition, S2, various 
objections to each theory were presented. An Aristotelian model was 
presented and defended as a preferable alternative. 
Surveys and interviews were conducted to determine how different 
individuals perceive moral shame to impact upon character development and 
to investigate whether their insights and their experience contribute to 
possible suggestions for curriculum reform. 
The analysis of the data corresponds to aspects of the second and third 
research questions. These research questions provided the aim by which to 
design the interview guide (see Appendix B). One aim of the interviews is to 
determine whether the participants consider moral shame to contribute to 
moral progress and to the development of good character (Research Question 
#2). A second aim in conducting the interviews is to seek possible suggestions 
for reforms to the public school curriculum from the insights of the 
participants (Research Question #3). 
The words of each participant provided the descriptive accounts, or raw 
data, of the phenomena under study. Data from each interview were 
transcribed, sorted, and complied according to the general interview guide. 
This guide will be outlined following the introduction of the participants. 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants were interviewed for this study. Twenty-one 
individuals agreed to have their interviews tape-recorded. The interview tapes 
were transcribed verbatim by the researcher and a professional secretary. 
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From the interview transcripts, excerpts were extracted and organized 
according to themes relevant to the second and third research questions. 
To protect the identity of the participants, all proper names have been 
omitted. Participants are referred to only by their occupation (e. g., Priest, 
Probation Officer, Elementary School Teacher #1, #2, etc.). All proper names 
of schools and town departments, as in Amherst Police Department, are 
omitted if these names might lead to disclosing the identity of the participant. 
When a proper name appears in the transcripts and this section is quoted, the 
name is replaced with the designation “XXX”. In quoted sections, words 
enclosed in parentheses are those of the researcher. These words were 
inserted only to help clarify the meaning of the participant’s comments. 
The participants were: 
Priest: 71 years old, retired in 1998, converted to Catholicism, pastor at his 
last assignment for over 12 years. 
State Trooper: 46, has worked as a trooper for 23 years, employed in Western 
Massachusetts, began career working through the District Attorney’s office in 
several towns. 
Social Worker (DSS): mid-forties, Supervisor of the Department of Social 
Services - western Massachusetts, supervises staff of six case workers for 
adolescents, oversees roughly one hundred and twenty cases “at any given 
time”. 
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Judge: fifty, hears cases in three different western Massachusetts District 
courts, served on the bench for five years, previously criminal lawyer, married, 
two children. 
High School English Teacher (HSET): Late fifties, taught in the same school 
for thirty-three years, married, three children. 
High School Teacher / Aide #2 (HSTA): Early fifties, six years experience at 
the high school level, artist, vocational arts instructor, married, two children. 
Juvenile Probation Officer (JPO): Female, late forties, JPO for 15 years, 
Bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice and Psychology, Master’s degree in 
Criminal Justice Administration, Associate’s degree in court stenography, 
oversees approximately 400 cases a year which are primarily Children in Need 
of Services complaints (CHINS). 
Counselor #1 (Cl): fifty-one year-old female, twelve years at the elementary 
school level, masters degree, married, two children. 
Counselor #2 (C2): forty year old female, seven years in human service 
organization, three years at the elementary school level, master of science in 
counseling, divorced. 
High-school student #1 (HS1): 17 year-old male, 10th grader, spent two years 
in an court mandated alternative school setting, lives in foster home, Mother 
has history of substance abuse, does not know who his father is, has lived in 
mother’s home with an abusive boyfriend, serious criminal record (e.g., assault 
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and battery, grand theft, breaking and entering, violating probation, lewd and 
lascivious charges), has older sister who is deaf, older brother who is mentally 
impaired, believes their problems are attributable to Mother’s past substance 
abuse. 
High-school student #2 (HS2): 15 year-old female, sexually-active, uses 
recreational drugs, may drop out of high-school, failed every class in ninth- 
grade, father alcoholic, younger brother has serious record with police, lives 
with mother and mother’s boyfriend, does not get along with either 
High-school student #3 (HS3): sixteen year old senior, lives with biological 
parents, honor student, accomplished athlete 
Rabbi: fifty, served 10 years as rabbi in a small town’s only synagogue 
Elementary School Teachers: Eight elementary school teachers from three 
different schools were interviewed. These individuals range in age from the 
mid-twenties to the early fifties. The grade levels that they teach range from 
first to sixth. They are designated by order of appearance, an in EST #1, 
followed by his or her classroom grade (e.g., EST #1 - 2nd). 
Organization of the Data Analysis 
The data are organized and presented according to the interview format. 
The first portion of the interview sought to gather biographical data from each 
participant. Some of this information is listed above. For those participants 
who are, in some capacity, professional service providers for children, intake 
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questions attempted to establish what the nature of their profession is, how 
long they have been employed in this profession, and the characteristics of the 
population they serve. When interviewing children and adolescents, the 
researcher began by drawing a standard genogram with the student. In most 
cases this procedure helped to establish a suitable comfort level to pursue 
further questions. 
The second interview question attempted to elicit information regarding 
a participant’s view of the current state of affairs of: a) the family; b) children’s 
view of the importance and purpose of education; c) an overview of the general 
nature of student’s behavior; and, d) children’s level of respect for authority 
figures. 
The third interview question asked participants how they thought 
children respond to acts of wrong-doing. That was, in some instances, followed 
by a fourth question which attempted to establish what connection that act, 
and the reaction to that act, might have to authoritative directives or 
prohibitions. 
In some instances the fourth question was expanded to include the 
participant’s view on what motivates ethical behavior. The researcher’s 
objective was to determine, in the view of these participants, why people 
behave. Is the motivation grounded in a fear of punishment or social disgrace? 
Or to people behave because it is the honorable thing to do? 
Delimitations 
Over six hundred and fifty students and more than thirty professional 
adults participated in this study. The overwhelming majority of these 
participants are white and middle class. All reside in New England. All school 
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personnel and students who were surveyed or interviewed attend or are 
employed in public schools. 
Future studies would benefit by conducting surveys with an more 
diverse population in different geographical locations. A comparison of results 
complied among more diverse public school settings as well as with those from 
private and religious schools might offer intriguing contrasts. Furthermore, 
the survey results included in this study do not cover all grades in middle and 
high school. No results from a college age population were gathered. 
Canvassing these grades in future studies would give a more accurate basis 
for comparison and analysis. 
This study was hampered by the researcher’s relative inexperience in 
the art of interviewing and in designing research instruments. While reviewing 
the transcripts it became apparent that many avenues to investigate as well 
as points that merited clarification were missed. The Detention survey 
instrument was administered to allow respondents anonymity. This made it 
impossible to follow up on brief but provocative answers. This restriction 
detracted from the data that could have been studied in Chapter 5. 
Interview Questions and Excerpts 
The Family 
There is an enormous body of research on the family and its effect on 
child development. Divorce rates and the detrimental effect of a family 
breakup on children is well documented. Many scholarly research projects 
have been conducted on the added stress one-parent families experience as 
well as the negative effects on children of fatherless families. 
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These concerns and the apparent lack of parenting skills were concerns 
expressed by most of the participants. A representative comment comes 
from a high school teacher. 
(HSET) Modeling is either non-existent or negative. We are 
talking two-thirds of the population in this school...or take that 
down to 30 or 40%,...they just don’t have it. Parents are either 
single and overwhelmed with their children or there is just too 
much work and responsibility for them to supervise their kids. 
They don’t know how to set standards...Parents, today more than 
ever, need to be educated. 
Much the same concern is heard from a juvenile probation officer [JPO] 
and a Department of Social Services supervisor [DSS]. 
[JPO] I don’t know how it got from there to here...but it has in the 
last 20 or 30 years. I think there has been a big change in 
parenting skills...The parental abilities to not only curb delinquent 
behavior, but to teach the basics of right and wrong and to be 
able to handle their children out in public. (I)t is just not there. So 
I spend as much time teaching parents to parent as I do teaching 
children (that) they have to abide by the law. 
[DSS] These kids just don’t have (life skills) because dads have 
never been there, they don’t know who dad is, or where dad or 
mom is...Those (parents) who are there are so overwhelmed,... 
just overwhelmed. They can’t manage it all. They (the children) 
don’t have anyone to connect with. And I think that that is where 
some of the hopelessness is driven from. 
Little here seems new or surprising. These comments seem to reflect 
and support common perceptions on the difficulties facing and the apparent 
shortcomings of current parenting. But, three points of interest concerning 
families were not expected by the researcher. These were: 1) the number of 
high school students living on their own, 2) the number of very young children 
who live in one-parent or divorced households, and, 3) the tendency 
of custodial parents and guardians to offer excuses for their child’s 
misbehavior. 
In this order, pertinent interview excerpts are as follows. 
[HSET] So many kids in our school have jobs now. They have 
jobs after school...some...start at 3:00 o’clock...and end at 9:00 
o clock at night - sometimes even 10:00 o’clock. I notice more and 
more kids getting their own apartments. When I first came here 
for a kid to be living in an apartment was almost like somebody 
getting a divorce in the 1920s. Now it’s normal to be living in an 
apartment and to be holding a job to pay for the apartment. 
Interviewer: Could you give me a rough percentage? 
[HSET] I’m going to say between 5 and 10%. 
Interviewer: That’s alot of kids. 
[HSET] Yeah, that’s alot of kids. 
It is also common knowledge that the nation is plagued by a divorce rate 
of approximately fifty percent. However, what was not clear to this 
researcher at the outset of the study is that, in some regions, that rate 
accurately applies to households with very young children. The researcher 
assumed that couples would be more stable when their children were young 
and couples would tend to separate or divorce with more frequency after their 
children had grown. 
This exchange occurred in an interview with two third-grade teachers. 
[EST #1- 3rd] Easily half the children in my class live with one 
parent or are living with guardians or foster parents. I’d be 
surprised if half had both parents at home. 
[EST#2 - 3rd] That sounds right for my class, too. I’ve never 
asked them, but if you check the emergency cards I bet that’s 
what you’d find. 
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Informal conversations with a number of other elementary school 
teachers confirmed that the ratio of children living in single parent households 
compared with children living with both biological parents is thought to be 1:1. 
Another startling observation that emerged from the interviews was the 
commonplace occurrence of parents attempting to deflect the responsibility 
for misdeeds away from their child. Deeds cited in the interviews range from 
the relatively minor incidents of undone homework, failure to bring in signed 
permission slips, and inappropriate dress to more serious issues of fighting, 
lying, stealing, and dangerous bus behavior. “Some parents”, one teacher 
[EST #3 - 6th] remarked, “will first try to find out what another (classmate) 
might have done to cause their child to behave this way. I’ve had some 
(parents) put me on the defensive.” 
One elementary school teacher spoke of an incident of a first grader who 
stole money from a class fund collected to buy trees for a school beatification 
project. The evidence clearly identified one particular boy. In numerous 
private conversations, the boy repeatedly lied about his involvement. Finally 
he admitted he had, in fact, stolen the money. After school, on the day of the 
boy’s admission, the teacher called his mother. 
[EST #4 - 1st] The mother made all sorts of excuses for his 
behavior. “His father is working nights now, the house has been 
upside-down lately, it’s understandable because we’re having 
money troubles” those kinds of things. I couldn’t believe what I 
was hearing. I think stealing and lying are pretty serious things. 
It was as if she didn’t want to be bothered about what her son did. 
Not only that but I got the impression since she wasn’t bothered 
about it -1 shouldn’t be either. She said something to me like 
she’d appreciate it if I didn’t bring it up again because she’d take 
care of it and it really wasn’t any of my business. 
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A school counselor (C#l) confirmed that parental excuses are 
commonplace. 
Well, just yesterday I called a mother about (a boy) who has been 
fighting on the playground. She told me (he) has been getting 
teased to and from school. If we had done something about that, 
the fighting would never have happened. I guess she’s trying to 
tell us part of this - it’s our fault. 
Parent’s attempts to minimize or excuse student misbehavior is not 
confined to the elementary schools. With her daughter on report for suspected 
marijuana use on school grounds, a high school teacher recalls the parent’s 
response to this allegation by asking: “Do you know what’s been going on in our 
house lately?’ and “Do you know the stress she has been under?” (See 
Appendix F). 
Several teachers lamented the loss of the days when children feared the 
double punishment they would receive when they went home from school. The 
obvious implication is that in years past teachers could rely on parents to 
support them in disciplinary matters. Although some parents do, many 
teachers mentioned this is not support one can automatically rely on. 
Secondly, several teachers expressed frustration with their administrators. 
After citing a few examples of incidents where the administration failed to 
follow through on his efforts in disciplinary issues [HSTA] remarked simply, 
“After you get burned a few times, you learn”. The high school English teacher 
voiced similar concern. 
[HSET] Teachers do get up in arms when the administration 
tends to side with the students...Whether there is a verbal or 
physical confrontation with a student and a teacher, the 
administration, in the opinion of many teachers, goes out of its 
way to satisfy the students...So, I’m afraid to say that that puts 
out a pretty awful message to kids - which basically means they 
run this institution ultimately. Right? 
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As a result, many teachers comment they are increasingly hesitant to 
involve parents or administrators in issues of student misbehavior. 
In summary, themes which emerged in discussions of the family with 
the participants were: 1) parents have less time and/or a compromised ability 
to consistently model and to insist upon appropriate behavior from their 
children; 2) more children are working long hours after school; 3) teachers 
cannot rely on parents or administrators to support their efforts at discipline, 
and, as a result, many teachers overlook obvious infractions for fear of student 
reprisals or in anticipation of administrative non-support; and, 4) several 
participants in education referred to a dual trend of parents offering excuses 
for their child’s misbehavior with administrators tending to appease the 
parents and child rather than support the teacher. 
One could conclude that if the behavior of school-aged children and 
adolescents is to be restrained by an external fear of punishment, then the 
perceived force of this restraint is relatively weak. 
Children’s View of the Importance of Education 
Over the past decade there has been a concerted effort - one might say a 
media blitz - to impress upon children the importance of a education. Famous 
television and movie personalities make commercials, full-page newspaper 
advertisements are run, and popular musicians make announcements at 
concerts aimed at encouraging children to stay in school. Nevertheless, many 
educators remain disheartened by the attitudes of the students themselves. 
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[HSET] There is more gross indifference to the education process 
itself. There is more of an attitude from the students, “Did I 
pass? Did I get the ‘D’ ?” I hear (that) from alot of kids today - 
“Did I get the ‘D’ ? The sense of academic achievement is not 
there. It is just not a big deal. They know they can get into the 
Community College and they know they can get in to some other 
college. 
One inference we might draw is that more and more students do not 
consider knowledge to be intrinsically valuable. Indeed, this notion may be 
true. But what seems uncontroversial is that an increasing number of 
students appear to require proof of how their academic achievements will be 
converted into financial compensation. One problem of this view lies in the 
fact that for many students academic achievement does not appear to be 
defined by or synonymous with high levels of learning, critical thinking skills, or 
reading comprehension. For many achievement can merely be measured by 
the acquisition of a diploma or a degree. This seems to be the sense in which we 
are to understand how a ‘D’ is thought to be adequate. And most students who 
wonder if they “got the D” acknowledge, by virtue of the question, that they are 
not sure if they have done the bare minimum in order to pass. No one harbors 
any illusions of the student having developed a love for learning after these 
kinds of dialogues. 
An elementary school counselor speculated that one reason for student 
indifference to education is the comparative unattractiveness of the learning 
process. 
[Cl] Reading is way down on the list (of what children enjoy). It 
takes time to relax, to find a quiet spot to get into reading. Kids 
want to be immediately involved, immediately gratified. 
Computer games do that, and TV...And there’s peer pressure, too. 
I’ve never seen a group of kids (who) had reading in common...but 
they get really animated talking about (computer) games and 
horror flicks. 
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This same counselor commented on the possible influence of the 
internet. Bits of knowledge now seem adequate to many students and parents. 
The sustained effort to master a subject now seems burdensome. The 
counselor suspects many students have the the impression that knowledge 
can be “punched up” and printed out in mere seconds. 
The concerns for financial reward and the minimal effort to pass emerge 
in the interviews during discussions of homework. In this interview topic two 
unexpected themes emerged: 1) students have begun to dictate homework 
policy in the upper grades; and, 2) some administrators foster the attitude that 
the learning that occurs through homework be justified or defined by the level 
of future job readiness skills. 
The idea that learning and homework are subject to a job 
compartmentalization or time constraints is evident in the following. 
(HSET) In general there is less of an emphasis on doing 
homework. That’s another big change in attitude or aspiration or 
value. Homework just doesn’t seem to be what it used to be. 
More and more kids, even (honor student) kids are saying that, 
“Weekends are my own”, and prior to that teachers were of the 
mind (that) weekends were the time teachers gave kids more 
homework. They would be able to do it and it was a time they 
could get caught up on the behind work. That seemed to be logical 
and that seemed to work. Now we’ve got (students) saying, “We 
aren’t going to do homework if it comes on (week-ends).” So what 
the teachers have done, generally speaking, is to give weekend 
assignments and have them due on Tuesdays instead of 
Monday...Many kids reason, “Look, I work here five days a week, 
that’s my job, now it’s over”. 
A local newspaper article reports similar teacher and administrative 
reactions in Boston high schools. In Boston it is being reported that “as many 
as two-thirds of students...will ignore homework assignments. In response, at 
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least 5 percent of Boston teachers have simply stopped assigning homework” 
(Nicole Cusano, “Greenfield Recorder”, 23 November 1998). 
Very few kids do homework, and those that do it, every other 
sheet has the same ridiculous answers”, he (David Dingley, 
English teacher, Madison Park High School) said. “They cheat”, 
said Dingley, who assigns homework three or four times a week.’ 
“You have to keep giving it, but it is hard to base a lesson on 
homework if the work isn’t being done” (Cusano, 23 Nov. 98). 
Two months after the publication of this statistic in the Recorder, Time 
magazine cited a Boston Globe article which puts the percentage of teachers 
who have stopped giving homework at 20% (Morse, “Too Much Homework!”, 
Time, 25 January 1999). But in the Time article, homework seems to be an 
area that currently admits of extremes. The cover story focuses mainly on 
children in wealthy suburbs and private schools that are overwhelmed by the 
amount of homework they are assigned. 
One aspect in common appears to be the justification of economic 
advantage as an incentive to do homework. This comes through clearly in the 
comments of an area administrator in the Recorder report. 
Frances Zak, principal at the Ralph C. Mahar Regional High 
School in Orange, said he didn’t have statistics on homework at 
his own school. But he said homework is more important than 
ever at a time when the job market requires strong 
communication and math skills (Cusano, 23 Nov. 98, italics 
added). 
Zak’s emphasis on mathematics and communication skills 
demonstrates a shift from the educational priorities from HSET’s early years 
in teaching. 
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[HSET] When I first came into teaching I think the general 
mission was to make children literate, make children moral, 
make them aesthetically conscious, make them love learning for 
the sake of learning...I think our mission statement now excludes 
some of that stuff. I think other forces in this country of ours are 
trying to move it in the direction of more pragmatism. I think the 
mission now seems to be career pathways and the school to 
work...They are asking us to operate almost as these kinds of 
vocational schools. We are not here to prepare kids for vocations, 
we are here to prepare them for life. 
Although her students are young to be contemplating possible 
vocations, an elementary counselor commented that on the basis of the fifth 
and sixth graders she knows, the media blitz does not appear to have been 
effective. 
My kids from impoverished backgrounds don’t seem to 
understand they can get out of (poverty) with an education. They 
don’t have much motivation to go to college. When I do hear 
something about how they will make a living it’s I want to be a 
rock star or I’ll marry somebody with alot of money. 
To summarize, in the themes that emerged in the discussions of 
children’s view of education, children are perceived: 1) to want material 
justifications for how effort spent on schoolwork with be rewarded; 2) to he 
more attracted to those activities that offer immediate gratification; and, 3) to 
assume, in the upper grades, that they are entitled to participate in 
administrative decisions regarding, specifically, homework assignments. 
Complaints from interview participants regarding homework are that too few 
children do enough or do it adequately while national news articles report some 
teachers have stopped assigning it or assign far too much. 
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Perceptions of Student School Behavior 
Elementary school teachers and a high school teacher all report gradual 
changes in student behavior. A third grade teacher [EST #5 - 3rd] remarked 
that she is shocked by the lack of common courtesy displayed by her students. 
“I guess their parents never talked to these kids about common courtesy...At 
this level I shouldn’t have to teach them to say thank you or excuse me.” 
Another teacher [EST #6 - 4th] spoke of the lack of deference shown to adults 
in the hallways and the stairwells. “Children must think I’m suppose to move 
for them or stop my conversation with another teacher (to speak with them)”. 
When the high school teacher began his career, “you would never hear of a 
young woman using the heavy T word...now it is so common”. In one high 
school, it is not a matter of overhearing vulgarities, some of it is directed at 
teachers. 
[HSET] I feel threatened because with kids today...they will snap 
at you. They are very angry. They will humiliate you if they can. 
They will do whatever they can to strike back. It isn’t like it use 
to be many years ago when you could say something to a student 
and...he would feel a certain...presence there on your part. Today, 
students do not find it an issue to curse teachers. 
An interview with a social service provider testifies to the fact that even 
with the children who chronically misbehave, the seriousness of their 
misbehavior has increased. 
[DSS] I have been seeing these kids for 20 years and working 
with this population of kids and I don’t see these kids as the same 
kind of kids I saw 10 years ago, or even 6 or 7 years ago. The 
population I work with here are CHINS (Children in Need of 
Services) kids. The CHINS law was never designed to manage 
the types of behaviors these kids are presenting. You know the 
CHINS statue was developed for kids who ran away from home a 
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couple of times...The kids that are coming through now with 
CHINS petitions have multi-level problems. They are failing in 
school, they are out for weeks at a time, they are substance- 
abusing. Regardless of all the education you give them they are 
incredibly sexually promiscuous...I don’t remember these kids 
having so much chaos at home...the violence is much more 
extreme than it was. So I do see a different phenomena 
happening here. I’m not sure exactly what it is, but these kids are 
acting out much more recklessly and much more destructively 
then I think they ever did before. 
The explanation given for some of this misbehavior is that the effects of 
poor parental modeling are not always immediately apparent. Some parents 
who displayed delinquent behaviors when their children were young, 
apparently assume that since they now have reformed, their children 
should - or will - automatically model this new parental example. The social 
worker views this as a myth. 
[DSS] (A) very consistent (element) to all the kids (whom) we see 
is the chaos that they experience, the trauma they experience 
when they were young. It is not ongoing. It doesn’t have to be. 
And this (fact) confuses parents. When these kids come in here 
and I sit down with a mom who appears to be very intact with me, 
doing a wonderful job today, and can’t figure out for the fife of her 
what her child is reacting to, why he’s behaving this way. What 
these kids are reacting to is what they got from their parents in 
their early years - the very, very critical years. And I find out (as 
young children, they) were witnesses or victims of sexual abuse 
(or they were) witnesses of domestic violence. All those lines got 
very blurred very early on for those kids (as) to what is 
acceptable, to what you grow up believing, and what is okay. And 
that is what Fm talking about in terms of what kids really know is 
right or wrong. They are reacting to what was presented to them 
in those very early, critical years...These kids basically need re¬ 
parenting. 
In the experience of the DSS worker, the population of children she deals 
with do not think reflectively nor do they, in her estimation, exhibit moral 
imagination. The implications of the following exchange are troubling. 
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Interviewer: Do these kids realize how dangerous their behavior 
IS? 
[DSS] I don’t think these kids stop to think at all, to question, or 
think about the effects (their behavior) has on themselves...I am 
talking about very significant abuse here because it is a part of 
the culture of their group and it is okay and acceptable by their 
group. 
Interviewer: You mean if it’s approved of by their group then it’s 
acceptable behavior? 
[DSS] Yes. 
Interviewer: Can’t they think for themselves? 
[DSS] There is very little reflection or projecting (on) any of the 
consequences that may be on themselves - let alone on other 
people. 
Interviewer: Why is that? 
[DSS] They just don’t seem to have the time. 
Interviewer: The time? 
[DSS] Yeah. I think so. What really strikes me is that even alot 
of the kids that make it through high school or graduate from 
college really don’t get time to sit down and think about much of 
the future other than “How am I going to make enough money to 
get my own place and pay for my car?”, and things like that. 
Even for the kids that get alot of family support - financially, 
emotionally, whatever, it is just scary. Day to day stuff is very 
scary even for the put together kids. 
Interviewer: Are you saying most all kids are preoccupied with 
material things? 
[DSS] Survival, I think. All kids seem to have a sort of 
shattered sense of security. 
Interviewer: That’s sad. 
[DSS] Yep. It really is. 
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Worries about car payments hardly constitutes a survival issue, but 
this may be quibbling over word choices. What does seem clear is in the view 
of many social service providers, many children and adolescents are focusing 
on lower level extrinsic goods. An important theme to be revisited is why do so 
many children appear to be morally unreflective? It is clear that the DSS 
worker believes most children today are otherwise preoccupied. 
Themes that emerged from discussions concerning student behavior can 
be summarized as: 1) many younger children are believed to be entering the 
early grades unversed in basic manners and deference to adults; 2) for a 
segment of the population, destructive behaviors are at dangerously high 
levels; 3) a significant population of children are openly hostile toward 
authority figures; and, most importantly, 4) there is a perception that many 
children are morally unreflective. 
Children’s Level of Respect for Authority Figures 
In an interview with a Rabbi, he recalled a conversation he had had with 
a young woman in the mid 60s. At that time, he considered her view to be 
representative of many of the young people toward authority figures. 
Moreover, he considers this view to be prevalent today. 
[Rabbi] I remember talking with this young woman...and she 
was saying the difference between my generation and (hers was) 
that I thought that the government was upstanding and right and 
I was dismayed when I found out that they lied to me. She 
started out with the assumption that they lied to her and so she 
had no expectation of righteousness out there...I think that to the 
extent that you think that the system and the world is corrupt, 
then you know whether you get punished or you don’t get 
punished, doesn’t mean alot because it is not coming from a place 
that is just in its own self. So, if you can get away with it, okay. 
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This attitude would rate very low on a Kohlbergian stage theory. And 
this young woman’s logic is not very impressive. From her premises to 
conclude, “If you can get away with it, okay” can be classified as both 
fallacious and repugnant. Unpunished wrong-doing is still wrong irrespective of 
the supposed level of governmental corruption. It is not clear how shame will 
affect her character development. Presumably she, at one time, derived her 
values from societal conventions. Since the authority who established these 
conventions has proven to have been corrupted, supposedly the conventions 
are thereby negated or invalid. Now one might suppose for her to violate a 
convention will not elicit moral shame. But for her to then suggest one ought 
to get away with whatever one can implies such a person now concentrates on 
maximizing her own good, however that is construed. Better had she appealed 
to some higher notion (e.g. the spirit of the law, personal commitment, or what 
morality requires). 
The priest believes this woman’s view is prevalent among the young. 
[Priest] It’s the authority that is gone. And I would contend that 
one of Idle reasons that there is no respect for authority or anyone 
else is because there is no respect for self. I watch kids on Main 
Street...they have no regard for themselves...I think that one of 
the things that brings disrespect for authority is that everything 
tells us that we must have what we want. You watch television. 
What it is is you can’t live without this bicycle, or whatever...It 
not being obedient to authority and being a law abiding citizen, it 
is getting enough money for everything you want. And if you don’t 
have the money, you’ll get it anyway you can. And, of course, 
there is no morality in that. 
Three beliefs are advanced here. First, it is assumed that most adult 
authority has eroded. Second, the notion that young people have no respect for 
others because they have no respect for themselves has taken on the status 
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of received wisdom. The priest may have thought he was stating the obvious. 
But this notion does not seem to be necessarily true. Most of the children I 
interviewed for this study had relatively high opinions of themselves. Not all of 
them thought highly of others. Nothing seems paradoxical here. One can 
easily imagine an agent, who, however deluded, thinks highly of him or herself 
while having disdain for everyone else. In the earlier section on self-esteem 
this point was discussed. 
The third point is that the priest reiterates the social worker’s 
observation that a percentage of young people seem consumed by material 
things. He seems to imply that those who acquire these things illegally tend to 
be morally unreflective regarding the means of acquisition (e.g., by deception or 
theft). As the priest observes, this disposition entails either a disregard or a 
certain contempt for authority, for laws, and for religious commandments. 
In an attempt to verify the frequently stated observation that a large 
percentage of children appear to have little respect for authority, the 
researcher devised and conducted a survey that asks participants to rank 
fifteen professions on a scale from 1 to 5. A score of 1 signifies the participant 
has little or no respect for individuals engaged in that specific profession and a 
score of 5 signifies the participant highly regards those individuals (see Table 
1). From the fifteen professions, five that can be regarded as authority figures 
(Mother, Teacher, Priest, Judge, Police Officer) were extracted and ranked in 
order (see Table 2). 
The aim of the survey was threefold. One objective was to determine 
how the authority figures would actually fare. Second, it was of interest to the 
researcher to see how the rankings would change as children matured. Third, 
the researcher was curious to see if the rankings of those professions that are 
usually associated with liberal compensation (e.g. professional athletes, 
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lawyers, movie actors, etc.) would support the comments of the 
participants who suggest many children appear to value money (or material 
things) above all else. 
For the researcher the survey had surprising results. It is noteworthy 
that there is little variation in the scores across grade levels. In particular the 
scores between the 2nd through the 6th grades are remarkably consistent. 
Mother, lawyer, stock broker, television actors, priest, and rock musicians 
fluctuate less than .65 across all grades. And, according to Table 2, authority 
figures ranked relatively high. For instance, the profession of priest - although 
low among the authority figures - ranked higher than a lawyer and a rock 
musician while scoring comparably to a movie actor/actress and a professional 
athlete. For second and third graders this seems to be a sophisticated, yet 
unlikely, response. An encouraging result was that up to and including the 
sixth grade, mother, police, and teachers scored above 4.0 and in some cases 
significantly higher. And professions in athletics, acting, and law - obviously 
well-paided occupations - scored only moderately. There seems to be much 
reason for optimism here (See Tables 1 and 2). 
It might be objected that the survey merely asks children what they 
think, or, less impressively, what they think adults would like them to think. 
Psychological experiments and studies have persuasively demonstrated that it 
is one thing to say what we might do or what we believe and quite another, in 
real life, to act upon these statements and beliefs (Hartshome and May, 1930; 
Milgram, 1974). It may also be objected that surveys cannot distinguish 
between what a person’s character is and what that person pretends to be or 
incorrectly believes him or herself to be. 
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An example that illustrates both these ideas comes from the 
researcher’s experience administering the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children - Third Edition (WISC-DI). In five years the researcher has given the 
WISC-m to well over five hundred elementary school children between the 
ages of six and twelve. Of these five hundred students, although 
disproportionally white and lower middle class, several races and most 
socioeconomic brackets are represented. One question on the comprehension 
section asks: “What are you supposed to do if you find someone’s wallet or 
purse in a store?”. 
Appropriate two point answers include: turn it into the cashier, to the 
owner, or to a security guard, give it to the police, and mail it if there is an ID. 
In the researcher’s experience a very small number of the youngest students 
could not think of an answer. At all ages, however, the great majority of 
students do offer something in response. Yet only one student responded with 
a devilish smirk, “I’d keep it” and he quickly retracted this answer. The point 
being: Clearly not all children, or adults, would return the wallet. We leave it 
to the reader to estimate the approximate ratio. 
In an recent article, Howard Gardner objects to assessing intelligence 
solely with standardized “paper and pencil” instruments. One objection is that 
these tests frequently contain questions that admit of cultural bias. Gardner 
illustrates this point with the question cited in the text above. His objection 
reads: 
Some class bias are obvious....Others are more subtle. Suppose 
the question is what one should do with money found on the street. 
Although ordinarily one might turn it over to the police, what if 
one had a hungry child? Or what if the police force were known to 
be hostile to members of one’s ethnic group? Only a canonical 
response...would be scored as correct (1999, p. 70). 
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But Gardner is injecting a conflicting moral claim that is not present in 
the original WISC-III question. He may have been thinking of Kohlberg’s 
Heinz dilemma. And Kohlberg would not have classified the Heinz example as 
a dilemma unless stealing were not considered to be wrong. He sought to 
determine the level of cognitive sophistication by means of adjudicating 
conflicting moral claims. His dilemma essentially asks “What would be 
required to override one’s obligation to respect another person’s property?”. 
But every child the researcher tested recognizes - barring a moral conflict - 
that a person is “supposed” to return lost property. So all the children 
recognized their primary moral obligation. Whether one does return the wallet 
is another matter. But that, as all these children recognize, is not the 
question. The operative word is “supposed”. Personal circumstance aside, 
viewing the test results in this way is encouraging. 
One can concede the points suggested by the psychological studies and 
from various testing experiences regarding actual behavior and still find 
reasons for optimism. The point of asking children to rank professions was an 
attempt to elicit a response which weighs a student’s recognition respect as 
opposed to their appraisal respect. This asks a student to report what respect 
they consider is due the office of full-time mothering, police work, or the 
political life, not their individual assessments of their mother, their local police 
officers, or Bill Clinton. As the researcher administered this survey, he was 
careful to make this perfectly clear to each class. So even if children 
responded with what they think adults would like them to think, there is still 
an indication that, if the responsibilities of these professions are met, then 1) 
children are aware that they merit respect, or 2) it is the case that they 
acknowledge others consider them to he honorable. Even if we accept the 
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weaker of the two alternatives - children acknowledge that since adults 
consider certain professions to be honorable, then they should too - it is still the 
case that when these children are contemplating vocations for themselves, 
this consideration is there to be weighed in their calculations. 
Another reason for optimism is that the authority figures ranked 
relatively high. Even if deeds do not always coincide with words, it is a hopeful 
sign that those professions that advocate high ideals (learning, family, legal 
and moral behavior) are recognized by children as meriting respect. One 
conclusion to draw from this is that adults in the professions that enjoy 
recognition respect have an obligation to conduct themselves so as to merit a 
high level of appraisal respect. 
To summarize the themes of the responses to this question: 1) the topic 
of moral unreflectiveness surfaced again; 2) a prevalent view among many 
professionals is that adult authority has seriously eroded; and, 3) results from 
the respect for professions survey suggest that the recognition respect for 
authority-figure occupations is high. 
If it is a reliable and valid finding that among those elementary and 
secondary school children surveyed, recognition respect for positions of 
authority is high, then one can justifiably infer that these children will feel 
some obligation to abide by authoritative standards or directives. These 
standards and directives will affect a child’s thinking and emotions. But a 
breach between survey responses and actual conduct does seem to exist. 
Does this disparity signify a reaction of guilt or shame? Interview question #3 
pursues this apparent disconnection. 
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Children’s View of Legal and Ethical Wrongdoing 
Distinct new themes emerged in the interviews regarding how some 
young people seem to respond to legal and ethical wrongdoing. Following Jeffrie 
Murphy’s definition of repentance (Chapter 3, pg. 67), one hopes if someone 
were to commit some moral transgression or legally prohibited act that agent 
would, at the very least, remorsefully accept responsibility for his act, be 
sensitive to the harm he caused, “repudiate the aspects of (his) character that 
generated the act”, and resolve to reform and/or make amends (Murphy, p. 3). 
If an agent reacted to a moral wrongdoing in this way, then, we might submit, 
that person is capable of making, or has made, moral progress. The emergent 
themes from the interviews on Question 3 suggest there are a multitude of 
barriers to this moral progress. 
Two related themes expressed were that many young people appear to 
be genuinely unrepentant for wrongdoing as well as unintimidated by the 
possible consequences they might face from authority figures if they were to 
be apprehended. Regardless of the specific evidence in individual cases, 
denying personal responsibility for wrongdoing is a common reaction observed 
by a juvenile probation officer. 
[JPO] I don’t think they come here at first thinking any specific 
way about their transgression because I think most kids come 
here thinking they have been victimized. The cops just happen to 
grab them...they are on their case...They don’t admit any guilt or 
that they are accountable for their behavior. It is always 
somebody else. And if they don’t accept any guilt, then they can’t 
change - they will never change. You know it’s always some 
excuse, but they all are angry for having been caught or 
victimized (italics added). 
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One worry about children with this attitude is that there might be some 
justification for it. If the child’s experience supports the notion that 
“everyone’s doing it”, say, smoking marijuana, then he might consider his 
arrest to be somewhat arbitrary. And if he views pot-smoking as legally or 
morally justifiable - or something soon to be legalized - then prosecution for it 
will be seen as a type of victimization. A Catholic priest attributes such an 
attitude to be justified by the prevalent belief that one’s conscience can 
override all religious, ethical, and legal proscriptions. 
[Priest] There’s no sense of sin, there is just a thing of being 
caught. You see, there is just no idea of sin. Sin, of course, is the 
breaking of God’s law, it’s going against the divine law and I think 
all sense of... any kind of natural law is (also) gone. There is no 
such thing because we are heavy in this “it’s all your conscience” 
is the rule. That is the guide to your behavior - a guide from 
reality. So consequently, if you feel it is perfectly alright what 
you are doing then it is alright, there is no sin involved...The kids 
aren’t sorry they have done something to upset their parents, 
they are sorry they have been curtailed in what they want to do. 
The perception of arbitrary arrest is exacerbated for some offenders by 
their view that the court system is incapable of exacting just punishments in 
the great majority of cases. The researcher visited two court houses - each 
twice - on juvenile day to simply observe the moods of the people who were 
there waiting to appear before the court. The emotions that the majority of 
the children and adolescents appeared to exhibit on all four occasions might be 
best described as ranging from a mild annoyance at an inconvenience to 
outright disdain. Whatever these emotions were, they seemed far removed 
from feelings of disgrace or guilt. Other interview participants had stronger 
reactions to the mood of the waiting defendants. 
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[Priest] I thought “What is this? Some kind of class outing?” But 
no, these are the ones being hauled into court. Incredible! It was 
chaos! 
[State Trooper] The attitude in the hallway just reeksL.In XXX 
they’re not scared at all. It s like we’re going to get the revolving 
door treatment, it s just another day in paradise. I see that in the 
hallway. 
On this question of the emotional response to appearing in court, the 
following exchange occurred with the Probation Officer. 
Interviewer: I have noticed when I have been here (in court) that 
there are juveniles sitting around on the benches and they appear 
to be very cavalier. I don’t know if this is a youthful bravado - a 
front they are putting on - or if they are genuinely unaffected by 
the process. I have been in court with elementary school children 
and I’ve been amazed at how contemptuous they are of - 
apparently - all authority figures. 
[JPO] I think alot of it is bravado, but Fm not going to brush it off 
- because in court you’re going to see kids that are going to be alot 
tougher because they are with their peers so they have to come 
off as really cool...But do I see alot of kids that breakdown and cry 
or show great remorse? Usually not until they see the handcuffs 
being put on them and they are being brought out of the 
courtroom and then all of a sudden they realize that there are 
intense consequences...You have to get to that point of really 
showing them that you are going to follow through because not 
many people in these kids lives ever follow through as far as 
(doing) what they say they are going to do. 
What is unfortunate is that the probation officer observes “great 
remorse” to coincide only with “intense consequences”. Of the children who 
appear, only a small percentage are led away in handcuffs. So one explanation 
for this relaxed or unaffected demeanor is that many offenders seem to know 
that it is unlikely they will ever be punished. It seems clear to the judges, to 
the police, and to the offenders that the likelihood of intense consequences is 
remote. 
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Interviewer: I talked with a police chief in Athol and he told me 
that he had seen a study that says that a very high percentage of 
kids believe that the chances of being apprehended, brought 
before a court, sentenced, and then to have to serve their full 
sentence is very slight. Literally one in a million he said - if that’s 
possible. Somewhere along the line (these children believe) they’ll 
get off or their case will be dropped. And the study goes on to say 
the kids are precisely right. I wonder if this accounts for the 
cavalier attitude I see in the hallways and in the courtroom. 
Judge: I think that that is true. I think that is absolutely true 
and it’s almost like a badge of honor to come before the court. We 
don’t do anything within the system to discourage that. For 
instance if you come to XXX Court on juvenile day you will see 
wall to wall people, wall to wall kids, and what goes on in the 
corridor is beyond our control. We don’t have any way to deal 
with that physically...There is supposed to be a certain amount of 
confidentially involved when there are juveniles involved, but it is 
everyone else’s business. Kids are getting together and laughing 
at the system, as to what occurs, the noise that occurs. 
One of the most interesting themes to emerge from the interviews is a 
reason which helps explain the apparent cavalier demeanor, or response, of 
youthful offenders to ethical and legal transgressions. Some offenders 
calculate the magnitude of their wrong-doing by how they feel those who have 
been trespassed against should react to the transgression. According to 
many offenders, an appropriate response would be how the offender himself 
would feel if it happened to him. By an inability of the criminal to empathize 
with the actual suffering his or her crime causes, the seriousness of many 
crimes, in turn, is devalued. A school shooting incident is a case in point. 
The “Boston Globe” reports Evan Ramsey, 16, admitted to shooting and 
killing his principal, one student, and to wounding two others. The Globe 
reports Ramsey had this to say about how the families of the injured parties 
should react. 
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But he was less apologetic when asked about the effect of the 
crimes on friends and relatives of the victims: “I think I’ve 
(expletive) these people’s lives up - temporarily. And if they’re not 
(expletive) morons they’ll get on with their life. What happened 
was really screwed up, but that don’t mean that they should just 
stop living and stop doing what they were doing before (Steve 
Fainaru, Boston Globe, 20 October 1998). 
Similar sentiments were expressed by a high school student who was 
interviewed. A relevant portion of that interview with this 15 year old reads: 
[HSS#1] I still steal cars once in awhile. Just for the 
excitement. Plus I don’t get to drive much, But I have never 
gotten caught for it, so I really haven’t had a chance to think 
about it. 
Interviewer: Would you think more about it if you were to get 
caught? 
[HSS #1] Well, I would probably think about a better way to do 
it. What do you mean, How do I feel about it? 
Interviewer: Well, you said that you felt bad when you stole that 
last car and... 
[HSS #1] Yeah, but I didn’t get to take it out of the driveway. It 
was basically they had to wake up in the morning and see it 
halfway down the road because I accidentally snapped the 
ignition and I couldn’t get it started. It was getting too early. 
Interviewer. So you felt bad about the snapped ignition... 
[HSS #1] Maybe because I didn’t get to drive it around first. I 
don’t know. 
Interviewer: Then you’re not feeling sorry for the people. 
[HSS #1] Maybe. Maybe I am, maybe Tm not. I guess I don’t 
know how I feel about it. Some things I don’t feel bad about. 
Drugs and alcohol I don’t care because it’s not good for them. Like 
I wifi steal somebody’s cooler of beer. I don’t really care. Who 
cares if they have to go buy more. I just take it. I know if it was 
mine I would be pissed and I would try to find out who did it, but I 
wouldn’t sit there for the rest of my life and worry about it. If the 
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car was stolen, it was stolen. I get pissed when someone steals 
my bag of weed or something, but I get over it. If that’s how I feel 
about people then that’s how I expect them to feel about me in 
the same way. Even if they don’t, oh well. 
Interviewer: So if they are really upset that their car was stolen 
or that their house had been broken into, they’d be overreacting? 
[HSS#1] Yeah. Get over it! 
Later in the interview HSS #1 expressed concern over the possibility of 
being arrested for stealing cars. He believed that because of his previous 
record, mandatory jail time would result from a car theft conviction. Unclear 
as to the nature of the concern the researcher attempted to gain clarification. 
Interviewer: Do you feel guilty afterward? 
[HSS #1] I don’t know if I would call it guilt or if I would call it 
worrying. Maybe I didn’t wipe off all my fingerprints. I worry 
about protection. Did I remember to get all my tools? My 
fingerprints might be on something I forgot. 
Interviewer: Oh, I get it. I think. How long do you worry? 
[HSS #1] Coupla days. Cops don’t show up by then, they’re not 
coming. 
At one point in a subsequent interview with another high school student 
the researcher addressed a range of cases. HSS #2’s matter-of-factness over 
widespread wrongdoing seemed significant to the researcher. 
Interviewer: Tm going to list off a few things and I would like you 
to tell me, not what you think I’d like to hear, but what you think 
most kids you know think about these things? Okay? How do you 
think most kids you know feel about stealing from stores? 
[HSS #2] Kids enjoy it. 
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Interviewer: How about stealing from the phone company? 
[HSS #2] What do you mean by that? 
Interviewer. Well, credit card fraud, charging calls to someone 
else. 
[HSS #2] They don t care. My friends steal from each other, so 
stealing from the phone company is nothing’ to them. 
Interviewer: How about cheating at school? 
[HSS #2] If it benefits them? I don’t know anyone really who’d 
care about that. I mean, I know there are some good kids in my 
school - they do their homework and study - but most of them 
don’t care. 
Interviewer: So if they had the opportunity to cheat on a test 
they would? 
[HSS #2] Yeah. 
Interviewer: Okay, what do you think most of your friends think 
about cheating the government - like not paying their taxes? 
[HSS #2] I’d say all of them would if they had the chance. 
Interviewer: Do teachers ever bring up any discussions about 
some of these things - like cheating or stealing - here at XXX? 
[HSS #2] No. 
The themes that emerged from the third research question support the 
impression that many youthful offenders appear unrepentant in response to 
their supposed wrongdoing as well as unaffected by the possible punishments 
that might be imposed. There is also the impression that many children have 
what we might call an “episodic life view”. “Snapshots” of ethical behavior 
can stand alone; they need not connect with the past nor the future. At the 
risk of stretching the metaphor too far, when a snapshot is not pleasing, it 
never is put in a picture album; it is disposable. And this might explain the 
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impression of* concerned, observers that many children appear to be morally 
unreflective. An episodic life view need not calculate discrete acts in the global 
self-assessment of one’s character. And this is a different type of 
rationalization from the view that a particular act is out-of-character or that 
one acted under coercion or from some fatalistic predetermination. This view 
suggests ethical conduct and one’s character is not unified over time but the 
result of a subjective and selective memory of only discrete and disjointed acts 
or “scenes”. No one suggests this is advisable. It does, however, appear to be 
happening. An elementary school counselor articulated the episodic life view in 
this way. 
[Cl] I think TV and movies are largely responsible. Kids see so 
many acts of violence and people just go on with their lives - if 
they’re left standing. “Pulp Fiction” is an example. It’s all out of 
sequence, just disjointed acts of violence. There’s no connection 
to how people are after (committing violent acts). And the “Die 
Hard” movies. Bruce Willis is in those too. Hundreds of people 
get killed and at the end he (Willis) is reunited with his family with 
some kind of happy ending. After killing all those people he looks 
fine. It’s back to life as usual. I think kids are acting like that - 
though not to that degree obviously. But it’s a very skewed sense 
of reality. 
Interview question #4 attempts to examine the emotions and the beliefs 
of the episodic life view in more detail. 
Motivational Forces 
When asked, “What do you believe is a stronger motivational force for 
people - external restraints (e.g., fear of punishment, the fear or social 
disgrace, ostracism from the community) or internal restraints (e.g., personal 
morality)?” a State Police Officer responded that he believes the hold of social 
sanctions on families and individuals has significantly weakened because the 
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community, through uninvolvement, is perceived by many observers to tacitly 
condone misbehavior. 
[State Trooper] I asked some other (police officers) when I knew 
I was coming, “What do you think? What do you think about 
shame?” I think they all were a little to quick to say - police in 
general - “Nobody cares”. Still I have to admit that they are kind 
of right, they don’t care. I really think alot of people just don’t 
care. Even some good people just want these problems to go 
away and in a way they don’t care either. I think the social 
perception that a criminal gets., .is kind of like saying “Okay just 
go away and do it, I don’t care. Just go do it over there in your 
comer and don’t bother me. It’s alright if you want to do it. 
That’s not really social disgrace, it’s not. It’s acceptance and 
condonement. Just go over there, right? There is a place for 
everything and the place for it is over there. 
An interview with a Rabbi suggests that, for the Jewish community, 
this is significant change that has occurred only within the last fifteen years. 
[Rabbi] There was a great deal held under wraps in Jewish 
homes and I think it has opened up in the last fifteen years. It 
was a disgrace if you were unemployed, whether somebody (in 
your family) had a mental disease, whether someone had 
substance abuse problems, whether there was violence in the 
house. Those kinds of things were not talked about in public 
(because) to be part of America you had to be good otherwise we 
were outsiders. Outsiders were dismissible...So in order to secure 
one’s place in America’s society you had to be good. 
To be dismissed or ostracized by one’s social group has traditionally been 
a powerful incentive to abide by the prevailing conventions. Asked about 
internal versus external restraints, the Rabbi related this incident from the 
60s that lends credence to the power of ostracism. 
[Rabbi] In some ways I don’t know the answer. I don’t know 
what’s going on in people’s minds, but I know in some settings it's 
the push of the community on the individual. There was this 
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(situation) that took place in Boston in the late 60’s which the 
community really got down on this slum landlord. He had this 
property and his tenants had tried to get him to work and 
upgrade it and he just ignored them. The tenants at one point 
brought him in front of the court in Boston. The court said there 
were obligations the tenants had abused and that the landlord 
had abused...But...what they said was until he agreed to do (the 
repairs) that no Jewish institution may grant him any privileges. 
In part what made that work was even the Jewish social settings 
went along with that, so that the country club would not allow 
him membership. And that became very public shame in terms 
of the community saying we are going to name this person and 
put him in a position of excommunication until he complies with 
this requirement...There is really nothing in most places where 
you can bring that kind of pressure to bear. You know if someone 
was doing something in XXX or whatever town and the 
community said they wanted to publicly call that person to task, 
there is really no mechanism to do that. You don’t have any 
authority or framework to do that in most places. That story in 
Boston is a somewhat unique example, but it is a powerful one for 
what it offers. And there is a piece of me, when we talk about 
how to move people, that thinks it is increasingly (important) 
that the community has a role to play, though it is not clear to 
me how you get to a place where the community can play that. 
Much of the force behind the early indoctrinative model of moral 
development was propelled by the cohesiveness of the family, the school, the 
community, and the church in transmitting the same message to children. If 
it is true that adult authority has seriously eroded, that church attendance is 
down, that parents and teachers are often at odds with one another, one worry 
is what then constitutes this modem “social group” for children today. The 
composition of each child’s social group would seem to vary greatly in 
contemporary society. This concern, for the high school English teacher, 
accounts for a “futility we are sensing in the schools (which) is the same type 
of futility we are sensing out of the schools - in society in general: this lack of 
control that the adult population has on the younger population”. The priest 
expresses a similar thought, remarking: “Today there is no discipline because 
there is no morality and you have nothing to hold over their heads . Recall the 
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DSS supervisor who implied for many children the influence of one’s peer’s will 
override other ”groups”. When binding social conventions for these adolescents 
are self-imposed they can be profoundly misguided. To come to see these 
conventions as misguided seems unlikely if, as the DSS supervisor testifies, 
these children don’t “stop to think at all”. 
Recent social science studies on binding conventions offer neither 
encouraging results nor hopeful predictions. In “Moral Credibility and Crime”, 
Paul Robinson summarizes some preliminary research findings on why people 
are predisposed to lawful behavior. His findings suggest social 
disapproval to be one of three important independent variables which 
encourage people to obey laws. 
Beyond the threat of legal punishment, people obey the law 
because they fear the disapproval of their social group and 
because they generally see themselves as moral beings who want 
to do the right thing as they perceive it...But one key condition 
must exist if personal moral commitment and the power of social 
disapproval are to be harnessed: criminal law must be seen by the 
potential offender’s social group as an authoritative source of 
what is moral, of what is right...More specifically, the social 
science studies suggest, the extent of the law’s power to gain 
compliance depends upon the extent of the law’s moral credibility 
(Atlantic Monthly. March, 1995, pp. 75-6). 
Robinson suggests that people will obey the law, or feel some compulsion 
to obey the law, more readily if: 1) they perceive the law to be 
an “authoritative source” of what is moral, and, 2) they believe the law will be 
applied justly (1995). By applied justly, Robinson means people get what they 
deserve. This is clear from his clarification of the term “moral authority”. 
By “moral credibility” and “moral authority” I mean criminal 
law’s reputation for punishing those who deserve it, under rules 
perceived as just...and where punishment is deserved, imposing 
the amount deserved - no more and no less (p. 76). 
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If this is true, it is cause for worry for Robinson cites specific 
percentages to show, according to his definition, that the law has no moral 
authority. 
The overall conviction rate among those arrested is 30 percent. 
Fewer than half of those convicted are sentenced to prison...the 
median time served by those actually sentenced...ranges from 5.5 
years for murder to 2.2 years for kidnapping to 1.4 years for arson 
(p. 73). 
For the threat of punishment to regain “moral authority” Robinson lists 
several necessary reforms that need to take place. Among these are: a 
substantial revision of parole, abolishing probation, the reform of rulings on 
what can be submitted or repressed as trial evidence, eliminating diplomatic 
immunity, expanding the powers of the police, and significant revisions of plea 
bargaining guidelines (1995). We can speculate that virtually no thoughtful 
observer expects these reforms to happen anytime soon. 
A state police officer expressed the discouragement his colleagues feel 
regarding the ability of the police to assist the courts in exacting just 
punishments. 
[State Trooper] Til tell you after O. J. (Simpson) all the cops - ALL THE 
COPS - are so bad (negative) about going to court...As bad as it was 
before O. J., it’s ten times worse now. You can’t get anything. It’s like 
the attorneys are putting in stuff that’s almost asking you to prove your 
existence...They come up with everything, like “Prove you were on duty 
that day”. Pm not kidding you. It’s that bad...All you have to do is make 
the slightest mistake in any of your (evidence) readings and your case is 
out the window. I mean the attorneys know it and the criminals know it 
because they are getting off more and more routinely...They tried to 
make the L. A. P. D. into a conspiring police department, and they are 
making it the same (for police) in every courtroom. 
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Robinson’s suggested legal reforms might help to create a more just 
state of affairs (as in, more people will get precisely what they deserve), but 
his argument is grounded in a dubious philosophical principle. When Robinson 
states that the key condition to harness the power of personal morality and 
social disapproval lies in the recognition that the authoritative source of what 
is right is criminal law’s efficiency rates of punishment, he elevates law above 
morality. This suggests one’s personal morality is defined by and confined to 
the parameters of lawful behavior. Social disapproval is similarly constricted, 
if not more so, since public disclosure is required. But a good person is more 
than a law-abiding citizen. Motivated by self-interest someone can technically 
obey all the existing laws begrudgingly. Morality is clearly broader than lawful 
behavior. 
The primary difficulty is the inherent circularity of his argument. 
Robinson claims a person will be more readily disposed to obey the law if he 
perceives the law to be moral. A law is moral if that law is applied justly. 
When a law is applied justly - exacting the appropriate punishment when 
deserved - than it is moral. So Robinson appeals to the notion of the just 
application of a law to define moral, and he appeals to the notion of moral to 
define the just application of law. In Robinson’s axiology, or theory of value, 
morally right is contingent upon a just application of rewards and 
punishments. But this would seem to be a necessary condition of whether a 
state of affairs is just or unjust and not whether it is moral or immoral. 
From the findings of his own research Robinson concludes the justice 
system does not punish all those who deserve it. Those who are punished 
often receive unjustly light sentences: serving 5.5 years for murder, if you are 
one of the 3 out of 10 to be convicted - hardly seems the numbers that would 
deter most potential offenders. This too Robinson concedes. 
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Deterrence requires that potential offenders think about the 
consequences of their actions, as many fail to do...Unfortunately 
for deterrence,...(they) think the threat of capture and 
punishment applies to others but not to them. Unlike the other 
guy, they will avoid detection by taking the necessary 
precautions...(and) if a robber faces a mere four percent chance of 
going to prison, why should it matter to him whether the likely 
sentence is two years or ten years? (1995, pp. 73-74). 
From his own research statistics and according to the premises of his 
argument, this is Robinson’s conclusion: present laws have no moral 
authority. What this argument overlooks is that, regardless of conviction 
rates and just punishments, some acts are intrinsically wrong. So, because of 
a flawed axiology, a second problem with Robinson’s theory is that it cannot 
account for bad laws. In years past for an official to justly apply punishments 
for violating a segregation law or a statute that restricts women’s rights does 
not confer moral permissibility on acts of discrimination. Regardless of how 
effectively a community adhered to a segregation law, no moral authority was 
established for that law by virtue of some community’s conformity with it. 
Another case which illustrates this point is that fervent opponents of abortion 
find no solace in laws which grant legal access to this procedure. The moral 
status of abortion, for them, remains unaffected by vacillating Supreme Court 
decisions. In some eyes the punishment of conscientious objectors in no way 
enhances this law’s moral credibility. 
So the fundamental problem with Robinson’s argument is that the 
moral status of an act is not determined by the efficiency rates of 
apprehension and conviction. Efficiency rates attach to levels of social justice; 
percentages of specific conduct by individuals attaches to the level of moral or 
immoral behavior in that society. 
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Furthermore, in a forward-looking perspective, in order for a law to deter 
potential offenders they must believe there is a possibility they will be 
apprehended. Even if the law, in every instance, justly punishes all those 
apprehended, most offenders will still assume they will not be caught. This is 
precisely what Robinson’s statistics show. Here Robinson’s study would be 
benefit by precisely defining who a potential offender is. 
Psychologically, potential offenders are those who are not constrained 
by personal morality to evaluate some immoral acts as unattractive. Some 
feature on an illegal and an immoral act tempts them. Robinson’s reforms are 
merely intended to impress upon potential law breakers that the 
attractiveness of these base activities decreases as the efficiency rate of 
apprehension increases. But these are not the people for whom Aristotle’s 
lectures are intended. Robinson’s project is not to recommend virtue as 
desirable in and of itself. As Bumyeat interprets Aristotle, lectures on the 
intrinsic value of virtue will influence only those who have ahold of the moral 
facts and are motivated to more clearly understand why and how to be 
virtuous (1980). 
This is why Aristotle can claim...that the goal of the study of 
ethics is action, not merely knowledge: to become fully virtuous 
rather than simply to know what virtue requires. Someone with 
a sense of shame will respond, because he wants to do better at 
the right sorts of things. Someone with nothing but a fear of 
punishment will not respond; the only thing to do with him is tell 
him what he will get in trouble for (Bumyeat, 1980, p. 81). 
Robinson suggested reforms to the justice system are intended to edify 
potential offenders to the fact that what they have been told about 
apprehension, conviction, and punishment is true. But, given these reforms, 
the best that he can hope for is an increase in the number of people to be 
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thinking at Kohlberg’s law and order stage. All the improvements Robinson 
suggests are merely intended to transmit the message that the chances of 
apprehension, conviction, and punishment have greatly increased. In short, 
more people will actually be “in trouble”. But this is not instruction regarding 
an act’s moral permissibility; it is only a pronouncement on the efficiency of 
the justice system to punish that which it considers to be wrong. We still may 
not know, or care, why some act is wrong; we will avoid it because it is 
something we are relatively sure we will punished for doing. 
Robinson hopes are directed towards enhancing the fear of punishment. 
But to instill a fear of punishment hardly seems a worthy aspiration for 
education, law, or a democratic society. Any society that strives to motivate 
her citizens with that logic may very well get what it deserves: a citizen body 
of “pre-moral” beings. 
What is missing is an effort to harness the power of a sense of shame. 
A personal morality guided by a sense of shame will be unaffected by the 
current efficiency rates of punishment since acts for which one is legally and 
morally blameworthy will not seem attractive. Such a person is dissuaded by 
an immoral act’s disgracefulness and the knowledge of the internal pain it will 
cause long before he calculates the odds of possible public apprehension. To 
conclude, Robinson’s reforms might have a beneficial effect on reducing crime, 
but far more than this is needed to help young people develop good and strong 
characters. 
Detention Survey 
To investigate the deterrent potential of in-school detentions, the 
researcher conducted a survey of 574 students in seven elementary school 
332 
grades. Students were asked to answer questions pertaining to what they 
thought the purpose and the effectiveness of detentions and how they might or 
have reacted to receiving one (See Appendix C). 
The summaries of the detention survey (Tables 3, 4, and 5) show that 
the perception of the effectiveness of detentions steadily decreases 
consistently from kindergarten to the sixth grade. Ninety-four percent of 
kindergartners believe detentions help to enforce school rules and curtail 
misbehavior. Only 21% of sixth-graders agree. 
As children mature the frequency of split decisions increase. Although it 
was not an option on the survey sheet, many students wrote in that they 
believe detentions could be effective for some children but not for others. 
Whereas the percentage of detention’s effectiveness steadily decreases with 
age, the percentage of split decision write-ins steadily increases. 
Representative comments of this view are: “I think it depends on the person. 
Some people may think nothing of it or some people really learn from it (5th 
grader). A frequent response expresses the opinion: “It would work for me but 
you see the same kids in there all the time” (6th grader). From the fourth 
grade on, many children make the observation that “the same kids” are in 
detention repeatedly. 
As children mature, the nature of the responses to how one feels 
changes. At the kindergarten and the first grade level customary responses 
were “angry5”, “sad”, “mad”, and “bad”. Second through fourth grade were 
“guilty”, “shouldn’t have done it”, “bad”, “bad if I deserved it”, and, “mad if I 
didn’t do anything wrong”. Only one third grader wrote, “I feel fine”. A small 
percentage of fourth graders wrote, “It doesn’t bother me at all”. 
From the fourth grade on, the researcher had the general impression 
that those children who had never served a detention were more inclined to 
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believe detentions were effective than were those children who had served 
them. As cited above, several comments were of the nature: “It would work 
for me, hut... . From these same classes responses of “Not so good” occurred 
as frequently as “Not so bad”. For others at 5th and 6th grade level detentions 
have become routine. One child wrote “it feels like a daily assignment”. 
In addition to the expected “It’s only a fifteen minute recess” and “I don’t 
care at all” type responses, at the 5th and 6th grade level, there were some 
answers that implied, or explicitly stated, more. One child wrote: “I like 
detentions because it’s alot warmer in the winter and colder in the summer 
and it’s quiet. I like that alot better.” Three others wrote simply “It’s quiet”, 
and another said “It’s fine. I can read or do homework. It’s usually quiet and 
(that is) good”. The appreciation of a period of quiet time seemed significant to 
the researcher (See Tables 3, 4, and 5). 
One conclusion to be drawn from this survey is that detentions become 
less painful as they become more familiar. Conversely, if a child has never 
received one, the threat of a detention retains a deterrent quality. In the 
upper elementary grades, however, a majority of students believe that 
detentions do not have a deterrent property for the general population. 
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Table 3. Detention Survey by Class 
Class Yes No Yes and No 
Kindergarten 1 12 2 0 
Kindergarten 2 16 0 0 
First 1 14 1 0 
First 2 16 2 0 
First 3 12 4 0 
Second 1 17 3 0 
Second 2 16 0 0 
Second 3 13 5 2 
Second 4 13 4 2 
Second 5 13 3 3 
Third 1 15 4 1 
Third 2 13 7 0 
Third 3 13 8 0 
Third 4 11 1 6 
Third 5 12 3 3 
Fourth 1 8 4 4 
Fourth 2 8 10 0 
Fourth 3 12 5 0 
Fourth 4 6 9 3 
Fourth 5 12 8 0 
Fourth 6 9 6 6 
Fifth 1 6 12 5 
Fifth 2 6 12 4 
Fifth 3 7 13 4 
Fifth 4 4 15 3 
Fifth 5 6 7 4 
Sixth 1 10 2 5 
Sixth 2 2 6 14 
Sixth 3 4 15 3 
Sixth 4 2 12 1 
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Table 4. Detention Survey by Grade 
Grade Yes No Yes and No 
Kindergarten 28 2 0 
First 42 7 0 
Second 72 15 7 
Third 64 23 10 
Fourth 55 42 13 
Fifth 29 59 20 
Sixth 18 35 33 
Table 5. Detention Survey by Percentage 
Grade Yes 
Kindergarten 94 
First 86 
Second 77 
Third 66 
Fourth 50 
Fifth 26 
Sixth 21 
No Yes and No 
6 0 
14 0 
16 7 
24 10 
38 12 
55 19 
41 38 
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The most interesting responses were from those children who reported 
they liked or enjoyed detentions. Other than a few children who reported they 
disliked recess, it appears that a small but significant number of children 
reported an appreciation for moments of quiet. In order to meet the 
instructional daily teaching time required by the new curriculum frameworks, 
study halls in many elementary schools have been eliminated. 
It is acknowledged that the threat of a detention is only one variable 
among many that influences a student’s behavior. 
In general, schools are active and vibrant communities, but they are 
also noisy places. If a child’s home is fast paced and noisy, as many are, then 
quiet moments for reading and reflection will be few. In a letter to the editor 
regarding the cover story on homework, one teacher wrote in: 
The students in one of my classes beg for a 10-minute sit-silent 
period that I instituted in response to chronic overstimulation. 
Can you believe it? Middle-school students have a desire to sit 
silent? (Time. 15 February 1999). 
A schedule that accommodates periods of quiet time to read and to 
reflect upon what one has read is one obvious suggestion for curriculum 
reform. If Aristotle was correct to assign contemplation a place above all 
other moral and intellectual virtues, those schools involved in the development 
of character now have a concrete goal at which to aim. 
There is a resurgence of interest in character education and in the role a 
public school can play. Two established institutes - Thomas Lickona’s 
“Center for the Fourth and Fifth R’s” and Kevin Ryan’s “International Center 
for Character Education” - offer school programs that have credible 
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suggestions for establishing and for reforming curricula to foster moral 
development. With a goal of the practical implementation of their 
comprehensive moral development theories, neither program has 
concentrated on an extended analysis of moral shame nor do they emphasize 
the role a sense of shame occupies in the development of character. This 
following section focuses on reforms that are specifically associated with a 
sense of shame. 
An Answer to Research Question #3 
Various public school initiatives have appealed to guilt and shame to 
change attitudes and behaviors. Bolstered by the knowledge acquired from 
their classroom teachers, their counselors, and in health classes, 
kindergartners regard smoking as harmful and foolish, first-graders can 
identify a “good touch” from a bad one, and from the second grade on most 
children come to believe littering is wrong, “extinct means forever”, drug use is 
bad, and tolerance is a cardinal virtue. As a result, many young people today 
regard disgraceful conduct to be exemplified by polluting, smoking, the sexual 
abuse of minors, discrimination, and substance abuse. To be informed on 
these issues and to revise one’s behavior accordingly undoubtably constitutes 
personal, social, and ecological advancements. But this is not to say a child is 
on his way to grasping the essential “moral facts”. For example, tolerance 
can be an attitude, when directed at improper objects, that can undermine 
moral responsibility and obscure sound judgment. Teachers are under no 
obligation to tolerate dishonesty, disrespectfulness, unkindness, or 
irresponsibility. Similarly, students ought not develop a value scheme that 
dismisses acts of this nature lightly. And the inadvertent message that many 
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children receive from school health classes and from that which trickles down 
from some modern psychological theories is that physical well-being has 
supplanted moral goodness. The easy call is to identify and avoid that which 
makes one physically ill. Too often a preoccupation with “health” comes at the 
expense of recognizing an ethical dimension. Appraisals of something as 
morally right or wrong is avoided so as not to be faulted for an archaic 
judgmentalism, personal zealotry, or controversial “indoctrinative” 
impositions. Without question, physical health is a blessing and excellence in 
mathematics and communication skills are valuable commodities. But if 
these goods are attained at the expense of, or as importantly, without an 
accompanying moral knowledge, then some of our children may live long and 
possibly prosperous lives, but these lives could ultimately be unhappy ones. 
Commercially produced laminated posters that hang in many public schools 
read: “Zero tolerance for violence” or “Drug-free Zone”; no such posters are yet 
produced which read: “Zero tolerance for dishonesty”. 
Public schools share in the responsibility to introduce children to the 
basic moral facts. One suggestion that will help to introduce these facts is to 
establish a “Word of the Month” program. This practice is endorsed by some 
character educators; specific new suggestions can be offered, however, to 
connect this program with the development of a sense of shame. 
Word lists can vary to include those core values a school community 
identifies as most appropriate. Below is the list the researcher proposed and 
oversees for the academic year 1998 -1999 in the Orange Elementary School 
system. 
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September - Honesty 
October - Responsibility 
November - Consideration (Golden Rule) 
December - Cooperation 
January - Politeness / Courtesy 
February - Respectfulness 
March - Fairness / Justice 
April - Friendship 
May - Sportsmanship 
It is suggested that each month every class - systemwide - attempts to 
define the word (or virtue), to offer examples as to how that virtue is 
exemplified, and to be attentive to examples from lessons and from literature 
when the virtue, or its contrary, emerges. Monthly newsletters alert families 
to the new topic and encourage discussions to be held at home. A systemwide 
adoption of the program affords the opportunity for siblings to concentrate on 
the same topic which will help coordinate these home discussions. 
If schools approach parents at the beginning of the year with an 
invitation to discuss the list, and in the spirit of assisting them - as the 
primary caregivers - in helping to develop these qualities of character that 
they most assuredly want to see in their children, a healthy partnership can 
begin to develop. A simple contract to take the project seriously between all 
parties - parents, teachers, and children - can be signed. Now, much like the 
boy scout oath, to be a good member of the school community is defined as one 
who is honest, responsible, courteous, respectful, and so on. Nothing seems 
too controversial here; either parents want their children to be honest, kind, 
and courteous or they don’t. 
An additional value of a systemwide adoption of the program is that 
children can directly experience the increasing sophistication of their ability to 
offer defining characteristics and the range of cases in which these virtues 
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operate. It will be instructive in itself to learn that the topic is rich enough to 
revisit. And the adjudication of conflicting moral claims can be engaged so as 
to be age appropriate. There are many ways to approach such questions as: 
“Is one obligated to be brutally honest?” or “Is it honest to leave out the whole 
truth?” Hopefully, in the family discussions older siblings will tax the moral 
imagination of their younger brothers and sisters (or vice versa) with 
some thorny cases or new considerations. But, unlike Kohlberg’s theory, this 
dimension is hardly all there is. 
Violations of the qualities of character on the list can now be handled 
with a new clarity and assurance. These virtuous qualities, and others, have 
been agreed upon to contribute to good character. And good character ought to 
be portrayed as beneficial for the individual as well as for the community. No 
student need be publicly humiliated when falling short, but an honest 
engagement must take place. As the school’s adults model these virtues, 
students have tangible examples of how better to approximate these qualities. 
By example a child can be shown, simply and concretely, a better way to 
behave. And if adults do behave accordingly, surveys of appraisal respect will 
more closely coincide with the results of the recognition respect poll. 
A suggestion that accompanies the word list concerns how a teacher 
should respond to the reaction of a student who displays wrong behavior. If a 
student expresses shame for his behavior, the most appropriate reaction from 
a teacher might be to accept this expression of repentance, acknowledge the 
behavior as unacceptance, but also point out that it is commendable that the 
student honestly recognizes his transgression, has not lied to conceal the 
mistake, has reacted to it with the proper regret, and has displayed a genuine 
willingness to improve. The teacher can point out to the student that what he 
did was indeed wrong but, more importantly, for him to see it as such and to 
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assume responsibility for it signals the desire to improve. A brief discussion of 
better alternatives for future conduct can ensue. 
The task for the teacher is far more complicated for the student who 
reacts shamelessly or with disinterest. In these instances the teacher will 
have to refer back to the list and its contraries and attempt to persuade the 
student to see certain qualities and dispositions as contributing to a happy life. 
How one does this will be dictated by the child’s developmental stage. 
When and if a parental objection arises, a respectful, philosophical 
dialogue can ensue. Administrators and teachers have no monopoly on 
insights into possible conflicting moral claims or the range of cases; but now 
they do have, with the contract and the list, standards to which all must 
adhere and specific guidelines which restrict the field of individual liberties that 
might disrupt the school community. 
It would be an attractive selling point to propose that this program can 
be adopted with a minimum of added work for an already overburdened staff. 
It might be suggested the program is but another dimension that merely 
augments the work that is already being done. But, for the program to be 
effective, this is not the case. And here additional suggestions for curriculum 
reform emerge. One illustration is that examples from literature will 
spontaneously emerge. But the teacher must seize the opportunity and direct 
the class discussion appropriately. And the time to research the virtue, poll 
the students for examples, display the children’s thoughts on a bulletin board, 
and synthesize these thoughts to arrive at age-appropriate and enlightening 
definitions all will take considerable time. As the year progresses interest may 
wane and other duties may seem more pressing. One school member, possibly 
the principal, a counselor, or the school psychologist, might be assigned to keep 
interest high. 
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Second, the most worrisome observation that repeatedly surfaced in 
this study’s interviews is the concern that too many children appear to be 
morally unreflective. Remarkably a social worker suggests that this can be 
explained by the fact that young people do not have enough “time”. 
Presumably, their priorities are otherwise arranged so that all their attention 
is in other ways preoccupied and consumed. It seems more plausible to 
suggest they have not had the opportunity to develop this admirable reflective 
quality. In our fast paced world it may be too easy to overlook the simple fact 
that thoughtfulness is hard work. To be thoughtful, one must have exposure 
to material upon which to reflect, the discipline for extended and undistracted 
mental operations, and the emotional control and will power to stay focused. 
But one must be able to focus. As mentioned, with vibrant communities 
comes high levels of noise. Administering intelligence tests in three different 
elementary schools the researcher takes pains to find the quietest place 
available so students can perform at their best. It is not easy. When asked 
about noise levels, few students seem bothered. Regardless, the researcher 
will oftentimes feel required to suspend a test session until a later time. He 
wonders if their reports of the apparent negligible effect of noise on their 
performance is a good thing. If children are becoming acclimated to high noise 
levels this suggests a topic worthy of further study. So another suggestion for 
reform is for administrators to set building-wide times for quiet reflection. If 
buildings can coordinate, at one and the same time, all classes to have mid- 
morning snacks or daily assemblies, so to can they arrange a short period of 
silence for reading and reflection. If moral reflection is an activity, like virtue, 
that requires practice, this seems a good place to begin. 
Moral unreflectiveness attracted national attention with the Clinton - 
Lewinsky matter. This coincided with conducting research for this project, it is 
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introduced here reluctantly. If there are any hopeful signs for a country 
fatigued by this disgraceful performance, it is the reemergence of a public 
dialogue that utilizes so many terms of moral self-assessment. Hundreds of 
newspaper articles and numerous television commentators, along with the 
principal players themselves, have used the terms ‘guilt’, ‘shame’, 
‘shamelessness’, ‘regret’, ‘remorse’, and ‘repentance’. The drafted Senate 
censure characterized Clinton’s behavior as exemplifying “shamelessness”. 
The chronology of Clinton’s public statements followed the graduated scale of 
regret, to guilt, to remorse, and finally to shame. Many commentators were 
distressed it proceeded so slowly; this public dissatisfaction unquestionably 
accelerated the progression of Clinton’s emotional responses. Others 
questioned the sincerity - and we have yet to hear - of Clinton’s “repentance”. 
Still others, Lewinsky among them, remark that this appears to be a case 
study in the difference between a fear of punishment and a fear of disgrace. 
Lewinsky reportedly believes Clinton is only sorry to have been caught 
(Jurkowitz, 1999a). 
In this unfortunate incident one benefit is the refocusing of national 
attention on these emotions of self-assessment. For a time it was a daily 
occurrence for newspaper articles to refer to shame. This was a word one saw 
only infrequently from the press during the 70s and 80s - a time often 
characterized as eras of self-preoccupation and materialism. A recent article 
by syndicated columnist Donald Kaul, “Without Shame” is an example. He 
wrote this as a clever opening paragraph. 
I watched Monica Lewinsky’s interview with Barbara Walters 
last week and...I was appalled. I found the woman altogether 
insufferable: vulgar, obnoxious, and utterly without shame. 
I didn’t like Monica much either (Recorder, 15 March 1999). 
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With both Clinton and Lewinsky, the public was exposed to clear 
instances, as Aristotle has said, of affective miscalculations and youthful 
desire overcoming reason. This exchange transpired in the television interview 
Kaul refers to between Walters and Lewinsky. 
BW: Did you ever say to yourself, “Tm doing something 
wrong...This is bad for the country. Did you ever think about 
that? 
ML: Now with everything that’s happened...I feel bad I didn’t. 
But I didn’t at that time. I was enamored with him. And I was 
excited. And I was enjoying myself (Jurkowitz, The Boston Globe, 
4 March 1999) 
Later in the interview, Lewinsky’s moral unreflectiveness and fuzzy thinking is 
again exposed. 
BW: If you had it to do over again, would you have the 
relationship with Bill Clinton? 
ML: There are some days that I regret that the relationship ever 
started, and there are some days that I just regret that I ever 
confided in Linda Tripp (Jurowitz, 1999a, italics added). 
White House correspondent Sam Donaldson reacted to the interview 
with: “Here is a young woman who clearly doesn’t feel any personal shame, 
doesn’t think she did anything wrong...she doesn’t get it (Jurkowitz, Globe, 11 
March 1999, italics added). With more than a year to reflect upon the 
situation, it is perplexing Lewinsky “doesn’t get it”. From the study’s 
interviews this same unreflectiveness appears to hold true for the high school 
car-thief and the young woman on academic probation. As was proposed at 
the outset, a developed sense of shame could have avoided these problems. 
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The costly and ugly national disgrace we have all endured gives us some 
perspective to shame’s potential value. 
Moral reflectiveness will increase a child’s control of his or her actions 
with a new understanding of one’s motivations. The aspiration to lead a good 
life and to avoid disgrace requires clear thought, proper affective responses, 
control of the emotions, and a desire for the just and noble. Acknowledging 
instances of moral shame points to future avenues of preferable behavior. A 
sense of shame designates these parameters. 
Third, if Kupperman is correct to propose young students will benefit 
from dogmatic instruction, that instruction ought to be consistent within a 
school system. Investigating rationalizations from different perspectives and 
resolving ethical dilemmas might be appropriate at the high school level, but 
not in the early elementary grades. In specific subjects - mathematics for 
example - there has to be a curriculum of logical progressions from year to 
year. So too with moral development. This requires that, in establishing moral 
development strategies, the coordination of efforts will have different focuses. 
Elementary school programs will need strong, continued guidance in imparting 
the basic moral facts coherently and consistently. Just as algebra ought not 
precede the learning of the multiplication tables, having students debate 
dilemmas ought not precede the cognitive and emotional attachment to the 
virtues. We must first believe stealing and dishonesty are wrong before we 
can calculate how extreme the circumstances must be in order to override our 
moral inclinations and responsibilities. There will be no dilemma in the first 
place if our sense of shame does not inform us that stealing and dishonest acts 
will cause us internal pain. In large part, it is precisely this sense of shame 
that creates the conflict. It is, then, logically required that the sense of shame 
precede the project of adjudicating conflicting moral claims. The upper grades 
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will have more flexibility in discussing the particular circumstances and 
applications of the virtues. But teachers at the elementary level are just as 
much individuals as are those in the upper grades. So creativity and individual 
input in relaying the moral facts is especially important in the early grades to 
keep interest high. 
Fourth, counseling is an area in need of reform. It is vitally important 
what transpires systemwide be supported in individual efforts. Confidentiality 
is an umbrella that extends over so wide an area that many times little is 
known about what transpires in private counseling sessions. At team 
meetings on a student’s individual education plan (IEPs) or in special education 
meetings (SPED evaluations and reevaluations) counselors often report only 
that they see a child for “outside issues” or for “personal problems”. Nothing is 
shared about a counselor’s objectives for a child, specific counseling successes 
or failures, or future plans. Parents, teachers, and administrators must 
operate blindly in good faith. 
If moral development programs are an essential part of the school 
experience, counselors are, by design, apt to encounter many instances of 
violations of school rules which have ethical dimensions. Many students are 
referred to counseling precisely because of just such a history of violations. 
But one can earn counseling certification without any exposure to ethics, 
ethical theories, logic, or educational philosophy. 
Fifth, it is suggested that this change at the university level. Counselors 
trained in Rogerian-type methods are still being instructed never to use the 
terms “should” or “shouldn’t”. This, it was explained to this researcher during 
his course work, stifles dialogue and personal discovery. Then and now, this 
seems preposterous. The teachers of teachers should encourage their 
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students to take moral progress seriously. Anything less constitutes an 
irresponsible omission. 
In interviews for this document, the researcher noted many wall posters 
that hang in counselor’s offices. Many have pithy, but rather confused, 
messages. A popular one reads: “All emotions are O.K.; it’s what you do with 
them that counts”. Presumably, envy is alright if it remains bottled up, malice 
can be exemplified in an acceptable manner, and there is some proper 
measure of shamelessness. One counselor remarked, “Shame is not a word in 
my vocabulary”. So for her shamelessness must not exist in any measure. It 
is understandable how some children can get confused. Counselors and 
teachers encounter difficult cases every day. Counseling and teaching 
certification that requires three credits in the study of the emotions, of logic, or 
in ethical theories could strengthen the critical thinking skills so as to deal 
more effectively with these important and difficult cases. 
Chapter Summary 
Many public school children and adults who work with public school 
children offered their insights through surveys and personal interviews on a 
variety of topics related to the emotion of moral shame. On being approached 
for an interview all of the adults who participated reported, in varying degrees, 
to an initial uneasiness to discuss shame; none felt qualified and no one was 
perfectly comfortable with the topic. The researcher was denied permission to 
speak with students in one school and with inmates in a correctional facility. 
A few requests by telephone were never returned. Of those who agreed to 
participate, however, while reviewing their interview guides prior to our 
meeting or in the interview itself, all of the participants became animated and 
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engaged. With slight encouragement, and almost as if they were recovering a 
suppressed memory, they seemed to realize that they had much to say about 
moral shame and its role in child and character development. 
All the participants recognize an enormous variety and amount of 
stress on the family. It is commonly thought by all participants that the 
biological parents in approximately half of the families with school age children 
are divorced. A significant percentage of the families that the participants are 
involved with are thought to desperately need - or would benefit by - parenting 
skills education. A consensus is many parents either do not model appropriate 
behavior or have a compromised ability to educate their children in matters of 
character development. One reason for a compromised ability to parent is 
that many households have both caregivers working full-time. Simply put, at 
the end of the day the parents or guardians are understandably tired. And in 
many households, because of after school jobs, so are the children. 
More and more students are reported to be working after school. As a 
result, these students appear tired during school. Many schools report 
increasing numbers of students do not regularly or conscientiously do their 
homework and the connection with outside employment is obvious. 
Some students have assumed an administrative role of dictating 
homework policy to which some teachers and administers have acquiesced. 
Students in the upper grades show outright disdain for authority, while 
younger students are occasionally characterized as ignorant of the common 
courtesy of showing deference to their elders. By acquiescing in matters of 
homework policy and in enforcing discipline, one high school teacher recognizes 
adults have abdicated their authoritative responsibility. 
Another troubling trend reported by elementary school teachers is the 
impression that children appear to be unversed in basic manners while high 
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school teachers are distressed by the levels of vulgar language and 
disrespectfulness. Across all grade levels, most troubling to some educators is 
the tendency of parents to intercede on their child’s behalf with excuses for 
misbehavior. Offering extenuating circumstances to absolve a child of his or 
her responsibility is becoming commonplace. This parental intercession 
creates an adversarial relationship with the teacher. When teachers appeal to 
administrators to resolve the conflict, a common perception is that too often 
the principals and superintendent will attempt to appease the parents at the 
teacher’s expense. 
The general picture seems to be one of younger children who have not 
been exposed to - and, therefore, do not have ahold of - either the basic “moral 
facts” or the conventional rules of etiquette. Older students are thought to be 
preoccupied with survival and/or material goods. Teachers are reluctant and 
discouraged by past efforts to impart these lessons due to parental charges of 
inappropriate intervention as well as non-support from their administrators. 
The long term effect of all these factors on maintaining discipline, academic 
standards, and the work ethic is profoundly negative. 
Compounding these problems, as one high school educator related, is the 
perception that a liberal education is becoming too dependent upon producing 
demonstrable relevance to job readiness skills. He worries further that too 
many of his students are demanding a justification for how their efforts and 
educational pursuits will translate into “billable” skills. He is saddened to see - 
and cites as evidence for this trend - that art and music appreciation courses 
have been replaced by Accounting I, II, and III (see Appendix F). 
Mathematics and “communication skills” seems to constitute the primary 
educational objectives for one principal. 
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Of particular relevance to this study is the troubling and complex 
observation that many children and adolescents appear to be morally 
unreflective, if not shameless. Several candidates - and candidates in 
conjunction with one another - emerged to explain this phenomenon. 
First, a shared opinion was that respect for authority has significantly 
eroded. Although a recognition respect survey for authority figures registered 
optimistic findings, this did not coincide with the experience of the participants. 
Second, as children mature they seem less susceptible to a fear of 
punishment from schools (e.g., the detention survey) and from legal 
institutions (e.g. the apparent nonchalance of defendants in area court 
houses). 
Third, a rabbi, a priest, and a state trooper reported that communities 
no longer wield a controlling power over her citizens. The state trooper 
observed that many communities no longer have the means nor the desire to 
hold some of her members accountable for harmful or immoral behavior. This 
behavior is tolerable, the message seems to be, if it is confined to the fringes. 
But it may be true that as a community retreats from insisting upon and 
imposing acceptable standards of behavior of all citizens, the community itself 
begins to dissolve or fracture. As the social worker observes, many young 
people have formed their own social groups. And to only these groups do they 
feel answerable. Here it is not a question of a community dissolving; young 
people have never joined. In turn, one will not fear ostracism from that to 
which one has never been connected. 
Fourth, having never connected with a community may account, in 
part, for a morally unreflective disposition and the emergence of the adoption 
of the episodic life view. As the rabbi observed, not long ago the perception of 
Jewish citizens was that the way to assimilate into American society was to 
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be “good”. Shameful, undesirable, or unfortunate family circumstances were 
kept hidden. But if communities are slowly becoming smaller associations 
defined by subjectively chosen norms, the shameful can become, for some, 
acceptable. Recall the comments of the social service supervisor who implied 
that for some young people dangerously high levels of destructive behavior is 
the price of admission into their group. Street gangs share similar 
requirements. 
This returns us full-circle to the episodic life view. Some participants 
reported they fear children see life as a series of discrete and disjointed 
episodes that are independently negotiated by whatever means necessary to 
maximize extrinsic goods. If, for example, that extrinsic good is a diploma, a 
grade of D will suffice. Two high school students reported that for them - and 
everyone they know - there is no compunction to cheat to acquire the D. A 
conception of virtue does not portray cheating as unattractive because virtue 
does not unify activities, projects, commitments, or goals. Good character will 
not be conceived as unified over time if life is a series of disjointed “scenes”. 
As a school counselor charges, the media shares responsibility for this 
phenomena. The visual media is riddled with daily images of glorified violence 
seemingly disconnected from emotional impact and lasting influence, split- 
second flashing images that require no expenditure of sustained attention, and 
casual sexual encounters that require no commitment or sacrifice. One 
cannot look to television or the movies to find an alternative to the episodic life 
view exemplified and recommended. 
Reforming the justice system so as to legitimize a fear of punishment 
will not reorient anyone to desire virtue for its own sake. An external threat 
might inhibit activity, it cannot, by itself, motivate an internal conversion. 
These findings are summarized in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
At the end of the twentieth century, public schools, as never before, are 
expected to care for a wide array of children’s varied developmental needs. 
Many public schools feel obligated to provide children with, among other things, 
a healthy breakfast, after school tutoring and recreation, emotional and 
behavioral interventions, and instruction in good hygiene, sexually transmitted 
diseases, safety issues, and the dangers of substance abuse. 
There is also a resurgence of interest in the public school’s role in a 
child’s moral education and character development. Simultaneously there is a 
concern in this country that the severity of school age children’s misbehavior 
is on the rise. In 1999 reports of heavily armed students firing on and killing 
their classmates and teachers have become tragically commonplace. 
One problem that this study addresses is the parallel development of an 
increase in an apparent shamelessness for social misbehavior and criminal 
deeds (Kahan, 1997; Jurowitz, 1999; Kaul, 1999). Many self-reports from the 
school-aged population include testimonials that some students feel no shame 
or remorse for their misbehavior (Jurowitz, 1999). One hypothesis of this 
study is that if a child had acquired a sense of shame, some of these criminal 
acts might never had occurred. 
A second problem addressed by this study is that it is not at all clear as 
to what the emotions of shame and shamelessness are. Initially, Anstotle s 
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comments on shame seem contradictory while some modem commentaries 
are even more obtuse. At a fundamental level, a review of the pertinent 
literature suggests there is substantial disagreement as to how one defines 
“emotion”. On another level there is an even greater disagreement over what 
moral significance ought to be ascribed to the emotions. And moral shame is 
an emotion that is particularly plagued by this imprecision and these 
disagreements. By way of illustration, there is no consensus in the literature 
on the moral significance of shame. Some authors claim shame has no moral 
significance, it is intrinsically bad (Isenberg, 1980). Others believe shame to 
be neutral (Urmson, 1980). Some writers believe shame to have positive 
attributes outweighed by its negative qualities (Kekes, 1990,1993), while still 
others believe shame to be a positive emotion (Taylor, 1985; Williams, 1993). 
If moral shame can be shown to be conditionally good, a third problem 
arises: Do public school moral education programs recognize and utilize 
shame’s beneficial qualities? 
Summary of the Study 
This is an exploratory, conceptual study with three aims. These aims 
are outlined in Chapter 1. There it is detailed that the study will, first, attempt 
to offer a clear, precise, and useful definition of moral shame. Second, if moral 
shame can be persuasively argued to be conditionally good, can it be shown to 
affect character development positively? Third, from the conclusions of the 
preceding aims, do suggestions emerge for the reform of public school moral 
education curricula. These aims guide the formulation of the three research 
questions. These are: 1) “What is the emotion of moral shame? , 2) What 
impact might moral shame have on character development? , and 3) What 
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implications for the reform of school curriculum are suggested by the findings 
of this study?”. 
Chapter 2 details the research design and procedure. Since this is a 
conceptual study the literature review is extensive. This review spans 
ancient philosophical texts to modem educational articles. 
In depth interviewing, as a quantitative method, is employed to produce 
descriptive data from twenty-four professional men and women who, in 
various capacities, serve children. Two surveys are conducted with 576 school 
children. One survey asked children about their perceptions and reactions to 
in-school detentions. As only one variable among many which affect behavior, 
detentions are of interest because the researcher gained some insight into a 
child’s emotional reaction to misbehavior. These data intended to elicit 
information regarding one effect shame might have on character development. 
The second survey asked children to rank occupations according to the 
child’s level of respect for fifteen different professions. The rationale for 
collecting these data is that one can assume that if a child has respect for a 
profession, then he or she will likely have some respect for the principles, laws, 
or standards of that profession. Ranking a profession highly gives some initial 
insight into a child’s respect for these principles. 
With the aim of arriving at a suitable answer to Research Question #1, 
“What is the emotion of moral shame?”, Chapter 3 proceeds in three specific 
steps. First, an emotion is claimed to be comprised of the interrelated 
components of cognition, affect, and desire. Arguments are advanced to 
discredit the positions that claim emotions are solely cognition or affect. In the 
second section, having established the necessary and sufficient conditions an 
emotion must meet, several self-regarding emotions related to shame are 
analyzed. In order, these are: regret, remorse, repentance, guilt, 
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embarrassment, humiliation, self-esteem, pride, and self-respect. Following a 
review of the literature on these emotions, specific definitions for each are 
formulated. 
An analysis of these emotions enables the researcher, in the third 
section of Chapter 3, to embark on a study of those qualities that are 
distinctive of shame. To be clear about what an emotion is seems to logically 
precede any attempt to attribute significance to that emotion. Accordingly, 
the analysis of moral shame next reviews various positions in the literature 
that concentrate on specific features of this emotion. These include 
arguments that shame is either an internal or an external experience, whether 
an audience is required in order to feel shame, whether all shame experiences 
are moral in nature, and, finally, a review of positions that question shame’s 
moral significance. Arguments are advanced which propose shame can be 
experienced internally and externally, an audience is not required, not all 
shame experiences need be moral in nature, and that shame is highly 
significant for moral progress. Having advanced an argument for each of 
these points, a formal definition of moral shame is advanced. 
Chapter 4 reviews past and present theories of moral development and 
moral education programs. The purpose of this review is twofold. The review 
attempts, first, to determine if these theories and programs are cognizant of 
shame’s beneficial qualities and, second, to ascertain whether the insights 
gained from the analysis of moral shame suggests revisions that will 
strengthen existing public school moral education theories and programs. 
The theories and programs reviewed are an early American 
indoctrinative model, three theories of the leading cognitive-developmentalists 
Jean Piaget, Sidney Simon, and Lawrence Kohlberg, a contemporary 
character education program, and an Aristotelian theory of moral 
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development. Edch section concludes with how shame is accommodated 
within each theory or program. 
A synopsis of this review is as follows. The early indoctrinative model 
has much to recommend it, but it is faulted for being inflexible to personal 
circumstance and unnecessarily restricted to the operative social customs. 
Such confinement can relegate moral shame to violations of social customs 
exclusively. 
Both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories of moral development could have 
been improved by a greater emphasis on the emotional aspect of the human 
condition. Piaget’s theories of moral development and shame are faulted for an 
unpersuasive reliance on “realism”. It is argued Kohlberg’s stage theory is 
defective by virtue of a “pre-moral” conventionalism that infects all stages up 
until the fifth level. Through Stage 4, with its emphasis on appearances and 
abiding by social conventions, Kohlberg’s theory is insensitive to moral shame. 
Simon’s Value Clarification Theory is discredited for many reasons. 
Among these are its permissive requirements for a “value”, its ethical 
relativism, its emasculation of teacher authority by prescribing 
nonjudgmental adult intervention, and a theoretical incoherence. Moral shame 
has no discernible role in such a relativistic value program. 
The modern character education theory is defended as preferable to all 
the previous theories and programs reviewed but it is faulted for its near total 
neglect of some of the self-regarding emotions, most notably, moral shame. 
Chapter 4 concludes with an explication of a moral development theory 
which is Aristotelian in nature. This theory proposes moral development 
occurs in three developmental stages. In the first stage children learn the 
basic moral facts. Dogmatic instruction is appropriate with this age group. 
Shame occurs in instances of clear violations of central moral norms. In the 
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second stage, children begin to develop habits of good conduct. In doing so, good 
conduct becomes second nature. As conduct becomes habitual, those rules 
. and principles that have been dogmatically instilled can now be examined in 
greater detail. Moral complexities can be studied and multiple perspectives 
can be debated. Shame now pains an agent internally because children at this 
stage begin to see how their behavior contributes to the development of a 
settled disposition. In the third stage of moral development an agent works 
out for herself how the virtues are appropriately exemplified given her 
particular circumstance. Her reason coincides with her desire and moral 
conduct appears to her as pleasurable. Virtue is seen as intrinsically 
desirable. Shame is the pain of disgrace for falling short of what virtue 
requires and of failing to approximate her “better self”. A conditionally good 
status is attributed to moral shame by virtue of its power to reorient an agent 
to more desirable alternatives. The reaction to moral failures at the three 
developmental stages serves as an answer to Research Question #2. 
Chapter 5, through interviews and surveys, reports on data that are 
collected regarding the participant’s views on several different issues that 
relate to shame, character development, and the public school experience. 
These are: the family, children’s view of the importance and purpose of 
education, the state of current student behavior, perceptions on children’s level 
of respect for authority figures, how children respond to legal and moral 
wrongdoing, and what motivates good and bad behavior. Lastly, surveys on 
how children emotionally respond to school detentions and their level of respect 
for a variety of professions were conducted. 
Regarding the family the majority of people interviewed believed there to 
be too many families with poor parental modeling, after school jobs negatively 
impacting on education, and an alarming increase in the number of parents 
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offering excuses for their child’s misbehavior in school. The most distressing 
observation of the participants was an increase in adults attempting to deflect 
attention away from their child taking responsibility for his or her behavior. 
Interviewing adults about their impression of how children regard an 
education, many participants noted an indifference in many children. This 
impression is supported by a trend of more and more students who are not 
doing homework, are satisfied with barely passing grades, and are disrespectful 
toward educators. Out of frustration, some teachers have stopped giving 
homework assignments, have abdicated their disciplinary authority,and do not 
oppose an emphasis on job readiness skills. For example, one veteran teacher 
remarked that his high school today more closely resembles a vocational 
school than a institution dedicated to a child’s intellectual, aesthetic, and moral 
development. 
When the interview shifted to how adults perceive current student 
behavior, common observations were that many students lack basic manners, 
show no deference to adults, and many students are openly hostile to people in 
authority. For the first time the theme of student’s apparent moral 
unreflectiveness surfaced. 
The respect for professions survey had surprising results. Students 
were asked to rank fifteen professions according to the level of respect that 
they had for these occupations. From the results five professions that can be 
construed as authority figures (Mother, Teacher, Priest, Police Officer, Judge) 
were extracted and ranked. Across grades from second to twelfth these 
professions scored generally high. This suggests that school children have high 
recognition respect for positions of authority. Appraisal respect for particular 
individuals within these professions may not score as well, which may, in part, 
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explain the disparity between why adults believe children’s level of respect for 
authority to be low and the alarming juvenile criminal rates. 
Moral unreflectiveness reappeared when the researcher questioned the 
participants about their views of how children respond to ethical and legal 
wrongdoing. Many children are thought to be unrepentant for wrongdoing, 
unintimidated by school punishments and legal ramifications, and are 
skeptical that the justice system is capable of exacting just punishments in 
the majority of cases. Reforms to improve the reliability of the justice system 
to exact just punishment may dissuade some, but it was also noted by the 
participants and the researcher that a fear of punishment is not the proper 
motivation to act virtuously. 
Even the motivation to do good so as to avoid ostracism from society 
seems to have lost much of its force in contemporary society. Many 
participants appear to believe a large percentage of children have never 
connected to an adult social group. A young man will not, then, fear ostracism 
from that to which he is not attracted or to which he has never connected. 
Many of these participants further believe that a community’s ability to 
restrain undesirable behavior has become negligible. 
The detention survey also had surprising results. From kindergarten to 
the sixth grade there is a constant and alarming drop in student’s beliefs that 
detentions are an effective means to control and shape behavior. While 94% of 
kindergartners believed detentions to be effective, only 21% continued to 
believe so by sixth grade. Many other variables contribute to how one 
behaves, but the detention survey seems significant since this is one of the few 
remaining ways a school can exert influence on student behavior. 
The study concludes with several recommendations for curriculum 
reform which serves as an answer to Research Question #3. Among the 
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recommendations suggested are the institution of a Word of the Month 
program. In the early elementary grades this program serves to introduce 
children to basic moral principles. In the later grades it provides an excellent 
forum to discuss the exemplification of the virtues and the particular personal 
circumstances and moral conflicts that makes ethical matters so perplexing. 
This program is recommended also for the opportunity it allows for parents, 
teachers, and students to work in concert to establish a positive learning 
community. 
Other advantages to the Word of the Month program are that it can 
help reestablish adult authority. Principles outlined in the program should 
extend to all facets of school life. Children who violate the values or virtues 
covered in the program can be confronted. But teachers need training in how 
best to handle reactions of shame and shamelessness. Current teacher and 
counselor certification programs presently offer no instruction in this area. 
This suggests a final recommendation that university teacher and 
counselor certification programs add required course work in both the study of 
the emotions and in how to address student’s reactions to their behavior. A 
student who expresses shame for her bad conduct has made a positive step 
toward reform. Here the opportunity presents itself for a teacher to 
acknowledge the transgression, offer a better alternative, and to commend the 
student for taking responsibility for her actions as well as for displaying the 
proper emotional reaction. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
Important issues illuminated by this study include the perception of 
many participants that a disturbingly large percentage of school children 
appear to be morally unreflective, that they do not exhibit shame for 
transgressions, that they are disrespectful of authority, and that they do not 
hold either education or the law in high regard. 
Most the participants in this study are from New England and are of 
similar economic standing. All the school children interviewed and surveyed 
are from one school district. The current study could be improved with a wider 
sample of people of different races, socio-economic standings, geographical 
areas, and educational institutions. It is possible that the explanation for 
shamelessness could be quite different among the advantaged and the 
disadvantaged. For instance, this study did not conduct research among 
populations who - because of their immense good fortune - may consider 
themselves above the law, nor does it examine the views of those who - 
because of their profound misfortune - may feel marginalized or hopeless. 
Feelings of shame might operate quite differently in these two extreme 
circumstances. Future studies could augment the ideas presented here by 
conducting this more diversified research. 
A key element in the moral development of children requires a 
partnership between parents and the school personnel. The current study 
would have benefited by a larger sample of parents. Many of the teachers who 
were surveyed are parents, but they spoke primarily as educators. The 
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perspective of moral education in the schools from the parents viewpoint 
would be valuable data for future studies. 
One recommendation for curriculum reform is at the university level. It 
is suggested that teachers and counselors need instruction to properly 
confront instances of shame and shamelessness. One way this study can be 
instructive is in teaching educators what these emotions are, but more 
research needs to be done in the exact nature of the necessary reform of 
university certification programs and in the implementation of the new 
required course work. 
It is a valuable learning opportunity to engage the child who feels 
ashamed. As with the study of moral shame, too often this condition for 
learning has been neglected. 
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APPENDIX A 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT FORM 
Dissertation Title: An Analysis of Moral Shamp 
Consent for Voluntary Participation 
I volunteer to participate in this study and understand that: 
1. I will be interviewed by Jay J. Conway, a doctoral candidate at the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, using an open-ended questioning 
interview format. 
2. The questions I will respond to will address my views on the significance 
of self-regarding emotions. I understand that the interview will have a 
particular emphasis on moral shame. 
3. The interview will be tape recorded to facilitate analysis of the data. 
4. My name will not be used nor will I be identified by name in any way or 
at any time. I understand that I will be identified by a pseudonym and my 
actual profession (e.g. priest, rabbi, social worker, high school teacher, 
etc.). No geographical designation or place of employment will be used. 
5. I may withdraw from part or all of this study at any time. 
6. I have the right to review material prior to the final oral examination or 
other publication as well as the right to request a copy of the taped 
interview and a copy of the transcript in order to review the accuracy of 
the transcription. 
7. I understand that all children must review this consent form with their 
legal guardian and that the guardian’s signature is required to participate in 
this study. 
8. I understand that the information from this interview will be included in 
Jay J. Conway’s doctoral dissertation and may also be included in 
manuscripts submitted to professional journals for publication. 
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9. I am free to participate or to not participate without prejudice. 
10. Because of the small number of participants, approximately forty 
people, I understand there is some risk that I may be identified as a 
participant in this study. 
Participant’s signature 
Guardian’s signature 
Researcher’s signature 
Date 
Date 
Date 
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APPENDIX B 
GENERAL INTERVIEW GUIDE 
1. Briefly outline the work that you do. 
a. How long have you been doing this work? 
b. What attracted you to this profession? 
c. What is the age of the children that you serve? 
2. During your professional career, what changes have occurred with or in: 
a. families 
b. peer influences 
c. the media and media influences 
d. the level of stressors on children 
e. children’s view of authority figures 
f. children’s view of education 
g. children’s behavior 
3. How do you think the children of today view legal and ethical 
transgressions? 
4. What do you believe is a stronger motivational force for children: external 
restraints (e.g., the fear of punishment, fear of social disgrace or ostracism 
from the community) or internal restraints (e.g. personal morality)? 
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APPENDIX C 
DETENTION SURVEY FORM 
Detentions 
Please take a moment to answer these questions thoughtfully and 
honestly. Thank you. 
1. What do you think is the purpose of a detention? Or, What do schools hope 
to accomplish by giving someone a detention? 
2. Do you think detentions are effective (do you think they “work”)? 
Yes_ No_ 
Please explain. 
3. How would you feel if you got a detention? (Or how have you felt when 
you got one?) 
Teacher and Grade 
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APPENDIX D 
SURVEY INSTRUCTION FORM 
FOR HIGH SCHOOL PARTICIPANTS 
SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS 
* Do NOT place your name anywhere on the survey form. 
* In the survey, you are being asked to indicate your level of respect toward 
several professional fields. As you consider your thoughts, it is important that 
you focus your thinking on the profession itself and NOT on a specific 
individual or individuals in that profession. 
For example, in the first category, which is MA Professional Athlete”, you may 
think highly or lowly of Michael Jordan or Rebecca Lobo, but it doesn’t matter 
for this survey. The concern here is with the profession itself and NOT with 
particular members of it. 
* For each category, place a circle around line 1, or line 2, or fine 3, or line 4, or 
line 5 - whichever number BEST represents your feelings of respect toward 
that profession. 
So, 
A Full-time Mother I © 
means that you have a high level of respect for full-time mothers, but not the 
highest level. 
And if you were to enter, 
A Full-time Mother © 
you would be saying that the profession of full-time mothering gets less than 
average respect from you. Thank you for your cooperation. 
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LEVEL OF RESPECT 
1 
Professional Athlete I_ 
Movie Actor/Actress I_ 
Politician I_ 
Veterinarian I_ 
Rock Musician I_ 
Priest I_ 
t 
Television Actor/Actress I_ 
School Teacher I_ 
Doctor I_ 
Judge I_ 
Stock Broker I_ 
Police Officer I_ 
Car Salesman I_ 
Lawyer I_ 
Full-Time Mother I_ 
APPENDIX E 
FOR PROFESSIONS SURVEY FORM 
2 3 4 5 
1 = little or no respect 5 = respect very highly 
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APPENDIX F 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTION 
Interviewer. To begin, would you tell me how long you have been a teacher and 
what grades you teach? 
HSET: For about 33 years this is my first job and it will be my last job. I 
teach English. In 1980,1 started my position as chairman of the department. 
I have been around 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th graders. I do not confine myself 
to one grade nor do I confine myself to a level ability of learning, that is, I don’t 
just teach honor students, I teach all students and have taught all students 
through my 33 years. 
4 
Interviewer: During these 33 years, what changes have you seen occur within 
the family? 
HSET: Clearly that’s the one on the top of everybody’s fist - the breakdown of 
the family. That families are generally speaking, at my level at least and 
probably even at earlier levels, as I am hearing, turning their kids over to the 
kind of culture I believe which finds its basis in sort of establishing its own 
authority, or finds its basis in absence of authority. My own sense is that the 
absence of authority for many children today - probably more than what we 
would like to know about - it really begins at birth. That could be probably be 
verified through some research. This kind of culture also strikes me of not only 
one which defines its own authority, but also one which is premised upon this 
kind of cool indifference. Cool in the sense of a jazzy term. The more 
indifferent one is - maybe with a little tinge of anger in it - that’s my sense 
anyway. 
Anger seems to be a little bit of maybe a big part of it for all I know of 
that kind of culture. I mean if you just take a look at some of the personnel 
that make up the kind of culture on the popular level, the people who you 
would point to and say he/she is a member of this kind of culture. You almost 
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never see a smile from these people, they seem to be so unhappy. You look on 
a record album, or whatever it might be, and there is this frown that seems to 
characterize a little bit of that. It is very difficult. I think it is an arrogance, 
and I am not sure what adjective I ought to precede with arrogance, but there 
seems to be an arrogance that has made up this kind of culture. And I think 
this kind of culture is not something that was invited. I think it evolved over 
many many decades and I certainly think all teenagers have been part of this 
kind of culture since the beginning of time. This particular kind of culture 
seems to have more force I think than the ones I’ve known or participated in. 
Interviewer: Do you think that the children are emulating this anger that they 
see in the leaders or do you think that they have anger themselves? 
HSET: I think that it is really a combination of both. I think for the kids who 
would be a part of this kind of culture is just because they want to belong. I 
think that it is adopted. I think for some kids who need this kind of culture, and 
who need it in a pretty serious way, I think a lot of anger has built up, genuine 
anger that has built up in them. And it just finds its place in this kind of 
culture itself. I bet we have something there with that anger - an arrogance. 
But this kind of culture, my sense again, seems to put a certain amount of 
weight on the adult world for this unhappiness that there is in the world, if not 
in our own personal lives. Relatively speaking that is to let’s say pre 40’s and 
speaking probably specifically the sexual revolution that took place between 
the 50’s and 60’s and thereafter. I think that the thing that annoys me the 
most about this though, is that this kind of culture is like an 
“I -1” thing as opposed to an “I - thou”. I mean that in the sense that Martin 
Buber spoke of the aI - thou” , I don’t think they seem to understand an 
“I - thou” kind of relationship that is at the center of all existence. I think you 
know. It’s like “I -1”. And it’s not as if it is intentional, but it’s like they don’t 
know anything. They don’t understand that there is a world beyond their own. 
Interviewer: How’s that? 
i 
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HSET: I don’t know if I got that right, but I thought about that. I have to say 
this, Jay, that the sexual revolution is a very very big part of your inquiry here 
into the question of shame. The ultimate form of shame had at one time to do 
with sexuality, as you well know. It started way back in prehistoric times. 
You know with issues dealing with incest for example, which was the ultimate 
taboo. But I remember in the 50’s when I grew up, there was still something 
to virginity that still a sense of the value of virginity for example. Today as 
everybody in the world can tell you, anybody who knows some of this stuff, it 
seems to be reversed. What I am finding in the kids today is that there is 
general willingness to, it isn’t even a sacrifice, they don’t see it as a sacrifice - 
their virginity, they just see it as you know the natural course of events. I 
don’t even think they ask a lot of intellectual questions, like why shouldn't I 
give up my virginity or whatever. 
Interviewer: No? 
HSET: No. I just think it is part of the flow the way the world is today. Fll 
give you an example in my own life. I brought up, well, I have three girls, but 
the two girls that are out of the house now we brought up as Catholics. They 
would go to communion every Sunday, they went through all the various 
whatever, the lessons and sacraments and all that other stuff that goes on in 
the church. They were a big part of that world and as soon as they graduated 
from high school, they both left the church, they cohabitated, and so on and so 
forth. I didn’t really understand it. Cohabitation to me was just the wrong 
thing to do until I realized that “No”, the culture has moved it into an 
acceptable thing to do now. It seems to be acceptable. I know this is true of 
some very dear friends of mine whose names I can’t mention, but who brought 
their children up Catholic and were astounded when their children left high 
school and started cohabitating with their mates, or whatever, their partners. 
So I think when we talk about shame I don’t know where the beginning or the 
end of this whole thing is, but I think that the sexual revolution had a whole lot 
to do with that motion of what’s there to feel bad about. You know if I can 
more or less deal with the shame that comes from the sexual mores, or the 
absence of shame really, then nothing else seems to come up and measure up 
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to that. So therefore, everything else underneath the sexual revolution is 
acceptable. It almost seems, see if you agree with this, it almost seems as if 
we adhere to the old standards of like waiting until marriage, we have 
something to be ashamed of. 
I can see that in my 17 year old daughter right now. I was telling my 
wife just last night that some place along the way, you know, in her life, just 
like the fact that she has some very pure and very pristine values right now. 
They are almost archaic, in some ways by today’s standards. They are just 
beautiful. They are so healthy. They are so positive and so respectful of her 
own humanity and in humanity in general. I told my wife that I just have this 
awful sense that once she leaves high school and gets out there in that world 
that the forces out there are so powerful that even the very best kids in the 
world in my estimation are almost compelled (to conform to the popular 
culture). It’s a scary thought. Especially when it is your own child. 
< 
Interviewer: Do you see any other forces affecting children and families that 
seem different today? 
HSET: I think another thing is the whole philosophical dilemma we are in 
today, which is, you know, is at a very high level, but I think it does filter into 
their (the students) minds (is) the question of “What’s the purpose? What’s 
the meaning?, Why am I doing what I am doing?” I mean if the answer is only 
to get ahead - to be successful with money and so on. They don’t see any other 
kinds of purposes, any higher purpose, and we as a society haven’t given them 
much to search for either. 
We have such very bad models out there, as you well know, in the world. 
Some of the people that are supposed to be adults are behaving like infants, in 
terms of their creed, in terms of the kind of standard setting. I don’t want to 
sound like Bob Dole here or like the conservative party, which I don’t identify 
with in the slightest, but there are adults who are putting out films and other 
types of entertainment. There are adults who are compromising the truth for 
their own good, intelligent beings who are compromising the truth, and various 
truths, for their own welfare. And I think the kids sense that. I think that 
right now in America we are a little bit weird. We are little bit out of it - very 
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confused about what it is we want as a nation, as a country. And I think that 
the adults are responsible. You see this is the thing. We talk about kids here 
and I think the biggest issue is adults. Where are they? Because if they are 
the leaders, these kids have really lost their leaders in many ways and Fm not 
sure that we are getting the leadership that we need from the adult world - on a 
family level, on a political level, on an intellectual level. I mean all these 
various things I think are somehow they get into the minds of these kids. Kids 
know. 
They can sense if they want to get into college they can just because 
they have enough money to get into college and that it doesn’t take any degree 
of academic excellence. And indeed, academic excellence in public schools -1 
can speak for but not in private - that academic excellence is so relative now. 
You know we have taken away the absolute standards of excellence and we 
have just basically scaled everything we do here in terms of, you know, taking 
the so-called raw scores and turning them into passing grades. Honor societies 
aren’t even honor societies any more if you check into them very carefully. 
They are just not societies with standards. Kids know that they can get so 
many A’s, so many B’s, so many C’s, have a good leadership record and so on, 
and take average to low-below average courses, and get A’s and B’s in those 
and still be on the honor society. 
I think kids are sensing that the world in general has these kinds of 
oscillating, or else non-existent standards. And I think that they sense that. I 
think that what I am trying to describe here is a kind of, you know, instead of 
saying that it is just you are dealing with just a question of shame - I think we 
are talking about all these contributing forces that really somehow (get) beat 
into them. That’s why I say this is a huge problem. 
Interviewer: Could you explain what scaling is? 
HSET: Scaling would be like if a kid got a 54 on a test in a class of 20 students 
and the highest grade on that test was a 74, then the 74 becomes an A and 
the 54 becomes a “C”. 
Interviewer: Oh, I see. Where the 74 should have been a C . 
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HSET. Yeah. So we are sort of feeding the curve here. You know you have to 
have so many A’s, B’s and C’s and all that sort of stuff. But even then, it is a 
different kind of thing. It s not only that we are feeding the curve but it’s like 
we are almost devising a curve of our own here and again, it is lowering the 
standards. 
Interviewer: Could you tell me more about your comment about a lack of 
purpose in kids today? 
HSET: I think it’s also in society today. There is a sense, in terms of purpose, 
I think the kids that I teach anyway, they sense that in order to really get 
along and be happy in today’s world, that they would have to reach heights 
that are impossible for them to attain. I mean, you know, it’s the lottery 
mentality you know. Either you’ve got a lot of money or you don’t have 
enough and I think that some of these kids are sensing that they can’t get a lot 
of money, so there’s a certain kind of resignation that they operate under. Like 
okay, I’ll work for what I can get but I know I can’t get everything I want. 
There’s nothing there for them. What I am suggesting is that for many kids 
they don’t see striving towards something and for something as a real thing 
today because they know that, or they sense that at least, that in order for 
them to get all of what they want out of life they would have to be like 
(Michael) Jordan, making millions like some of these actors and musicians 
, with tons of bucks. 
I Interviewer: Do you perceive it like a combination of skepticism and 
defeatism? 
.. 
HSET: I think so. They are skeptical about the standards. Yes, I think they 
are skeptical. 
Interviewer: And the models? 
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HSET. And the defeatism in relation, yeah, I absolutely agree with that. And 
I also think that the institutions of education themselves are not sure of what 
they want from kids any more. I think that all our standards in education, I 
think there are people who are debating it out there. There are so many damn 
debates on what education is and what do we want our kids to get from it, and 
what do we want them leaning toward. I think generally speaking that the 
institution of education right now are simply unclear about what our mission is 
- if indeed we have a mission. And I think that there is again, there is that 
relativism that has crept in, you know, and I think that a certain amount of 
relativism is important but I think that there have to be stopping points. 
There have to be points where you say “yeah, that’s acceptable”, but as far as 
this, as opposed to this kind of thing that keeps rotating and rotating, there is 
no getting off point. Do you know what I mean? 
Interviewer: I think so, yeah. 
HSET: So, what I am sensing here, like at (XXX) High School, we are just 
going along blindly what we do. We don’t have any leadership basically. This is 
where I want to be careful, but I think school committees in general over the 
years I have taught, these are not educators, they are not people who are in 
touch with education. These are people who have been educated through 
public schools, alot of them, whose kids are in school, but they don’t know very 
much about education in the conceptual sense of education. They haven’t 
been around education. They haven’t studied. They don’t know what the 
research is. These people are not paid or paid pennies and they are there. 
Some of them are there because they are really conscientious members of the 
community and some of them are there for the prestige that it brings them, 
but they are not really there as knowledgeable people in the field of education. 
Therefore, they are not leading us. 
I don’t have to talk about the Federal government. Are we going to have 
a Department of Education or are we not going to have a Department of 
Education? What does it stand for? You bring in a conservative 
administration, they’ll end up abolishing education - that is the Department of 
Education. Then you bring in other groups and they want to take something 
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which, has had a long history or whatever they want to dispense with it and 
start something else. We have got more debate going on in the field of 
education, yet we haven t asked the question: “What do we want our kids to get 
out of education?” and “Why do we want them to get it?”. And I think kids 
sense that kind of equivocation. 
Interviewer: Uh huh. What kinds of changes have occurred in approaches to 
discipline here at the school? 
HSET: Well, I would have to say that over the years that I have been here, 
there have been gray areas, grayer areas of approaches to discipline. We still 
use the old detention system and its, I mean, you can’t say it works. You can 
say it serves as a kind of a threat, like who does it threaten? Well it doesn’t 
threaten the chronically undisciplined kids, if I can use that term. Those kids 
don’t care how many detentions they accumulate. In the 33 years that I have 
been here, that has never changed. You still get your steady list of kids. They 
will be in there 3-5 times a week or maybe twice a week. The kids that really 
benefit from the detention program are the ones that are never there because 
they always feel like there is where I think shame is still alive. Level I kids still 
feel, generally speaking, in our school, Level I students, the honor students, feel 
a sense of public shame. It’s almost as if they are on display if they were to 
appear in detention. I tell you it will drive some kids to tears and they do 
everything they can to avoid it and sometimes they fall into it, but it is rare, 
they fall into it unwillingly. And when they do, it is like the ultimate 
humiliation. There is that sense there, but I do have to say that has always 
been the case. Level I kids, honor kids in the schools, probably nationwide, just 
don’t want to be identified as detention type of people. 
We have got internal suspension and external suspension. Expulsion is 
almost illegal. I mean we almost can never use it, it is rare. Basically that’s 
where we pull back I think. When we use to suspend kids, externally, it was for 
longer periods and then there would be more expulsions, but I think we have 
pulled back. A lot of that has to do with litigation. You know, the legal 
profession has gotten into this thing and I think that, you know Boards of 
Education at the state level have sent dictums to the areas advising them 
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that if a kid is blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, he/she still has to be educated and so 
on. I mean the State Department has muddied up the waters in a lot of things 
in education and I think discipline is one of them. 
Interviewer: How important is it if the kids know that being expelled is 
virtually impossible? 
HSET: You have to understand that for some kids that school is a social world 
for them. This is where they come to be with other children. It is a primal 
instinct to want to be with the herd and when kids are going to be suspended 
for two days, and that’s the ruling of this place generally, most kids are 
suspended for two days because it has to be terrible for them to be suspended 
for more than two days. Two days is okay with them. That’s almost a little 
status thing you know. Fm out for two days, I don’t have to go to school for 
two days and all that. It strikes me that they would be terribly uncomfortable 
if it was for like 5 days or 10 days they were suspended. My sense is that it 
would probably be more of a deterrent if it were that long because these kids 
know what to do with themselves for two days, but for 5-10 days they would 
have a lot of trouble. So, I think that it would definitely have some affect. I 
can’t be sure, but that would be my sense anyway. 
Interviewer: What’s the view of the faculty toward detentions? 
HSET: We have a faculty now as opposed to many years ago that’s pretty 
relative. I mean many years ago, the faculty found detentions to be generally 
an acceptable part of what school is about. Now we have many faculty 
members who agree with detention and (those) who disagree with detention. 
Who agree with suspension and who disagree with suspension. I mean that 
you are finding amongst your faculty, you know, this kind of diversity of 
opinion. I think that that is okay but diversity of opinion generates into the 
community itself, in the school community itself, and I think that people get a 
sense here that discipline is on unsteady ground. That we are not actually 
sure what to do with it. 
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Teachers do get up in arms when the administration tends to side with 
the students in various ways. Whether there is a verbal or physical 
confrontation with a student and a teacher, the administration, in the opinion 
of many teachers, goes too far out of its way to satisfy the students in that 
kind of situation. Feeling it would be safer for them to satisfy the students 
instead of to satisfy the teachers. So, I am afraid to say that that puts out a 
pretty awful message to kids which is basically means we can run this 
institution ultimately. Right? So I see that as another problem. 
Interviewer: When you say there is a relativism among the faculty on 
detentions, do the students get the idea that in your class for a certain act 
they might get a detention, where in Mrs. Brown’s class they wouldn’t? 
HSET: You got it. Teachers know that in some cases, I include myself in this, 
I am not of the same mind of other teachers in this school regarding the same 
issues. If I see two people in the hall making out, you know, kissing or petting, 
I mean I feel embarrassed to go up there and say cut it out. And I am not only 
feeling embarrassed, but I feel threatened because with kids today and you 
interfere in that kind of intimacy that goes on, even though they are doing it in 
the wrong place and at the wrong time, they will snap at you. There are very 
angry. They will humiliate you if they can. They will do whatever they can to 
strike back. It isn’t like it use to be many years ago when you could say 
something to a student and somehow he would feel a certain amount of, you 
know, presence there on (a teacher’s) part. Today, students do not find it an 
issue to curse teachers. I will give you one case in point. One of our new 
teachers who came to our school, this was this year, caught a student 
cheating and she had all the goods on him, it was just so blatant, it was just so 
visible, and of course a lot of denial set in on the part of the kid, so the teacher 
called the Vice Principal and said we are coming down there because I need 
some action on this and I can’t get this kid to either admit or comply in some 
way and I am even trying to offer him ways to deal with this thing and he just 
won’t do anything with it. The Vice Principal said come on down and as the 
new teacher was taking this boy down to the V.P.’s office, the boy was walking 
either in front of her or behind her, (he) said to other students who would be 
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standing in the hall at the time, “If you see this bitch on Main Street, shoot 
her, shoot the fucker.” And, he said that a couple of times as he was walking 
down the halls. You could talk to her if you need further information, or I could 
get it for you. 
Interviewer: On the way to the office? 
HSET: Yes, this was on the way to the Vice Principal’s office that this 
happened. Now, admittedly this may sound like an outstanding, remarkable 
case, and I would say that I’ve never heard of that before, but it was verified. 
It did happen. The heavy “P and that kind of an abandon, that kind of threat 
to the teacher, is not unusual these days. Therefore, teachers tend to back off. 
Interviewer: And you? 
HSET: I’d back off to some degree. Partly because I feel, Pm not going to be 
dishonest here, that I feel a threat of these kids. Fm not afraid of them, it’s 
just that I have reached the point in my career where I am not sure of whether 
I want to sacrifice my own safety sometimes just because I catch a kid 
smoking in the bathroom. And I get this awful sense that if I catch a kid 
smoking in the bathroom, I know this is sounding really contradictory and it 
probably is, but if I catch a kid smoking in the bathroom and I go through all 
the hassle that encompasses and leads to places that I don’t even want to go 
to either, and then I find that, and I have found it with my colleagues over the 
years, Fm better off to find ways to get out of it and avoid it. You know, I take 
some of the punishment here. I mean my (past) efforts feel so feeble. You 
know when I am doing it against so many people. But, I am not trying to get 
myself out of this thing. I am as guilty as the next person when it comes to 
that kind of asserting myself in matters of discipline around the school. 
Interviewer: But as you commented to me earlier, it sounds as though if you 
were to assert yourself, many times you might not be backed up by the 
administration. I mean it sounds likes this child who was swearing at the 
teacher and cheating - what were the consequences? 
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HSET. I believe he got two days suspension. A lot of teachers were angry 
about that. I mean we thought he deserved a harsher punishment than that. 
We feel that this kind of language is freely used and not only in this school but I 
am sure in a lot of other schools. Although we remind kids, people like myself, 
kids use the words pissed-off5 on their papers and I will underscore it and say 
that this is inappropriate language. I hear kids conversing, let’s say during 
class, I tell them that is perfectly all right for them to talk but I don’t want to 
hear any type of that language in the classroom. But there is that - and I have 
had bad experiences with Vice Principals - where I have gone the extra mile 
and come out on the wrong end of the deal. And when you get burned enough 
times on something like that, and after a while you just say no. 
I think that alot of us when it comes to discipline in the school, I think 
we are all feeling a sense of futility but I do have to say I think that futility we 
are sensing in the schools is the same type of futility we are sensing out of the 
schools - in society in general. This lack of control that the adult population 
has on the younger population. I mean once again it comes down to the old 
concept of whether the schools can do the job that the society really needs to 
do on its own. The schools are supposed to be institutions for fundamental 
learning but we have had to take on so many jobs, replacing the parent, you 
know, in so many ways, that I am sensing that the administration keeps sort 
of hoisting on us this psychological, sociological kind of approach to teaching 
and you have to consider the whole kid and they give us all this kind of stuff to 
think about. We have got 22 kids and sometimes they would have us teach all 
22 kids individually so we would have to go in there with 22 individual lesson 
plans - totally oblivious to what it means to prepare for a class. It is difficult 
to prepare for one class let alone 22 individuals in that class. The 
administration has bought that I think, but the teachers have not bought it. 
The teachers want to go straight ahead and they want to teach and they want 
to meet problems as they confront them, but we don’t want to deal with kids 
as if we knew what was going on in their lives every single minute of every 
single day of their life here at the school. We just can’t. It’s crazy, you would 
get anything done. 
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Interviewer: Yeah. Do you have to second guess what impact criticism would 
have on their self-esteem too? 
HSET: Yeah, it’s always going on. Self-esteem is bug-a-boo at high school 
level, I mean it is very difficult. Life is unfair. You know the things we learn we 
learn too late, number one, and most of the things we learn, what I mean by 
too late is that I am suggesting is that it is almost impossible to change 
ourselves but we can modify how we can do things. But at this level here, we 
can t really do a hell of a lot for self-esteem. It has already been so ingrained in 
them. You know the self-esteem buzz word around here strikes me as kind of 
hollow. 
Interviewer: Do you hear it alot? 
HSET: Not a lot any more. 
Interviewer: No? 
HSET: Which is good. Teachers have stopped using it because we just don’t 
take that stuff seriously any more. We believe that we need to dignify kids but 
we don’t think that we need to try to improve their self-esteem as if it were 
something, as if it was something measurable in that we could move it from 
this level up to that level. 
Interviewer: What changes have you seen in educational approaches? 
HSET: Well, it has changed. It’s trying to change. I mean that when I first 
came into teaching I think the general mission was to make children literate, 
make children moral, make them aesthetically conscious, make them love 
learning for the sake of learning, learn for the sake of learning. I think that all 
those things were going on. I think our mission statement now excludes some 
of that stuff but I think other forces in this country of ours are trying to move 
it in the direction of pragmatism. I think the mission now seems to be career 
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pathways and the school to work. What I think they are asking high schools 
to do is the impossible, (to be) comprehensive high schools. They are asking us 
to operate almost as these kinds of vocational schools or something you know. 
We are not here to prepare kids for vocations, we are here to prepare 
them for life. Life is more than vocations. I think that alot of us will agree 
with that. So, I think that we are band wagoning them, not surprisingly, but I 
am not sure about all that. Fm just speculating. 
Incidentally that whole mission statement thing is very interesting 
because that is a term adopted once again from the business community. 
Boy, that tells you something! Business puts out mission statements you 
know. If I can just be liberal here with language a little bit, but I think that it 
is so much bullshit you know to take that thing called a mission statement and 
apply it to you know this world of human beings with so many factors to be 
concerned with . You know its an encroachment, is what it is. The business 
community has been doing its level best in this state especially, and maybe in 
other states too, but this state especially it is done. Infringing upon the very 
sacred world of education. 
They want us to operate, if they could, if we could, like a business. They 
want us to basically prepare students for the working world. They are vague 
as to what the working world is you know? We don’t work with factories any 
more. How do you want us to prepare them? If you want us to prepare them 
for the working world, then you better change what we have got here in terms 
of the architecture, changing the curriculum, changing a lot of ways. You can’t 
do it with what we’ve got now. We don’t even want to do it. We still see the 
system as the best system of all to prepare the kids in a lot of different ways. 
So, the mission statements generally, and there has been one major 
shift and the on major shift that I have detected is the move from the 
development of the whole person to the development of just part of that person 
that is going into the job market. They want high schools to do that now. 
Before they were asking colleges to do that. It seems to me that there 
has been a great emphasis on math and science. I mean that’s the kind of 
indication. Remember when Ronald Reagan came out with the “Nation at 
Risk”? I don’t know if you remember that. He issued a report “The Nation at 
Risk.” You should read it, you would be astounded. It was so politicized. 
383 
Basically he was saying, it wasn’t really that the nation that was at risk, but 
it was, it was a report about education. The reason why he entitled it “The 
Nation at Risk”, or they did, is because the thing we were risking was our 
national security. So what they envisioned, ultimately, if you read the 
document, is that education is here to serve national security in times of war. 
That we weren’t doing well with weapons and that we weren’t doing well with 
rockets and so on and so on. So there was this big move toward Math and 
Science as was there was in the days of Sputnik. You might remember in ‘57, 
that was kind of a renewal of the effort. 
Interviewer: Even Clinton is making noise about Math and Science as well. 
HSET: That’s right. 
Interviewer: And art was seen as kind of a fluff course and Music. 
HSET: That’s funny you should say that because maybe that really does in 
some ways - again - (function) as kind of these hidden messages these kids are 
picking up all over the place. We don’t value the arts. The arts are in 
shambles in public education. They are in shambles. Check our music 
program, check our art program for example in our school system alone. It is 
tokenism. Pure tokenism, if anything. So if you think about what the arts are, 
art is statements about humanity. Art ultimately tries to assert, even if it is 
in no uncertain terms, a certain morality, a certain basis for our being in 
eternity. I mean it if you want to put it that way. It entemalizes us in some 
way. It says that there is more to life. There are bigger things and bigger 
issues in life. And we have taken the one thing that I think a lot of kids could 
be drawn to in the world of art, in the world of music, and basically we have 
suppressed them. 
So fundamentally what we have done today, and maybe we have been 
doing this since ‘57, we have been shifting more toward the what I would call 
the amoral discipline of education - science and math. These things don’t deal 
with morals. That’s not their concern. I mean questions of ethics. 
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Oh, incidentally, the move toward business too. You can see a clear 
move in that direction. You look around the schools and you will see more 
computer rooms - IBM’s competing with Macintoshes and so on. You can see 
that the curriculum has broadened in the business areas. There’s Accounting 
I, II, and HI. I can remember when I first got here there wasn’t any 
accounting or maybe Accounting I. And (now) they have all these office 
courses. Don’t get me wrong, I have nothing against that, but what I am 
saying is that that seems to be the proclivity - the direction as opposed to the 
arts. 
Interviewer: You make a good point. When Accounting II and m came in did 
other art courses go out or has it always been just Art I? 
HSET: I am not saying that we should forsake one for the other, but what I 
am saying is that you know we need to have a broader curriculum in that way. 
We need to hire a couple of more personnel to help move that music and art 
curriculum in our particular school. And bring in other forms such as dance. 
Require the student body to take those courses, not just electives. You can do 
some checking on that yourself and you will see that it is not a question of we 
need more in business but we do need more in the arts, definitely. 
Whoever adopted, and I forgot who it was, if it was the guy from Brown 
University, the big educationalist down there, I can’t even think of his name 
right now. If he was the one who called Music and Art the frills, but he was 
right. Whoever said it, they used the word “frill”. They were exactly right. 
That is still what it is right now. Drama - we have been frying to get drama 
going in the school. There is no one who is going to get behind drama in this 
school. No one. I have been trying to get writing across the curriculum to be 
become a big part of this education unit. I can’t get an administrator who will 
support it. Just so that writing can become a creative thing - writing is being 
creative. 
Interviewer: Have the students attitudes and behavior seem to have changed 
over the course of your tenure here? 
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HSET: I would have to say that attitudes have changed. Generally there is 
more abandoned in their attitudes genuinely. I remember when I first came 
here you would never hear of a young woman using the heavy “T word, at least 
publicly, you just wouldn’t hear it. Now, it is so common. You would never 
hear anyone burping in the halls, or if you did it was some weirdo. Now, 
burping in the hall is pretty much an acceptable form of behavior. I’m not 
saying it goes on all the time, I’m just saying that they think that it is 
perfectly okay to do this and it’s not a big issue. Even girls burp and that’s 
okay. I know that it sounds pretty sexist, but there was once when there was 
a kind of genteelism here, you know, and maybe some people might frown on 
that. Fm not sure if there wasn’t some value in it. 
There is more gross indifference to the education process itself, too. 
There is more of an attitude from the students “Did I pass? did I get a D? I 
hear from a lot of kids today - did I get the D? The sense of academic 
achievement is not there. It is just not a big deal. They know they can get into 
the Community College and they know they can get into some other college 
and still be able to get some sort of a passing grade from me or some of the 
other teachers. Again, did I get a D because they didn’t want to get the F. Did 
I get the “D” as opposed to the “F”. They are alot more casual, I should say 
careless, not alot more, but they are careless, in the way they dress. Fm not 
saying that dress codes, ah, I am saying, I mean dressing up isn’t what it used 
to be. “Dressing up” just isn’t what it used to be. The only way they do is if 
they are forced to. 
There is more liberal attitude towards drugs and alcohol in this school. 
There is that simmering anger I was talking to you about before that is always 
there and you have to be very careful how you talk to kids these days - very 
careful. They are just ready to just pounce on you verbally and some of them 
physically. Although most kids are pretty careful about assaulting teachers. 
Most of the kids who maintain pretty good standards in this school are the 
upper level kids. I will tell you again, honor kids. That is very interesting and if 
you do a profile on some of these honor kids you will find out that their families 
are generally pretty stable. You probably know this as a counselor. The 
families have standards you know what I mean and they are moving the kids 
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in that direction. The mothers and fathers have kept together, they devoted 
their lives to their kids and it is paying off. 
There is less of an emphasis on doing homework. That’s another big 
change in attitude or aspiration of value. Homework just doesn’t seem to be 
what it used to be. More and more kids, even Level I kids are saying that 
weekends are my own and prior to that teachers were of the mind, several 
years ago, weekends were the time teachers gave the kids more homework. 
For kids, they would be able to do it and it was a time they could get caught up 
on the behind work. That seemed to be logical and it seemed to work. Now, we 
got them saying “We aren’t going to do the homework if it comes up on Friday 
night”. So what teachers have done, generally speaking, is to give weekend 
assignments and have them due on Tuesdays instead of on Monday. So that 
way it gives them the option to do it over the weekend, or if they want, they 
can do it on Monday when they are back to what they call school which to 
them is “Look, I work here five days a week, that’s my job, now it is over” 
And you know the other thing is that so many kids in our school have 
jobs now. They have jobs after school and, you know, some of these jobs start 
at 3:00 o’clock, which I think is a crying shame, and end at 9:00 o’clock at night 
- sometimes even 10:00 o’clock. 
I notice more and more kids are getting their own apartments - not a lot 
more. When I first came here, for a kid living in an apartment it was almost 
like someone getting a divorce in the 1920’s. Now it’s not uncommon living in 
an apartment for a kid on his own and holding a job to pay for the apartment. 
I wouldn’t say it’s the rule but more kids are there. 
Interviewer: Could you give me a rough percentage? 
HSET: I am going to say there are - I’ll just take my own percentage -1 am 
going to say between 5 and 10%, which I think is pretty high. 
Interviewer: That’s a lot of kids. 
HSET: Yeah, that’s a lot of kids, but you can check that with the office and 
get more valid information on that and I would if I was doing this report. 
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Interviewer: How has parenting changed over your thirty plus years? 
HSET: I mean I think that the modeling and the involvement is absent in 
general. I could tell you many instances. The other day the Vice Principal 
was called up to a classroom to smell one of the female students because the 
teacher detected the smell of marijuana and, indeed, the Vice Principal came 
up and she could smell the same thing. She brought the kid down and went 
through her inquiries. I guess the Vice Principal was well within her rights to 
do this. And then the next thing I knew, the mother was in the school, this was 
the next day when the mother was in the school because the daughter was 
really belligerent about this whole thing and the mother came into the school 
to try to, I think, prevent her daughter from getting suspended or whatever. 
The mother sat down and the mother looked as untamed as the daughter. She 
looked physically untamed - over made-up - trying to make herself look young 
and everything. At any rate, the Vice Principal spoke to her and she said this 
is what she did and this is what we found. The mother got belligerent and said: 
“Do you know what has been going on in our house lately?” What kind of an 
insane question is that. How the hell does she (the VP) know what has been 
going on in (their) house lately? “Do you know the stress she has been under?” 
I mean this is not leadership, this is not modeling, I don’t think. Right? 
The kid showed no respect for the mother. She walked out on the 
mother and the mother was saying “Come on!” and the girl just kept walking 
away from her mother. It wasn’t like the mother got any great respect from 
her either. You know, you must see these things yourself going on all the time. 
It’s just no big deal. 
Interviewer: That’s a good example though. 
HSET: Well, here is what I see is a primary source (of the problem) for most 
kids. Modeling is either non-existent or negative. We are talking two-thirds of 
the population in this school. I would say that modeling is non-existent or 
negative. Now you take two-thirds of those kids and take it down to about 30 
- 40 %, but I am very certain about the 30% figure, they just don’t have it. 
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Parents are either single and overwhelmed with their children or there is just 
too much work and responsibility for them to supervise their kids. They don’t 
know how to set standards. Jay, I have said this time and time again, parents 
today more than ever need to get, and I don’t know at what level of 
intervention this ought to set in, but they need to be educated. The parents 
need to be educated about what (they need to) know about today’s young 
people, what to know about the climate out there and how to deal with it. 
You wonder what kind of parents these kids are going to make. 
Interviewer: Well that’s the big worry. 
HSET: Some of these kids might do what I did which I considered I didn’t have 
a very good father or a model, and I decided you know that my life was not 
going to be like his, and I haven’t been like him. Very thankfully I haven’t been 
like him. Some kids just might go that route and say when I have kids I am 
going to do it right. But I think, by and large, that’s going to be the exception 
and not the rule. You know my sense, my sense is that a lot of these kids are 
going to go off and get married and repeat the cycle. It is just going to keep 
going. They are going to have kids and they are not going to be good parents 
for their own kids. 
I hope that I am totally wrong about that and I know this sounds like 
you know that I mean I feel like I am off base when I say things like that, but 
it is just a sense I get. 
Interviewer: Finally, let’s say it seems intuitively correct that a sense of 
shame would prohibit some of these certain behaviors from ever occurring. Do 
you think that this sensitivity is less of an internal issue for children today? 
HSET: Yeah, I do. I think that it is less of an issue today. But, it’s primarily 
because of the lack of training in that area (for) their parents. They just 
haven’t had the training and from the teachers of this school, and from adults 
in general. 
In short I think what we have done, as a society, and maybe this is a 
Western civilization feature, I don’t know, but I really do think that we have as 
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adults - we really deserted our kids. I think we have deserted our kids. And 
here we are, you know, trying to find ways to bring them around. That’s what 
your whole experiment or inquiry is all about. To find ways to bring them 
around, but we all know what we have to do. We all sense what we have to do 
as adults (is that) it has to be a concerted effort and (on) many fronts. I am 
not sure, Jay, Fm just not sure. The fact that people like you are looking into 
this thing I think is hopeful-a sign of hope. I really mean that. It certainly is 
worrisome. 
Interviewer: What’s happened to this higher purpose? I mean did that - do you 
think that alot of students of yours are evaluating their life, or will evaluate 
their life, in monetary terms as in physical acquisitions? 
HSET: I think. 
Interviewer: More so now than when you were teaching 10 years ago? 
HSET: Maybe not 10 years ago, but when I first started. I started at a pretty 
tough time. I started right at the beginning of the Vietnam War. We were just 
getting into the Vietnam War and the whole 60’s revolution was about to 
break wide open. Yeah, I just think it’s “Get what you can while you can”, and 
in the best way you can and in the quickest way you can. 
You know it is just like all the writers and artists have been trying to tell 
us, the 20th century writers have been trying to tell us. The spiritual world is 
really fading. It’s fading. And what you do, you know what it causes. Joseph 
Conrad, This Side of Darkness, answers a lot of those questions. With his 
famous hollow at the core. The search for power and the search for position, a 
lack of conviction, people who have conviction but do not act on those 
convictions, or people who are staying clear away from convictions because 
they know what a conviction could mean. It could mean commitment in some 
way for them - moral commitment, other kinds of commitments. And I really 
think that that has been just generating and generating and then we go 
through a couple of wars and I am sure from there you know a certain kind of 
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what I call a survival sort of mentality set in. 
Over this century - it has been a tough century. It has just been a very, 
very tough century. And, you and I are products of it. The psychological age 
has really come upon us now and it is very interesting the new spiritual gurus 
are the psychologists and psychiatrists. You know what I am saying - that 
they have become now the people that we look to, and, Jay, it is funny when 
you look into the lives of these people who are leading us in the psychiatric 
area, the psychological area. Many times their lives are in disarray too. They 
don’t practice what they preach either. They will tell you how to raise your 
children, but not in their house. It is unbelievable. God, it is like, What the 
hell? A marriage counselor who has been divorced twice. What the hell does 
that tell you? She has been there! Oh good. 
But do you see what we do? We have become such great manipulators 
today we can justify almost everything. We can take someone who is guilty 
and we can make that person innocent. We can take ourselves who are guilty 
and make ourselves innocent. There are so many vast definitions in language 
now in that respect. We sort of bought into that. Someone once said that the 
reason why language was “invented” so that we could protect the truth from 
getting out. 
Interviewer: That’s interesting because if you do see alot of excuses, and alot 
of skepticism, and not a commitment then there’s little or no room for shame. 
I mean shame in the sense having these aspirations and falling short and 
feeling responsible. 
HSET: Well, that’s the key, feeling responsible. I think that is where the 
shame really comes in. You know you had something and now you let it go and 
now you have to sort of feel the impact of that. 
And you have to feel it in a community sense. As I sit here and say 
that, you know, this nagging thing hits me about “Who cares about the 
community, who cares about what anybody thinks”? But when you think 
about it we have to be concerned about the community because the 
community is what protects us ultimately. As much as it condemns us, it 
protects us too. We have to protect the community. That s what we are 
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talking about here, this whole thing ultimately. We’re not just talking about 
kids that don’t feel shame, we’re talking about the whole structure of the 
society, where it is going. 
The kids seem to want all the rights but none of the responsibilities. It 
goes back to 1968 at the Chicago Convention, you know, as long as we are 
protesting and so on and so forth, they couldn’t understand it when they were 
getting beat over the head with the clubs. They didn’t understand that in 
reality, you know, if you do this, and you break laws, then you get beat, you get 
clubbed. It is all part of it. But I think you are right, I don’t know what we 
have done. Maybe society has developed more institutions to protect people 
from feeling their responsibility. 
I am very much in favor of welfare. I think that people who need welfare 
ought to get welfare. But when it becomes a cushion, a generational lifestyle, 
then I think we have got to take a closer look at what the hell we are talking 
about here. Because what we are probably doing there is taking the individual 
away from his responsibility, her responsibility, and encouraging this kind of 
non-personhood. Which is okay by some people -live and die. Yeah. That’s 
just the way they look at life. This is good. 
Okay, I am sure that most of what I have said is superficial but I’ll be 
interested to see if it will be confirmed in some of the other stuff that you find 
there. 
Interviewer: Oh no. Thanks very much. You had great ideas. Any last 
thoughts? 
HSET: You know for education it is clear in my mind what we need to do. We 
need to involve parents. We need to bring them into the schools literally, into 
the schools. We need to educate the parents. We need to provide places for 
their education, time for their education. We need to bring the employers into 
our schools so that they can see what kids are giving up in order to get. We 
need to have more facilities and more teachers into the profession so that we 
can get the arts in there. You know, make them a very visible part of what we 
do. We don’t need all these damn charter schools and all these other schools 
that are sort of splintering you know, because that’s not going to solve our 
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problems I think either. I think that most kids are going to come to your 
public schools. 
I really think that those are the kinds of things that are going to have to 
happen and I am going to tell you that politicians are going to have to stop 
bull-shitting the public. They are going to start having to tell the public the 
way it is and that if you want to have good healthy kids, and you want a good 
educational system, you, Mr. & Mrs. Parent, you are responsible for it. Not 
with your taxes and not with your complaints, but with the way you bring up 
your kid. That’s it basically. 
Interviewer: Thanks again, thanks very much. 
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